I was wondering about this after reading of the recent violence in Guinea, which ruled by a junta with Captain Moussa Camara at its head. (See: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/world/africa/07guinea.html?_r=1&hp). Assuming that the Guinean military structure is similar to the American one, an Army captain would be a relatively junior officer. How does a guy like that build the connections and popular support amongst military personnel needed to stage a coup? I mean, one would think that generals or colonels would have more opportunities for the sort of “networking” that would be required.
This phenomenon isn’t unique to Guinea - Jerry Rawlings of Ghana was only a Flight-Lieutenant, and Samuel Doe of Liberia was a Master Sergeant.
So - how do you pull off a coup when you aren’t top brass, and how do you keep the brass from taking over the leadership afterward?
Think again about most military structures, junior to mid-level officers are usually the ones directly in control of men and weapons and ammunition. Get a few of them together and well…
It also helps that Guinea has a military strength of only about 15,000 men. In Guinea a relatively low level officer may very well have been able to make the connections necessary.
In Guinea’s case I believe Brigadier General Diarra Camara is still the Army Chief of Staff. Odds are pretty good that President Moussa Camara and Diarra are related… but I have to admit I don’t know that for certain.
More power than the existing head of state. For a weak head of state, that power could be a single gun pointed in the right direct.
To hold power takes only charisma. Guns and Money help.
Sieze the throne, convince the other officials and leaders that its safer for them to be on your side, an voila, you’ve got yourself a country.
The downside, you’ve just established the tradition of seizing power by force and now you’ve got to watch your back much more carefully. Few people who seize power survive when it is seized from them.
In 1969, the then Captain Muammar al-Gaddafi led a group that seized power in Libya. Now, a little more than 40 years later, he is just a humble colonel, but he’s still in power.
Many Arab states especially in the past prevented such happenings by not issueing ammunition to their troops in peacetime. With the result that their performance suffered.
Sometimes there’s more to it than “army captain”, though - an army captain may come from an old wealthy family, be a scion of a deposed family, etc. I have no idea what the situation in the OP is, but there’s that.
Poor or weak leadership at national level.
Poor or weak leadership at the military HQ level.
A culture that feels disaffected, disconnected, or dis-empowered vis-à-vis national leadership (See ‘weak leadership at the national level’).
Charismatic leadership at a the coup-level of the military.
Poor discipline in the military (see ‘weak leadership at military HQ level’).
An excuse. Any will do, really.
A pervasive culture of corruption helps, but is not necessary.
Bluff and bravado can help against (weak) superior officers that were appointed by the head of state specifically because that senior officer was lacking a spine. (For example: El Supremo appoints weak willed, easily intimidated General officers, in order to feel assured that those officers would not plan a coup against him.