How vulnerable was Germany's electrical grid in WWII?

[ralph124c]

@Sailboat

John Keegan pointed out that, in practice, high-grade steel machinery proved almost impossible to destroy using aerial explosives. The buildings might be destroyed, but the critical machinery just got knocked over. Crews could right it again, reconnect it to power, and have it turning out war material in a shockingly short time.

Can’t argue that coal wasn’t important, but I’m dubious that aerial bombing would have been an effective way to attack coal. We’ve already discussed how the Allies couldn’t reliably hit railroad infrastructure until they could bring short-ranged fighter-bombers to bear. I can’t imagine that hitting the mouth of a mineshaft would have been possible except by accident; and bombing an open pit mine – essentially already a huge crater – would have been totally absurd, and might even have helped (by breaking coal into loose chunks). And it’s not like stored coal itself would be vulnerable to catastrophic destruction like aviation gasoline; some World War I dreadnoughts had been designed to employ bunkered coal as additional protection against naval shells that penetrated their armor.

Well, coal must be mined…by humans. So the solution would be:
-burn down the residential towns housing the miners
-destroy the railheads at the mines, and the coal loading yards
Miners have to eat, sleep, and live-incendiary bombing would have made that impossible.
This would have made far more sense than bombing a city like Dresden.
Dresden was a mistake for two reasons:
-it killed a lot of civilians to no good purpose
-it had almost zero impact on German war industry
Speer relates that the main weak point (besides petroleum) was steelmaking-and steel depends upon coal.
QED

[carnivorousplant]

@ralph124c

Albert Speer discusses the impact that the bombing had on German industry. By the end of 1944, Germany was still capable of producing large numbers of fighter planes…but all of the experienced pilots were dead. Also, the oil supply was inadequate-the Romanian oil fields were getting hammered, and the synthetic oil production was inadequate.

I was given to understand that the ME-262 couldn’t be produced because the engines and airframes were manufactured in different places, and the railways were bombed to the extent that the Germans couldn’t get the engines and airframes together.

[KarlGauss]

@ralph124c

Well, coal must be mined…by humans. So the solution would be:
-burn down the residential towns housing the miners
-destroy the railheads at the mines, and the coal loading yards
Miners have to eat, sleep, and live-incendiary bombing would have made that impossible.
This would have made far more sense than bombing a city like Dresden.
Dresden was a mistake for two reasons:
-it killed a lot of civilians to no good purpose
-it had almost zero impact on German war industry
Speer relates that the main weak point (besides petroleum) was steelmaking-and steel depends upon coal.
QED

The Dresden bombings killed “a lot of civilians”, yes, but not the hundreds of thousands that Goebbels lied about(he, literally, seems to have placed an extra zero on the real number of casualties). ISTM that the appx 20,000 dead at Dresden is similar to that of other raids on other cities by both sides, the main difference being that the Dresden deaths happened in one night.

As to it having “almost zero impact”, I believe that Dresden was the only possible marshalling center in the east left for the Germans by early 1945. In other words, with Dresden gone, the notion of organized German counter attack also vanished.