Beginning in WW I, and certainly by WW II, Industrial Age warfare was in full bloom. The industrial capacity of a nation is, to a very large extent, its ability to wage war. Natural resources, and political and industrial organization are components of this, but the greatest asset to an industrialized nation waging war is the workforce that produces the tanks, fighters, bombers and naval combatants that actually wage tactical and strategic warfare.
Objectively speaking from a military standpoint, victory can come from either destroying your enemy’s ability to wage war, destrying their will to wage war, or a combination of both to greater-orlesser degrees. The factories and civilian workers are strategic assets. If they can be crippled, demoralized or destroyed, then you have struck at your enemy’s capacity and/or will to wage war. That’s all fine and dandy if you limit your objective to simple victory over the enemy. If you are at all concerned about the aftermath, then a broader view must be taken. With Global Industiralized Warfare being a new thing in the 30s and 40s, and all of the potential repercussions not fully understood at the time, I think that the U.S. struck a decent balance.
I found this site interesting from a purely scientific POV. Distinctly lacking is a military POV. It again uses the conceit of post-analysis in critiquing the decision, and only briefly touches upon the civilian-military relationship of the American government at World War.
I’m not advocating that matters of war conduct be the sole provenanceof the military, but we’ve also had a harsh lesson in Vietnam of too much civilian control over the military in times of war. That door swings both ways.
I also think that the Marshall Plan and the Japanese Reconstruction goes a long way towards absolving America of a great number of what we now call “war crimes.” Had we left Japan and Europe twisting in the post-war wind, then perhaps a greater case can be made for us as bad, evil Americans.
Modern analysis (as was mentioned earlier in this thread) has indicated that the strategic carpet bombing carried out in WW II was of limited success, due to a variety of factors such as the inherent limits of munition’s and delivery accuracy (and this was with the Norden bombsight, one of the best available at the time), but also because of the counter-productivity of targeting civilian assets (as was mentioned earlier in this thread, Germany’s industrial capacity peaked in 43-44, after being carpet-bombed by the 8th Air Force for some time).
That’s the modern take, with years of analysis leading up to it. In 43-44? Who knew?
Ain’t hindsight a great science to practice? Anybody and everybody can be an expert. IMHO, examining history should be a tool to use to avoid making future mistakes, not laying blame, practicing PC historical revisionism, or perhaps playing partisan politics.
Had OBL and his network targeted our tank, helicopter or missile factories, they would have a greater cache of legitimacy to their cause. Especially if they had issued a warning of some sort, or made a declaration of intent prior to the act. Their attack on the Pentagon was the closest they came; unfortunately, the greatest damage was to the World Trade Center, a purely civilian target.
Although…in the Global/Information Age we are currently in, a purely military case can be made for attacking economic assets as well as military/industrial. Anything that can weaken your enemy is a legitimate target if one were to completely ignore things like the Geneva Convention and the Law of Land Warfare, or the possible social make-up of your target in which such attacks could seriously harden the resolve of your victims into pursuing a war. There’s only so many ways to cripple your enemy’s will to wage war.
Which OBL and other like-minded terrorists do, for political and religious reasons which don’t address objective reality, only their own limited, subjective world view. We weren’t much different in WW II, but we did accurately predict the impact of the A-bomb on an enemy’s will to wage war. And possibly saved hundred of thousands, if not perhaps millions of lives, Japanese and American, by doing so.
At least as we thought at the time.