You’ve totally missed it, sorry.
Beginning with the terminology. Tactics are the methods used to gain advantages in the short term. These advantages are combined to accomplish STRATEGIC goals.
Strategy involves the actual setting of goals, developing long-range plans to attain them, and choosing individual targets and sub-goals along the way. Often the goal is set by political needs, and strategy is wholly consumed in firuring out an over-arching plan on geting there.
Terrorism has nothing to do with tactics in any way, shape, or form. It is a strategic and political doctrine. There are a lot of twits in the media who ought to know better but don’t, and they often confuse guerrillas, terrorists, soldiers, and politicians. And the fact that some individuals have been all of these (sometimes at once) blows their tiny minds.
Terrorism is a practice by marginal groups seeking to attain political power. It operates by carrying out attacks upon targets of an “oppressing,” “colonial” or “intruding” power (note that these descriptors may be entirely in the minds of the terrorists and need not bear any reltionship to reality). The oprtations will nt distinguish between military personnel and civilians, because the terrorists do nto consider them to be morally seperable, and generally consider them unworthy of any moral consideration(i.e., they’re vermin to be exterminated).
The purpose of these attacks is NOT to damage the targeted power (this is where Al-Quaeda fell down; they thought they could do so), because the damage is ultimately trivial. They are intended to incite a furious but disorganized response which strikes at members or potential members of the terrorist’s own “resource group.” That is, whomever they want to draw recruits from (this is where Al-Quaeda fell down again; the U.S. response was overwhelming but aimed to attract, if erratically, local groups, thereby undercutting Al-Quaeda’s base and humiliating it even in Arab nations)
In theory, these reprisals by the targetted power will simply hit whatever national, political, or racial group the terrorists are “championing.” (Scare-quotes again because it’s usually BS.) This is supposed to enhance the terrorist’s power-base and increase its money and people. They carry out more attacks, enhancing their prestige and making the targetted power look weak.
At some point, this is supposed to transition into a normal guerrilla war, with actual armies. This generally requires significant foreign support. Note that most “oppressed nations” do NOT actually have a notable terrorist movement before achieving independance; they either work it poltiicall or begin the guerrillas directly.
The purpose behind those “first world” practices (none of which are tactics) are in fact to decrease civilian casualties by clearly removing them from the danger of war to the greatest possible degree. This is not always easy; it’s often impossible, and technological and logistical issues always contrain it.
For example:
Uniforms. Uniforms are meant to distinguish soldiers from civvies. Terrorists not only do not wear them, but do not consider them when attacking others. This is a big no-no, and no legit guerrilla would follow that practice.
Having bomb traps (the roadside bomb thing) is a grey area. It’s probably permissable but most armies frown on random mines and take a dim view of those who use them. It’s also another serious danger to civvies.
Hostages. hostage-taking and demands for money are the actions of criminal gands and terrorists, not soldiers. At one point in the past it was more normal, but the fact that knights and kings don’t dominate the battlefields made this entire practice moot. Of course, traditionally hostages weren’t murdered if the money wasn’t forthcoming, either; they were simply held.
Note that in Afganistan and Iraq, indivduals were both terrorists AND guerrillas silmutaneously, moving from one to the other as the situation required. In my view, the fact that they engage almost all their time in terrorist work and only come out to fight as guerrillas on rare occaisions in their momentary best interest doesn’t cut it. Not even close.