I’m afraid I side with Diogenes; **Stoid **hasn’t done anything to merit a whit of sympathy over the course of this fiasco. She’s convinced she’s smarter than those whose advice purportedly seeks, and would likely have spun anything but an utter defeat as a vindication of her obsessive, arrogant, muleheaded behavior. It sounds like the court has unambiguously declared her to be in the wrong, as pretty much everyone on this board had tried to tell her. I think it’s actually the best outcome, creating a sliver of possibility that she’ll do some hard self-examination and avoid getting involved in this sort of lunacy in the future. If that’s harsh, then so be it.
That post wasn’t aimed at anyone here – it was an attack on attourneys she had contacted personally.
C’mon, people, at least acknowledge that she’s losing her house – that’s pretty bad. IF Stoid later comes back and starts screaming about the injustice and acting arrogant, THEN you can attack her. But this isn’t the time.
I read the opinion. Your appeal was nearly all focused on factual disputes, something appeals courts rarely disturb. You claimed you gave us all relevant information and endlessly bitched that lawyers always believe relevant facts are left out if a party is not questioned by a competent lawyer. You mocked lawyers, called the lawyer, receiver and judge various terms questioning their ethics.
You claimed there was no deadlock. According to the opinion you changed the locks and diverted funds for your own personal use. I don’t give a shot for your excuses, that’s apparently what the record says. Had you been up front about your conduct, fine. Maybe there would have been sympathy, maybe a lawyer would have offered a bit of help off board. You were not honest about the record.
I am sorry about your house, but even the appeals court mentioned you were emotional.
Let it go and when your life evens out you might want to admit you left out key facts. If you do ever seek counsel think long and hard about letting that lawyer use his or her judgment as to what is important.
To those who think I am harsh, I’ll be happy to set forth all f the issues she glossed over or did not tell us what had been established pre-appeal.
Just a question or two for anyone:
Isn’t the appeal process supposed to show errors in a previous case as opposed to reviewing the facts of the case?
The ruling on the appeal seems mostly to be for procedural things; i.e., since the appeal was not in order, the judges said, “We’re not wasting our time with this.”
And if that’s the case, it’s still possible that the original ruling might possibly actually have been in contravention of existing statute and/or case law, right?
(And while I don’t have a legal background, I have always assumed that it takes either a) some pretty overwhelming or b) a ridiculously bad decision by a lower court for a higher court to overturn a decision.)
I don’t know which post you’re talking about, but in the Arrogant Attorney Asshats thread in the Pit, she certainly did not limit her vitriol to attorneys she had contacted personally. She was bitching at Doper attorneys who refused to offer her legal advice in a GQ thread.
yes
yes
irrelevant, frankly. you fail to properly argue, you waive. you don’t get multiple cracks at the apple. it would be 100% unfair to the other side if you would.
looks back over the thread You’re right. Sorry, I thought it was mostly about how she was asking for “info” for free. Sorry, I didn’t read it over again. The way I remembered it was that she was going to various attourney’s offices and asking them for leads.
Stoid, you changed the locks on your house? Why the hell would you do that? And why would you move company funds into your own personal account?
Yes, although a factual finding that is unsupported by the record, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, can be challenged.
There’s some of that. There is some review on the merits as well.
Yes, if she procedurally defaulted an otherwise disposive issue, sure.
No.
Right, I’ve made an anonymised version of the judgement as it seems stupid to have people talking about it while others don’t have it.
In these consolidated appeals, defendant Stoid seeks review of interim orders concerning the partition by sale of the parties’ home, the involuntary dissolution of the parties’ limited liability company, the appointment of a receiver, damages, attorney fees, and an accounting. To the extent the interim orders directed the appointment of a receiver, a partition sale, and the involuntary dissolution, winding up, and liquidation of the business, they are directly appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subds. (a)(7) [appeal may be taken from an interim order appointing a receiver], (a)(9) [appeal may be taken “[f]rom an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition determining the rights and interests of the respective parties and directing partition to be made”]; Reynolds v. Special Projects, Inc. (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 496 [interlocutory decree ordering winding up of corporation was final, notwithstanding its title, and therefore appealable].)1 As to the issues addressed in this opinion, the orders are affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff The Ex and defendant Stoid, an unmarried couple, were the sole owners of a limited liability company, Stoid-biz LLC (Stoid-biz, the company, or the business), through which they operated their home internet business. After their personal and business relationships deteriorated, The Ex moved out of their home and ceased working for their business. After the parties tried but failed to divide their assets voluntarily, The Ex filed suit in September 2006 for partition by sale of their home, involuntary dissolution of Stoid-biz, accounting, injunctive relief, appointment of a receiver, and damages.
**I. The March 25, 2008 Interim Order and Appeal **
The trial court bifurcated the issues and tried the partition and dissolution issues first, leaving the accounting issues for a later date. Following the trial of the partition and dissolution issues, the court entered a March 25, 2008 interim order from which plaintiff appealed on June 6, 2008 (No. <<REMOVED>>) after her motion for new trial was denied. The court ruled in the March 25 order as follows.
*A. Partition by Sale *
The court found that the parties owned their home as tenants in common, and that The Ex was entitled to exercise his statutory right to partition by sale. The order explained “that under the circumstances, sale and division of the proceeds is more equitable than division of the property. The Court finds that there is no written agreement providing for appraisal by any other method. The Court hereby appoints a referee to monitor the sale of the Subject Property. All expenses regarding the sale of the Subject Property shall be paid by Plaintiff and Defendant Stoid equally. No portion of such expenses shall be paid by Defendant Stoid-biz. The property is to be sold at a private sale and the proceeds are to be divided in accordance with this interlocutory judgment.”
*B. Involuntary Dissolution *
Before discussing the dissolution order, we briefly note that Stoid-biz’s Operating Agreement provided for the involuntary dissolution, winding up, and liquidation of the business upon the occurrence of certain “liquidating events,” which included “[t]he happening of any other event that makes it unlawful or impossible to carry on the business of the Company.” We further note that Corporations Code section 17351, subdivision (a)(4) states that “[p]ursuant to an action filed by any manager or by any member or members, a court of competent jurisdiction may decree the dissolution of a limited liability company whenever any of the following occurs: [¶] . . . [¶] (4) The management of a limited liability company is deadlocked or subject to internal dissention.” In the March 25 order, the trial court ordered the involuntary dissolution of Stoid-biz, stating that “the management of Defendant Stoid-biz is deadlocked and is subject to internal dissension. [¶] The Court finds that Defendant Stoid changed the locks on the Subject Property, changed the [company’s] bank account [by opening a new account in her name only,] and did not give Plaintiff further access to the records of Defendant Stoid-biz.” In light of The Ex’s exclusion from Stoid-biz’s premises, books, assets, and accounts, the trial court appointed The Receiver as receiver and referee. As referee, The Receiver was to oversee the sales of both the home and business. As receiver, The Receiver was “to determine the value and manage the assets of the business, to sell the business, report to the Court and facilitate the division of the proceeds amongst the parties.” The March 25 order directed The Receiver to oversee the sale of Stoid-biz after obtaining three independent appraisals, unless the parties agreed on a reasonable value that met his approval. The order allowed either party to “make an offer to purchase the business interest of the other prior to or once the business is on the market.”
**II. The Asset Sale **
Before The Receiver could obtain three independent appraisals, Stoid-biz’s assets were liquidated in June or July 2008 at a sale by referee. The sale by this method was precipitated by Stoid-biz’s loss of its merchant bank account through which it processed credit card sales. Given the nature of Stoid-biz’s business (<<REDACTED BY H.P.>>), it was difficult to obtain a new merchant bank account and Stoid-biz was rapidly losing income. In light of this development, The Receiver filed a June 13, 2008 ex parte application seeking to hold a sale by referee. (Citing § 873.610 [“The court may, at the time of trial or thereafter, prescribe such manner, terms, and conditions of sale not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter as it deems proper for the particular property or sale.”].) After the trial court approved the sale, Stoid sought a stay pending her appeal from the March 25 order. When she was unable to post the $337,000 undertaking (later reduced to $295,000) that was ordered by the court, she petitioned for an immediate stay and writ of supersedeas, which was denied by this court on September 9, 2008. At the sale by referee, Stoid purchased Stoid-biz’s assets for $116,000. On July 18, 2008, the court ratified the sale.
**
III. The Accounting Trial, December 4, 2008 Interim Order, and Appeal**
Following the sale of Stoid-biz’s assets, the court held a trial of the accounting issues. It then entered the December 4, 2008 order titled “Proposed Interlocutory Judgment After Completion of the Accounting Phase of Trial,” from which Stoid appealed on December 18, 2008. (<<REMOVED>>) The two appeals (Nos. <<REMOVED>>, <<REMOVED>>) were consolidated on February 6, 2009. According to the December 4 order, the parties’ home had not yet been sold. The December 4 order directed the dissolution of Stoid-biz, ordered the sale of the home’s furnishings, and awarded judgment for The Ex on the accounting issues “in the amount of $103,640 plus attorney fees and costs in an amount to be determined.” The December 4 order reserved the court’s “jurisdiction to resolve all disputes until the Subject Real Property has been sold, the final Referee/Receiver report has been reviewed and approved and any funds remaining are distributed.”2 On April 21, 2009, the trial court entered a “Modified Judgment and Statement of Decision After Completion of the Accounting Phase of Trial.” The April 21 order, which was also interlocutory, increased the amount of The Ex’s judgment to “$194,760.50 plus attorney fees on the partition and costs in an amount to be determined.” The April 21 order further stated that the “judgment is to be paid, to the extent there are funds to do so, from defendant’s share of the assets of Stoid-biz following payment of the creditors and the referee.” The court again reserved jurisdiction to resolve all disputes until the sale of the home, the approval of the final referee/receiver report, and distribution of any remaining funds. On December 2, 2009, Stoid petitioned for writ of supersedeas or immediate stay pending appeal, seeking a stay of the hearing on the receiver’s motion to approve the final acts of dissolution, and to approve his final fees and discharge. The petition was denied by this court on December 17, 2009.
DISCUSSION
Before addressing the issues on appeal, we briefly address the “Motion for Factual Determinations on Appeal” that was filed by Stoid, a pro se litigant, after The Ex elected not to file a respondent’s brief. As a general rule, issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed to be waived. (Reed v. Mutual Service Corp. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372, fn. 11.) The rule exists largely as a matter of fairness and we see no reason to depart from it here. Accordingly, the motion is denied. Turning to the opening brief, Stoid raises numerous issues that will be addressed as follows: (1) the right to partition; (2) the finding of deadlock; (3) the appointment of a receiver; (4) the sale by referee and involuntary dissolution order; (5) the accounting judgment; and (6) judicial bias. Because no final award of attorney fees and referee/receiver fees has been entered, we conclude that those issues are not yet ripe for review.
**I. The Right to Partition **
In general, the partition of concurrent property interests is a matter of right, unless barred by waiver or altered by agreement. (§ 872.210, subd. (b); Harrison v. Domergue (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 19, 21; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 72, p. 119.) The right to partition is “subject to waiver which may be effected by an implied as well as an express agreement when an inequity would result. (Thomas v. Witte, 214 Cal.App.2d 322.)” (Pine v. Tiedt (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 733, 738.) An implied waiver may be found based on evidence “that the parties had committed the property to a specific use for a certain period of time.” (Id. at p. 739.) It may also be found based on evidence of a “writing which requires one party to first offer to sell his interest to the other.” (Schwartz v. Shapiro (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 238, 253.) However, equitable factors are relevant to this determination and partition may be ordered when it would be inequitable to enforce an implied waiver under the circumstances. (Id. at p. 256.) According to the example cited in Schwartz, “‘If, after an opportunity to purchase the interest of the petitioner under the terms of the contract, the defendant Rhodes should refuse to avail himself of this privilege, the right to partition the property would then arise.’” (Id. at p. 254, quoting Rhodes v. Lane (1947) 202 Ga. 608, 610.) In this case, Stoid contends that, given the undisputed evidence of her right of first refusal, the trial court erred in failing to find that The Ex had waived the right to partition. According to The Ex’s declaration, the parties had orally agreed that Stoid would buy “out my portion of the home we owned together, and she would buy out my interest in the Subject Business as well.” The Ex argued below that it would be inequitable to enforce an implied waiver because Stoid’s right of first refusal was not in writing (citing Civ. Code, § 1624 [statute of frauds]) and, in any event, it had expired because it was not exercised within a reasonable time. (Citing Schwartz v. Shapiro, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d at p. 254.) The Ex stated below: “The parties agreed to no specific time in which to keep the right of first refusal open. Plaintiff has allowed Defendant 15 months to either purchase his interest in the Subject Property or to place it on the market for sale but Defendant did not take any actions toward that goal. . . . [P]laintiff cannot be forced to wait indefinitely and respectfully submits that his application for an order to market and sell the Subject Property immediately be granted.” Stoid contends that because her failure to purchase The Ex’s interest in the home was caused by The Ex’s “unfair demand that Stoid pay a surplus to him for the property or lose it in this action,” The Ex is estopped to deny the existence of an implied waiver. However, Stoid cites only the evidence that arguably supports her position that The Ex’s price was unfair. She does not address the conflicting evidence The Ex presented to convince the trial court that he was entitled to a partition sale.3 Given that a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court and all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the respondent (Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 51, 60), we conclude that Stoid has failed to establish the existence of reversible error.
**II. The Finding of Deadlock
**
Stoid contends that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the parties were deadlocked as to their management of Stoid-biz. The contention lacks merit. In the March 25 order, the court cited as supporting evidence the testimony “that Defendant Stoid changed the locks on the Subject Property, changed the bank account and did not give Plaintiff further access to the records of Defendant Stoid-biz.” Although Stoid challenges the credibility of this testimony, she correctly concedes that “the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.” (Evid. Code, § 411.) Given the trial court’s determination that the testimony was credible, we are bound by that determination in the absence of a compelling reason to disregard it. The rule is well established that “‘[c]onflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]’” (People v. Jones (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 161, 165.) Stoid contends that the finding of deadlock was based on evidence of “disagreements about two advertising expenditures,” which was insufficient to establish that the parties were deadlocked. However, as noted above, there was other supporting evidence not mentioned in Stoid’s brief. An appellant must state fully, with transcript references, the evidence that is claimed to be insufficient to support the challenged findings. Where this rule is ignored, the reviewing court need not make an independent search of the record. (Haynes v. Gwynn (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 149, 151.) “‘When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.)
III. The Appointment of a Receiver
The trial court may appoint receivers in “cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party.” (§ 564, subd. (b)(9).) Subject to the court’s control, receivers may bring and defend actions, take possession of the property, receive rents, collect, compound, and compromise debts, make transfers, and “do such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.” (§ 568.) “A receiver may, pursuant to an order of the court, sell real or personal property in the receiver’s possession upon the notice and in the manner prescribed by Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of Division 2 of Title 9. The sale is not final until confirmed by the court.” (§ 568.5.) In this case, The Ex alleged in the complaint that a receiver was necessary to oversee the business because Stoid had assumed complete control of Stoid-biz’s premises, books, assets, and accounts, and had misappropriated company assets. The complaint alleged that a receiver was needed to prevent material harm to The Ex’s interest in the company. After conducting a hearing, the trial court found that a receiver was necessary to preserve Stoid-biz’s assets and appointed The Receiver to serve as receiver. Stoid challenges this appointment, stating that “the Corporations Code statute is intended to prevent such an appointment” and that The Receiver “was supposed to be simply a ‘referee . . . .’” Stoid argues that The Receiver was given the “task of ‘running’ the company and the business as a receiver, without any hearing, and caused irreparable harm in the process.” The court appointed The Receiver as a receiver after a hearing. The opening brief fails to explain why the appointment conflicted with or was precluded by the Corporations Code. The contention, which was raised without adequate argument or citation to authority, merits no further discussion. (Krain v. Medical Board (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1426 [a reviewing court is not obligated to develop the appellant’s arguments].)
**
IV. The Sale by Referee and Involuntary Dissolution Order **
Stoid contends that the trial court erred in allowing a sale by referee of Stoid-biz’s assets after she had elected to purchase The Ex’s interest pursuant to Corporations Code section 17351. Given that the sale by referee was approved and confirmed by the court and the dissolution and winding up of Stoid-biz is nearly, if not entirely, finished, we fail to perceive what relief, if any, is available at this point. In any event, in order to prevail, Stoid must explain, with citations to relevant legal authority, why the trial court erred in confirming the referee’s sale. Given Stoid’s failure to do so, further discussion is not warranted. (See Krain v. Medical Board, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.)
**V. The Accounting Judgment **
Stoid contends that the trial court’s “accounting judgment and statement [of decision] were completely wrong in almost every possible detail.” However, she relies solely on the “Objections and request for a statement of decision” that were filed before the court issued its “Modified Judgment and Statement of Decision After Completion of the Accounting Phase of Trial” on April 21, 2009. She offers no explanation as to why the April 21 order was erroneous. Stoid also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the accounting trial while her consolidated appeals from the March 25 and December 4 orders were pending. In support of this argument below, Stoid cited Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank (1941) 17 Cal.2d 104, 107, and Neusted v. Skernswell (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 361, 370, for the proposition that the perfecting of an appeal from an interim order of partition operates as a stay without bond. However, section 917.4, which was enacted in 1968, provides in relevant part that “[t]he perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or order in the trial court if the judgment or order appealed from directs the sale, conveyance or delivery of possession of real property which is in the possession or control of the appellant or the party ordered to sell, convey or deliver possession of the property, unless an undertaking in a sum fixed by the trial court is given . . . .” Stoid does not explain why section 917.4 does not apply to this case.
To be continued…
…continue:
**VI. Judicial Bias **
While this action was pending, The Receiver filed an unlawful detainer action against Stoid, which, as a related case, was transferred to Judge The Judge, the bench officer in this case. Stoid then filed a section 170.6 motion to disqualify Judge The Judge, and the unlawful detainer action was sent to another department. Stoid contends on appeal that following her disqualification from the unlawful detainer action under section 170.6, Judge The Judge was “without jurisdiction to sever the consolidated cases,” citing Geldermann, Inc. v. Bruner (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 662. Geldermann is distinguishable, however, because it did not arise under section 170.6, but involved the voluntary disqualification of a trial judge under section 170.3. Accordingly, Stoid’s reliance on Geldermann is misplaced. Stoid has failed to provide any argument or authority to support her allegation of bias.
DISPOSITION
As to the issues addressed in this opinion, the March 25, 2008 and December 4, 2008 orders are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
FOOTNOTES
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 The December 4 order described the remaining issues as follows: “There is $81,033.63 remaining of the assets of Stoid-biz. The Stoid-Street property [the couple’s residence] has not yet sold. The real estate market has been in a downturn since the commencement of this action. As of the end of September 2008, fees for Kevin The Receiver totaled $32,302. [¶] The Court’s judgment at this time is an interlocutory judgment. The Court will issue a proposed final judgment when (1) the Stoid-Street property has been sold and there has been a Court confirmation/overbid hearing; (2) the Court has received the Referee/Receiver’s final report and accounting[;] and (3) the Court has received the Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs detailing the attorney’s fees requested by Plaintiff. The Court retains jurisdiction to effectuate any further orders necessary to complete the partition of real and personal property and the allotment and distribution of proceeds of the sale of the assets of Stoid-biz LLC as well as to hear any further objections to the accounting of the Referee/Receiver.”
3 Stoid states that The Ex “agreed with the $650,000 [record citation] value she used for the house that was based on the value the bank had given it when they refinanced the home equity line of credit a few months prior. . . . Stoid had offered to pay The Ex exactly the same net amount he would have received in a sale to a third party, but he believed that Stoid should pay him more than that. Eight percent more, specifically, the standard amount of closing costs and broker fees, which Stoid had considered in doing her calculation of their equity. [¶] The Ex said he would discuss the offer with an accountant he knew.” “He never actually turned down Stoid’s offer, although they had several emotional discussions about it. When The Ex first raised the possibility of a partition suit, Stoid pointed out that going to court to try to twist her arm to pay him more than he would receive from anyone else would simply eat up all the extra he was trying to get even if he got it. He said he understood that.” She also argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence, but because this apparently occurred at the accounting trial held months after the partition order was entered, it had no bearing on the order granting a partition by sale.
Thank you.
I haven’t read anything anyone has said, except for Bricker’s note yesterday (that gave me heart failure, and rightly so) and the note from Frank above this box about the anonymized version of the judgment.
I very much appreciate the bone-picking to remain as anonymous as possible, please. I think that’s a fair request on my part, and most people do not know or wont’ make the effort to get the original, we don’t need to make my privacy and the privacy of others too easily available.
I won’t be coming back to this thread for quite a while, for a whole host of reasons, the obvious among them: checking out the gleeful taunts would be simply masochism, and my life has loads of pain without adding that.
But also, I have far too much to do, both legally and just in my day to day life. I have to take control of my obsessiveness and impulse issues just to stay alive in the simplest way, forget anything larger than that.
For the consumption of those who are hungry for it, I give it to you freely: I am exactly as devastated as you might imagine (and enjoy). Those of you who despise me may delight in the knowledge that I’m completely trashed and terrified and I feel utterly lost. Very much like the earth has opened up and is about to swallow me whole, for reasons that encompass so much more than you will ever begin to understand.
And I give you what you want to know: do I accept this as a fair review of the judgment? Of course not. They completely ignored what was actually the problem, and what I argued, which was the denial of my right starting on the day of the verdict, continuing to the judgment, and on to the May ruling, and answered a question/argument that was never asked: was it legitimate to affirm the asset sale? (Well, sure… assuming such a sale was legitimate to start with, which it wasn’t… sigh)
The way the opinion is written, it appears for all the world that they actually did not read the brief. They read the judgment, went with the idea that it must be right, and affirmed. Almost nothing that I brought up was addressed in any way at all.
So whatever you think of that (and I know what you think of that) it is what I said I would not accept as legit: a dodge. I was brushed off. I would have accepted, because I would have had to, an opinion that upheld her denial of my buyout right based on some kind of lawful reading of the statute and her interpretation of it which led to her denying my right to buy him out.
You guys busted your asses trying to tell me how the law could be read to uphold her decision (made in the hearing, let’s not forget) - but the court of appeal didn’t bother at all, they just pretended it never happened that way to begin with.
Some of you may believe that’s legitimate. Some of you may understand why I don’t.
Thanks to all who are for me and feel for me, I assume there’s a lone voice or two, but I can’t wade through the taunts to find you. If you really want, you can email me.
I’ll be back, down the road.
And again, PLEASE try to respect my privacy in terms of keeping real names of EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING out of it! PLEASE. Trash me all you like, but be civilized as far as that goes. ***Thank you very much in advance. ***
And one more thing, not that I imagine much attention will be paid: reading the opinion and the recitations of what happened, what the judgment stated, blah blah… does not reflect the facts, so holding them up and going: “See?” doesn’t mean anything. Because the judgment and findings did not come from the testimony and evidence offered at trial and in sworn declarations, and by that I mean the PLAINTIFF’s testimony, it reflects the relentless assertions of the plaintiff’s lawyer, which did not match his client’s testimony.
Plaintiff: Sky is blue.
Plaintiff’s attorney, 2 dozen times afterwards: Your honor has heard my client testify that the sky is pink!
Court’s finding: Sky is pink.
Over and over and over.
So the appellate court stating what the trial court found was true is meaningless.
Just for the record.
Now I’m gone… dance on my grave, pick at my bones, delight in my defeat.
Stoid, if your case does indeed have merrit beyond what you see I truely hope a lawyer here who reads this will offer some kind of assistance to you. Take care.
You obviously didn’t learn a thing. You’re still smearing people for doing their job. There was no conspiracy against you, Stoid. You were not wronged. You lost on the merits. Your complaint was bullshit. You also misrepresented and glossed a lot of the facts in this thread. I’m not taunting you (actually, no one in this thread has taunted you in the wake of decision, though you would have been taunting to beat the band if you’d won). I’m not looking for you to be devastated. I was hoping you’d be able to crawl out from your own ass and see that maybe your arrogance and hubris was not quite as warranted as you thought. I was hoping maybe you’d be able recognize that people were trying to help you, not hurt you. I can see you’re still going to persist in your delusions, though.
Good luck to you. I’m not hoping for you to be ruined, but you should do yourself a favor and learn how to admit when you’re wrong. No one knows how much that sucks more than I do, but I’m capable of it sometimes, and I’d never let it wreck my life this way.
It does not have any merit, and multiple, sympathetic lawyers, to a person, has already told her so, but even if it did have merit, it’s the end of the line now. There’s nowhere else to take it.
I’ve been following your legal troubles in lurker mode for quite some time. I’m no lawyer, but I read the judgment and it seems clear to me that they didn’t completely ignore the actual problem - they basically told you that you were incorrect in what you thought the problem was.
People have been telling you this from the start - you got too close to the whole thing, focusing in on minute details, unable to see the forest for the trees as it were. It seems clear that this is a big reason why representing yourself is such a bad idea. This case has clearly consumed your life. You speak of spending hour after hour in the law library, this has drawn out for years, you’ve turned someone you once loved into an enemy - was this all worth it? Even if you had won, it would have been at a terrible price. Now you’ve lost and still paid that price.
I do feel for you in that you are obviously in genuine pain right now. I would hope that you can learn things from this - going into something thinking that you are smarter than everyone else is not a good approach, pissing people off by insulting them will make them not want to help you, and sometimes you can fight hard and still come up short.
Instead it seems as though you are determined to learn that you have been done wrong and that the judge you were praising a few posts ago you now think didn’t even read your brief. That is maybe the saddest part of all.
This is a pretty standard rule which if you think about it, makes perfect sense. The appeals court should be very hesitant to overturn a trial court’s findings of fact since they aren’t present and can’t evaluate the evidence and testimony for themselves.
An appeal isn’t a de novo trial. At least in civil cases, the appeals court will rarely disturb the factual findings and any disputes as to factual matters will be construed in favor of the non-appealing party.
At least, where I am, the appealing party will submit the trial transcript. If you content that the record does not support a finding that the sky is pink, you have to show why, not just with your testimony, but with the testimony of the respondent.
The majority of cases that are heard and overturned by appeals courts are cases where the trial court screwed up on the interpretation of the law, or where there are different interpretations between the various local courts. Occasionally, the appeals court will overrule established precedent, but those cases very rarely occur.
It seems that here, the problem was that Stoid and her ex couldn’t agree on the division of the house and the business. At least, with respect to the house, they were quibbling about whether the ex’s buyout should include a discount for what they would have paid for the sale of the house.
Well, that was predictable.
Then the solution to that is for your appeal to clearly, concisely, without recourse to emotional words, without mentioning the effect it had on you and how wrong it all was, lay out the areas where this was done:
The court below found that the sky is pink. (TRANSCRIPT, DAY 3, PAGE 84, LINE 6). But this finding was completely unsupported by the record. The plaintiff’s only testimony was that the sky was blue (TRANSCRIPT, DAY 2, PAGE 366, LINE 14) and was uncontradicted by any other testimony or documentary evidence in the record.
But you didn’t do that. None of your own brief’s excerpts that you posted laid out a claim in that format, and according to the opinion, the rest of your brief didn’t do it either.
The opinion does show they read your brief. And at least once in your brief, you refer to evidence that supports your side but don’t even mention that there was contrary evidence. Now I know: you’ll say it was his lawyer, not him, and thus doesn’t count as evidence. But the solution to that is again to refer with specific transcript references:
The court below found that the sky is pink. (TRANSCRIPT, DAY 3, PAGE 84, LINE 6). But this finding was completely unsupported by the record. The plaintiff’s only testimony was that the sky was blue (TRANSCRIPT, DAY 2, PAGE 366, LINE 14) and was uncontradicted by any other testimony or documentary evidence in the record. It’s true that Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly claimed the sky was pink ((TRANSCRIPT, DAY 3, PAGE 83, LINES 11-27 infra). But plaintiff’s counsel’s statements are not evidence, and the recored does not contain any evidence upon which the court below could have based this finding.
I will say, though, that I simply don’t trust you to accurately report the record below, so when you make the claim that there was no evidence, I don’t believe you, and neither did the appellate court.