I have to confess to an abysmal knowledge of history, especially military, so I am puzzled by a line in a book I am reading. In discussing his strategy for an upcoming battle, and officer says: “Some wars call for Alexander, others for Grant.” The context is in terms of the size of the opposing armies and their ability to absorb losses. Can someone please explain to me the different strategies of those two so I can make sense of this statement.
I’m not really sure what the quote was implying. But Alexander of Macedon usually fought against numerically superior armies. He’d win due to the superior quality of his troops. Ulysses Grant, on the other hand, generally led the larger army into battle. And while you can argue about the quality of the Union vs Confederate soldiers, I think most people would agree that the Union didn’t have any major lead in quality. So I’d guess the meaning of the quote is that sometimes great generals win by having better troops and sometimes they win by having more troops.
You wouldn’t happen to be reading John Keegan’s The Mask of Command, would you? If not, you’ll find the answer there.
In necessarily sketchy terms, Alexander and Grant embodied two different styles of leadership. Alexander the Great was an “in front always” kind of guy, leading from the front and displaying heroic leadership in order to motivate his troops, and hopefully leading the section of the army under his local command in the schwerpunkt, or main line of attack. Because he was engaged in battle and could not see the entire battlefield, Alexander’s subordinates necessarily had total control of the other sections of the Macedonian army and its allies.
Grant, on the other hand, is considered to be “unheroic” by Keegan. That’s not a disparaging term; it’s a style of management that keeps the commander at a central point of communications so that he can command the entire army in battle.
Sometimes you need a fighting general, and sometimes you need a commanding general. I think that’s probably the underlying thought behind the statement.
An excellent book and a great companion to ‘The Face of Battle.’
To amplify on Keegan’s thesis, Alexander had no choice but to lead from the front. His entire authority to command rested on the display of personal courage and prowess at arms. When he wasn’t able to display these qualities, his ability to command his army evaporated.
Grant’s authority to command did not rest solely on his personal courage - though it certainly didn’t hurt that Grant had courage in spades. But the invention of ranged weapons made the exercise of the heroic style of leadership dangerous and impractical.
Andrew Warinner
There is also a strategic comparison to be made, which was unfortunately devoured by the hamsters that be. I’ll re-state it in short.
Alexander, while fighting the Persians, was almost always outnumbered. He couldn’t afford to fight any wars of attrition, so he took some big risks, fighting an enemy with superior numbers, usually on ground of their own choosing. Alexander had to defeat his enemy in battle in order to gain control of the Persian Empire, and he pulled it off by relying upon audacity and tactical superiority.
Grant, on the other hand, outnumbered the Confederates, and unlike his predecessors, he knew it. He took the initiative away from (an Alexander-esque) Lee by threatening the capital of the CSA, Richmond. Lee had to defend it, and Grant used his superior numbers to force a seige on Lee at Petersburg. Attrition and extension of the lines took its toll on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, and eventually they had to retreat and shortly thereafter surrender and lose the war.