At the end of his book “Sovereignty in Dispute: the Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982,” Hoffmann said
“Could it be that the U.S. Navy and the British Admiralty have decided that the islands are essential for protecting oil routes around South Africa in case of world conflict? With the eastern coast of Africa unsafe for Western tankers, they would have to cross the South Atlantic to reach South America, where they would be under the protection of friendly navies, ultimately to reach the Caribbean and the North Atlantic. In such a case, the Falklands/Malvinas would play a crucial strategic role.”
I don’t understand why Western tankers would be safer if they sailed south from the east coast of Africa. The tankers would still encounter some dangers, like Somali pirates if they sailed south. Unless they voyage from the Strait of Gibraltar on the western coast of Africa, they couldn’t avoid the unsafe eastern coast of Africa. Please enlighten me.
Avoids the Red Sea/Suez Canal, which would be a potential choke point in any 1980’s-style World War. Port Louis in Mauritius, far out in the ocean, is a major transshipment center and nowhere near anything threatening. It’s a way more circuitous (and hence slow and expensive) path. But paranoiacs in the 1980’s worried about the next World War saw the potential for a truly global conflict where just about everyone everywhere would get dragged in (in the vivid imagination of the above novel, Western aligned South Africa for example would be invaded by Cuban-stiffened Soviet-aligned hordes from Angola and Mozambique).
So I can see some general in a war room coming up with such an “optimistic” scenarios. Because it would be optimistic nonsense - the Falklands/Malvinas are just about utterly worthless strategically. They had neither impressive port, nor military facilities. In retrospect we can see the more paranoid admirals and general in the 1980’s were living and breathing silliness. But I imagine it is completely conceivable somebody, somewhere war-gamed it.
Arabian Gulf > south to Port Louis> west to Durban (South Africa)> cross the South Atlantic to the vicinity of the Falklands/Malvinas> north or northwest up one or the other side of South America to US ports or Western Europe.
It doesn’t really make great sense, no. But no doubt some analyst filed a plan somewhere in the bowels of the Pentagon (“Operation Port Stanley”). My understanding is that they gamed a plan on almost everything back then, sensible of not.
My grandfather was in that battle as a 14 year old sailor. When it all kicked off in 82, age was getting the better of him and he was convinced the Argentinians were after the coal station.
True today, but the OP is asking about the state of affairs in the 1980s (based on their posting history, the Falklands War is a particular interest of theirs). My understanding is that Somali piracy wasn’t even a thing until 2000 or later.
No, I read that first one in college probably around the late 1980’s and was quirking many an eyebrow . It’s kind of an interesting snapshot into the mindset of certain elements of the late Cold War military back then - I believe Alexander Haig among others was a fan. I wasn’t aware of the sequel and it almost (ALMOST) makes me want to check and see what he retconned, but…nahhh .
Ref a couple of posts upthread …
The last ~20 years of Somali pirates were utterly irrelevant back in the 1960s / 1970s when the putative plans discussed in the OP’s quote would have been formulated.
As to the OP’s question, and all IMO:
I’ll fall back on a standard tenet of journalism: When a headline is formulated as a question, the correct answer is “No” even as much as the headline is intended to imply the answer is “Yes”. So:
My answer is “No, that’s not correct thinking. The navies did not hold that view.”
I also believe the author wrote the following couple of sentences badly. He wrote:
There are two possible interpretations. Here’s one: I think what he meant was
Which of course is mostly bunk. The Falklands / Malvinas are too far away from that tanker route to much matter.
Here’s a simpler variant, where a simple unnoticed editing error spoke of the east coast of Africa when they really meant west coast.
Which is also mostly bunk, but a bit less bunk-full.
As well … If Hoffman was positing tankers crossing the south Pacific and rounding Cape Horn instead, then yes, a Falklands / Malvinas in hostile hands would be a much bigger issue and could essentially cork off that route once naval / aviation facilities and forces were emplaced there.
My overall take is that British and US institutional biases in that era were simple. Every square inch of Earth’s land is either in friendly hands or in hostile Soviet-sympathetic hands. The current multi-polar world did not yet exist in fact, nor in their institutional worldview.
Within that bipolar worldview any friendly dirt that changes hands can only lead directly to the benefit of the Soviets. So every friendly bit of land, no matter how remote or useless, must be preserved diplomatically and defended militarily if it comes to that. Period.
OP, your question seems relevant today as there are attacks going on in the Red Sea. I’m not clear if you mean to direct your question to the time of your Hoffman cite.
Today, ships using the Suez canal and the Red Sea have to pass within 17 miles of Yemen. They can stay many times further from the east coast of Africa if they opt instead for the route around Africa.
Apart from the political retconning needed, the sequel gives an interesting snapshot and view into how much the thinking of some Cold Warriors was affected by a certain at the time well known Soviet defector going by the pen name Viktor Suvorov, real name Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun. His involvement was a big selling point in the sequel. From the Author’s Notes and Acknowledgements, first a quick look at the political retconning needed:
The team that put together the earlier book, The Third World War: August 1985, has gathered again,
some four years later, to take a further look at the events we imagined then and to amplify and explore
them a little further. In these years, though much of what we then had to say has since become even
more closely relevant to the world about us, as recent events in Poland, for example, suggest, the
scene here and there has changed. The Shah has gone. Egypt is no longer dependent on the Soviet
Union. The story we now offer takes account of these events.
Yeah, some pretty big changes there, suddenly Egypt isn’t team USSR and Iran isn’t team NATO. As to Suvorov’s involvement:
The most important new element in this latest book is some investigation of what it all looked like
from the Soviet side. Here I acknowledge a deep debt to a new colleague in Viktor Suvorov, from
whose experience and advice I have profited greatly. His own first book, The Liberators (he
commanded a motor rifle company in the ‘liberation’ of Czechoslovakia in 1968), already published,
demands attention. He has another book coming out soon.
No, my question has nothing to do with the attack that took place in the Red Sea today, I just want to know the logic of Hoffmann’s statement about the strategic position of the Falklands/Malvinas in the early 1980s in the context of the Cold War with respect to the routes of Western tanker traffic.
After reading all the posts up-thread, first of all, I would like to thank you all for your time and ideas, but it seems to me that my doubts still exist.
In WW2, HMS Exeter took shelter in the Falklands after being damaged in the battle with the KGM Admiral Graf Spee . The Falklands were later garrisoned to prevent Japanese invasion.
In 1976, Argentina invaded Southern Thule, part of the British South Sandwich Islands and established the military outpost of “Corbeta Uruguay”.
There was no military reaction until the Falklands War.
The people of the Falklands were all British and wanted to remain British.
It surely would have been cheaper, in human life and money, to buy them similar real estate in the British Isles though.
True. OTOH, then the Argentines would occupy the Malvinas for whatever malign result might obtain.
Similarly I have often suggested that we could demarcate a plot of land on the Oregon coast in the exact size and shape of Israel including Gaza and the West Bank, displace about 10,000 Americans and a couple of rusty bulldozers, and give it to the state of Israel on the condition they relocate there immediately, and spurred by the stoppage of US support if they did not.
Easy solution to the perpetual fussing in the Middle East and negligible upfront cost to us and zero ongoing cost. They’d have better weather, or at least more rain, and no more issue of fussy neighbors. Win win for everyone.
. It’s kind of an interesting snapshot into the mindset of certain elements of the late Cold War military back then - I believe Alexander Haig among others was a fan. I wasn’t aware of the sequel and it almost (
.