Sorry - that was just a snarky line, not argument.
Huh? I just showed you a case with boatloads of evidence as to sincerity that was nonetheless disposed of with a finding that the claimant was insincere. That evidence was not narrowed or limited at all. Instead, the opinion showed that a fact-finder did what fact-finders do: make a decision that is supported by the record.
Maybe I’m not being clear.
My contention is that when fact-finders evaluate religious sincerity they are restricted in the weight they may assign to actions that are inconsistent with that sincere belief (and, by implication, those that are consistent).
In particular, fact-finders are not to place significant weight on the claimant’s adherence to other aspects of orthodoxy or on the claimant’s adherence to this identical practice prior to the claim in question.
Your cases represent examples of the claimant’s post-claim identical practice, and to contemporaneous and highly-related practice.
So while courts are permitted to rely on a very small slice of behavior apart from the person’s testimony in examining sincerity, when compared to the available evidence in a self-defense case or other analogous circumstances, the inquiry into sincerity is much more limited. When added to the fact that there is very rarely extrinsic evidence of sincerity apart from these factors which are not to be the crux of the inquiry, the process is quite unlike examination of a reasonable fear of grave harm, for example.
I’m not following either of your arguments, for what it’s worth.
When fact-finders evaluate the guilt of the accused, they cannot place ANY weight on prior bad acts offered to show that the accused acted in conformity thereto.
When fact-finders evaluate the claim of a rape prosecutrix, they cannot place any weight on her prior sexual history.
No one howls at these kinds of restrictions.
Religious sincerity claims are not sui generis. They are evaluated by the same process the courts apply to other claims of fact.
Bricker?
Yes.
As a matter of law, all the things you mentioned could sustain such a finding. A resolution adopted by the board, a shareholders’ vote, without unanimity, but a majority – all of these could be relied upon to support a finding of sincerity.
I think you might need to expand on that a little.
Why? As a matter of law, the finder of fact’s decision can rest on competent evidence, period. Twenty people can testify it was daytime, and one person can testify it was nighttime, and as a matter of law, the record supports either answer.
Huh. And when I asked, I got accused of insincerity. Twice.
Because you were insincere. Both times.
And thus spake Bricker, who is endowed with the capacity to sift through men’s souls and certify the contents. A good theistic argument, I warrant, for if such a wonder as Bricker can exist, who can doubt that an all-seeing God is equally possible?
I believe your unprovable belief is sincere.
People complain about them all the time. But that’s beside the point. Yes, of course there are many restrictions in the law concerning the scope of relevant and prejudicial evidence. So what? (Incidentally, I think a rape victim’s sexual history with her alleged attacker is admissible evidence in a rape prosecution, which would be a more analogous setup for purposes of this discussion.)
My point is just that the inquiry into sincerity is cabined by various restrictions, both evidentiary and because of the nature of the inquiry, that distinguish it from run of the mill inquiries into mental states. In the typical case, there is a much narrower arsenal of evidence to bring to bear on sincerity than there is on subjective fear of bodily harm or discriminatory purpose of a decision-maker or the dozens of other common mental state inquiries courts make.
That’s true, and irrelevant, which I guess underscores that I haven’t made my position clear enough. Once more, with feeling: Unlike the assessment of mental states that happens all the time in the law, assessment of religious sincerity has a much narrower set of evidence to examine. In the absence of rare behavior (such as failing to follow the identical religious practice immediately after the claimed violation) sincerity generally goes unchallenged, and when it is challenged, courts rarely find claims to be insincere.
The upshot here is that I think it is incorrect to point to sincerity as a bulwark against self-serving religious claims. Notwithstanding the .001% of religious burden cases finding claims to have been insincere, it is very rare for defendants to succeed on that basis for reasons that should be pretty obvious.
Totally obvious, no question! But just for the sake of the dullards amongst us, perhaps you could clarify that last bit.
It’s an access to evidence issue. Most of the time the only way to disprove the sincerity of your religious beliefs is to reach inside your head and and read the skull-entrails. Our courts, powerful though they are, have not yet acquired that ability.
So all they can really do is see if an analogous situation occurred before and whether you reacted the same way - and even then you can say your views have evolved.
I see what you did there, even if you didn’t mean to do it. 
I daresay if corporate religious claims become common, some sort of standard will have to evolve, else corporate religious sincerity becomes like pornography - a judge will know it when he sees it.
An abortion issue is an easy hot-button, but the actual scriptural support for a pro-life stance, as far as I know, rests primarily on a fairly small number of verses, arguably:
Psalm 22:9-10
Job 31:15
Isaiah 44:2 and 49:5
Jeremiah 1:4-5
…none of which explicitly or implicitly discuss abortion, though the concept surely existed at the time. I expect there is far more extensive biblical discussion regarding, say, the proper role of women. Could a corporation use these to justify sexist hiring or promotion policies, claiming sincere belief (which apparently no judge can challenge) in scripture?
And since Bricker now recognizes that unanimity is not strictly required, can 51% of a corporation’s shareholders (that is to say, the shareholders who collectively own 51% or more of the corporation) vote in such policies?
My understanding of affirmative defenses (i.e. I did something bad but I had a good reason) is that the behaviour is specifically and determinedly discouraged and the defendant must supply evidence of justification. It is not okay to kill someone, but if you can convince a judge or jury of a reasonable belief that lethal self-defense was called for, okay. It is not okay to refuse to hire a woman just because she is a woman, but is it necessary to convince a judge or jury of anything or is citing scripture and claiming sincere belief (reasonable belief not required) in the truth of that scripture sufficient?
Another option, one that I am more than happy to see the government take seriously and apply numerous man hours to, is to have the government seriously question the sincerity of the belief and investigate the proponents. I, for one, would love to see the Green’s be forced to answer questions about the use of contraception in their own families, their investments in contraception companies, their dealings with China and the abortion rate amongst the workers there, their illicit affairs, their dark secrets, and the rest. Rather than just taking the owners at their word and not questioning the rationality or hypocrisy of their religious beliefs, perhaps we should really delve into these issues.
That appears to be the effect Bricker is going for, where the sincerity of these beliefs get to be questioned by the owners personal conduct and piety. It’s a can of worms that courts have been loathe to open, but I, for one, think that if we’re making this the standard, and if these for-profit corporations want to claim some kind of religious high ground, by all means, let’s get to question them about it rather than take them at face value. Maybe this could turn out to be a great ruling after all.
Is it possible to actually find out if Hobby Lube paid for their own litigation bill, or did the Beckett people chip in?
Perhaps religions will have to start carrying disclaimers about not having been evaluated or proven, like homeopathic products.