The IDF was freewheeling, daring and aggressive long before it had nukes. If anything, it’s grown more conservative over the years.
Overly so, judging by how long we’ve been scared of a confrontation with Iran and how much we’ve been bending over backwards to avoid it.
Given what Iran was actually capable of, I am more and more convinced that we should have done this years ago.
From my reading of the history of the area this is accurate. I don’t think there is any modern (or ancient) parrallel.
Maybe Field Marshal Montgomery in the Africa campaign, but that was a very different war.
Are you familiar with Orde Wingate? He was probably the craziest of all crazy British WW2 generals. Before the war, he spent a few years in this part of the world training Jewish militiamen, many of whom went on to form the core of the IDF officer corps. Look him up.
I am not, and thank you. I will look him up.
That, I think, gets back to the emphasis (and resources) that Israel puts on their intelligence service: They’ve managed operations like convincing a lot of people that Israel has nukes.
Not enough, obviously. If everyone believed that Israel had nukes, then we would never have seen the wars that we have. But they’ve definitely gotten at least some benefit from the rumors.
Not sure that’s true. Nobody has convincingly tried to truly eliminate / obliterate the Israeli government since their “probably nuclear” ambiguity became well known.
Iran’s recent combat was (is?) certainly trying to hurt Israel, kill Israelis, and damage Israel’s economy and infrastructure. And to direct Israel’s government’s future behavior in a different direction. But I don’t think they were trying to, and probably could not succeed at, really attacking the Israeli seat of government with the intent of destroying that. Blow up the Knesset building, the prime minister’s offices and residence, etc. Likewise really taking the attack to Israel’s forces. Blowing up air bases, naval facilities, army weapons depots.
It’s all countervalue, none is counterforce. Which is about coercion, not about direct regime change.
It’s all evil and hostile, but it is distinguishable as to its goals.
Monty was the polar opposite of freewheeling and aggressive in the Desert War - are you actually thinking of Rommel?
Monty was hyper cautious, he missed opportunities to cut off Rommel’s retreat after El Alamein, or even to cause him serious losses during it. Which meant that the Germans got to make a serious stand in Tunisia, delaying the Italian campaign by weeks if not months.
The prospect of another up-and-back in the desert as one side overextended itself was enough to make Allied arms take the win at Alamein, and follow up more cautiously this time. Another Djebel Handicap in the fourth year of the war would raise questions about whether we could ever win in Africa.
This was a legitimate concern in the past, of course, when Israel was at war with Egypt and Syria. Their armed forces is accordingly structured.
The Yom Kippur War postdates significantly postdates it, and I think that should count.
I don’t know if Soviet, let alone Arab, intelligence has ever had a picture of a deployed Israeli nuclear bomb that they’ve just never released, but Israeli intent (and that the Dimona reactor was plainly not a purely civilian initiative) was obvious when they requested (and were denied) bomb racks suitable for nuclear weaponry as part of their F-4 Phantom acquisition in 1968, and when a proviso in that deal that would have required Israel to sign the NPT was dropped under pressure from then-ambassador Yitzhak Rabin.
By 1970 it was understood by American politicians (and reported publicly) that if Israel did not have nuclear weapons at that moment, it was because they had not assembled them; the New York Times asserted in July of that year that American policy had been predicated for two years on the assumption that Israel had an atomic bomb or could assemble one immediately, and by early 1972 the testing of the Jericho missile was also understood to be incompatible with anything other than a deployed nuclear deterrent.
But, more than a year later, Israel’s neighbors either felt like those weapons wouldn’t be used (presumably, that Israel would be restrained by the United States), or that the cost would be worth it.
Up until recently they had a sizable amount of counterattack capacity by way of proxies. That was, I believe, a major deterrence, and was relied upon.
It was a huge investment for them and one that went to zero value in the past year.
Last fall, after the Assad regime collapsed, the Israeli air force went on a rampage in Syria, bombing the crap out of abandoned military equipment, air defenses in particular. It was discussed extensively on this board at the time. In retrospect, the reasoning behind this was obvious: it cleared the path to Iran. No matter who ended up in control of the company, they wouldn’t be able to inconvenience Israeli planes headed towards Teheran.
This. Israel has known since 1947 that if it had to depend on arms imports it would be doomed. Not that they don’t welcome imports in addition to what they can produce locally, but they know better than to rely upon the shaky and uncertain goodwill of the rest of the world. It’s worth noting that Israel may be the smallest sovereign state on the planet today that maintains its independent existence by force of arms; smaller than Taiwan.
When I was in (US) Basic Training, a group of Israelis visited the base where I was training, and briefly observed my company. Some of them were in uniform, and some not-- I don’t know whether the non-uniformed were civilians, or just not in uniform for some reason.
I was one of only two Jews in the company, and the only one willing to come forward be introduced, and speak a bit of Hebrew. I had paid attention in Hebrew school, and taken biblical Hebrew in college, and been in Israel as a tourist, so notwithstanding that all the Israelis spoke English, I spoke just a bit of Hebrew with them.
Just a bit of data that the Israelis make contact with US forces and observe training. I saw no other foreign contingents observing us during training, and there was nothing special about us, other maybe than that we were all women. Maybe most people just observed the men.
Which is another thing about Israel-- taking advantage of the talents of women, including in combat.
It might be true that not as many women are as qualified as men, but if even just 10% of women inductees are qualified for combat positions (not just infantry, but pilots, artillery, etc.), they are probably more qualified than the bottom 10%, or barely qualified, men they replace, which brings up the overall quality of the combat troops.
And that holds everywhere. By drafting women, Israel gets the best of everyone. It might turn out that the top soldiers every year are mostly men, but as long as some are women, drafting men and women both makes a better army.
Also, the motivation can’t be overlooked.
As Alessan said, most people know someone affected by some sort of attack, given the size of Israel.
And we are not too many generations away from WWII so it is still “fresh,” but enough generations away that nearly every young Israeli (the current crop of draftees) is descended from someone who fled the war; hid from it; or served time in a camp. Or, if of American origin, with family all who came here before WWII, then descended from someone who fought for the US military during WWII, and saw horrors.
It’s always personal.
I still find it amazing that Dr. Ruth Westheimer was once an Israeli sniper.
As a sniper with the Haganah, forerunner to the modern-day Israel Defense Forces (IDF), she was so accurate, she could put five rounds in the center of a target at will.
Her small size led to her being chosen as a scout and sniper.
On the other hand women are as likely as men to be less than warrior material, as this one black comedy movie examined:
Good for her that she didn’t actually get to participate in any of the atrocities Haganah committed, I suppose.
I’m more inclined to believe the data that includes the actual identities of the casualties. Plus of course this talking point of “Hamas-supplied” remains moot while the IDF does not allow journalists into the region.
Let me give you a hint : They ain’t.
- Middle Eastern Armies are often crippled by graft.
- Officers in ME Armies frequently hate & fear each other, viewing them as rivals, not team-mates.
- Officers frequently view ME Enlisted as no better than animals, & mistreat them accordingly.
- ME Non-Coms are viewed as no better than Enlisted.
- Training of ME Armies is weak.
- Conscription .
- Israel has NEVER faced a European-level opp-force.