The idea that armies are obsolete and air attack can subdue an enemy has been seductive since air vehicles were invented. IMO it still doesn’t pass the laugh test. With a slight carve-out for widespread nuking of some country’s government, infrastructure, and population centers.
Are those drones forcing Ukraine to surrender? Did the Blitz force the UK to surrender? Did North Vietnam surrender?
but_this_time_arrested_development.jpg
There’s also the matter that the conflict isn’t because Taiwan is a threat to China; it’s because China wants Taiwan. If they destroy it, they can’t get it.
I think China would be fine with reunification if the only way they could get it included a significant strategic bombing campaign. Sure, they would prefer getting TSMC and whatever else intact, but I don’t think that’s a requirement.
The big recent purge of Chinese military leaders is relevant. Here are some links:
It’s a factual matter how powerful the Chinese military is, just as it is a factual matter how all these Chinese generals and admirals being purged impacts Chinese military power. But it is impossible for us to know these facts — all we have are opinions about the facts.
P.S. Just to acknowledge something that is probably irrelevant to the thread but that those here cannot help think about — the United States is also purging generals and admirals.
The four most dangerous words in military policy (and economics): “This time it’s different.”
No it isn’t. Potentially powerful, maybe, but not actually powerful. Until it sees combat, no military force is anything more than theoretical.
The question concerning China’s ability to invade Taiwan is far more complex than what is being debated here.
You are half right, the idea of winning without an invasion is being debated among scholars, think tanks and in articles, but it’s part of a bigger picture, because the key alternative to an invasion is a blockade, with or without massive attacks on infrastructure, especially energy; cities; defense targets; etc.
For example, the drills highlight China’s preparations for blockading Taiwan, either as a stand-alone coercive measure or as a precursor to a full-scale invasion, experts say.
Taiwan is vulnerable to a blockade. International trade accounts for about two-thirds of Taiwan’s gross domestic product. And the island relies on imports for nearly 100% of its energy and 70% of its food, according to a recent analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
The idea that it’s possible for Taiwan to fall without invasion is not only accepted by experts, but seen as a real possibility. This debate has been going on for a number of years now as Chinese military strength has made a blockade possible. China now has not only sufficient naval strength, but also enough fighters to make life really difficult for Taiwan in case of a blockage.
The bomber mafia got it wrong before WWII, but that doesn’t mean it’s necessarily wrong all the time, and the idea itself isn’t laughable.
First, the objectives need to be understood. The goal is not necessarily a total surrender per se, but rather for the pro Chinese part of the government, opposition, and military leaders to take action and decide to come to an “agreement” with China. This agreement would be a surrender, but not necessarily framed as that.
There are a lot of Taiwanese who believe it would be better for Taiwan to cave in rather that get destroyed. There are a lot of pro Chinese leaders who are willing to make a deal with the Devil, believing that they will become the new Communist leaders of the “Province of Taiwan.” (It’s not likely to go as they think, but that is another thread.)
The decision to surrender isn’t going from zero to 100, it could be a much smaller movement. This is one of the big unknowns if this would happen or not.
Americans tend to view Taiwan vs. China is the same light as the US vs. USSR in the height of the Cold War, but it’s a lot more complicated than that. There are some “better dead than reds,” but there are a lot of “better well off and watched by Big Brother than free but destitutes” as well.
I’m not sure why that is a slight carve-out. It’s huge, and it’s not limited to nukes.
In World War II, Germany surrendered after the Soviet and the western allies occupied almost all of the country, and met at the Elbe River. A huge portion of its army was defeated and had surrendered.
But you can’t overlook Japan! That country surrendered before it had been invaded. There were millions of troops waiting and prepared to die for their country. The Imperial Japanese Army overwhelmingly wanted to continue the struggle.
One of the key reasons for the decision to surrender was the fear by the Emperor and his advisors that the population had had enough after the months and months of firebombing that destroyed 40% of the urban areas of all of Japan and killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, even before the atomic bombing. The Emperor and his advisors were afraid that they couldn’t defeat the Allies, and it was better to preemptively surrender before an invasion.
When the larger picture is looked at, the threat of force has caused many countries to give in to various demands. Japan opened up when Perry arrived with his Black Ships, which ultimately lead to the fall of the Shogunate government and the complete change of Japan from a closed feudal society.
As China further develops its ability to destroy Taiwan, there is a chance that even the threat of force, or the use of limited force with the threat of increased force could convince leaders in Taiwan to capitulate. Certainly, had there been a different leader in Ukraine, the outcome to the initial invasion could have been different. The Taiwan situation is similar.
Now this is laughable and fortunately Taiwanese and US leaders don’t entertain such nonsense.
First, generally countries don’t plan on going to war and not causing damage.
China isn’t a toddler that wants some shiny new toy. The desire to take Taiwan whole is not seriously thought to be the major goal by anyone.
Many (most?) scholars assert that Xi Jinping’s greatest motivation is remaining in power, similar to Putin. He’s going to do whatever is expedient to keep being in charge. Both Xi and the Communist Part of China (CPC) do everything they can to remain in power and if it takes destroying Taiwan for him and them to remain in power, they’ll do it.
This is one thought:
Xi can’t be soft on Taiwan for a number of reasons. One is that he can’t let Taiwan walk, or other groups in China will agitate for more freedom as well. He has staked his legitimacy on bringing Taiwan back and losing that would make him seem weak to political rivals as well.
Another real possibility is that Xi could decide that if he can’t get Taiwan, he’s not going to let the Taiwanese have it either. This is also a way of sending threats to the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries. Do it our way, or your country will get wrecked.
OTOH, China is doing really well in the current world environment and getting into a shooting war with the US would seriously disrupt trade, so it’s not going to be his first choice, but it still can’t be said that it’s not a possibility.
Why is this import to understand the likelihood of various scenarios? Leaders of countries need to understand them in order to plan how much to spend on defense and how to allocate it. Taiwan and the US need to assume that China could plan on missile and drone attacks on Taiwan without an invasion in addition to planning on possible invasions as well.
In other news:
The tension between Japan and China is increasing. The new Prime Minister of Japan was direct in an answer to a question concerning China.
Answering questions in parliament on Nov. 7, Ms. Takaichi suggested Japan could activate its defense forces if China were to take military action – such as a blockade – aimed at seizing Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island claimed by Beijing.
Such a Chinese attack could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, she said.
Chinese outrage ensued, unleashing a diplomatic war of words from both sides and leading to formal protests lodged with ambassadors in Tokyo and Beijing. China demanded that Ms. Takaichi retract her statement. She refused.
China’s Ministry of Defense warned bluntly on Friday that if Japan used force in a Taiwan contingency, it would suffer “a crushing defeat.”
China has told its citizens to not visit Japan:
The matter has deteriorated into a trade war of sorts. On November 14, China issued a no-travel advisory for Japan, an apparent attempt to target the country’s tourism sector, which welcomed some 7.5 million Chinese tourists between January and September this year. On November 15, three Chinese airlines offered refunds or free changes for flights planned on Japan-bound routes.
Local media is making a lot of this story, and very anti China.
Japan has increased its military capacity as well, and taking steps such as building bases on Yonaguni, a small island a mere 60 miles from Taiwan. The US is placing equipment there as well.
Japan has declared that China cannot be allowed to use force to take Taiwan as the loss of that could endanger oil shipments to Japan from the Middle East. This is seen as sufficient grounds for Japan to intervene.
If China starts something with Taiwan, there is a question if they would preemptifily attack US bases and / or Japanese ones.
May you live in interesting times.
There’s the number who believe that now, and then there’s the number who would continue to believe it after the military action started. Aggressors always assume that the second number will be greater than the first. Has that ever once in history actually been the case?
Based on this question, is it your assertion that this would not happen?
What I read about this is simple - China with strong governments ruled its extended territory. When the central government was weak, the outer territories peeled off as independent or less obedient vassal states. So the state of the government - weak or strong - is determined by whether they control the terrirtories China has ever controlled. Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao…
Xi, like previous communist leaders, does not want to lose face as a “weak govenment”.
Following up on this, this should not be taken to mean that the only people in Taiwan who would be willing to cave in would be pro Chinese leaders.
In fact, capitulating to the threats of overwhelming Chinese power is seen as a possibility of even the most ardent of pro Taiwanese supporters.
The idea of Taiwan capitulating or being unable to withstand China, has been games out by the US military, and widely discussed in papers, as has the idea of a Taiwanese Quisling (someone in this thread asked “has that ever once in history actually been the case?”)
These opinions and scenerios have been discussed in endless papers in the last couple of decades, but I don’t think many people have been paying attention.
The “common sense” thoughts about Taiwan and China for most Westerners just doesn’t match reality.
Here is a quote from US Naval Institute, a think tank, from an article by a retired USN admiral outlining a possible scenario where Taiwan is lost to China. This was a scenerio written in 2020 speculating what may happen at some point. It’s obviously just a scenerio, but it reflects what a lot of experts have been talking about for a long time.
By then it was already too late. On the morning of 20 January in Taiwan—still late in the evening of the 19th in the States—Taiwan’s government realized that, while the Taiwanese Armed Forces remained capable of putting up stiff resistance for a limited time, U.S. forces would require too much time to be brought to bear. In mid-morning, realizing Taiwan was on the brink of a bloodbath, Tsai Ing-wen reluctantly capitulated to Xi’s demands, expressing hope that the people of Taiwan would be able to retain at least some measure of freedom.
That evening in Beijing, three hours before the Chief Justice delivered the oath of office on the steps of the Capitol, Xi Jinping triumphantly addressed the Chinese people, declaring that the most important step in the “Chinese Dream,” which he had been championing as his future legacy since 2013, had now come true. He welcomed the people of Taiwan “home” and promised local elections down the road. Tsai’s government was replaced the next day by a group led by a Taiwan politician who had long called for reunification with the mainland.
My bolding.
Tsai Ing-wen, former president of Taiwan, is one of the strongest proponents of independence, and the speculation by the admiral is that it’s possible that (1) Taiwan may cave even before missiles fly, let alone an invasion and (2) that a Taiwanese traitor would be taken over.
Perhaps directing the mocking questions to him would be more appropriate.
Here is another article by a retired USN Rear Admiral.
China is preparing for a conflict it hopes never to fight — by slowly engineering the conditions for Taiwan’s total capitulation. Central to that strategy is energy coercion: the use of economic, legal, and cyber levers to throttle Taiwan’s fuel supply and fracture its political will. Rather than launch a sudden maritime blockade or kinetic invasion, Beijing is more likely to pursue a subtler campaign, one that begins with administrative actions and regulatory pressure, such as Coast Guard inspections disguised as routine maritime enforcement.
By design, and consistent with Beijing’s pattern of gray-zone coercion, these initial moves will likely be legally ambiguous, publicly restrained, and strategically deniable. The intended effect is to paralyze Taiwan before it can respond while sowing division among Taipei’s partners. From there, China will likely escalate incrementally — amplifying economic disruption through disinformation, intelligence-enabled targeting, and persistent cyber intrusions — before potentially turning to selective maritime interference that slows or reroutes Taiwan-bound energy shipments. China’s goal is exhaustion, not escalation: a gray-zone siege calibrated to degrade Taiwan’s resilience and coerce strategic surrender under the veneer of legality.
This summer, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the Taipei-based Centre for Innovative Democracy and Sustainability (CIDS) at National Chengchi University conducted a tabletop exercise to examine this exact energy contingency, testing how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) might escalate from diplomatic and economic pressure to an actual quarantine, interrupting and potentially blocking Taiwan’s energy imports. Each phase of the game explored responses to an ever-evolving Chinese cyber-enabled economic warfare (CEEW) campaign against Taiwan.
My bolding.
In the article:
In the real world, as in that game, China desires not to rely on force but rather on friction to bend Taipei to its will, producing conditions on the ground that will ultimately lead to capitulation without causing an all-out conflict.
Again, my bolding.
The co-author of the study:
RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery
CCTI Senior Director and Senior Fellow
Expertise:
Artificial Intelligence (AI), China, Cyber, Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare, Energy, Indo-Pacific, Israel, Israel at War, Military and Political Power, North Korea, Russia, U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy
Projects:
Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab, Air and Missile Defense Program, Center on Military and Political Power, Russia Program, China Program, Israel Program, Energy and National Security Program
And yet another article, a 45-page study by Brookings Institution on the question if China can take Taiwan, and includes the question if Taiwan may caputitulate
China would not need to stop all ship voyages into and out of Taiwan. It would simply need to deter enough ships from risking the journey that Taiwan’s economy would suffer badly. For example, to make the blockade seem humane, Beijing might grant passage to ships carrying key medicines — only requiring the ships to dock in China for inspection before heading to Taiwan under Chinese escort. Beijing might also tolerate air traffic into and out of Taiwan (at least at first, so as not to put at risk airplanes carrying large numbers of civilians).14 Beijing might then propose a so-called reasonable political compromise, allowing a degree of autonomy for the people of Taiwan even under the general mantra of reunification.15 This strategy would likely work best against what Owen R. Cote Jr. calls a “weak Taiwan,” rather than a “strong Taiwan” willing to endure protracted hardship to survive and outlast the blockade.16
My bolding.
The footnote leads to a 2011 paper Assessing the Undersea Balance Between the U.S. and China.
Which says:
The possible purpose and course of a coercive mine warfare campaign by China against Taiwan has been much studied and debated.9 The undersea balance would obviously play a role in its outcome, but in many cases political factors would actually be the decisive variables. The ideal scenario from a Chinese perspective is one in which a modest amount of pain is sufficient to cause a domestic political collapse in Taiwan, which presumably would lead to a relatively quick negotiated solution to whatever Taiwanese “provocation” or “threat to the status quo” caused the conflict in the first place. One might call this the “weak Taiwan” scenario in which Taiwanese domestic political conflicts over its relations with China are severe enough that it would lack the cohesion and political will to stand up to even a modest amount of punishment. In the weak Taiwan scenario it becomes difficult to imagine an undersea balance between China and the U.S. that would allow the latter to prevent successful coercion of Taiwan by the former.
In a “strong Taiwan” scenario, one in which Taiwan proved as resistant to coercion as most states historically have, a larger, more protracted coercion campaign would be required because China would need to do severe economic damage to Taiwan.
My bolding.
Even back in the more innocent times of 2011, when the US head a clear military edge, there has always been a question about the political will of Taiwan to resist. Back in 2011, it was assumed that the will would be stronger, but as China as become stronger and its military might has increased, this gets kicked around more.
Which also goes for China’s regional rivals.
The latest issue of Time magazine (with a closeup of Trump at his Oval Office desk on the cover) has an interesting article about the politico-military situation between the PRC and Taiwan.
It’s not bad.
I don’t think there was anything new in the article that people who have been following the situation wouldn’t already know. It can’t get down in the weeds in everything but it did well as an overall look as well as some specifics.
I thought the overniew of the progressive steps of quarantine, blockade and invasion, was good and did a good job of explaning how a quarantine could be enacted. It mentioned the vulnerability of Taiwan to a quarantine or blockage and discussed the difficulties of countering that from other countries.
It covers the desire by China for dividing the Taiwanese people and attempting to force Taiwan to surrender without an invasion. It also mentions the number of spies, including members of the Taiwan armed forces. And, like the scenerio in the article from US Naval Institute, Time suggests that:
Beijing may recognize a particular opposition figure as its preferred negotiation partner, while inciting public unrest and demonstrations against the Taipei government.
(They aren’t directly saying this, but the president is from the DPP and the opposition is the KMT, which ironically is far more pro-China.)
Unfortunately, it doesn’t address the question of drones, which is a serious oversight. However, drones makes the situation less rather than more clear, and perhaps they didn’t want to make the story even more uncertain.
It also doesn’t really discuss how overextended Taiwan is now, especially its air force.
It says that the compulsory national service is being extended from four months to one year, but doesn’t mention how much damage was caused by the reduction from two years to one year and then the four months.
Some good takeaways from the article for those who haven’t been following the situation that closely include:
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China is getting much stronger and there are experts who believe it can successfully invade Taiwan now or could obtain the ability soon.
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China really wants to reclaim the island, with a ticking clock.
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Taiwan is attempting to strengthen its military, but faces challenges.
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The situation is complex.
This is hard to understand from my perspective as an average American. Taiwan hasn’t been a part of some unified China for a long time. Off the top of my head, my guess is that it would date back to a time before the British showed up in the 19th century. Why would it be the case, after there not being a unified China that includes Taiwan since probably the early 19th century, that this is now something that power of the leader of mainland China depends on? To me it sounds almost as silly as saying that the power of the US president depends on making the Philippines part of US territory again.
ETA. Or maybe some part of what is now Canada that was in dispute when the US / Canadian border was being settled.
The average American has so much more to worry about than Asian history so it’s understandable that people don’t get it. Also, most people see the world from their own perspective so just as most Americans don’t understand Asians, most Asians don’t understand Americans.
Yeah, you are mixing up countries. Taiwan was never a British colony.
Chronological of Taiwan
Prehistory to 1624
Dutch Formosa 1624–1662
Spanish Formosa 1626–1642
Kingdom of Tungning 1662–1683
Qing rule 1683–1895
Republic of Formosa 1895
Japanese rule 1895–1945
Republic of China rule 1945–present
Note that Taiwan had been under the control of the Qing dynasty for more than 200 years until the Japanese defeated them in 1895, and took Taiwan as a spoil of war.
The ROC was the nominally the government of all of China (but not Taiwan) from 1912, but it didn’t have complete control over the country and there were a bunch of warlords, as well as a civil war with the communists and the Japanese, who occupied parts of China beginning in 1931 and continuing until the end of WWII in 1945.
The ROC was defeated by the communists and escaped to Taiwan in 1949.
Imagine that Cuba has been a part of the US and people there spoke English. Instead of the US Civil War ending in a defeat of the Confederacy, let’s say that the government, much of the army and important people were able to flee to there. There could be US presidents who would want to continue to war and really defeat the Rebels. It’s not a perfect analogy, but better than comparing Taiwan to retaking the Philippines.
As Taiwan had been part of China for more than 200 years, the People’s Republic of China claims Taiwan as a part of China. (There are debates about this, but let’s avoid them in FQ.)
You can’t compare dictatorships to democratic states. In democratic states, leaders’ legitimacy comes from being voted in by the will of the people. They win the election, therefore they are the leaders. (Grossly simplified and let’s not get into debates about the US and elections.)
Dictators need other reasons to be seen as the legitimate leaders. Just as Putin has staked his reputation on retaking former Russian territories, Xi as stated he will retake Taiwan. Previous Chinese leaders didn’t corner themselves into this position, so previous Chinese Chairmans didn’t depended on taking Taiwan for their legitimacy.
However, above all, dictators have to have more personal power than the people around the throne, so once Xi declared he was going to reunite China and Taiwan, a failure to do so will weaken him.
This is where my understanding falls apart. As I stated, I’m not anywhere close to knowledge in recent Chinese history. But this hypothesis about dictators seems even more difficult to understand than Chinese history.
I’d come to believe the hypothesis that once dictators are in power, they stay there, with only three routes of exit.
- Old age / illness like the Kim family in North Korea.
- Being overthrown by an outside power like Saddam Hussein getting overthrown by the US.
- A major revolution like recently in Syria or with the Eastern European Iron Curtain states (Ceausescu in Romania comes to mind).
Sure, in the old days there were dictators getting overthrown left and right, like the year of four emperors in Rome or the Three Kingdoms period in China. But these days that type of thing clearly weakens a nation, and so the “rival to the throne” style of a dictator getting overthrown no longer happens. Or at least I’m not aware of that sort of thing happening anymore.
Backtrack a bit to how Saddam Hussein got into power and you’ll see the flaw in this logic. Hussein was part of the 17 July Revolution that overthrew the existing Iraqi government in 1968 in a bloodless military coup (the existing government itself was in power as the result of a military coup in 1958, overthrowing the Hashemite monarchy). He was vice-president until 1979 serving under al-Bakr. He took power after the resignation of al-Bakr in the 1979 Ba’ath Party Purge. Granted, he was the cousin of al-Bakr, and had positioned himself as the strongman behind the throne, but his succession to power was opposed by enough of the Ba’ath Party (who themselves suspected that al-Bakr’s resignation was a quiet coup orchestrated by Hussein) that Hussein staged a violent takeover:
Muhyi Abdul-Hussein Mashhadi, an RCC member, fiercely objected to al-Bakr’s resignation during the session and urged al-Bakr to take a temporary vacation without transferring power to his successor, a proposition that was declined by al-Bakr. This had raised the suspicion of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi second-in-command who became president on 16 July 1979. In an assembly of the party leadership convened on 22 July, Saddam staged a purge against the military wing of the Ba’ath Party whom he accused of collaborating with Syria to topple the regime in Iraq.
Saddam hurriedly convened an “emergency session” of party leaders on 22 July. During the assembly, which he ordered to be videotaped, he claimed to have uncovered a fifth column within the party. Abdul-Hussein “confessed” to be part of a Syrian-financed faction established in 1975 that played a major role in the Syrian-backed plot against the Iraqi government. He also gave the names of 68 alleged co-conspirators.[4]: 282–283 These were removed from the room one by one as their names were called and taken into custody. After the list was read, Saddam congratulated those still seated in the room for their past and future loyalty. Those arrested at the meeting were subsequently tried together and found guilty of treason. Twenty-two men, including five members of the Revolutionary Command Council,[7] were sentenced to execution. Some party members were given weapons and directed to execute their comrades.
It’s called irredentism - the belief that if a piece of land was once “ours”, then by rights it should be “ours” forever. It’s one of the more common driving forces for war in recent history, from the unification of Italy and Germany in the 19th century, to the Falklands, to the Balkan wars of the 1990s, to both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to the current war in Ukraine. Its details varies from culture to culture, but the principle is the same - once ours, always ours.