I know, I know: Manuel Garcia O’Kelly Davis reminds us that ‘sovereign’ is just a word in between ‘sober’ and ‘sozzled’. But still.
Naomi Klein in The Nation says that we’re remaining in control of Iraq in a number of ways past June 30:
So, I read the the Iraqi ‘Constitution’ (technically, the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period”) to see how it would empower such things. Here’s what I saw:
Article 2:
The ‘annex’ is mentioned nowhere else in the Law. We don’t know what will be in it, or who decides what is. It appears that its authority ends when the National Assembly is elected in January, but who’s to say for sure?
Article 3:
A high bar, but it applies only to stuff in this document, and the ‘annex’. And the National Assembly gets to draft a real Constitution that will put this Law out of business.
The only other potentially worrisome part I can see is Article 26:
Section A says that laws from before June 30, other than this Law, shall still be good until the Transitional Government kills them. Section B is the usual boilerplate about national laws superseding local ones.
Section C applies to laws and directives issued by the CPA, and the language is different from that of Section A. Nothing about the Transitional Government this time; it says those directives “shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.”
Knowing that legal biolerplate has its uses - if you use the same phrase in the same way in two different places, you expect it to mean the same thing - one has to believe this means something different than Section A. What it must mean, therefore, is that the CPA’s directives stand as law until a government established under the new Constitution, whenever that happens, is in place.
I still don’t see how any of this empowers Bremer to write laws that stay in effect once Iraqis ratify a constitution of their own. And if al-Sadr chases us out of there (or at least, back to our ‘enduring bases’ in the desert), I fail to see how anyone’s gonna make him regard Bremer’s directives as binding. But if we hand over power to some subset of the IGC on June 30, it sounds like they will dance to the tune of the purse-strings for quite some time, and will regard Bremer’s directives as law. Not to mention, it doesn’t sound like there’ll be much difference in our military presence until the ‘enduring bases’ are ready for habitation.
So, let’s open it up. Assuming the US actually hands ‘sovereignty’ over to somebody on June 30, how much or little will that actually mean?
There is considerable suspence on that issue. For instance, will the newly soverign Iraqi government invite and beseech the American military to remain in order to provide security immediatly, or will they break for lunch first? Will President Chalabi be willing to entrust the security of the government to native Iraqi forces for as long as an hour, or would this be too risky?
30 June Iraq handover questioned:
" . . . the interim government to be in charge until elections for a transitional national assembly by next January; the assembly to draw up a permanent constitution upon whose basis elections to a full Iraqi government will be held by the end of 2005.
However, the reality behind the plan is more complex.
security after 30 June will remain in the hands of a four-star American general who will command all military forces, foreign and Iraqi.
the format of the interim government is far from agreed. There is likely to be a prime minister under a revolving three-person presidency. The prime minister will have to have the approval of the United States.
the interim government will administer but it will not rule. It will have very little power. Many of its ministers will probably be the same as those now running the Iraqi Governing Council.
financial decisions will largely remain with the US since $8bn of reconstruction aid will be flowing in. The new US embassy will be the power in the land. . . . "
Could’ve skipped this part. The quotation marks and the odd diction, slew and tricks don’t do much to enhance the piece or the excerpt.
Depending on the terms and powers of these regulators, ( I can’t get into the CPA site very well tonight), this might be a good thing.
These are just licenses. They expire. They need to be renewed. Whoever heard of a govt calling a tax a license and not saying it has to be renewed. Even simple ID cards “expire.”
If the regulator has the sole power to issue/renew licenses to whichever companies he chooses, the Iraqi government be damned, then there’s some problems. However, if this regulator is just there to safeguard the investments of the current license holders then it’s probably a good thing.
The license holders, (presumably), paid a fee and in return they just want to conduct their business in Iraq. These guys are, (presumably), going to come in and provide some sorts of services to the Iraqi people. W/o such a guarantee, these companies, (presumably), would’ve been more reluctant to invest their capital in Iraq. Iraq needs the capital. International businesses need assurances. Iraq’s an unstable place.
That the $18bil will be administered by the US embassy’s uncontroversial, yes?
The presence of that much foreign aid could be turned into an argument against a country being quite as sovereign as it could be The presence of that much foreign aid. But only til the money tapers off. (It will won’t it?)
This is a good thing. IIRC, most of these things have gone to complete shit in recent times. For example, some power plants were from the sixties held together with makeshift replacement parts.
It depends what “no say” actually means.
Regardless though it’s only for five years worth of construction.
The presence of an overwhelming, foreign, armed force inside of its borders could be turned into an argument against a country being quite as sovereign as it could be without an overwhelming, foreign, armed force inside its borders. But it’s only until the troop levels are drastically reduced.
This seems to remove the Iraqi army as a political force, (though not the individual members of the army), during the highly unstable period while Iraq’s government is negotiated amongst the Iraqis. Again, could be a pretty good idea.
Oh, I didn’t realize the OP was looking for reasons.
Short answer: There is no way in hell the “Iraqi government” will be able to stand on its own two feet come July 1, 2004. Upon receiving national control from the United States, the only way Chalibi et al can try to prevent the place from degenerating (further) into total anarchy is to turn right around and work out a deal where the Americans stick around and help “stabilize” the country – even if that means sticking around for another two, three, or seventeen years.
It’s rumored that a photographer specializing in high-speed photography and armed with ISO 64000 film will be on standby, to capture the historic nanosecond when Mr. Chalibi actually ruled Iraq on his own without American aid.
