Bricker, I don’t know if you are simply ignoring me, but your OP clearly states that you contend that any claim to animals having rights is meaningless: a pretty darn clear and major assertion that you don’t seem willing to defend for some reason.
Now, maybe you wanted to have an argument over whether it was appropriate for the poster you referred to (not by name) was right to assert that it was objectively unarguable that they do, but that’s not the OP you posted.
Please, either defend your original OP, or amend it. Don’t cop out on both.
We’re neighbours. I’m driving home from work. It’s dark, I’m tired, I’d like nothing more than to walk in the door, flop down on the couch and veg in front of the TV. So I’m pulling into the driveway and there’s a thump from under the car. I park and investigate. Seems I ran over your dog. A ridiculously rare breed – quite possibly the last of his kind, in fact. Was the last of his kind. Oops. Meh, whatever. I shrug, walk into the house and retire for the night.
Was I wrong for running over your dog? For not caring enough to tell you or even attempt to pay restitution? Let’s ignore the legal aspects of dog ownership and animal cruelty for the moment and assume he’s not property so you have no legal avenues to pursue. Let’s further assume that there are no grounds upon which to file suit. This is purely between us. Was it wrong of me, morally, to run over your dog, and to furthermore not really think much of it? On the assumption that your answer is “Yes, you were wrong and you’re an asshole for killing my dog,” would it be safe to say that pretty much everyone would feel the same way in the same situation? (Assuming that “everyone else” enjoys the company of dogs)
If yes, then describe to me please the difference between this fictitious scenario and the real one we’re debating.
Yes, but that’s largely irrelevant.
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Plus, a moral decision based on the utility of (or threat posed by) a species is not a moral decision at all. Moral decisions are choices between two goods, not between a good and an evil (that would be economy, I guess).
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The very definition of morality is determining what is right and what is wrong – an ethical choice between good and evil, if you prefer. Morality doesn’t even factor into a decision of convenience. That’s based solely on how much effort and/or expense one cares to invest in whatever actions either decision entails.
We don’t necessarily have a moral obligation to protect the weak if their weakness is self-inflicted or borne of ordinary, natural circumstances. We do have a moral obligation to protect the weak from the strong who threaten them, however. Hell, in some US states, doing nothing while a crime is being committed against another human being is, in itself, a crime.
Yes, it was wrong of you – but it was wrong for the reasons you explicitly ask me to ignore. The dog is a pet in which I have a possessary and property interest. If you ran over a dog that belonged to the guy across the street, it is NOT wrong for you to fail to tell me then.
You see the trick you’re using here? You invite me to say (or think) “Yes, you were wrong and you’re an asshole for killing my dog,” when you have trieed to explicitly disavow the “my” dog aspect earlier. This dishonest slight of hand invites the reader to agree with your conclusion for all the wrong reasons.
For the same reason, we have laws against cruelty to dogs, and these laws apply even if the dog in question is a stray. You unconvincingly ask us to forget that such laws exist, and then appeal to emotion from a society that felt strongly enough about the welfare of dogs to pass such laws in the first place. Sorry - that’s a first-year rhetorical trick. As Lincoln is alleged to have pointed out in answer to “How many legs does a horse have if you call a tail a leg?” the answer is “Four - because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg.” Similarly, trying to exclude the entire social context of pet ownership and animal cruelty laws does not make them disappear.
No rights have an utterly rational basis, they are gifts we bestow to ourselves and our fellows. We don’t even pretend, we just say “We hold these truths to be self-evident…”, which has got to be the Mother of all Evasions. Still, works for me.
I think this isn’t getting anywhere because only one person even brought up the word rights and it was taken out of context. I’m not even sure what that means.
Which is why I brought up the analogy of the rights of unborn children. I assert, with the same bland certainty shown for the dolphins, that unborn children have a moral claim to life. I hold that truth to be self-evident.
Bricker, since all *you * have done is “deny it”, you might try to provide some support for your own position. If, that is, you really *are * interested in persuasion or even honest, ignorance-fighting discussion, an interest which is sadly not at all evident.
It would help you first to accept the *normal * definition of “rights” instead of trying to insist upon your own weirdly idiosyncratic definition, seemingly chosen to be cramped enough to match your own preferred conclusion. Fair enough?
I assert that rights may be possessed only by coherent entities that can appreciate the rights (i.e., the capacity to appreciate a right is a necessary but not sufficient condition for having that right). An entity who cannot give birth to babies has no right to have babies; an entity who cannot feel pain has no right to avoid pain; an entity who cannot move has no right to freedom of movement. An entity that can feel pain does have a prima facie right to not be caused pain (a right which holds only against entities capable of appreciating rights, of course); an entity with a desire to survive does have a prima facie right to survive.
Rights come into conflict very often, of course, and when they do, they have to be weighed against one another.
Suggesting that an eight-week-old fetus has more of a right to life than an eight-week-old alfalfa sprout seems weird to me: neither has any more self-awareness than the other, neither has any greater capacity to feel pain, neither has any greater set of desires or fears than the other. Suggesting that a dolphin has more of a right to life than an alfalfa sprout seems perfectly reasonable: the dolphin can feel pain and pleasure, can exhibit desires and fears, has awareness of its environment, can take deliberate action to achieve its interests, can make predictions about the future (e.g., if it performs a trick, it will get a treat), and so forth. It has the capacity to appreciate many more rights than a fetus has.
And Bricker, if you’re suggesting that animal welfare laws are extensions of property laws, I believe you’re incorrect, for three reasons. First, a man who tortures a deer to death will be charged under the same statute as the man who tortures a neighborhood dog to death, at least in North Carolina. Second, a man who shoots his neighbor’s dog to prevent the dog’s attack on his livestock will not be charged, whereas a man who lights his neighbor’s dog on fire will be charged (even if he lights the dog on fire to prevent an attack on livestock). Third, and most significantly, a man who tortures his own dog to death will be charged with animal cruelty; indeed, this is the backbone of prohibitions against dogfighting.
If anti-cruelty statutes apply to wildlife, I don’t see how you can say that they should be viewed primarily in the context of pet ownership. If i may quote Lincoln back at you, “I care not much for a man’s religion whose dog and cat are not the better for it.”
Not relevant to the point I’m making – I’m showing that we need more than simply a “I declare this truth self-evident” statement. Or I can simply declare that it’s self-evident your distinction is meaningless, in exactly the same way that the dolphin fringe is declaring that their claimed rights exist. It’s not enough to “declare” – you must offer either near-universal acceptance, as with the other rights mentioned above, or provide some other source of “rights” that both you and I agree upon.
The mere fact that I discussed both, one following the other, should not compel the conclusion that I argued one causes the other. Obviously animal cruelty laws are not co-extensive with ownership.
On the other hand, animal cruelty laws are not an example of universal human morality. Merely because we have such laws does not make them universal moral imperatives, any more than our minimum wage laws should compel the conslusion that $5.85 per hour is a universal moral human right. (Although, come to think of it, perhaps most readers here are nodding their heads vigorously and saying, “Yes, of course it is!”)
If rights do not exist except if defined in written law (as you told us before), but even being defined in law does not constitute a right (as you tell us now), do you believe that there is such a thing as a “right” at all?
If you do, then what to you constitutes a right? If you do not, what is left of whatever your system of morality may be? Your good faith in this thread is not at all apparent at this point, sadly.
Now we’re where you explain how the capacity to appreciate rights is not a necessary condition for having rights. That idea seems to me to be bizarre: what sense does it make to talk about someone’s having a right that they are incapable of benefiting from?
Well yes, obviously. That’s why I began that quote with “If.” I was responding to:
A code of morality need not be universal to be compelling, of course. Indeed, I don’t think you can find any item of morality that is universal among humans; if that’s the baseline for morality, then there’s no such thing.
“Appreciate” doesn’t mean “reflect on and consider.” In this context, I mean “benefit from.” An alive being can benefit from a right to life; they may appreciate it.
However, I don’t consider a right to life to be especially important; rather, it’s the rights to fulfill desires, avoid feared events, experience pleasure, avoid pain, explore interests, and so forth that are the significant rights. Death obviates the rights to fulfill desires, explore interests, etc., and often involves a feared event and pain.
To the extent that a particular profoundly retarded person lacks the ability to experience pleasure, they don’t have that right–how would it make sense to speak of their having a right they cannot appreciate? (or, if it’s clearer, benefit from)? To the extent that they fear nothing, they do not have a right to not be subjected to feared events. And so forth. If a given profoundly retarded person cannot experience pleasure or pain, pursue interests or avoid feared events, fulfill desires, or perform similar functions, I’m not sure what benefit it is to anyone, least of all the profoundly retarded person, to speak of their right to life.
Note that in such cases, “profoundly retarded” isn’t the usual language; “profoundly retarded” generally refers to people who can fulfill all the above functions. The more general language would be something like “hydrocephalatic”, I believe.
Since we’re not legislating here, but rather discussing morality, let’s go with you personally.
If you kill such a person, you will be subject to the same criminal legal penalties that you would for killing, say, Larry the Cable Guy. We, as a society, provide a legal remedy for taking the life of such a person, and that’s the only objective definition of “right.”
I personally feel we may safely disceren moral guidance through an informed conscience, and the guidance of the Church, which I believe is divinely instituted and teaches infallibly on matters of faith and morals.
BUt I don’t suggest that is an appropeiate basis for legislation.
The first sentence is true, as is the first part of the second sentence. I disagree that the third sentence is correct, that there is any objective correspondence between the law and “right”.
In other words, I disagree with your assertion. Where does that leave us?
Actually, I’d say that moral guidance through an informed conscience is a basis for legislation–even though, again, I’m not discussing legislation here. I’m discussing what’s right and wrong, and I disagree that legislation is a basis for discovering what’s right and wrong. Quite the opposite: legislation should be based on what’s right and what’s wrong, not the other way around.