So, my question is how can an icbm launch be distinguished from a legitimate satellite launch? I suppose the trajectories are different, but surely a satellite can be launched with a similar trajectory as an icbm.
Also, how can the US and Russia be sure that the other hasnt deployed nuclear weapons in orbit? I am aware that the Russians tried to implement such an orbital bombardment system, but it wasnt operational. How can they be sure that a certain sattelite, that goes over their nation isnt equiped with an Reentry Vehicle that can be deorbited at any time?(Obviously not thousands of warheds, but a minimal number, could present a reasonble decapitation type attack.)
I don’t know this for sure, but I believe that back during the cold war days, both sides would notify the other of normal launches. That isn’t to say someone couldn’t pretend that a single launch was a satellite. A single launch is not nearly enough to cripple a retalitory strike.
Additionally, I am pretty sure knew where each other’s ICBMs would be launched from with the exception of mobile launchers.
1 launch = OK.
500 simultaneous launches = 1st strike.
I’m not convinced of that. Trajectory defines destination - at least when you include the velocity and acceleration under the heading of ‘trajectory’ and not just a path through space. A trajectory capable of delivering the payload into a stable low-earth orbit (or any stable earth orbit) will look very different from one designed to deliver the payload back down to Earth, and a trajectory capable of doing both would be at least twice as expensive.
Unless you meant to say that the trajectory immediately after launch would appear similar… and that gets into questions of how long you have to determine the difference.
I’ve seen a lot of references to that. Both sides were concerned about the misinterpretation of any launch. But not always, I recall something about an upper atmosphere test by the USSR that was suspected to be a neutron bomb. No idea what that turned out to be, but I’m sure both sides often had their fingers near the trigger whenever launches were seen whether there was advanced warning or not. A single launch probably wouldn’t be the start of nuclear war, but there would be no way to know that additional launches wouldn’t follow soon after. Unfortunately we were playing a game of chicken in those days.
I think this is probably a big part of the answer. A launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida is probably a satellite. A launch from somewhere in North Dakota is probably a nuke. I’m sure the US knows the comparable locations for Russian/Soviet launches.
I wasnt thinking that they would be identical, but at least for some time after launch(I dont know how much) it would be difficult to make out the difference, I suppose that it would be something like the norwegian rocket incident Norwegian rocket incident - Wikipedia
I assume because the norwgian rocket followed a ballistic path and wasnt putting a payload into orbit, it was more easily mistaken for an ICBM.
My initial thought, was that an ICBM launch could be disguised as a Satellite launch,(Of course, after some time the real trajectory would be detectable) but i suppose a single missle, would never be a real danger to a nuclear superpower, anyway.
What about the Orbital bombardment system?Cant Nuclear warheads be placed into orbit, under the disguise of military or commercial sattelite launches and then on command, reenter over the country and make a limited uclear first strike?How can the treaties that ban nuclear weapons in space be enforced?
Launching a weapon into space would require that you either put the decoy payload and the bomb onto the same launch vehicle (requiring a significantly larger launch vehicle) or omit the decoy payload (whose absence might be conspicuous).
Putting a skin that looks like a communication satellite over the weapon would not be at all difficult. The skin burns up as it goes into orbit (or, if we can get a good look at satellites in orbit, it stays until time to launch).
There is a Treaty between the US and USSR/Russia which forbids the weaponization of space.
Yes, I suspect it was signed when neither side had the ability, so they weren’t exactly giving up anything.
IIRC, Reagan’s “Star Wars” program would have seriously violated that Treaty - once it was announced, I imagine the USSR decided it could do the same.
That’s the sort of thing that i had in mind. However, now that i think of it, it would be more difficult to make o coordinated attack. Only a limited number of armed sattelites can be put into orbit wihtout raising some serious questions and an even smaller number would be able to reenter simultaniously. Even then, assuming that for a regular ICBM the warning time is on the order of ~10-30 minutes i am not so sure how much of that orbiting nuclear force could make an attack in less time than that. The only serious threat is the capability of atacking from every angle, thus maybe circumventing some early warning stations. Still, it is an interesting thought.
Yes, but when the supposed communications satellite doesn’t actually relay any communications, folks are going to start wondering. Or, if you can miniaturize the communications hardware enough to fit into the decoy skin, then why aren’t you making teeny tiny communications satellites that can be launched much more cheaply?
As mentioned, there is communication about these things and it is highly unlikely that an attack would consist of one ICBM. All participants know this.
Launch location. If Russia sees a large rocket go up from in North Dakota or some other known silo site that doesn’t make sense from a satellite-launching perspective they won’t think it’s a satellite.
Trajectory. An ICBM has a suborbital trajectory that goes higher than most satellites and then plunges down. Even satellites that go higher than ICBMs still take much longer to gain that altitude.
Second question: nuke warheads are likely detectable in space. Even then, it wouldn’t make much sense when ballistic missiles will do the job more efficiently and can be protected/hidden better and more cheaply.