Ok. I think a few things are getting tangled here.
Consumption decisions are ethical because of the facts about the objects consumed. Consumption of X means Y ccs of CO2 are emitted into the atmosphere, Z children in the third world are harvested for their organs, and Q kittens are kicked. These are facts.
My opinion of people who consume X is a consequence of my values. I care a lot about them. I expect almost no one else to. My opinions are for my own sake and are relevant only to me.
I agree that regardless of what I personally think, people are free to buy whatever is legal (and as far as I am concerned, some things that are not). I do not expect anyone to care about my opinion. But the ethical nature of their consumption has nothing whatsoever to do with my opinion. The purchaser of X is responsible for the consequences of his purchase whether I agree with it or not. This is completely independent of what anyone thinks of him.
Whether he assumes this burden knowingly or unknowingly is a choice entirely up to him.
They do when they’re covered in reinforced spikes, sawblades, barbed wire, and maybe a dead man’s switch rigged to some explosives in the gas tank. The sheer fact of my vehicle being on the road makes everyone else’s fatality rates go up. Hence how my vehicle is “safer”, relatively speaking.
Who are you to tell me what I can and can’t drive, especially when I have a perfect driving record?
Hmm. I guess that I am a good example of someone who engages in “thoughtless self-gratification” in that I use a rational self-interest philosophy to make decisions on whether or not to do something. I thought you were using that term to refer to egoism (i.e., the position that something that benefits me is morally right), which I don’t agree with.
Anyway, I guess we all understand each other here.
Does your flavor of rational self-interest admit any other normative propositions? I am not talking about normative propositions that can be justified ex post by rational self-interest (i.e., doing X that does not appear to be in my interest really is because it satisfies a priority more important than utility, etc). I am sure you justify these other propositions by such rationalization, but I am honestly more interested in what these propositions are in the first place.
No I don’t think so (at least if by normative proposition you mean a rule providing that I should do something even if it’s not in my rational self-interest). I just really don’t think in terms of whether a contemplated action is “morally right” or “morally wrong” or whether I or someone else have a “moral obligation” to do or not do something. Those are essentially meaningless concepts to me. I choose whether to do something based on whether I believe the action is in my rational self-interest, and I expect others to do the same.
I also believe that almost all other people make decisions in a similar manner even if they believe they follow some moral code.
In one sense I agree with you, Rand. But our definitions of rational self-interest may differ. My estimation of my own rational self-interest is to behave in what I judge to be a moral and non-selfish fashion, because I like myself better that way.
I had an opportunity to cheat on my wife yesterday. It would have been easy, and Mrs. Rhymer wouldn’t have found out. But I didn’t, because I used to be a cheater, and I hate the guy I used to be when I was like that.
It seems to me that your idea of rational self-interest is somewhat tautological. If you believe that people are rational actors and that all of their behavior is essentially utility-maximizing, then aren’t you defining utility so broadly as to be conceptually useless?
I don’t understand. Can you rephrase or break it down for me somehow? Thanks.
Skald, sounds like we don’t disagree at all. You determined that not cheating was more in your RSI than was cheating because you’d feel bad about cheating. Just because you dressed up the determination that you’d feel bad about cheating into a decision to follow a moral code doesn’t mean you were doing anything other than acting in your RSI.
The bolded portion is the tautology. You use RSI as an ex post facto explanation for anything and everything. No matter what a rational (non-stochastic) actor does, you claim that the action by definition was in his RSI. This assumes that the only autonomous motivation is RSI. Everything else is just window dressing or a rationalization of RSI. RSI is so broadly defined that it can explain any action or lack thereof.
This is problematic both logically and empirically. When RSI can explain everything, it also explains nothing. You cannot use it as a good model of human behavior if you cannot use it to predict human behavior.
Furthermore, a huge amount of interesting research has been done to show that people do in fact have other autonomous motivations and serious cognitive biases. Studies in constrained/bounded rationality show that people just do not always act in utility-maximizing ways. If your theory doesn’t fit the data, no matter how nice and convenient it might be, it just isn’t very useful.
Maeglin, I understand, but I think we are talking at cross purposes on this point. I’m just saying that I don’t see the value of me determining whether an action I take or an action someone else takes is “moral” or “immoral.” People just generall act in their own RSI (except ehrn they don’t, as you point out), and a determination that the action was “immoral” doesn’t amount to the proverbial hill of beans.
Your posts above seemed to be saying that instead of acting in one’s own RSI a person should apply a moral code to determine whether to take an action or not. Is this right?
What is value? What is your framework for determining value? The fact that you do not see the value could indicate that your framework is defective.
The idea that people just act in accordance with their RSI is dogma, Rand Rover. You refuse to define it sufficiently narrowly to use it to generate hypotheses about human behavior. Economists do this all the time, and despite the fault lines and flaws in the discipline, they usually do this with honesty and integrity. They make predictions based on clear, logical articulations of RSI and are often wrong. But economic rationalism is very different than what you are selling. Your universalization of RSI makes it completely meaningless.
I don’t agree with Jeffrey Friedman’s characterization of much of economics, but this is quite telling and definitely applies to your arguments.
You seem to be curiously uncomfortable with this idea, given Ayn Rand’s somewhat grandiose claim to solving the is-ought problem and insisting on the necessity of morality. I imagine you are somewhat familiar with this.
I agree wholeheartedly with this. Certainly, right and wrong is about more than just what is or is not within your legal rights. I don’t think I’ve relied on the “Well, it’s a free country” defense in my OP, although perhaps some of those defending my choice did.
I would phrase it more as “I think the benefit (to me and my family) outweighs the negative impact.” Is this a “selfish” justification? In a sense, sure. But we all put our own personal needs or our families’ needs over the needs of society to some degree – I don’t think this makes us immoral. The question, I guess, is how far are you allowed to go, and I suppose it has to be judged on a case by case basis.
Sure, by all means judge away. I made a deliberate choice to open myself up to criticism with the OP, but I think it makes for a more interesting thread than “Let’s debate the morality of some hypothetical individual.” So far, I’ve been enjoying the mix of responses, which is worth taking a little flack.
Except for Boxer engines. Here the configuration is different - if I am not wrong the cylinders in a boxer are horizontally opposed or some such (I am sure a mechanic can explain far better) but I know the cycliner configuration for a boxer is more compact than an “inline”
And I do believe some bikes do use a V4 configuration…
My big beef with SUVs is not in their consumption of resources per se, but rather that there are (often) many other choices that would fulfill the users needs just as well, while consuming less resources.
SUVs by their very nature are inefficient and don’t package things (seats, engines, drivetrains etc) as well as a “standard” car can. Because of their higher profile they have greater wind resistance, need more power to accelerate etc etc.
I am not going to research right now, but I am betting that for any of the smaller SUVs, I could find another vehicle that has just as much useable space, comfort etc etc but is more fuel efficient, and performs better at a lower price than the SUV.
Naturally - none of this applies if you need a four wheel drive with the ground clearance of an SUV…
if its not clear - I think people should buy vehicles to meet their needs (however they define those nbeeds) I just think that too often SUVs are ill-informed choices.
To Furt - your choice is perfectly acceptable (to me anyway) because you have justified exactly why you wanted it, and make no apologies for that. Just the same as somebody that wanted an extreme performance sports car is justified in buying a Lamborghini.
What I really hate seeing is somebody that buys a corvette ZR1 (for arguement’s sake) but only drive’s it to the local supermarket and back and never goes over 40 miles an hour - that is a waste of resources…
Your argument has some merit except for the kids part. The idea of treating children as a consumer product like a home in the country or a boat is pretty vile, but all too common these days.
Having kids is a legitimate need for a larger vehicle.
Ultimately responsibility for the legitimacy of one’s lifestyle is a personal moral choice. As Maeglin pointed out, the idea that personal ethics are irrelevant to choices is pretty sad. Then again, I own a big screen TV that was bought on credit, and that’s the other trope of irresponsible consumerism, so what do I know?
