Its not a fallacy per se, it is an arbitrary moral belief with no basis in logic. There is no logical reason they cannot be trivially equated, It’s a moral code and that’s perfectly reasonable, but its no more logical than a moral code that prohibits you from eating pork.
For the second time (not you @griffin1977, but mijin also missed it and I requoted it upthread), in the paragraph directly following the one you quoted:
Ok, I get what you’re saying. Valid point. Not sure how it applies to the Trolley Problem. The nice thing about hypotheticals is they spell out all the details. Some may choose to fight the hypothetical by proposing all sorts of facts not in evidence.
Legally, however, it is considerably different. So, it is not a fallacy. Flip the switch and you have done something that killed someone- they call that “murder” or perhaps “manslaughter”. NOT doing anything is rarely a crime. You could always say you have no idea how to safely operate the switch. There would also be lawsuits, etc.
Also, I was not responsible for the 4 people dying- it is whoever tied them to the tracks- both legally and morally.
Yes, and if you could save everyone- then perhaps there could be issues if you did nothing.
Likely more- and thus everyone here who didnt donate is guilty.
It’s not a fallacy at all. And in terms of “no basis in logic” I guess you’re just making a general statement about all morality.
Because I just gave two examples of how action and inaction are different and it seems no-one wants to bite the bullet and claim I am morally culpable for children dying in a hospital with insufficient resources, or for a person dying of kidney disease because I selfishly keep two kidneys.
But in those examples there are perfectly logical reason why the two options are not equivalent. E.g. the survival rate, in the long/medium term, for transplant patients is not super great, so in that case option A has a 100% survival rate for you (or close to it assuming you are young and healthy) versus a very much less than 100% chance for two other people (and 0% survival rate for you).
That’s why (as a thought experiment) the trolley problem is interesting. It removes all the uncertainty of real life and presents certainties. That does in fact shed light on ethical choices. But its just a thought experiment it’s not a guide to negotiating real life ethical conundrums
Ok…so are you suggesting that if the transplant survival rate was 100% we would all be obliged to give up a kidney? So why make this objection?
I agree it’s interesting. I was responding specifically to the suggestion that it’s a “fallacy” to draw a distinction between action and inaction.
It isn’t, and it’s trivial to show that. Not donating incubators to a third world hospital is a very different thing from infanticide.
Thus making it utterly worthless as a vehicle for evaluating human morality.
Except that in itself is a worthwhile analysis. If the only thing you can take from the trolley problem is the fact that the difference between answering the hypothetical and real life is the that real life is always uncertain, then that’s a perfectly good use of a thought experiment.
I’ve been thinking a lot about a variant of this problem lately.
If Democracy is tied to the tracks, and a train is rushing toward it, but the train could be stopped by shooting a fat orange man so that his body blocks the tracks, is it ethically acceptable to shoot him?
Yes, that’s obviously a terrible analogy. But the followup question I find myself legit wrestling with is “If someone else makes a choice to shoot the fat man, is it ethically acceptable to regret that he missed?”
In a vacuum I’d say it is acceptable but obviously we don’t want political violence to become normal. To answer your second question I’d say it is acceptable given the stakes and consequences of the worst case scenario. I don’t think anyone deserves to die for its own sake but I recognize that a person’s death can prevent even worse harm from happening.
Just a point - political violence isn’t normalized yet, but efforts to canonize (semi-literally in the case of the one deceased) and excuse the Jan 6 rioters for MAGA and the remaining Republican politicians who remain in power, indicates it IS becoming so for that group.
In terms of the trolley problem (back to the point of the thread) we’re starting to talk again about the moral question of the greater good. If we allow political violence in the form of targeted assassination of a single individual, and by doing so, save countless lives that would be endangered by said individual surviving, would it be moral?
If we want to keep the hypothetical political, take it back to 2016 - if, with the benefit of hindsight and a time machine, would it be morally justified to go back and snipe Trump prior to his election, putting nearly anyone else in power who would be willing to accept a more science-based attitude towards Covid, and likely vastly reducing the death toll?
I would make the case that yes, per the trolley problem that there is a good case for a greater good via an active if unethical act.
I agree and I also think violence should be a tool of last resort.
Moderating:
Let’s not do this, not in the abstract, and certainly not as an ethical debate. This is a bright line rule violation on this board. Don’t engage in the type of debate that contemplates killing another person.
The last few commenters seem to have misunderstood my point, but I’m not really trying to debate the morality of political assassination.
What I’m trying to figure out is whether it makes moral or logical sense to take the position “I absolutely deplore this action, and had I been aware of it ahead of time, I would have done everything in my power to prevent it…but I still wish it had succeeded.”
I think part of the problem is that while it’s a fine question, IMHO it doesn’t apply to the thread. We are theoretically talking about the trolley problem and the concern of taking an active response that minimizes a greater loss of life versus a passive response that indirectly causes a greater loss of life.
It seems related to me, though not identical. All the interesting trolley-problem questions IMO involve variations on the basic problem, not the problem itself.
In this case the action which minimizes loss of life, but is still obviously immoral (again, not wanting to debate that point!), is being taken by some third party. Our actions have no influence at all on the outcome. In that case, if we find ourselves wishing that the immoral action had succeeded, is that a problem? Does it suggest that we have some psychological work to do, or is it an ordinary and understandable thought to have?