Consequences of minimum wage laws
If the law is successfully enforced, and if they are high enough in real terms (or relative to the average wage), minimum wage laws are alleged to have various benefits and costs.
Hypothetical costs and benefits
Minimum wages may have the effect of:
Reducing low-paid work, which may be viewed as unfair and exploitative.
Reducing the dependency of the low-paid on welfare-state benefits, which may in turn reduce taxes or allow increases of other government outlays.
Stimulating economic growth by discouraging labor-intensive industries, thereby encouraging more investment in capital and training.
Encouraging many of those who would normally take low-wage jobs to stay in (or return to) school and thus to accumulate human capital.
On the other hand, minimum wages may have the effect of:
Discouraging employment of low-wage earners, and generally increasing unemployment.
Raising employment barriers for people with little or no work experience or formal education: if a worker’s labor is not worth the minimum, he may not find employment at all.
Curbing economic growth by increasing the cost of labor.
Increasing the price of goods and services, since employers pass on employment costs in the form of higher prices. (Opponents of minimum wage often see a negative income tax, e.g., as a way to support the lower-waged jobs, with the money coming from those who pay taxes, not those who pay for the products including the unemployed)
Decreasing incentive for some low-skilled workers to gain skills.
Where implemented locally, making labor more expensive than in other areas, which may discourage inward investment and encourage local businesses to relocate their operations elsewhere.
The effects of minimum wage laws, both positive and negative, may be increased by ‘knock-on effects’, with increased wages for workers already earning above the minimum wage. For example, some labor union contracts are based on a fixed percentage or dollar amount above the minimum wage. Certain public grants or taxes are based on a multiple of the minimum wage. (For example, a worker may have an exemption if his earnings are below 2.5 minimum wages.)
Debate
The costs and benefits arising from minimum wages are subject to considerable disagreement among economists, though the consensus among economics textbooks is that minimum wage laws should be avoided whenever possible as the costs exceed the benefits. This unified view has been disputed by empirical research done by David Card and Alan Krueger. In their 1997 book Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage (ISBN 0-691-04823-1), they found the negative employment effects of minimum-wage laws to be minimal if not non-existent (at least for the United States). For example, they look at the 1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage, the 1988 rise in California’s minimum wage, and the 1990-91 increases in the federal minimum wage. In each case, Card and Kreuger present evidence ostensibly showing that increases in the minimum wage led to increases in pay, but no loss in jobs. That is, it appears that the demand for low-wage workers is inelastic. Also, these authors reexamine the existing literature on the minimum wage and argue that it, too, lacks support for the claim that a higher minimum wage cuts the availability of jobs.
Critics of this research, however, argue that their research was flawed.[1] (http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=3896),[2] (http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj15n1-8.html) For example, Card and Krueger gathered their data by telephoning employers in California and New Jersey, asking them whether they intended to increase, decrease, or or make no change in their employment. Subsequent attempts to verify the claims requested payroll cards from employers to verify employment, and ostensibly found that the minimum wage increases were followed by decreases in employment. On the other hand, data analysis by David Neumark and William Wascher, economists who are usually critical of minimum-wage increases, supported the Card/Krueger results.[3] (http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/minimumw_bp_1996.pdf)
Some idea of the empirical problems of this debate can be seen by looking at recent trends in the United States. The minimum wage fell about 29% in real terms between 1979 and 2003. This should have helped fight the problem of youth unemployment (since these workers are likely to have fewer skills than older workers). But young workers between the ages of 16 and 19 suffered from increased rates of unemployment (relative to those of workers 20 and older) than before this fall. Similarly, poverty rates in the United States ended their long-term decline after 1979. This suggests that critics of the minimum wage need to present a more complete theory of the origins of unemployment of young or poor people.
Theoretical arguments
As is usual in serious social science, any empirical conclusion is subject to doubt and is simply the basis for further questions and research. One key question is the possible theoretical explanation of the different results.
The traditional view that minimum wages have significant negative effects on employment typically assumes that labor markets for low-skill workers can be characterized as fitting the model of a perfectly competitive market, where the only role of wages is as a cost. On the other hand, if Card and Krueger’s empirical research is valid, it may be explained by the efficiency wage hypothesis which states that higher wages may “pay for themselves” by increasing worker efficiency (i.e., labor productivity). Higher wages encourage a higher willingness of low-skill workers to stay with their current employers and to gain experience and skill, while the employers are more willing to train them. Alternatively, if monopsony exists, then an increase in the minimum wage can raise employment. Alan Manning’s 2003 book, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets (ISBN 0691113122) suggests that this kind of market is common if not ubiquitous in labor markets.
Even if Card and Krueger’s results are accurate, there may be a “tipping point” above which their conclusions do not apply and the standard economic consensus does apply. The possible validity of their research may be the result of political forces: in the United States, business political pressure on legislatures and Congress may have kept the minimum wage so low that it has little negative employment effect. Further, the Federal minimum wage has moved away from the presumed tipping point, becoming less relevant. It has fallen from about 50 percent of the average hourly wage in manufacturing during the late 1960s to less than 40 percent.