Tactically speaking how did ISIS manage to defeat the Iraqi army in Northern Iraq? Based on the how quickly it occurred it seems they were defeated outright, not slowly worn down by guerrilla tactics. They presumably they must have defeated them in open battle.
That seems pretty unusual in modern warfare. An irregular force beating a well equipped regular army (albeit, it turns out, not a very good one) in a pitched battle. Are there any public studies of how it actually happened, militarily speaking?
It’s truly a mystery. In 2003, my President told me that the Iraqi military was so dangerous that they were an imminent threat to Europe and the US, and only the massed Coalition of the Willing could stop them. And since then, we’ve given them boatloads of money and weapons and training, for over ten years. So you would think they must be the most awesome force in the universe by now.
I was watching something where a German journalist was actually allowed to film ISIS without being killed and it basically boiled down to them wanting it more. Each individual ISIS soldier had a bomb strapped on them and they were absolutely willing to die and think nothing of it. This allowed small numbers of ISIS soldiers to defeat the Iraqi soldiers because once they realized they ostensibly had no fear of death the Iraqis would abandon their posts and run for the hills. I’m sure there is a lot more to it in terms of guerrilla tactics, being well organized, and fear of their brutal tactics but the journalism piece was enlightening about the kind of enemy they are and I have no doubt it would scare the shit out of most people.
My point was even a BAD army has a whole bunch of advantages that an irregular force does not, militarily speaking. So while you’d expect an irregular force might win a war of attrition with guerrilla tactics, they wouldn’t be able to get the upper hand in an open fight. But that appears to be what happened here.
pool has it right. One side was willing to fight and the other just wasn’t. No matter how big your army is, you can’t win if your soldiers give up at the first sign of battle.
When the US rebuilt the Iraqi Army they built a counter-insurgent force. That was the experience of the overwhelming number of the troops associated. They generally dealt with small groups of insurgents that did not seek pitched battle. Iraq didn’t have an effective air capability to conduct close air support. They were generally untrained in synchronizing the various battlefield operating systems for a pitched conventional fight.
ISIS came in operating as a large conventional light infantry force. They were irregular only in the sense of not being the force of a nation state. They generally had experience fighting against the Syrian Army. They were ready for the kind of fight they were engaging in. The Iraqi Army wasn’t. The IA likely would have done better against ISIS if ISIS had chosen to operate as guerrillas.
A lot of the initial success was in less densely populated areas. The focus of the Iraq insurgency was urban so forces tended to be weighted towards urban areas. IA forces were dispersed to provide security in outposts that were designed to support those efforts not resist Company and above direct assaults.
Bottom line is ISIS beat on an Iraqi Army that was surprised, not arrayed for the threat, and who’s primary training and combat experience did not directly apply to the fight they were in.
ISIS had/has more initiative at winning. And when you lose initiative, you will likely lose, or so I have heard many times in General’s/Commander’s public statements and such.
In a nutshell, anyways, I do believe. Like pool & Suranyi were saying, most definintely.
A lot of it was cultural. The vast majority of the Iraqi army were Shia from southern Iraq who didn’t care to risk their lives to protect Sunni northerners from Sunni militants. Many Iraqi soldiers were there just because it was one of a very few ways to get a regular paycheck.
OP, presuming you’re American, would you be willing to risk your life to save Montreal from invading Quebec separatists?
That is pretty typical situation in any separatist struggle. But the fact is most separatists (particularly ones without a big superpower backing them) don’t typically win by fighting pitched battles, where the established military (even an ineffectual one) has the advantage. They fight insurgencies, and slowly they get the upper hand against but the powerful, most less committed military force.
What DinoR says makes sense, that unlike the typical situation like this the Iraqi military (as well as a host of other failings) WAS trained to fight an insurgency, but NOT a pitched battle.
As far as I know, much of ISIS is the pre-war Iraqi army. After the invasion, Bremmer’s “de-Baathification” effectively removed all of the trained members of the Iraqi military from their posts, and made it so that they could not contribute to the new regime. The current Iraqi Army was made up of poor unemployed men who were just looking for a paycheck, and many of them were not even getting that due to the corruption. I will look for cites for all of this.
There wasn’t really a decisive pitched battle. The Iraqi military basically gave up without a fight. One reason is that the Iraqi military largely existed only on paper. Iraqi politicians and high ranking military officers were pocketing money that was supposed to pay at least 50,000 soldiers who never existed.
It’s pretty clear that a lot of the Iraqi army did run, but this reasoning doesn’t make much sense.
Engaging in armed combat with soldiers generally means a very real risk of death. Running because it looks like the other side is prepared to die, would be like forfeiting a football game because it looks like the other side is prepared to engage in physical contact.
Of course if the other side is not even engaging in self-preservation, that would be an unusual level of “bravery”. But the result of this on the battlefield would typically be a big pile of brave corpses.
There is no mystery, regardless of which political side you wish to take. The Iraqi military was completely disbanded after the 2003 invasion and rebuilt from scratch. The Iraqi military of 2014 has no relation to the military of 2003.
Mao (from the point of view of the insurgent) and Galula ( for the counter-insurgents POV) both point to a more conventional phase at the end of successful insurgencies. Once the government is weakened and has lost the support of the people they usually need to be finished the old fashioned way.
The fight of the Viet Minh against the colonial French forces is a great study of the progress of a classic insurgency. They start as small guerrilla bands and culminate with Corps level offensive action at Dien Bien Phu.
One I really wish I could find a cite for but is was barely reported at the time and my google-fu is not helping. The best I can find is the Battle of Karbala Gap but that doesn’t seem to be the fight I am thinking about.
ISTR a mechanized force of Brigade level counter-attacking US Forces during the initial OIF invasion. They attacked under cover of a sand storm. They got detected by airborne ground surveillance radars and indirect fire utilizing precision guided sub-munitions stopped the attack before it ever got close to US forces.
Karbala Gap showed two IA Armor Brigades counterattacking. We’ve got at least two Brigade level counterattacks (maybe three if my memory is correct above). Despite all the logistics, morale, and command and control issues the IA faced they could and did plan, prepare, and execute large scale counterattacks. The result was like throwing eggs against a rock. ISIS is a predominantly light infantry force though not the US 3rd ID(Mech). An armored Brigade getting thrown into a counterattack against a light infantry force on the offensive might well have been more like throwing the rocks against the carton of eggs.
Bonus points to anyone who knows why I am laughing about using the eggs against a rock simile where the 3ID is the rock.
Recall that ISIS rules certain regions of Syria. They collect taxes. They collect utility charges. The Assad regime (who run Syria) let them do that so they can point to a Big Bad: see? Stick with us: the other choice is those guys. ISIS also controls certain oil regions in Syria, and now Iraq. They regulate the price and quality of goods in their territory.
So the Iraqi Army was going up against something like governmental army. That’s not to say that they were invincible: the Kurds have held them off on the border of Turkey for a while. But ISIS isn’t a guerilla army; they are led by some of Saddam’s old generals for instance.
