I Gotta Split. Paradox?

Great Debates
1

Imagine yourself being duplicated as an adult. Perhaps you come into contact with an alien material that has the curious side effect of causing one last bout of complete mitosis, reminiscent of your good ol’ embryological days as a blastocyte. Every cell in your body divides in such a way as to spawn two exact replicas of the original you. Let’s refer to the split beings as “splones”. In this scenario, it would be more accurate to classify both splones as a pair of originals, rather than an original plus a copy. The duplication is accurate down to the sub-molecular level: neurons, synaptic pathways, neurotransmitters, engrams- all identical in each.

Ask either splone to recall his past and he should be able remember back to the earliest memories of the original you. Each has an uninterrupted consciousness that tracks backward in time to and through the life of the original. Two beings that share the same past, while being a bizarre state of affairs, is a scenario that I can fathom. I don’t believe that this constitutes a paradox. But, let’s take this a bit further.

Before division takes place, let’s say that you are told that only one of your splones will survive the mitosis, but you may choose which one lives and which one dies (an arbitrary method to choose would be to say that the one that splits to the right is splone-A; to the left, splone-B). Does it matter which one you choose? If both splones can track their consciousness backward in time to the original you, it follows that the reverse should also be true. Will not your consciousness proceed flawlessly in either splone-A or splone-B? My guess is yes. What is your opinion? This premise is a bit more difficult for my mind to wrap around, but I still don’t believe that it necessarily constitutes a paradox. Let’s delve a little deeper.

Let’s now say that both splones survive post-mitosis. If consciousness proceeds backward in time from either splone to the original you, and it carries forward in time from the original you to either splone, would the consciousness be identical in each splone if both survived? Would this be a shared consciousness? If yes, would this shared consciousness perceive that it emanates from two bodies simultaneously? Hi, my name is Bob and Bob, do you like me-us? If this is the case, I don’t believe that it would be possible for the two splones to ever develop separate consciousnesses since, while they may be able to diverge spatially, they would never be able to diverge perceptually (the shared consciousness gets sensory input from both splones at the same time). Would a “schizophrenic” consciousness of this sort be able to function, or would it break down psychologically? If you don’t believe that a shared consciousness would result from adult cellular mitosis, how about mitosis at the subatomic level? In any case, I can’t fathom a shared consciousness and I think this may justify as a paradox. What do you think?

If I need to distill my inquiries into a single factual question in order to qualify for inclusion in the General Questions forum, then I ask, “Is a shared consciousness theoretically possible?”

Please answer my questions ASAP, because I really have to split now. And, please don’t think I’m being duplicitous when I say that this conundrum is giving me splitting headache… :stuck_out_tongue:

Tibbs

2

<mod>

I can see this turning into a splitting Great Debate.

Sorry, Tibbs, but I don’t see a factual answer able to be given to even your distilled question.

Have at it, GD’ers!

</mod>

3

Nature already did the experiment, it is called Identical Twins.

No.

Twins also have something to say on that regard:
http://www.oslc.org/inthenews/twins.html

4

Well, since I can’t answer factually, let’s just try it from the gut. As you’ve described the “mitosis”, each “splone” is its own being with its own sense of self. From the instant each is aware of itself, each immediately proceeds to become different from the other. I see no paradox at all, nor the possibility of a shared consciousness, unless since you’re just making stuff up, like “splones” and shit, you just go ahead and make up one with a shared consciousness, like instead of a kid being born with two heads, one head being born attached to two kids! :smiley:

5

No, identical twins (or clones) is not the same situation as I am proposing at all. Twins/clones split before they develop consciousness. Though perhaps similar, they do not share the exact same perceptions/memories/emotions etc. as the “splones” do before splitting. Twins and clones simply share pre-consciousness morphology, therefore they are as useless to this thought experiment as comparing any two unrelated beings.

6

In order to share a conciousness, two beings would have to be in perfect and nonstope communication with one another. Not in the sense of “I talk to him every day” but in the sense of two neurons communicating over a synapse. One never has a thought that the other does not.

Since they are starting from identical physiological and psychological states, they would have an easier time of it than other people. Indeed, their experiences of the first few moments post-mitosis would be identical to one another. But, then one splone would expereience something differently than the other. He’d look right where the other looked left. He’d have a “random” thought that the other would not. From this single moment of difference (which is inevitable, I think, even if you never let the splones leave each other’s presence) their mental lives would continue along different routes. Given time, I think they’d become quite different and distinct from one another.

A way to correct this divergence would be if the splones could share their different experiences with one another. However, these experiences would be so many and often so subtle that I doubt any two human beings would be able to communicate the toality of their different experiences and what those experiences meant to them psychologically. Thus, two identical people are doomed to diverge into distinct individuals merely because they inhabit different physical locations.

Unless you are suggesting that the splones would somehow be telepathic. But there’s no evidence that human being are physically able to share thoughts between two different brains.

7

Me thinks from the tone of your post that you believe my scenario and question(s) to be of such poppycock that an intellectual discussion is unwarranted. From this I infer that you deem me dimwitted to postulate such an absurd idea**. Well, yes, the premise of an adult human being splitting in two is far-fetched and admittedly impossible (at least under the constraints of our present knowledge of biophysiology), but I think that the concept is grounded on good science, not too far removed from reality: a mechanism (mitosis) does exist that splits every cell of our being multiple times in multiple stages of our embryological development. I’m simply taking a real physiological mechanism and extrapolating its deployment beyond the normal stage of development. This is, after all, simply a thought experiment; the conditions aren’t expected to be necessarily real or testable. I’m confident that Einstein*** did not believe that he could actually ride on a beam of light, but a couple of not so poppycockyish (if this isn’t a real word, it should be) theories sprang from his mind as he contemplated that and other seemingly absurd thought experiments.
For the record, I think that I put too much emphasis on the question of whether a shared consciousness is possible. I lean heavily on the side of disbelief. I don’t think that a shared consciousness is possible without an actual link. There is obviously no physical link between the splones, and I won’t consider a telekinetic link (devolving the discussion to the realm of metaphysics is not good science…although quantum nonlocality /action at a distance gives one pause to consider…).
Even if we scuttle the idea of a shared consciousness, there are still plenty of mind-benders to discuss in my splone scenario (i.e. if your consciousness will continue into both splones-this I do believe will occur-,what will you feel at the time of division? Or, if a shared consciousness is not an option, which splone will you feel continued into? etc.).

**Propriety dictates that I take the high rode and not resort to retaliatory name-calling. I’m sure you’re a nice person with many good ideas to share.
…I do, however, think that your splone is a tool/ :wally (propriety does not extend to hypothetical beings). :smiley:

***I am in no way comparing myself to Albert Einstein.
…well, sure he was about as smart as me, but I’m much better looking. :cool:

Mr. Tibbs

8

Well, you’re right about me being a nice guy who probably has had at least one good idea in life and hopes to have more, but if you found my earlier lighthearted tone offensive, I sincerely apologize. I meant it only in the most innocuous way, mainly because I wasn’t entirely certain of your sincerity. Now I know – you really are whacky!

There I go again! :smack:

Seriously, though, I will grant you that some day, maybe even soon, splones as you have described them may indeed be possible in a country somewhere which allows its scientists free reign. I cannot, however, foresee any consciousness-sharing, ever - not unless you can develop a method to hardwire the original being with one or more of the splones. By hardwire, I would include non-physical connections, such as those described in certain ancient Hawaiian Kahuna and Yaqui religious ceremonies, among others, something similar to “tethers of energy” that exist between all living entities and, when harnessed, can permit communication between them, even when far removed from each other.

Even if such a connection were achieved, though, I still doubt that true consciousness “sharing” could take place, no more than true “multi-tasking” ever really occurs in a microprocessor. I would allow for the possibility of ultra-rapid time-shifts back and forth between self and splone that would “feel” as if one were experiencing a dual awareness, or more correctly a single awareness in two locations, but again, it would be no more than an illusion. There can be only one “I” until we are all “us”, and I don’t think you want to go there with this discussion.

I will post this, then think about your postulation from the perspective of the splone.

In the meantime, I will hope that I have either redeemed what appeared to be my earlier apathetic attitude, or failing that, that I have at least contributed something equally absurd and worthy of derision to the debate.

9

I think you may be assuming that there’s something about your consciousness that means only one true version of it could exist at any one time; both of your splones would remember being the ‘real you’, and would both claim to be the ‘real you’ right now. And they would both be right. Simple as that.

They wouldn’t be the same ‘you’, neither would they be connected in some kind of shared consciouness way, they would just both be you. There would be two indivisuals with your genuine history, memories and personality traits as their own.

10

Interesting view, but I’m afraid I’ll still need more than that to convince me.

The way I see it, the splones can only be themselves, and that’s all, regardless of who they THINK they are. I am me, and each of them would be “me” to himself, but not to me, anymore than I would be “me” to them. They could no more be my “me” than you could. Certainly, they each would have a sense of “I”, yet so would I, as do you.

Anyway, all of that is academic (ya think?), because at the very instant of their awareness of their own existence, each of the splones and I would begin to accumulate separate perceptions of our immediate environment that would, if nothing else, serve to distinguish each of us from the others. If we, that would be you and I, can accept that we are the sum of our perceptions, then as soon as a splone perceives something that is either NOT perceived by me and its mate or is perceived differently by us, than that splone is a different “me”, again despite who or what he may think he is.

He thinks, therefore he is himself… not me.

Cool blog, BTW. I’m in Arizona, so I don’t see many lost gloves. Maybe every now and then at a campsite along a quad trail or on a construction site, maybe, but even that would be pretty rare. Never really thought about how missing gloves might congregate in one geographic area of the country over another before. Does it ever bother you to think that someone might simply throw a glove on the ground, photograph it and send it in as a lost glove, when in reality it’s not?

11

Just a small, but significant clarification: Remember, I mean for this split to commence as it would in real-life mitosis: each cell dividing in two. You would not be left with one “you” and two “thems” for a total of three. You are left with only two “you’s”. This is important because I want you to abandon the thought that an original, unchanged “you” exists and that this will remain the vessel for your conscious continuum.

I feel that the point at which a paradox may exist in my scenario has been either misstated by me, or misunderstood. Let me refine my thought experiment. Point of reference is of utmost importantance. From the point of view of an outside observer, I see no illogicality. You would observe someone split in two and they would appear to be physically identical copies of the original-no more bizarre than identical twins. They would, at the beginning, be mentally identical as well, but as time progresses, they would become less so, due to dissimilar sensory input from different spatial orientations. I believe that we all agree on this.

The reference point that I am interested in is that of the person who splits. Let me attempt to illustrate my case.

Assumptions:
[ul]
[li]· I don’t believe that the concept of adult mitosis, as I have described it, breaks any universal law of nature. It may not actually occur in nature, but it could occur-given the right conditions.[/li][li]· I believe that you will remain conscious during and after being split.[/li][li]· If only one splone may survive, it doesn’t matter which one you choose with regard to having your consciousness progress in a linear and uninterrupted fashion.[/li][li]· A shared consciousness in two unlinked beings is not allowed.[/li][/ul]
Now, lets progress from the point of view of you, the person undergoing mitosis. Before mitosis begins you simply feel like you. Now you begin to split, becoming grotesquely wide as each cell bulges from the dividing nuclei. (Although not germane to my argument, it would be interesting to ponder how you would feel at this point). Eventually, each cell completes its division and we have two discrete sentient beings. My prime question is: which brain does it feel like you reside in now? If we have established that you will remain conscious after mitosis, and both brains are equal, and shared consciousness is not allowed, where does the single, original you from before mitosis feel like it is coming from now, after the split? At no point should you feel committed to one as opposed to the other-but you can’t have it both ways. Herein lies what I believe to be the point of paradox. Perhaps my logic breaks down at some point (too much caffeine and scotch can do that to you), in which case I solicit your assessment.

I’ve come up with a few possible resolutions to this apparent paradox:
[ul]
[li]· Perhaps consciousness will not survive mitosis. The very act of splitting cells may destroy the engrams and synaptic pathways that are necessary for awareness. [/li][li]· Perhaps the maintenance of consciousness needs a form of mitosis that is more discrete and less damaging than cellular mitosis, namely subatomic mitosis-but division at the subatomic level may break laws of nature and therefore is impossible.[/li][li]· Perhaps consciousness is actually extra-corporeal, emanating instead from a heretofore unknown realm…or…hmmm…maybe it emanates from a *known *realm - God. Hold the presses, I’ve developed a proof for the existence of God! :smiley: Just kidding, I’m still just a hopeful agnostic.[/li][/ul]

Mr. Tibbs

12

Just some thoughts:

At the instant of mitosis, each of the two splones will (generally) have different environments. For example, if the two splones are in each other’s company, splone A will be to the left of splone B, while B will be to the right of A. I tend to think this fundamental divergence in environment will create a corresponding divergence in their individual consciousness.

However, suppose at that instant of mitosis we are able to separate the two splones, placing each of them into separate rooms. Each of the two rooms are constructed to be identical, down to the last quantum particle.

Now they have identical memories of their pasts, as well as currently living in identical environments. Would they share a consciousness now?

I think there are a lot of free will/deterministic issues tied up in this. Suppose each splone is allowed to live the rest of his life in their own single room.

Would the behaviors of the splones be identical? This seems to imply our lives are deterministic. On the other hand, is there a point at which their behaviors diverge? Of course, this seems to imply we have free will.

For the sake of argument, let’s assume their behaviors are identical throughout time. Can we now say they share a consciousness?

I think it’s fair to say that, in some sense, they do share a consciousness, though it may not be so clear what is really meant by that. All of their experiences, perceptions, and behaviors are absolutely identical. To say here that they share a consciousness does not necessarily imply some sort of “psychic” link between the splones–it may simply mean there is absolutely no distinction between the experiences of one versus the experiences of the other.

13

I have seen this issue (copying people) discussed in “The Metaphysics of Star Trek” in the context of the TNG episode where Riker was duplicated by the transporter. It also arises naturally when describing artificial intelligences or human intelligences uploaded into computer systems, where it might be possible to easily duplicate them.

I think the reason the sheer act of copying may seem paradoxical is that it’s easy to think of the continuity of consciousness across time as a basic metaphysical fact. This paradox can be resolved through reductionism: the feeling of continuity is created by dynamical facts about how memory and other mental functions work that give a smooth flow from one experience to the next. These processes might be perfectly preserved during a copy; or not, depending on the technology involved. Regardless, subjective continuity is something of a red herring. Do you cease to be yourself after being completely knocked out by a blow to the head?

The more interesting question, in my opinion, is one of probability. It’s clear enough that if you are duplicated, both of the future versions remain “you.” But, subjectively, what probability should you assign to the idea that “you” will end up as copy #1 vs. copy #2? Allow me to elucidate this with an example:

The scenario: you are offered the opportunity to participate in an experiment. Scientists will use a device to scan the exact state of your body and mind. In the process, your body must be destroyed–but it will be instantaneously recreated in exactly the same state. The scientists guarantee that this is absolutely certain to work, and you won’t even feel a thing! (This is to rule out the not-obviously-implausible argument that the original is the only real you.) The scientists intend to use this scan to create an exact copy of you as you existed at the moment you were scanned. They will perform numerous unpleasant tests on this copy before killing it. They are offering you an extremely large sum of money to agree to the procedure. You must also sign away, in advance, any right your copy might have to opt out of the deal.

The question: ignoring any moral concerns about accepting payment in return for the death of another human being, is it in your purely selfish self-interest to agree to this deal? Assume the money involved is not sufficient payment for you to accept a 50% chance of being tortured and killed.

Because, in this case, your original body is destroyed, there ought to be no metaphysical reason to favor one copy over the other. The obvious answer, it seems to me, is that you should regard yourself as equally likely to “end up” as either copy, whatever that means. Accepting this offer would then be a very bad idea. I think this is the intuition most people will develop, when confronted with this kind of scenario.

Unfortunately, I do not believe this intuitive answer is tenable. Imagine a modification: the scientists will first scan you (involving destruction and recreation) in return for the promise of some payment. Only then will the recreated copy of you be allowed to choose what is done with the scan.
First option: the scan will be destroyed. You’ll receive nothing. In fact, they’ll even bill you for their time! Perhaps you should have read the contract more carefully… :smiley:
Second option: the scan will be used to create a new copy in the same environment that you find yourself now. The scientists will now ask it the same question they are asking you in order to study how your responses compare. After answering, the copy will be killed. The scientists plan to repeat this process many times, regardless of what any future copies say. In return for your consent, as the first copy, you will be given some monumental reward.

There are several things to consider when choosing how to answer:[ul]
[li]If the recreated original version of you (copy #1) agrees to this procedure, then all future copies will not be able to tell that they are not, in fact, copy #1 until after they answer this question.[/li][li]If you are copy #1, then choosing to allow more copies to be made will not hurt you in any way in the future. From a purely selfish standpoint, there is an enormous upside and no downside.[/li][li]This position of ignorance, where you don’t know which copy you are right now, is comparable to your position prior to the scan, where you didn’t know which copy you would end up as.[/li][li]Assuming equal subjective probability of being any copy, then if copy #1 agrees, it will have been unlikely for you, pre-scan, to “end up” as copy #1 rather than one of the doomed later copies.[/li][li]This seems to run counter to normal causality: the probability of an event that has already happened is influenced by your future choices.[/li][li]Copy #1 is likely to choose how to answer based on your personal beliefs and values. If copy #1 agrees to allow more copies, then they will all have the same beliefs and values, so are likely to make the same choice.[/li][li]Thus, if you are inclined to agree, you are unlikely to be copy #1. Hence you will probably meet a bad end. The big reward for copy #1 is not enough to cancel out a much larger chance of being another copy and getting killed. Thus it seems like agreeing would be a bad idea.[/li][li]But if your natural reasoning process leads you to the conclusion that agreeing would be a bad idea, it is unlikely that there will be more than one copy. Hence you are probably copy #1. Thus it seems like agreeing would be a good idea.[/li][li]It seems like the safe decision is to say no, since that guarantees you won’t get killed–that is, if you are copy #1, in which case you wouldn’t be killed in any case, so have nothing to lose by agreeing. If you are a later copy, what you say changes nothing.[/li][li]Standard game theory dictates that you consider only cases in which your answer actually makes a difference, since if what you say changes nothing, it doesn’t matter. However, in this case that reasoning means you should consider only the possibility that you are the first copy, which means you get the worse outcome: you’re probably going to die.[/ul][/li]
Hopefully I haven’t made anyone’s head hurt too much trying to follow this… :frowning:

This seems to be a paradox. It will be impossible for the first copy to calculate the probability that he/she is the first copy in time to get any benefit from the decision, regardless of how much time is allowed for the calculation. This is not a logical problem if one regards this “subjective probability”–the likelihood you assign to ending up as any given version of yourself–as merely a human belief or preference with no objective foundation. Our beliefs often lead to paradoxes when confronted with unusual situations. However this scenario and many others I can come up with seem to suggest that there is some basic inconsistency in how we generally think of personal identity across time.

It’s getting late, so to wrap this up, it’s also interesting to consider e.g., the effect on probability of being a copy of making a massive number of copies which might be absolutely identical or might be different in miniscule, unimportant ways. Or imagine merging some of a large number of copies back together. If identity isn’t always an objective fact, can it ever be one at all?

14

Aw c’mon folks. Didn’t everybody see the ep of BTVS when this happened to Xander? Willow had to help meld them back together to make a complete Xander with magic. Geez, I thought everybody knew this.

::ducks and hides::

15

First off, I’d like to thank all posters to this thread thus far. Some comments are thought provoking, some are humorous, all are appreciated (yes, even those from that nice fellow with the “tool” of a splone, dishfunctional :wink: ).

Cabbage: Even though your post does not directly address my question of whether or not a paradox exists in the situation I’ve proposed, it is, nonetheless a welcome and thought provoking tangential experiment. The question of determinism is a fascinating subject and one worthy of discussion. Personally, I believe that the behaviors of the splones in your scenario will diverge over time. I think quantum effects will negate the possibility of non-divergence.

JasonFin: I feel that you have come closest to addressing the paradox question (maybe you’ve addressed it exactly, I’ll have to drink another cup of coffee and re-read your post).
Your scenario can certainly be used as an alternate method with which to illustrate the paradox question. I would like to narrow the focus down to the point where your copy has been made, and the original “you” is being tortured, but not yet dead. If asked beforehand what your fate will be after the copy has been made, you can answer with certainty that you will feel the pain of torture. But, you can answer with equal certainty that you will feel the joy of wealth as your copy. I don’t believe that you can say that the probability of either event occurring is anything less than 100%-particulary in the case of the original “you” being tortured (I can fathom no possible loss of continuity there). But, if the probability of one is 100%, then the other must be 0%. I don’t think that one entity can have two futures with 100% probability unless you invoke the fanciful (i.e. shared consciousness et al) or the hypothetical (i.e. many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics…but, if I recall correctly, Schrodinger himself didn’t really believe that that cat in the box could be both dead and alive before the wave of reality collapsed). Perhaps quantum mechanics does offer the correct solution, or perhaps I’m still missing something (my bag is medicine, not physics, mathmatics, philosophy or religion). What do you think?
Mr.Tibbs

16

I think quantum mechanics has no bearing on the problem, except perhaps in a metaphorical sense. We’re not talking about physics here.

I guess my problem with that idea is that it’s easy to craft a situation where there is perfect symmetry between the two copies. In that case, how can one future life be more likely than the other? Of course, this becomes more interesting when the total number of copies won’t be determined until some time in the future.

You say you don’t think one entity can have two futures with 100% probability. Yet isn’t that precisely what happens in these copying scenarios? I admit I don’t truly know what a 200% total probability implies. Still, it seems to me that the problem is in the way we think about these scenarios, and not in the scenarios themselves. They may be fanciful, but surely duplicating sentient beings can’t be impossible in principle. We’re ultimately made of the same atoms as everything else, after all.

17

I don’t feel like making a huge metaphysical post right now, but I did want to say that there was a recent science fiction book (Mindscan by Robert J. Sawyer) written about this exact thing. A man dying from an incurable disease allows himself to be copied into a robot body, and the original flesh person is sent to die on the moon. I don’t think Sawyer went enough into the philosophy of “duplicity” and the book itself isn’t all that well written, but I just thought I’d throw it out there.

18

I think that with quantum uncertainty, my mind and that of my splone would be different enough so that, while very similar, we’d be distinguishable, and increasingly more so as time went on. Both of us might be absolutely convinced that we are dotchan, but I have supreme confidence that we’d be able to work out some sort of compromise.

(“Wasn’t it your day to go to work?” “No, I’m pretty sure it was yours.”) :smiley:

19

That’s all any of us has each morning when we wake up; the entirely convincing illusion that we are the same entity we remember existing yesterday. We THINK we are the same person that lay down to sleep last night, but there’s no way to be sure. Otherwise, what is it that carries forward a ‘real’ sense of ‘me’?

20

Thanks. I was really surprised at the number of gloves I quickly accumulated on the site. It’s been a bit thin lately, but winter is just around the corner and I expect things to pick up now. I don’t worry too much about the possibility of bogus submissions; I suppose someone could fool me with a staged photo, but that would be a whole new class of pointlessness, over and above the inherent futility of photographing lost gloves in the first place…