Nice. So if you scowl at me and I feel intimidated and disrespected as a result, the HRC may award damages.
Did the commission supply any cites for the SCC findings?
A few procedural points.
First, this was not a decision of the Human Rights Commission, but of the Human Rights Tribunal. The difference is that the Commission is an investigatory body: it investigates complaints, attempts to bring the parties to a settlement, and if that fails, refers the matter to the Tribunal for a hearing. The Commission has no power to make any orders against anyone.
Second, the Tribunal is quasi-judicial in nature, independent of the Commission. The President of the Tribunal is a judge is the Court of Quebec, nominated by the Chief Judge of that Court, and must have some prior experience/expertise in human rights. The Tribunal also has six assessors, who also are required to have some expertise in human rights law. The President presides at all hearings of the Tribunal.
Third, this is a civil matter, not a criminal one. The Tribunal has made an award of civil damages, payable by the author of the letter to the individual. It is not a criminal matter, so community service is not an option. Nor is the money a fine, which would go to the Government. It goes to the complainant, to compensate her for the injury.
Fourth, the Tribunal’s decision can be appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal, the highest court in the Province, just like any other decision of the lower courts.
Now, as to substance. In Canadian human rights law, it’s recognised that speech can hurt the target of the speech. This is an extension of civil libel and slander, which are based on the idea that speech can hurt, and that speech which crosses a certain line can entitle the target of the speech to civil damages in compensation. If the woman felt really threatened by the letter, as the news reports quoted upthread indicated, I can certainly see a basis for the award of damages to her, in compensation. Yes, it’s hard to quantify that amount on an objective standard, but that’s usually the case with libel and slander as well: general damages for injury to one’s reputation are notoriously difficult to asses, but that has always been the case. Civil damages for dignity damages under human rights laws are very similar to general damages to reputation under libel and slander.
Thank you for the clarification, Northern Piper.
You’re welcome. Here’s a link to the decision - still just in French:
You’ll see that the style of cause lists the Commission as a party, and the decision is by the Tribunal. The Commission is a party because it argues the case on behalf of the complainant before the Tribunal.
For some reason that I’ve never understood, the media is never able to distinguish between the role of Human Rights Commissions (to investigate, seek settlement, and advocate), and the role of Human Rights Tribunals (to adjudicate the complaint as an independent, quasi-judicial body).
So you believe that if I sent a letter describing you as an idiot, that wouldn’t be libel (or defamation) simply because you are not an idiot? If you want to damn all libel laws, say so (and I might even agree with you). But it certainly defames her.
IANAL but by my reading of the letter (in translation, granted) and the Quebec Charter the writer clearly broke the law. Elaboration below.
I see a series of threats. He quite overtly opines that an entire protected class (the indigent - which in many cases overlaps with mental health problems also fall into a protected class).
It’s really not that uncommon.
No but he attacked her personally in the letter based on not her behaviour but her membership, both perceived and real, in various protected classes.
Then he suggested the brutal eradication of an entire class.
A part of that could be that there is comparatively little case law dealing with the various Human Rights Codes because most issues are resolved before they get to that level. This is a guess and any Law-Talkin’-Guy that knows better please, fight my ignorance.
[Kimmy’s Post Continues**snip
“…Anyway, conspicuous caprice tends to denote a government that understands its to be beyond being held accountable.”
I don’t believe it was capricious. The level of damages surprised me given the form and effect of the violations, but the decision itself did not. For reasons I’ll go into below.
Kimmy continues the chief witness (and provacteur of the litigation) was the provinical govermnet (SAQ) (and since when, by the way, can petitions to one’s government (here, an email to SAQ), however distasteful, be cause for an $8,000 fine — this is a serious black eye for civil liberties); the plaintiff’s representation before the was furnished by the provincial government. All this provincial involvement over some hurt feelings seems quite disproportionate. And more than a little suspicious.
[/QUOTE]
This was not a fine this was a decision in a civil proceeding to award damages to the complainant. The government did not get a payday, the woman did. Also it is worth noting that $7500 were for moral damages - something the act specifically provides for and only $500 for punitive damages.
The main bulk of the assessment, as I’m understanding it, was for violating the Act itself in that the writing andsending of the e-mail constitutes a breach of basic morality.
As to the complainant’s representation being supplied by the government; all of the Human Rights Codes / Acts that I’ve read (all but the Territories and, prior to today, Quebec) include a provision that the commission itself act essentially as the “plaintiff” and providing the representation in every case.
This is, I believe, to ensure that social, economic, mental/physical conditions do not interfere with or prevent the exercise of ours rights under these laws.
Should Piper,** Spoons** or any other lawyers or people versed in Canadian human rights legislation see fit to correct me I humbly defer in advance to their expertise.
Two things to bear in mind: This happened in Quebec which is a province whose legal system is somewhat different than the other provinces and the Fed; the other is that this happened under the jurisdiction of a province, not the Federal government.
That being said, these laws - and their enforcement - are one of the many things that made me both happy and proud to be Canadian
Thanks for this and you’re previous post.
Now for my NON-LAWYER thoughts.
Typically, I believe, these proceedings are decided not on beyond a reasonable doubt but rather on balance of probability It is a much lower standard and you needn’t show that the action was entirely due to discrimination against a protected class but rather formed at least a part of it.
Every excerpt from the Act come from here
- Every human being has a right to life, and to personal security, inviolability and freedom.
This is the most fundamentally important clause in the Act. Everything else just defines and delineates what is meant by6 this clause.
- Every human being whose life is in peril has a right to assistance.
It doesn’t say immediate or imminent peril, so if the letter can be seen as a threat either to her directly or members of her class - and I think it can - it’s possible that the manager had a duty under law to take action.
- Every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour and reputation.
By making mocking and specific reference to her IQ, alcoholism* and weight it looks clear that all her dignity etc. was seriously offended.
- I don’t see a specific provision for perceived membership in a protected class. For example, if you apply to work for me and, after you leave I toss your application while muttering, “I ain’t hiring no Jew-boy.” it doesn’t matter if you’re a Zoroastrian, the perception that you are Jewish was the cause - at least in part - of me denying you the job and is actionable. I think the lack of this provision is unique to Quebec.
9.1. In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec
Of course the letter writer has the right to his opinions and, for the most part, to express them. But I think he failed in his duty to abide by the constraints imposed by 9.1
- Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap.
Here is the big one. Had buddy said, “everyone should be shot.” there’d be no problem**. But he attacked the dignity of and jokingly (I hope) suggested the eradication of a whole class. This certainly counts as “distinction” and I’m pretty sure “exclusion” could shoulder its way in.
**Except possibly with the SWAT team 
So, I would say that he violated 1, 2, 4, 9.1 and 10.
I could go further but this post is more than long enough already.
Rehash of standard disclaimers - IANAL, Law folk please come in a slap the ignorance out of me… where warranted of course.
Zeke
If you sent it just to me and there was no threat - real or implied - then no, it would not be libelous. If it continued it could end up constituting harassment but that’s a criminal rather than civil matter.
Once you have published your letter calling me an idiot (sent it to anyone BUT me) then it may rise to the level of libel but only if it meets a bunch of criteria such as the likelihood of being believed, real damage to reputation and others.
There are also a lot of defenses available against libel.
But this has nothing to do with libel or defamation.
This has to do with violations of a completely different act.
[QUOTE=Kimmy Gibler]
But overall, the Commission wasn’t so much interested in the truth or falsehood of that particular epithet (and still less the threshold question of whether the email could be read as purporting to aver objectively factual information rather than an expression of exasperation) as they were in protecting what they evidently believe Section 4 of the Quebec Charter to stand for: A right not to be offended.
[/QUOTE]
No, they believe that section 4 protects dignity, exactly what it reads, not a broad right not to be offended. Note that s. 4 also protects reputation. Both of these are personal qualities.
As I mentioned earlier, this aspect of the human rights code is closely akin to the law of defamation: both protect these aspects of one’s person, by providing a civil remedy for breaches of those extra-patrimonial personal rights.
This is explained in the CBC article linked later in the thread. The customer service rep for SAQ said they had never seen such a disturbing letter, talking about shooting all beggars. They sought legal advice, and their lawyer recommended going to the police. The police told them that they couldn’t take a complaint from a third party, but only from the individual, so on the advice of the police they showed her the letter. Eventually the police concluded that it wasn’t specific enough to be a threat under the criminal law, and recommended that she go to the Commission.
Do you feel the same way about libel and slander laws? Do you consider them an infringement on freedom of speech?
Of course you don’t want to admit the obvious. So I will ask you: What indignity beyond a mere reviling insult (which was, in any event, communicated by the defendant to a government agent (including remarks on a former mayor of Montreal, thus alerting the reader to a political speech component), and only to the complainant when that goverment agent tranmitted it to her) was Mme. Beaumont subjected to?
If you are going to insist on a distinction between the legitimate goal of using govermental coercive power to protect dignity versus what you seem to concede is an illegitimate use of that power, namely, that the goverment can’t go around avenging petty slights, then I am going to have to insist that you make this distinction a bit more conspicuous.
I would hardly be the first critic to note that Canada’s defamation laws are these days considered deeply antiquated. And that number includes Canadian legal practitioners.
You like to brand the manager of a SAQ branch as a “government agent”. These people are employees of a chain of stores, which happens to be owned by the government and happens to have a monopoly. Sure, they get good job security and some rebates on booze, but beyond that they’re just employees of a large corporation. The law doesn’t give them any special powers beyond judging if you’re old and sober enough to buy liquor. I haven’t seen a president of SAQ being appointed for political reasons, but if it happened it wouldn’t trickle down to the branch manager or the guy who fills the shelves.
In other words, I can easily imagine this whole mess happening with any store that is part of a large chain with a legal department, like a Provigo supermarket or a Home Dépôt store.
I don’t know what you mean by this.
Five different suggestions by M Delisle how she and others like her should be killed.
As a result, she felt that her life was threatened, she needed to go on anti-depression meds, she became reclusive, and she stopped going to the SAQ for half a year.
Frankly, I don’t understand your continued references to SAQ as being part of the government, in this post and in your previous posts.
In Canada, Crown corporations are set up to provide public services, at arm’s length from the political branches of government. Liquor, power, gas, telephones, a variety of services are provided in this way. I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make?
In any event, the SAQ officials provided it initially to the police because they were very concerned by the violent, threatening language contained in the email. They did so after receiving legal advice about doing so. The Tribunal found that in doing so, they acted reasonably (“en bon père de famille”), in light of the contents of the letter.
As for the reference to Mayor Doré, that was a pretty marginal part of the letter, complaining about the City’s decision 15 years ago to repeal its anti-begging bylaw. That didn’t have anything to do with the five ways M Delisle suggested beggars should be killed, which was the substance of the complaint under the code. A marginal reference to a long-gone politician doesn’t immunise the writer for responsibility for making threats about killing people.
I was responding to your excessively broad mischaracterisation of the Code provision in issue. It does not create a general right not to be offended. It creates a specific right not to be treated in a particular way.
I have found from experience that those who do not like this type of law do not hesitate to over-state the scope of the law, casting it in the broadest possible light, and then criticising that broad fantasy version of the law, rather than the actual law. It’s simply a form of straw man attack. Your earlier posts, (and Xema’s post 41) strike me as examples of this type of fallacious arguments.
Sure, criticisms can be made of some aspects of libel law, but the fact remains that libel and slander laws are part of the common law generally, in Canada, the US, the UK, and other common law jurisdictions. The civil law jurisdictions have similar laws of defamation. I simply don’t see much difference between those laws that protect reputation, and the decision by the Quebec legislature to protect dignity as well. If we accept the general principle that the protection of reputation by libel and slander laws are acceptable and consistent with free speech, then I don’t see why the protection of dignity is any different
I’ve reviewed the Tribunal decision. It cited four cases from the SCC;
• Smith v. Jones, which discusses when it is appropriate to reveal private communications because of a concern about the safety of an individual. The Tribunal cited this case in support of the SAQ official’s decision to refer the email to the police.
• Simpson-Sears v. O’Malley, which held that intention is not relevant to human rights matters. Intention is an issue for the criminal law, but not for the civil law. Human rights laws are civil in nature, and therefore the same general principles from the civil law apply. The Tribunal cited it in support of the conclusion that the intention of M Delisle in writing the email was not relevant; it was the content and effect of the email that mattered.
• Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, a decision which upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition on hate publications set out in the Canadian Human Rights Act, and elaborated on how such provisions should be applied.
• Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v. Whatcott, a recent SCC decision re-affirming Taylor, The Tribunal cited these two decisions as aids to interpret s. 4 of the Quebec Code.
I’ve reviewed the Tribunal decision. It cited four cases from the SCC;
• Smith v. Jones, which discusses when it is appropriate to reveal private communications because of a concern about the safety of an individual. The Tribunal cited this case in support of the SAQ official’s decision to refer the email to the police.
• Simpson-Sears v. O’Malley, which held that intention is not relevant to human rights matters. Intention is an issue for the criminal law, but not for the civil law. Human rights laws are civil in nature, and therefore the same general principles from the civil law apply. The Tribunal cited it in support of the conclusion that the intention of M Delisle in writing the email was not relevant; it was the content and effect of the email that mattered.
• Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, a decision which upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition on hate publications set out in the Canadian Human Rights Act, and elaborated on how such provisions should be applied.
• Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v. Whatcott, a recent SCC decision re-affirming Taylor. The Tribunal cited these two decisions as aids to interpret s. 4 of the Quebec Code.
You can say that again!
Thanks, Desolation Island, for the English translation of the letter.
The letter writer is clearly not a very nice person, but it seemed to me he was just venting his spleen rather than actually threatening anyone. The letter is clearly over the top and hyperbolic, and the police, when shown it, apparently agreed. Freedom of speech has a higher value for me than a quasi-judicial attempt to compel civility and good manners by imposing fines. (I don’t know how much “dignity” a beggar outside a liquor store has anyway, such that the punitive powers of the state must be brought to bear on one who is deemed to have insulted her). And even if Canadian law permits it, an $8000 penalty seems waaaaaay disproportionate to the “offense.” A much more modest fine, a letter of apology and community service among the elderly or homeless would be the better way to go, I’d say.
Just my two cents’ worth.
Citizens have a human right to direct their grievances to their government without setting themselves up for penalties or having those grievances forwarded to third-parties in pretty transparent (and in this case successful) attempts at barratry.
The argument that SAQ is not an organ of the government, but merely a government-owned corporation which is afforded a legal monopoly in the sale of alcoholic beverages is another example of a distinction without a difference. Accounting tricks do not render the SAQ a non-governmental entity, and as a governmental entity, it is obligated not to suffer the outrage of hearing criticisms from its citizens without attempting to make them into human rights cases.
I also find the rationale for forwarding the email to the defendant to be utterly bogus. Even if SAQ understood this email to communicate a serious threat, it is unclear why the email needed to be forwarded to her, rather than the arrest of the writer or police protection for the putatitve target. (Except, of course, these options were not available, because the police department clearly understood, as SAQ and the Tribunal disingenuously did not, this email not to communicate a threat.)
As for the remarks on Mayor Doré, they are not marginal, but make it abundantly apparent that the email is meant to be a satirical take on what the email-writer percieves ask excessive governmental indulgence of panhandlers. A very permissible topic for a city-dweller to bring up to agents of his government, and which should not be met with trumped-up human rights charges.
This is why, as I said earlier, M. Delisle’s gravest offense was be insufficiently deferentital to the bureaucracy of Quebec, and insulting/threatening (the Tribunal’s decision isn’t sure which, but only the little people need to keep their jurisprudence straight) not Mme. Beaumont.
Speaking of fallacious arguments. Here you insist that your view does not create a general right not to be offended, but can only offer, as your alternative understanding of what’s at stake here, is the never-further-defined “right not to be treated in a particular way.” Well, yes, very good. Every bit of criminal/tort/civil rights law, in some fashion or another, creates a “right not to be treated in a particular way.”
What you have not been able to show is any limiting prinicple that would arrest the operation of this law before expanding into a general right not to be insulted or offended. And, indeed, it is now a fait accompli in Delisle c. Beaumont that someone was fined $8,000 for this very offense.
Again, you’ve been unable to identify why any of these characterizations, which seem amply instantiated by this case. We are not merely speculating as to what parade of horribles will result; we are addressing what has already taken place.
But, since you seem to have some expertise in this area, and since you seem to believe that the email genuinely communicated a threat, are you prepared to offer your opinion that this judgment of the Tribunal will likely be affirmed on appeal (if any)? And if not, why do you think the appeals court won’t see it the way you insist it should be viewed here?
Again, i would disagree with the suggestion that this is the punitive power of the state - human rights are civil, not penal.
But in any event, that’s why the concept of dignity is in the human rights code. Libel and slander laws tend to protect the reputation of well-established people of “good reputation,” (like lawyers, and dare I say it, judges? ), but generally aren’t of much assistance to individuals of low social status and poor reputation.
The principle of protecting dignity affirms that everyone has a certain level of dignity, regardless of social status.
In my experience, at the settlement discussions for human rights matters, letters of apology are often requested by the complainant, and often a sincere apology will go a long way to settle personal disputes on this type. A failure to apologise may lead to a break-down of settlement talks, in turn leading to the matter going to a Tribunal. No idea, of course, if that was in issue at the settlement talks here.
Community service does nothing to compensate the complainant. We use community service in Canada for criminal matters, but I’ve never heard of it being used in a civil matter. By its nature, community service is meant to compensate the community for harm done to the community. It doesn’t provide any compensation to the complainant, who is the person whose rights have been infringed.
I’m not convinced the complainant’s rights have been infringed. Had she not been shown the letter by the booze store manager, she would not have been aware of it at all. Had the letter not formed the heart of the tribunal’s case, the general public wouldn’t have known about it. For what does it profit a beggar to lose her anonymity but protect her “dignity”? $8000, I guess.
Dignity is in the eye of the beholder. I agree that everyone should be presumed to have at least some, but a beggar is, by her voluntary conduct, showing that she has very little, if any. Begging is an inherently undignified activity. I’m not suggesting anyone may or should insult, assault or hurt a beggar, but sending a vitriolic letter of complaint to a third party is, to me, no big deal. It reveals the writer to be an insensitive and over-the-top douche with nary a drop of human kindness, but not much more.