Of course they can, and I hope they do. But when people misrepresent that opinion and pretend it says something it doesn’t whilst ignoring the rest of it, I’ll try and call them on it. Unfortunately, I’m not prolific and patient enough to do it every time it happens.
Not exactly for the first time. The inconvenient Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market…
This case dealt with a kosher market that wanted to stay open on Sundays but was stymied by the state’s “blue laws” requiring a Sunday close. Crown Kosher was a for-profit corporation. Can you explain why the Court did not immediately dispose of that case by pointing out that, as a for-profit corporation, Crown Kosher Super Market had no religious exercise rights? Because they don’t – they discuss Criwn’s religious rights at some length. Why did they do that, Hamlet? Slow day at the Court, was it?
Admittedly, since the decision went against Crown, it cannot be said that the case definitively established the contrary proposition. But it sure seems obvious that the Court then didn’t have any heartburn about extending religious exercise rights to a for-profit corporation.
So, IIUC, you’re offering a case where a for-profit corporation said “Why should I be bound by your dumb-ass law - which could only be founded in a religious belief I don’t feel bound by?” AND in which the Court found that Government’s beliefs outweighed those of the business as evidence that Hobby Lobby had precedent?
Did that case offer up any comments on why, if businesses must be closed one day a week, that day must be Sunday?
“The Court regards Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U. S. 617 (1961), as “suggest[ing] . . . that for-profit corporations possess [free-exercise] rights.” Ante, at 26–27. See also ante, at 21, n. 21. The suggestion is barely there. True, one of the five challengers to the Sunday closing law assailed in Gallagher was a corporation owned by four Orthodox Jews. The other challengers were human individuals, not artificial, law-created entities, so there was no need to determine whether the corporation could institute the litigation. Accordingly, the plurality stated it could pre termit the question“whether appellees ha[d] standing” because Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961), which upheld a similar closing law, was fatal to their claim on the merits. 366 U. S., at 631.”
The plurality specifically said they weren’t getting into the issue because they failed on the merits.
But, again, I’ve pointed this out to you before. I can’t keep repeating myself to you over and over.
And what do you know, Ginsberg dealt with it too.
As evidence that a for-profit coloration had a right to religious exercise.
That case pre-dated the RFRA, and so it has no meaning to help decide anything about whose beliefs outweigh whose; this was a First Amendment case and not an RFRA case.
But it does show that when a for-profit corporation asserted that it can exercise religion, the Court accepted that claim even as it denied them the relief they sought.
Perhaps you could change your tactics and start pointing out accurate things.
The market was the only appellee required to close. The other parties were customers of the store and the chief orthodox rabbi of Springfield. Funny that the Court spent any time discussing the merits when they could have booted the market as a party.
I agree it’s not definitive.
But where was the prior case that said a for-profit corporation CANNOT exercise religion?
RFRA: says all persons. Dictionary Act: “persons” means corporations too.
Ginsburg wanted to write in a extra line to the law, to pencil in “non-profit only” because she didn’t like the results of deciding the law means what it says, in plain back and white.
Sorta. They justify one day:
And why it’s Sunday:
Sounds like “ceremonial deism” to me. It conveniently dovetails with the majority religion, and we’ve done it that way for a long long time so… shut up.
I would say that a grand misrepresentation was perpetrated by many in the media and the blogosphere about who and what was represented by the Hobby Lobby ruling. That effort seems to have created a lot of lingering confusion. They appeared to be mostly people with no or little legal experience but they were chock-full of feelings and emotion. If anyone has misrepresented the Hobby Lobby ruling, it would be the Chicken Little sky-is-falling crowd. IMHO, of course.
No, that is a non sequiteur.
Regards,
Shodan
As mentioned above:
But the Chicken Littles were proven largely correct the next day.
They were? I’m so glad.
Recognizing that a claim like “largely correct” as applied to a claim about what ‘the Chicken Littles’ were saying has almost no hope of being parsed into anything approaching objective verification or objective rebuttal…
…huh?
From my perspective, the ‘Chicken Littles’ were saying things like:
But of course that’s not another shoe. The letter makes no mention of the Hobby Lobby decision, and makes plenty of mentions of what it’s actually about: the Employment Non-Discrimination Act’s failure to garner support from either the far right or the far left. The far left wanted the existing Senate language conferring religious exemptions removed, while the far right wanted those prohibitions strengthened. The letter was motivated by the White House announcement that the President would craft an Executive Order to duplicate the ENDA’s effect with respect to contractors seeking to do business with the federal government.
This is not an area covered by the RFRA, and has nothing to do with the RFRA, and nothing to do with the Hobby Lobby decision.
So taking that as an example of Chicken Littleism, can you explain how Chicken Littles were proven right?
I wasn’t talking about Shayna, obviously. But the Wheaton College decision represents (at least for now) a clear reversal of the underpinning of the Hobby Lobby decision, as we already discussed.
No, it doesn’t. As we already discussed, the Hobby Lobby majority identified the exemption available to religious groups as proof that a less restrictive alternative exists. But nowhere does it say that this is the LEAST restrictive alternative.
Wheaton doesn’t want to use that form, or provide any instruction to the TPA.
In no way is that position a reversal of anything in the Hobby Lobby decision.
That is disingenous in the extreme. If it is a less restrictive but still impermissible infringement then it need not be mentioned at all. The majority is trying to have its cake and eat it too. You are sweeping up the crumbs and telling people there was no cake.
It was not impermissible as far as Hobby Lobby went. Why would you possibly imagine that two different plaintiffs would automatically have identical religious beliefs, especially when their pleadings easily show otherwise?
As to Hobby Lobby, that less restrictive infringement is perfectly permissible, because they don’t object to it.
As to Wheaton College, it isn’t permissible, because they object to it and a still less restrictive means exists.
I am a little surprised to see you trumpeting decisions that substitute the judgment of the court for that of the legislature (or here, the executive branch acting pursuant to an express delegation). The court is effectively demanding that HHS craft a measure to accommodate all potential religious beliefs - even unforeseeable ones like a sincerely held objection to filling out forms.