The terms of the peace settlement were attacked vehemently at the time and subsequently, and these attacks coincided with the general disillusionment about the new world which had emerged from the war and the peace among the former allies. There was a popular delusion, widespread at the time, sedulously fostered in the 1920s and 1930s by German propaganda, generally believed then and remaining the staple pabulum of history textbooks today, that Germany had been most terribly crushed by the peace settlement, that all manner of horrendous things had been done to her, and that a wide variety of onerous burdens and restrictions imposed upon her by the peace had weakened her into the indefinite future. On the basis of this view, a whole series of modifications was made in the settlement, all without exception in favor of Germany. The occupation was ended earlier than the peace treaty indicated, the commissions to supervise disarmament were withdrawn, the reparations payments were reduced and eventually cancelled, and the trials of war criminals were left to the Germans with predictable results, to mention only some of the most significant changes made. If at the end of this process, Germany – a bare quarter of a century after the armistice of 1918 – controlled most of Europe and had come within a hair’s breadth of conquering the globe, there was obviously something wrong with the picture generally accepted then and later.
The adoption of the national principle as the basis for peace settlement meant that the most recently created European major power, Germany, would survive the war, her population second in Europe only to Russia’s and her industrial and economic potential less affected than that of her European enemies, since it had been on the back of their, not Germany’s, economies that the war had been fought. Though weakened by the war, Germany had been weakened relatively less than her European enemies, and she had thus emerged relatively stronger potentially in 1919 than she had been in 1913. The same national principle, added to war-weariness, which had restrained the victors from using their armies to keep the new German apart, had equally restrained them from using their armies to refurbish the old or create some new larger structure in Central and Southeast Europe. The very portion of the peace treaty that all the Germans found most obnoxious, the revival of Poland, protected Germany from her potentially most powerful and dangerous adversary, Russia. The various argument over the details of the new boundaries between Hungary and Romania, between Poland and Czechoslovakia, between Bulgaria and Greece, between Austria and Yugoslavia, all only underline two facts of supreme importance: that Germany was now actually or potentially infinitely more powerful than any of her eastern and Southeastern European neighbors, and that there was practically no likelihood of those neighbors ever joining together against Germany.
The modifications introduced into the peace settlement reinforced rather than mitigated the stronger relative position of Germany. The prime example of this was the reparations question. The Germans shook off their reparations payments by simple refusal to pay, by destroying their own currency – in part to demonstrate inability to pay – and by more than off-setting what payments were made through borrowing abroad, followed by repudiation of most of these loans in the 1930s.
This process and the international public discussion of it fed an illusion of fateful significance. Because Germany did not pay reparations, it came to be widely believed that no or almost no reparations were paid at all. This, of course, is nonsense. All the reparations were paid: the devastated towns were rebuilt, the orchards replanted, the mines pumped out and all the pensions to survivors were paid (with some still being paid). This bill was simply shifted to other shoulders, primarily the very countries that had seen their economies suffer the most from the war. This shifting of the burden of repair costs from the less damaged German economy to the more damaged economies of others thus served to redouble rather than off-set the impact of the war itself. Only when a realistic perspective is restored to an examination of the peace settlement, its nature, its impact, and its modifications, can one begin to understand how a period of supposed German enfeeblement could culminate within less than two decades in a Europe, even a world, again terrified of German might.