The Does also assert that § 692A.2A infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right to intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has not decided whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, see Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974), although it observed long ago that under the Articles of Confederation, state citizens “possessed the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom.” United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920). During the same era, the Court also commented that “the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty . . . secured by the 14th Amendment,” Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900), but as the Third Circuit observed, “it is unclear whether the travel aspect of cases like Fears can be severed from the general spirit of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45(1905), now thoroughly discredited, that was so prominent in the substantive due process analysis of that period.” Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 266 (3d Cir. 1990).
Some of our sister circuits have recognized a fundamental right to intrastate travel in the context of a “drug exclusion zone” that banned persons from an area of a city for a period of time, Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 496-98 (6th Cir. 2002), an ordinance that outlawed “cruising” and thus limited the ability of persons to drive on certain major public roads, Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268, and a law thatcreated a durational residency requirement as a condition of eligibility for public housing. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit, for example, reasoned that it would be “meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.” Id. at 648; see also Johnson, 310 F.3d at 497 n.4; Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261. Other decisions have held that there is no fundamental right to intrastate travel in the context of a bona fide residency requirement imposed as a condition of municipal employment. Andre v. Bd. of Trs. of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48, 52-53 (7th Cir. 1977); Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that city’s ban of sex offender from all public parks did not implicate fundamental right to intrastate travel, where offender was “not limited in moving from place to place within his locality to socialize with friends and family, to participate in gainful employment or to go to the market to buy food and clothing”); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that there is no fundamental right for juveniles to be in a public place without adult supervision during curfew hours).
