Your use of the “plain text” phrasing implies that you are offering the simple, straightforward meaning without any reliance on interpretation. But you instantly deny that approach by adding a context not mentioned, that only an exact compliance with the precise wording will suffice. So, no, you are not offering the “plain text” approach, you are offering an interpreted version of that approach, and adding conditions that are not strictly stated.
If your cramped rendering of the “plain text” were valid, why is there no provision that the nominee must supply proof of his “incapacity”? The matter is entirely at his discretion, his statement is to be considered sufficient. If the law intended some restriction on his discretion, why does it no say so? For all practical purposes, his statement is held to be adequate. And he made said statement, referencing the statute in question. He wasn’t applying for a fishing license, he was making a statement of his non-candidacy.
Your use of the term “plain reading” is, at best, self-serving.
Bullshit. We’re not making some wacky claims here. What the rest of us are pointing out is that there are several possible interpretations of the law. You’re the only person who’s saying there is only one possible meaning.
Even if there are, the SoS’s interpretation gets deference.
So let’s see what the court says. That’s the reason I brought up the tax protesters: they are convinced they are right, but when it comes to court rulings they never win.
So you may be convinced of something.
You won’t win. (On this point, anyway.) I am hedging my certainty on the estoppel by reliance issue. But the court is not going to say that the SoS’s interpretation is wrong.
And this is a simple, testable claim. I’m right. You’re not.
What you’ve demonstrated is that clever lawyers can often find a misplaced comma or ambiguous adverb, and pimp it for their side.
It’s good that lawyers can draft fool-proof contracts to cope with slimy businessmen. What modern GOP behavior tells us, is that legislators now need to worry more about malicious public servants.
We have a difference of opinion. But it’s insulting for you to compare this difference of opinion to the gold fringe nuts. This is saying not only do you think we’re wrong but you also think we’re lunatics. I hardly think the opinions we’ve expressed, even if you disagree with them, deserve that kind of contempt.
You have a strong legal argument. I’ve acknowledged all along your side might win a court case. Which is why I’ve said that the other side might seek to take this case to the political arena instead. The Republicans could well end up winning the legal case and losing the election.
And I also don’t think the case is as certain as you make it out to be. Yes, there are precedents that say Kobach’s interpretation should be given deference. But there are other issues: the fact that the law giving public officials deference is not absolute, the fact that Bryant and not Kobach might be the central figure in this dispute, and the fact that Kansas law apparently makes an exception on deference in cases involving election law.
And there’s an issue of evidence. Kobach has said he is relying on the established practice of past withdrawal requests. But he has not produced these requests. Kobach’s credibility is already a little frayed because of his statement regarding Bryant and Taylor’s conversation - a statement that witnesses have now refuted. What happens if Taylor can produce several previous letters with the same language that Kobach approved of?
Except that I didn’t mean that the opinions arose from lunacy; I just meant that the key legal aspect here is the ability to correctly predict what the real courts will really do in real life. That’s why I said:
Perhaps I should have repeated it for emphasis, because I agree that without that clarification, it looks like I’m saying your argument is as zany as the ‘gold fringe’ idea. I’m not. I’m using that phrase for the shorthand; I mean to say: as ingenious as your alternate interpretations may be, at the end of the day the court won’t follow them.
Oh, in that case I absolutely agree that the result changes. Kobach can no longer claim that his interpretation is for an explicit statement if it’s shown that he earlier accepted non-conforming letters.
And I agree that the factual findings concerning what Taylor was told are of importance.
Both of those issues I have acknowledged from the beginning of the thread. (I did say the proof issue was a hurdle, admittedly, but if the hurdle can be met, the claim gets legs).
The point I am solid on, though, is the issue of including the capacity line by reference instead of explicitly. Unless the evidence reveals Kobach doesn’t really insist on that (by showing prior non-conforming letters) then his interpretation will win.
And since this is a very short-term and very testable proposition, I’m not really inclined to continue discussing it. One of us will be proven right very shortly.
What would stop the court from deciding that, yes, Bryant did tell Taylor that he was cool with the filing, but that Bryant was wrong, and his opinion does not change the strict meaning of the law? Therefore, Mr Taylor is not at fault, but de law is de law, so he’s boned?
Estoppel. If somebody reasonably relies on something you tell them to their detriment (the detriment here being that Taylor did not file another letter before the deadline) the court will find that you are estopped from changing your position.
Only part I’m not getting is how that would change the law. Would the fact of this estoppel mean that the law could be overlooked in those special circumstances? It wasn’t his fault he didn’t comply with the strict reading of the law, therefore he did comply?
And this, from the cite above:
Wait, what? Da fuq? I can get that answer from my Magic 8-Ball! So he said…no, gestured!…“yeah, maybe”…and then Taylor just walked away?
A court could decide to keep Taylor on the ballot for lots of reasons that don’t imply he’s a liar. They could decide that they believe Taylor’s affidavit and those set of facts equitably estops the SoS from enforcing the law against him.
The estoppel claim is presumably that he was advised that incorporating that declaration by reference is sufficient. The cited notice does not answer the question of whether the candidate must use those exact words or can say “I declare that I am eligible to withdraw according to the terms of [the incapability subsection].”
Unless your argument is that a candidate must use those exact words, a point you previously repudiated, then the notice only answers the question of whether he must make his declaration in writing. But that was never a good argument, IMO. The much stronger argument (though still maybe not strong enough) is that a declaration that indirectly but necessarily avers the truth of that language is sufficient.
I see a need for further questioning. According to Bryant’s statement, Taylor called him because “he needed to know how a candidate can file a withdrawal pursuant to KSA 25-306b(b).” Taylor asked if there was a form and Bryant told him there was not and candidates filed letter. Taylor then asked “what such letters usually say”.
This doesn’t seem to support Bryan’s belief that Taylor already knew what was required. Why would he believe Taylor knew how to file a withdrawal when the reason Taylor was calling him was to ask how to file a withdrawal?
Why would Bryant assume Taylor already knew what the requirements were when he was repeatedly asking what the requirements were? According to Bryant, even after Taylor submitted his letter and asked if it contained the needed requirements and Bryant could see that it didn’t contain the requirements, he continued to assume Taylor knew what the requirements were. Why on earth would he believe that?
