How important are motivations when judging the morality of an action?

If actions are the sole criterion for moral rightness, then to decide if someone has done wrong, the action is all that’s needed, correct?

A fellow named Bob killed a guy. Was he right or wrong?

Not so, historiography is as concerned with intentions and mindsets as it is the literal facts of an act.

Intent does not equate to words, it’s part and parcel of action.

I don’t think so- there are a lot of things that society seems to agree are wrong that are legal- bigoted beliefs and speech, adultery, casual dishonesty, rudeness, mocking the disabled, etc.

Right, but the fact that they aren’t illegal shows the relative weight of how wrong they are to the public. Thus, moral force is still vested in the justice system.

No, I don’t think so- I believe lots of people think adultery, bigotry, or dishonesty are worse (even far worse) then actual illegal things like jaywalking or disturbing the peace. In fact, I think as far as every day moral decisions people make, things like adultery, bigotry, and dishonesty are far more common then crimes like theft (or, obviously, violent crimes). People spend a lot more time thinking about legal immoral things then illegal immoral things, IMO.

Agreed, the overlap is not perfect. Something like jaywalking is malum prohibitum, wrong because it’s prohibited by law, not because it’s wrong in itself (malum in se). Another example would be the Lacey Act.

In other nations, acts like adultery, apostasy, hate speech, and blasphemy, are in fact illegal. This tells us the relative moral weight the culture places on the prohibited act. If adultery is wrong, but not so wrong that the adulterer must be punished for justice to be done, than it’s not as wrong as murder, theft, or rape, yes?

So, the law is where a culture defines what must not be done, and morality also covers what **should not ** be done. Considering the wide variance of culture within the United States, and the way the law reflects morality, as well as its clarity and universal application, I still hold that criminal law is the primary agent of moral force.

I think it’s more about “duties towards society” vs “duties towards individuals” (my phrasing), at least in the US. Crime is about enforcing duties towards society (not duties towards individuals, except when something is in both categories, like murder), and thus includes things like jaywalking which are seen as minor but are actually necessary for a safe flow of traffic. Sanctions against violent crime encompass both “duties”- it’s necessary for a functioning society that people not be constantly afraid of violence. This may be another way of phrasing your “must not” and “should not”, but I don’t think it’s a measure of how strongly society disapproves of something- I think US culture pretty clearly strongly reviles open bigotry, and yet open bigotry remains legal (the right to such speech is even enshrined in our Constitution).

But we can just disagree- I think the justice system is a “moral force” (or whatever) in society, I just don’t think it’s the most important one for a society’s overall morality (other big ones include religion [which is fading in importance] and media).

Can we at least try to avoid arguments of terminology? You are using “intentions” in a way that Human Action and I are not. We have each tried to make clear what we mean by “intent”. Is there some element of our eplanations that is confusing you or you would like to have clarified?

Are you a conscious moral agent? Does your body take actions without your will, judgment, or desires being engaged? If not, what do you call the result of those internal determinations that guides your body and compels it to take an action?

I call it “intent”.

More generall, for all involved, I think the context of our conversation is flipping a bit bak and forth between 2 classic question of morality:
[ol][li]How do I know whether my own actions are/were/will be good?[/li][li]How do I judge whether someone else’s actions are/were/will be good?[/ol][/li]To be fair - I think I might be the only person focusing on case (1), but I think that it really makes sense to do so. Adding in the uncertainty of jdging an eternal parties motives only muddies the waters if we are trying to address the question in the OP. After all, the elements important to make a judgment should be teh same for ourselves as for our fellow beings, right?

I think you and I need to part ways, here. I do not belive that a legal system has any more than a general relationship to a moral system - specifically that both are systems designed to assign appropriateness to actions. But morality is, to my thinking, an individual and personalized determination. A legal system is the means by which a society (not a culture, though that is perhaps not so important a distinction to make here) codifies acceptable behavior to whatever power structures are capable of enforcing provisions for their own benefit. Legal systems have several necessary or desired effects (stability of governmentall structures, benefit to the “body politic”, conferring/preserving advantage to privileged interests, etc.) While one or more of those interests may correspond to a system of morality, there is too much potential for disjunction for me to agree that a legal system is in any meaningful way a representation of morality.

That is for the abstract case, of course. It is certainly possible for a particular society to select a particular legal system that is closely bound to a particular moral system (Shariah law, for instance).

I think we’re approaching some of the same ideas with different terminology, because I agree with the above paragraph.

This, I do disagree with. I think legality is a measure, though an imperfect one, of how much society disapproves of something. In the case of bigotry, yes, it is reviled. But, since it does no tangible harm, it’s not on a plane with crimes, of the malum in se variety.

Conversely, an Islamist nation might view homosexuality or apostasy as doing tangible harm to society, thus breaking the duty to society you speak of. European nations have the same view of hate speech. Hence, the acts must be prohibited with the force of law.

So, the legality or illegality speaks as much to the moral “plane” as the absolute right and wrong. I’ve no love of bigots, but if Fred Phelps were to be clapped in prison for his views, I and most Americans would be shocked and appalled, just as we’d be shocked over prison time for jaywalking.

There’s a circular element to it, the law is a reflection of the society it governs, and the society is a reflection of the law it’s governed by.

elbows is clearly using a different definition of “intent”, which makes the discussion rather difficult. He or she seems to view intent as totally detached from action, when it is not.

Both questions are important. The focus on the latter question probably stems from the OP’s scenario, which asks us to judge the actions of two others. The elements should be the same, but since only you can know your own mind, in practice they generally aren’t.

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I would argue that the elements remain (and must remain) the same for any moral system that is not specifically determined by advantage to a single agent What’s good for me is good. What’s good for you is to be good to me. But our confidence in assigning a value to those elements necessarily decreases when judging another person’s motivations or understanding.
[/quibble]

I still disagree, pretty strongly. I think protesting in the way that Phelps does at funerals is morally terrible- and morally worse than all but the worst crimes- but I still don’t think he should be jailed for it. I think it’s a very good example of how the justice system does not match our society’s moral compass, and I think there are a lot of similar examples.

We may just disagree quantitatively, so to speak- you think the justice system is the best reflection (or biggest force) on a society’s morality, and I think it is somewhat of a reflection or force, but just one of many.

Absolutely.

Bingo. That lack of certainty, that inability to know another’s mind, guarantees that morality will be applied differently to oneself than to others. In a moral person, the gap is small, and quite possibly more forgiving of others than oneself. In a thief, say, the gap is broad, essentially “what’s good for me is good; what’s good for you is to be good to me,” as you note.

I agree that it’s not a perfect match.

Do you believe that Phelps and his ilk do tangible harm to society?

Sure, it’s majority vs. plurality.

I’m not sure what you mean by “tangible”. I think spreading and promoting hatred harms society, and in the same sort of vein (but to a lesser extent) I think the opposing political party harms our society. But I believe preventing free speech (or democracy) would harm society far more than Phelps or my least favorite politicians do, so they must retain the right to advocate for things I believe harm society.

Well, yes, but intent of specific actions cannot be divorced from their broader rationale. For example, if a nick a loaf of bread from you, my most immediate intent was to forcefully re-organize the local property, which is immoral. However, I may very well justify to myself this venial foray into immorality if my larger intent is to urgently feed my starving child lest they die - life is more important than anyone’s property, even more so if you’re not starving. Ergo I’m acting morally in my own eyes, and fuck your laws.

And in that broader sense, I do believe that everybody “sane” acts morally in their own eyes - nobody seeks to be a bad person or copes well with the idea that they might be one ; everybody has a reason and/or an excuse ; and our own case is always exceptional :). Only clinical psychopaths inflict harm (or withdraw succor) for its own sake, and even utter selfishness can be rationalized into a subjective ethical good (e.g. “it’s everyone for himself in this world, everyone is bastards, I only do it to them before they can do it to me”. It’s an extremely shitty rationalization, but it’s not exactly uncommon).
Taken to the extreme, I’m fairly certain Hitler himself believed that, in the end, every single thing he did was for the best & served a higher purpose, at least the best interest of the German people. Which is ultimately moral of a leader, isn’t it ? At least I’ve seen this sentiment echoed a lot in the “say something nice about your political opponents” thread over in Elections - “he’s an asshole, but I think at least he means well/tries hard/thinks he’s helping and I can respect that”

With that in mind, and considering the majority of evil in this world is committed by well-meaning assholes (even if their well-meaning is strictly confined to them and their loved ones) I’d say that when assessing the overall morality of an action, while I would agree with you that the intent behind it can and should be assessed (as indeed not all rationalizations are equal), it is comparatively much less meaningful than the action itself, and its effects/consequences.

You and I are quite close on this one, but I do want to point out one fairly technical element of how I am using “intent”. I absolutely mean it to be (often) more than a singular and localized “desire”. It is a set of desired outcomes that can include elements quite distant from the specific action in time, location, and scope. But I am not using it to indicate “why” - I use it to indicate “what are the (un)desired outcomes?” In many cases this distinction will not be important, but I want to avoid metaphysical complications and focus on teh practical manner in which choices are made. Now, the “why” elements may be inseparable from our assignment of actual moral values, but essentially what I am saying is:
[ol][li]I am presented with situation ALPHA and have options 1,2,3 . . . . to acto or withhold action.[/li][li]I have an undertanding of consequences A,B,C . . . that will arise from my (in)actions.[/li][li]Through whatever decision making process I use (my own morality) I determine that [ul][*]I want outcome A, B and F[/li][li]I do not ant outomes D or G[/li][li]No other outcomes are important to me[/ul][/li][li]I then determine which path will most likely result in the outcomes I desire [/li][li]I act[/li][li]Some set of outcomes actually occurs from my ations[/li][/ol]
Now - a consequentialist morality argues that only step 6 matters when determining whether my action was correct. Some others in this thread argue that step 5 has a moral value intrinsic in itself and independent of prededing intent or following consequence.

I am arguing that step 4 is the most important (but not the sole) element of moral evaluation. But step 4 is not about “why” - it is about understanding what was intended. It is entirely possible that I desire outcome B for resons very different from your desiring outcome B, but we would both judge it morally correct to make “B” happen.

In many cases talking about desired outcomes is essentially the same as talking about “why” value statements, but not always.

Well, there you are then. You hold that bigotry is wrong, but that punishing bigotry has the potential for greater harm to a society through the erosion of human rights. This is not the case with, say, aggravated assault.

In moral terms, they can. For one thing, an enterprise that consists of wrong actions will not produce an outcome that is right. Right ends don’t justify wrong means.

I fully agree. This is why a well-thought-out moral code is important, if you have a clear idea of right and wrong, the sort of rationalization you describe becomes more difficult. What makes the social contract work is internal barriers to wrongdoing, that stop the act before the rationalization, at least in most people.

Which has more import, the act or its consequences?

Your arguement is more technical than what I’m accustomed to, but I endorse your conclusion.

No, because I do want bigotry punished- I want bigots to be shunned, I want bigotry to be ignored and mocked, etc, I just don’t want it (unless it crosses into the realm of discrimination- like firing someone because of their religion) to be made illegal.

Thus, you are content for the punishing to be voluntary and individual, as opposed to punishment by the state, which is mandatory and collective.

That’s fine, but I maintain that it indicates that you hold bigotry to be on a different moral plane from theft or fraud or arson. Might have to agree to disagree on that one.

Perhaps- it might mean that I categorize actions as “crimes against society/individuals” or some combination, but if I were to compare “badness” of these acts, then Phelps’ group protests (which go beyond simple bigotry) would be worse than many crimes.

What about you? How do you feel about the relative morality of bigotry (or Phelps’ group protests) vs various crimes?

So in criminal terms, crime against the individual is worse than any crime against society. In moral terms, crimes against society can be worse than some crimes against individuals. Correct?

Well, my morality and politics are heavily based on rights of the individual, so that will color my answer. Morality to me means doing no harm to others.

I don’t think voicing an opinion can be immoral. Speech can be criminal in narrow circumstances, such as libel or perjury, and lying is immoral, but railing against homosexuals and those who tolerate them just makes you an asshole, it’s not immoral.

Similarly, I don’t think it’s immoral to hold any particular opinion.

So, I can’t really think of any bigoted acts that I’d call worse than criminal acts, other than those that are already illegal (such as gay-bashing or housing discrimination).