As a result of his comments, he’s recently been convicted under the Criminal Code offence of promoting hatred: Popescu guilty of promoting hatred.
The Crown evidently made some leeway with the fact that the same part of the Bible that Mr. Popescu relied upon also states that children who strike their parents should be stoned to death. Mr. Popescu has a previous conviction for assaulting his mother. Curiously, Mr. Popescu didn’t seem to think he should have been stoned to death. :dubious:
The judge gave him a suspended sentence and placed him on probation for 18 months.
Gee, I thought it was “astounding” a candidate for national office in Canada said gays should be executed. I’m opposed to laws that restrict what people can say, but since there are similar laws in most countries, I find the conviction less astounding than the crazy hate.
It’s a bit more complicated than that and yet so simple too. It’s also really not taken lightly. You are allowed to spew hatred as much as you want, as long as you aren’t advocating genocide or inciting a riot/violence.
You can say: “I really hate gays. Hate, hate, hate, hate them! I wish we lived in a society that killed them upon discovery! I wish we could create a gay vaccine so that faggotry vanished like smallpox! They are sick, sick, sick perverts and the abominations in the eyes of civilised society! I wish AIDS worked instantaneously so they would perish on faggoty contact! If one of them came up to me, I’d cockpunch him!”
That’s allowed.
But if your words are inciting violence, “We should tear down those pride decorations and beat some sense into them! Let’s go!” or if you are advocating genocide, such as: “We should execute gays!” is not acceptable.
So “I wish God would just smite them already and leave the world gay-free” is okay, but “Gays should be executed!” (implying systematic genocide) crosses the line.
Exceptions exist for issues of public debate, or religious doctrine. Dickwad tried to argue “religious doctrine”, the Crown pointed out a hole in that theory you could drive a truck full of beaten up little old ladies through.
ETA:
This guy is a very fringey fringe guy. He was never considered even a vaguely credible contender. He’s the town looney who somehow managed to scrape together the bare minimum paperwork requirements to get on the ticket.
[QUOTE=The Article]
A young man asked me what I think of homosexual marriages and I said I think homosexuals should be executed," he said. “My whole reason for running is the Bible and the Bible couldn’t be more clear on that point.” Candidates and teachers looked on in silence as students called for him to be “cut off.” Despite their outrage, the discussion moved to other topics.
[/QUOTE]
Note that he didn’t say, “Come on guys, lets get some rope and hang these queers!” He didn’t advocate any type of violence that would put anyone in danger. He was simply espousing a political and religious opinion, as ludicrous as it may be.
How far of a stretch would it be to make it a hate crime to call for execution of murders? Isn’t that inciting violence? Maybe someone knows someone who got away with murder and wants to take the law into his own hands?
So what do you view as “protected” free speech? As soon as you put that qualifier in, you’re just saying that you would draw the line at a different place.
Simply “promoting hatred” is enough? Most of the Pit consists of threads promoting hatred against identifiable groups of political or ideological adversaries. Are those criminally actionable as to Canadian participants?
Is al-Qaeda an identifiable group for purposes of this law?
Is there prior case law construing “hatred” to implicitly require some sort of incitement to violence, or otherwise limiting this provision somehow?
[QUOTE=Tom Tildrum]
Simply “promoting hatred” is enough? Most of the Pit consists of threads promoting hatred against identifiable groups of political or ideological adversaries. Are those criminally actionable as to Canadian participants?
Is al-Qaeda an identifiable group for purposes of this law?
[/QUOTE]
“identifiable group” in s. 319 has the same meaning as in s. 318(4):
So I wouldn’t think that Al Quaeda would count. It is a Muslim group, but what distinguishes it from other Muslim groups is its commitment to terrorism as a means of political action.
Also, the definition of “promoting” is governed by caselaw, as summarised below. What I’ve seen in the Pit wouldn’t meet that definition, IMHO.
[QUOTE=Tom Tildrum]
Is there prior case law construing “hatred” to implicitly require some sort of incitement to violence, or otherwise limiting this provision somehow?
[/QUOTE]
Not an incitement to violence, since that’s covered by s. 319(1), linked to above.
The leading case is R. v. Keegstra, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the provision and upheld it from a constitutional challenge. The majority held that the combination of the terms “promoting” and “wilfully” created a very high standard of mens rea:
[QUOTE=Chief Justice Dickson]
On appeal, Martin J.A. overturned the conviction [in another case, R. v. Buzzanga]. He noted that the word “wilfully” does not have a fixed meaning in criminal law, and thus sought to divine the use and import of the word as it appears in s. 319(2) (pp. 379-81). Comparing the section with s. 319(1) (then s. 281.2(1)), which prohibits incitement to hatred in a public place where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of peace, he said (at pp. 381-82):
The insertion of the word “wilfully” in [s. 319(2)] was not necessary to import mens rea since that requirement would be implied in any event because of the serious nature of the offence: see R. v. Prue, supra. The statements, the communication of which are proscribed by [s. 319(2)], are not confined to statements communicated in a public place in circumstances likely to lead to a breach of the peace and they, consequently, do not pose such an immediate threat to public order as those falling under [s. 319(1)]; it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that Parliament intended to limit the offence under [s. 319(2)] to the intentional promotion of hatred. It is evident that the use of the word “wilfully” in [s. 319(2)], and not in [s. 319(1)], reflects Parliament’s policy to strike a balance in protecting the competing social interests of freedom of expression on the one hand, and public order and group reputation on the other hand.
More specifically, Martin J.A. went on to elaborate on the meaning of “wilfully”, concluding that this mental element is satisfied only where an accused subjectively desires the promotion of hatred or foresees such a consequence as certain or substantially certain to result from an act done in order to achieve some other purpose (pp. 384-85). On the facts in Buzzanga, the trial judge had informed the jury that “wilfully” could be equated with the intention to create “controversy, furor and an uproar” (p. 386). This interpretation was clearly incompatible with Martin J.A.'s requirement that the promotion of hatred be intended or foreseen as substantially certain, and a new trial was therefore ordered.
The interpretation of “wilfully” in Buzzanga has great bearing upon the extent to which s. 319(2) limits the freedom of expression. This mental element, requiring more than merely negligence or recklessness as to result, significantly restricts the reach of the provision, and thereby reduces the scope of the targeted expression. Such a reduced scope is recognized and applauded in the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s Working Paper on Hate Propaganda, op. cit., it being said that (at p. 36):
The principle of restraint requires lawmakers to concern themselves not just with whom they want to catch, but also with whom they do not want to catch. For example, removing an intent or purpose requirement could well result in successful prosecutions of cases similar to Buzzanga, where members of a minority group publish hate propaganda against their own group in order to create controversy or to agitate for reform. This crime should not be used to prosecute such individuals.
I agree with the interpretation of “wilfully” in Buzzanga, and wholeheartedly endorse the view of the Law Reform Commission Working Paper that this stringent standard of mens rea is an invaluable means of limiting the incursion of s. 319(2) into the realm of acceptable (though perhaps offensive and controversial) expression. It is clear that the word “wilfully” imports a difficult burden for the Crown to meet and, in so doing, serves to minimize the impairment of freedom of expression.
[/QUOTE]
See also R. v. Ahenakew, a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, which emphasises that the element of “promotion” means that the accused must intend to promote his views; merely stating them in public, even to a news reporter, is not sufficient. The mens rea requires a subjective intention to promote hatred.
Poorly worded sentence. I believe that free speech should be protected under the constitution (yes, I know this was in Canada, but if I believe something in Montana, I believe it in Alberta).