So then voting isn’t a right, even though the Constitution explicitly calls it a right? That doesn’t seem like a very useful definition. Got any better ones?
First of all, citing to a headnote is really not a very good idea. Headnotes aren’t law.
But admittedly that headnote parrots language from Chief Justice Warren in the case. Unfortunately for your argument, the language is obiter dicta. Since the Supreme Court resolved Brown on the equal protection issue, it didn’t need to arrive at a determination of whether or not a right had been denied. And it doesn’t require a determination that education in Kansas is a “right” to determine that providing education in a “seperate but equal” fashion is a denial of equal protection; inded the language in the opinion addressing that issue makes no reference to the “right” supposedly found just five paragraphs earlier.
And in light of the decision of the Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), it is hard to support the concept that there is a “right” to education, even in states that provide for public education. Even after quoting the paragraph in Brown from which your reference came, the Court simply would not go so far as to find a protected “right” guaranteed by the Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly. Certainly, if the concept that public education, once provided at all, becomes a “right” were valid, the Court would have had to directly address the issue of a denial of that right through the funding scheme in the State of Texas.
So no, in my opinion, the law as it stands doesn’t create a “right” simply because it provides for a public program, whether it be education or driving lisences.
Sorry, but that doesn’t wash, either. The state can’t prevent me from voting. It can’t lisence the action of voting. It can register me, but I don’t have to show any qualifications, other than age, to be able to vote. Not the same thing at all, as you quite well know.
You can’t call the dog black just to try and say that it looks the same as the panther.
I hate the lack of edit features.
The “right” to vote, of course, is not absolute; there are ways the state can limit it, but subject to substantially more protection than my privilege of driving.
Has anyone ever tried to claim that the ‘You will give us blood, breath or urine or we will take away your license’ routine is contrary to the right not to incriminate yourself?
Yes. Not my area, so I can’t give you a cite offhand, but people have tried this. It doesn’t even come close to working in a drivers’ license situation, for the reason under discussion. (The state can take your privilege to drive away for basically any reason, because it’s not a right.) You refuse to take the breath test, your license is gone, with no criminal due process required as a prerequisite.
But beyond that., it’s my understanding that persons have been compelled to give up their DNA in non-driving, criminal situations. I’ll defer to Bricker on this, though. It’s his area, not mine.
This is too funny. Have you ever tried voting without being registered?
To add to Random’s post, I’ll simply say that the courts that have considered the argument have rejected it on the ground that the privilege against self-incrimination is limited to “testimonial” or “communicative” evidence. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (“We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.”) (footnote omitted).
So to the extent your question is, can you be forced to provide urine, blood, or breath samples upon a showing of probable cause (i.e., a police officer pulls you over and believes you’ve been drinking), the answer is yes, providing those samples does not violate your privilege against self-incrimination. (And all the other caveats, like probable cause, etc., that go to other constitutional protections.)
The state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that you are entitled to vote in the jurisdiction in which you are attempting to vote. Once you have established, per the governing laws, that you are so entitled then the state cannot deny you this right absent your conviction for a disqualifying offense.
Indeed. Just like their legitimate interest in ensuring that I’m capable of driving safely and thus entitled to drive.
To be honest, we studied Brown in the context of court cases relating to special education. It was presented as the case that recognized free public education to all children as a property right that cannot be denied under the 5th amendment (due process) and the 14th Amendment (equal protection). Of course we never studied San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez
I just read the case. It’s interesting that this court that was so dismissive of education as a fundamental right was able to conceive of abortion as a privacy right that was protected by the Ninth Amendment.
No no no no no.
Not that I should bother with you on this; you’ve obviously chosen to close your mind to what is being said.
But there is a difference between signing up to vote and proving that you are qualified to drive. One can be taken away (the ability to drive legally), the other can’t (voting). You persistently ignore this difference in attempting to treat each the same.
In the absence of something concrete in return from you, I’ll just ignore future efforts on your part to ignore what I say as a response. At least SaintCad is engaging in discussion, not the bulletin board equivalent of sticking one’s fingers in one’s ears and saying, “I can’t hear you.”
<chuckle> Well, consistency hasn’t ever been one of the strong points of the Supremes.
When I was in law school in 1984, I was offered the chance to do a research paper on a constitutional law topic. I got all excited at the time about attempting to establish a right to bilingual education. I ran smack dab into the stone wall of decisions essentially denying that education was a fundamental right, or even a right of substantial value. I decided to write about something more likely to succeed.
Once you prove to the satisfaction of the government that you are who you are and that you are of age to vote, the government cannot–absent convicting you of a crime–deny you the vote nor can the government dictate to you how you may exercise that vote. In other words, the government cannot tell you who to cast you vote for. On the other hand, it can and does dictate to you a number of restrictions on how you exercise your privilege of driving.
Response #2 to this comment:
So you admit that the government has a right to monitor your use of the privilege of driving? You admit that it’s okay for the government to check on you, albeit randomly, for your current qualification (not under the influence) to be operating a motor vehicle?
Fair enough. To you, any legal action is a right. So long as you’re aware that it’s a pretty useless and redundant definition and renders the general idea of rights so broad as to become useless, I’m not going to argue over it.
Neither Roe nor Casey rests on the Ninth Amendment.
A minor nitpick, but the right to vote is a much easier right to lose in many states than the right to drive. Just check out some state laws about ex-cons voting. In some states, committing ONE felony bars you from voting for the rest of your life. Not even multiple DUIs will make you lose your right to drive for the rest of your life.
Really? Roe v. Wade is based in part on *Griswold v. Connecticut * which deals with unenumerated rights. Actually, Roe v. Wade and the right to privacy is based on a few amendments *including * the Ninth.
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
However, Roe v. Wade could be said to boil down to the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Although Justice Blackmun chooses to justify his ruling under the Fourteenth Amendment, it seems that the using the Ninth is equally acceptable. In fact, IMHO Blackmun’s use of relating “personal liberty” to the Fourteenth Amendment seems an error. I suspect that this should be read as a unenumerated right protected under the Ninth Amendment and is thereby protected from state interference under the Fourteenth Amendment since Texas had no “compelling interest” in continuing the pregnancy.