How would you research this argument mathematically?

The US should or should not pursue overwhelming conventional military superiority.

  1. Overwhelming conventional military superiority forces opposing forces to seek out overwhelming unconventional superiority.
  2. When one side has a conventional military advantage (but not overwhelming superiority) it is more difficult for that side to defend an unconventional force than a conventional force.

I’m fully aware of the many flawed assumptions in the statements above. I’m looking more for a how would you do this type answer. Thanks.

The formal (mathematical) literature on questions like these is enormous. If you have no training in mathematics, it is tough going.

Your first question is just a modified “Security Dilemma”. It has been played out in countless permutations in the IR-seciurity studies-game theoretic literature. Start with Robert Jervis’ seminal 1979 article “Cooperation under the security dilemma.” It is not formal. From there, just search the usual trade journals: International Organizations, Security Studies, American Review of Political Science, American Journal of Political Science, etc. Robert Powell especially does some interesting formal models of these phenomena.

I do not really understand your second conditional statement, but everything I said above applies.

In order to make good use of the formal literature, it helps to have some experience in probability theory, calculus, and game theory. If not, I can suggest some textbooks that might get you up to speed.

I’m strictly a layman. I love concepts, but I’m not capable of any high level stuff. If you can recommend some reading that is written at an introductory level, I’d certainly appreciate it. Actually, if you know of anything that combines game theory with human psychology, and is written at a basic level, that would be outstanding. Basically, game theory that tries to incorporate irrational human behavior.

Yeah, I’m struggling with that second one myself. What the hell was I thinking? How about would lessening the conventional gap cause more or less losses than widening the conventional gap? This magically assumes the other side decides to fight conventionally when the gap is lessened. It also magically assumes you can adjust gaps like turning the volume up on your stereo. Very silly stuff I know.

Thanks for the Security Dilemma as well.

In the literature, this is called “bounded rationality.” I do not know this literature really at all, so I can’t give you good reading suggestions.

Ack. My cat decided that the above post was finished, so she stepped on my enter key.

In the literature, this is called “bounded rationality.” I do not know this literature really at all, so I can’t give you good reading suggestions.

It is really hard to find game theoretical texts that are strictly non-technical. It is not that the math is so hard (I am a piss-poor mathematician) but that symbolic language is so much more convenient than natural language. Start with Martin Osborne’s intro to game theory text, whose title eludes me. He might deal explicitly with bounded rationality, or he will at least point you to someone else who does.

Topics to check out in psychology are prospect theory and organizational theory, both of which measure human “irrationalty” and can be nicely incorporated in a game theoretic context.

Hope this helps once again.