I think therefore i am.....

[Spiritus_Mundi]

I have never intended to decieve. I have occasionally responded to misunderstood statements, generating replies which were based on false assumptions about he arguments being posed, but there was never an express intent to decieve. What would be the point? I’m not being paid per the head of ‘believers’.

The point? I haven’t the slightest idea. I don’t know why you posted the things you did. I only know that you did. Out of deference to your general retraction I shall not scrounge through the record to re-evaluate your intent in light of this parapgraph.

re: cogito
First an easy one. “Seeming” would seem to be a nounification of seems, thus it would be a perception.

Now for something meaty.

Let us begin with the definition you have offered for nothing, particularly the notion that any variation implies an existent thing. I have no problems accepting this definition and the implication it forces upon us (implication only, not causal relationship.)

For clarity, let’s establish a notation: Perception(“A”) means a perception with characteristic “A”. Characteristic, here, is kept purposely vague. We shall allow it to stand for the content of a perception, a property of the content, a property of the perception, etc. I do not think this amiguity will cause problems, but if it does we can go back and pin things down. Now let us look at what can be concluded given diffeent levels of confidence in our perceptions.
I) Let us assume that perceptions do indeed vary.
In other words, our perception of memory is if not accurate at least a reliable indicator that different perceptions occur at different times.
[ol]
[li]Perception(“change”) -> “something(s)” exists. [/li]This is the implication from definition. We cannot, at this time, know anything about the something(s) other than that it/they exist. “Something(s)” might be distinct from the perception(s), or “something(s)” might be only the perceptions it/themselves varying without external influence.
[li]Perception(“label”) -> “label” exists. We may follow this form for any perception we choose, but the symbols are empty of any additional meaning. Whatever “label” we substitute is indistinguishable from the unound “something(s)”. Placing any label with restrictive connotations into this conclusion serves only to promote confusions of meaning, since no restrictive connotations can be supported by this argument.[/ol][/li]At times, Begbert2, it seems that this is the argument you are trying to make. But then you try to use “I” as if the symbol carried additional meanings and restrictions, such as when you draw upon the Stanford site’s argument of subjectivity.
II) Let us assume (I) and presume that perceptions of variance within perception(s) are valid indicators of variance.
In other words, if presented with perceptions of “hunger” and “tree” we can presume that a variance does indeed exist either within a songle perception (encompassing both “tree” and “hunger” ) or between multiple perceptions that exhibit real difference. For simplicity’s sake, let us allow this presumption across all characeristics that we allow for perception.
[ol][li]Perception(“change”) -> “something(s)” exists. As above.[/li][li]Perception(“label”) -> “label” exists. At this point, we can make substitutions for “label” which are meaningful on one side of the implication. For instance:[/li][li]Perception(“tree”) -> “tree” exists.[/li][li]Perception(“thought”) -> “thought” exists.[/li][li]Perception(“I”) -> “I” exists.[/li]In all such cases, the “label” on the left side of teh implication is actually restrictive. It indicates a specific characteristic of perception which we have presumed represents a real distinction among the full set of our perception(s). However, the label on the right remains unbounded, for we have no mechanism with which to restrict the possibilities for “label’s” existence. As in (I), this “label” is a generic “something(s)” which might be external to the full set of our perception(s) or simply the perception(s) themselves.

We can, however, take things a step further with (II) by noting that the recognition of a "label"ed characteristic is itself a variance in perception. Thus
[li]Perception(“label(label)”) -> the label “label” exists.[/li][li]Perception(“label(thought)”) -> the label “thought” exists. In this case, both sides of the implication have a restricted meaning, though perhaps not the intuitive one. The left side, as above, indicates a real distinctin in a characteristic of perception. The right side indicates that the “something(s)” which exists can now be bound within the full set of perception(s). In other words, no matter whether the existence implied in (I) is extenal to perception(s), internal to perception(s), or a combination of both, we know that the ‘label “thought”’ can be completely internal. It’s a slight distinction, but it’s the first time we have been able to place even the slightest bound on “something(s)”.[/ol][/li]
III) Let us assume (I) and (II) and presume that perceptions of variance within perception accurately reflect real distinctions in the characteristics of existing perceptions.

This stronger for of (II) allows us, for instance, to conclude that perceptions with the characteristic “hunger” are different from perceptions with the characteristc “thought”. Thus.
[ol][li]Perception(“change”) -> “something(s)” exists. As above.[/li][li]Perception(“label”) -> “label” exists. Now, “label” has a meaning on both sides of the implication. The left side, as before, indicates a specific characteristic of perception. The right side indicates a set of perceptions to which that characteristic maps. However, that mapping is associative only. We still have established no causal connection. Thus, the set of perceptions that map to Perception(“anger”) exist, but this does not imply that any existing thing is angry nor does it imply that an existing thing that was angry would imply that set (or any subset) of perceptions exist. So, we have:[/li][li]Perception(“tree”) -> “tree” exists.[/li][li]Perception(“thought”) -> “thought” exists.[/li][li]Perception(“I”) -> “I” exists.[/li]But in each case, it is a set of perceptions being implied, not any external existent object. In the case of “thought”, this pretty much takes us to where Russell went. In the case of “I”, it takes us to a set of perceptions characterized by subjectivity, which is where the Stanford site takes off. Without that takeoff, “I” exist in this case does establish an identity relationship to a set of perceptions, but that relationship is descriptive only, it carries no implication beyond the associative mapping.[/ol]

IV) Let us assume (I) and (II) and (III) and presume that the real distinctions in the characteristics of existing perceptions indicate real distinction in existing objects external to the full set of perception(s).
In other words, if we see a tree, then something is “out there” (though it doesn’t need to be anything like what we perceive.) This is the “escape from solipsism” card. Thus:
[ol][li]Perception(“change”) -> “something(s)” exists. As above.[/li][li]Perception(“label”) -> “label” exists. restrictive on both sides of the implication. In this case, the right side carries the additional restriction that the perceptions mapping to “label” have an existing referent external to the full set of perception(s). For instance:[/li][li]Perception(“tree”) -> “tree” exists.[/li][li]Perception(“thought”) -> “thought” exists.[/li][li]Perception(“I”) -> “I” exists.[/li]A real thing exists which is perceived as “tree” (thoguh it need not be a tree).
Thought exists in a sense external to the perception of a thought. This would seem to be the minimum sense required to accept teh implication “thought -> thinker”.
I exist. My subjective identity has an existence external to my perception of subjective identity. Again, this does not require that the “I” of perception is similar to I. This, of course, is where the Stanford lead lands. It is also where Begbert2 seems to land most of the time.[/ol]

I very much doubt that anyone in this thread has issues with (I) or (II). We might even all agree to accept (III).

(IV), however, strikes me as very much unjustified if we pretend to be approaching ontology with penultimate skepticism. And, of course, if we do accept (IV) explicitely (rather than implicitly) it makes an available a more straightforward logical structure:
Perception of self; therefore I am.

ps
Still waiting for that proof of existence for nonobservational properties.

[erislover]

*Originally posted by begbert2 *
2) If we are doubting that anything supports our seemings (not that the seemings qua seemings are in doubt), why isn’t the conclusion ‘I think therefore I seem to be’ (instead of ‘I think therefore I am’)?

This one.

Depends; what do you mean by “self”? The answer is most likely no; ‘self’ sounds like it carries baggage that is not implied by the fact that many thoughts appear to have a subjective nature to them.

Then we are no longer with Descartes’s proof as a passage I quoted several pages ago explicitly mentioned that a self in such reflection could prove his own existence beyond any doubt.

I will defer my own comments to Spiritus’s otherwise.

[begbert2]

When I quote the Stanford site, it is in an effort to:

1. defer to the ideas of people who get paid to think about this stuff, and who hopefully have something to add,

2. Stay somewhat in line with Descartes, since, as I don’t have a copy of his and his opponents’ texts, and Stanford site seems to, so therefore they are probably more directly answering Descartes and his objectors than I am,

3. Keep from “polluting” the discussion of Descartes with my own separate approaches to the same questions, which has caused much confusion previously, and

4. Give you all something to read, and comment on, that isn’t me. (This helps avoid problems with my phrasing, and reduces the chance that my devious and deceptive tendencies will come up again.)

Reasons 3 and 2 are most important to my mind.
Many sorrows, but I did not understand your notation and distinctions between your categories. (For example, while “a perception with characteristic “change”” made sense to me, “a perception with characteristic “label”” did not.) Given that, your categories are not clear to me. I would have thought the categores were:

1. (existant) idea(s) without meaningful content
2. ideas with meaningful content, including a subective aspect, and meaningless senses.
3. meaningful ideas with meaningful senses.
4. meaningful ideas with accurate senses.

Defining ‘idea’ as an internal thought, and ‘sense’ as an external input about so-called reality (sorry, but the ‘sensory’ aspect of perception is slightly distracting):
Most of us operate in daily life somewhere between 3 and 4.
According to Stanford, Descartes appears to bring things to a halt at 2, though that sounds like speculation on their part. That’s why I’ve been speaking on that level; if we grant that our thoughts are indeed indicitave of a subject, then that subject can be reasonably labeled “I” (and depending on how much you believe in the content of your thoughts, you can assembled them together and note that they seem to describe/be typical of the thing you know as yourself).

Personally, I shy away from accepting 2 as axiomatic. As I do not fully understand how Descartes justified that leap, so I don’t follow him in it. However, assuming only 1 as axiomatic, we can still prove our existence somewhat. (Note that I am now on my own tangent here, ‘polluting the discussion’ of Descartes somewhat.)

Suppose I have absolutely no trust in the apparent content of my thoughts. Their subjectivity may be illusory. However, I cannot doubt that they exist. In effect, I am undoubtably aware of them.

We don’t normally contend that all existant objects have either awareness of themselves or of other existant objects (if any). However, such awareness is a property reserved for things that exist. Because I persist in being aware of these seemings, I know that there is something out there with the capability of being aware of other thoughts, or of mistakenly believeing that some internal error with this capability of awareness is in fact an awareness of something external. Because of necessity I am the only thing that I can know is aware of things, the label “I” is natural. In either case, I must exist, as both “observing implies an observer” and “mistakenly believing imlies a mistaken believer” seem axiomatic.

It is true that you cannot prove that this “I” is not merely another thought, but this thought must have the capability of either being aware of other things, or of being aware of aspects of itself, because one of these must be occuring for us to be able to have ideas or the awareness of them, mistakenly or not.

I think that answers ‘I think therefore I seem to be’. I cannot be certain that my seemingly self-aware thoughts are in fact maningful, but from an objective point of view, the fact that there is awareness of them implies that something is being aware. If I were to rewrite it, I might say “I seem to think, therefore I am.” rather than the other way around.

And as to wether “self” has been proven, by the observing/mistaking argument, “I” must necessarily be the thing that is (or thinks) it aware of the thoughts that appear to belong to itself, which pretty much complies with the standard concept of “I”. That being the case, we can syntactically modify “I” as it is normally modified, which we couldn’t if it were merely ‘labeled’ I. So, we have proven the self, though we have not proven that it is in fact self-aware, merely that it thinks it is.

And you’re right, with this argument I’m departing from what Descartes said in his proof. Or at least, from everything that am aware of him saying.

And, S.M., the phrase was “non-observable properties”, and I never said I could prove that they eixst. (And it’s all retracted now anyway.) Non-observable properties do seem to be around in abundance. They fall into roughly two categories: properties that we can observe, but others claim they cannot, and properties that we cannot observe, but that others insist are there.

Examples of the first:
Light which the blind claim not to be able to observe
Colors which dogs reportedly cannot observe
Quiet sounds which the deaf cannot observe
That annoying shriek that occasionally I notice my monitor making that doesn’t seem to bother anybody else

Examples of the second:
The time when my monitor is fading to black between refreshes
The color of the back of my head
The empty space between atoms in solid objects
microwave radiation

So, I have reason to believe that there very likely are properties of things that I cannot observe. I have no reason to believe that all properties of everything are observable by anything; so I have no reason to assume that properties are objectively observable. I am certainly unable to disprove unobservable properties of an existing thing, because by the nature of being unobservable, I cannot be effected by them enough to know one way or the other.

Satisfied, S.M.?

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Spiritus Mundi
Perception(“A”) means a perception with characteristic “A”. Characteristic, here, is kept purposely vague. We shall allow it to stand for the content of a perception, a property of the content, a property of the perception, etc.

begbert2
I did not understand your notation and distinctions between your categories. (For example, while “a perception with characteristic “change”” made sense to me, “a perception with characteristic “label”” did not.)

In this case, it would be a perception that exhibits the characteristic “label”. For example:
[ul][li]The fragrence of a flower would be a perception(“smell”). {content or element of content}[/li][li]An impression of an oak would be a perception(“tree”).{property of the content of the perception}[/li][li]A sense of rising anger would be a perception(“emotion”). {property of the perception}[/li][/ul]
As I said, I left the notation purposefully broad so that we would not be buried beneath an avalanch of cases & notation. If it remains unclear to you, thougth, we can recast.

I would have thought the categores were:

1. (existant) idea(s) without meaningful content
2. ideas with meaningful content, including a subective aspect, and meaningless senses.
3. meaningful ideas with meaningful senses.
4. meaningful ideas with accurate senses.

Defining ‘idea’ as an internal thought, and ‘sense’ as an external input about so-called reality (sorry, but the ‘sensory’ aspect of perception is slightly distracting):

My categories are designed to address the question: what do we know about what is perceived. Yours proceed from an assumption that we already know enough about what is perceived to assign categories like “internal” and “external” and “thought” as if they represent real distinctions. Like Descartes, you seem either unable or unwiling to question what is perceived as thought. Thus, you argue that circles are straight lines because you have never wondered whether you stand on a plane or a sphere.

Suppose I have absolutely no trust in the apparent content of my thoughts. Their subjectivity may be illusory. However, I cannot doubt that they exist. In effect, I am undoubtably aware of them.

I disagree.

You cannot doubt (barring what I see as irrational nihilism) that something exists which is perceived as thought. At the most skeptical level of analysis, though, neither the possessive “my” or the descriptive “thought” can be considered meaningful restrictions on the possibilities of existence.

Something(s) exists is ratinally undoubtable.
Whethe that something has any meaningful association with “my” or “thought” or “Schroedinger’s pussy” is decidable only after additional axioms have been accepted.

It is true that you cannot prove that this “I” is not merely another thought, but this thought must have the capability of either being aware of other things, or of being aware of aspects of itself, because one of these must be occuring for us to be able to have ideas or the awareness of them, mistakenly or not.

You are standing on a sphere. Really.

You argue that “I” must be aware of self/others because “I” is aware of self/others.

I think that answers ‘I think therefore I seem to be’. I cannot be certain that my seemingly self-aware thoughts are in fact maningful, but from an objective point of view, the fact that there is awareness of them implies that something is being aware.

There is no objective point of view.

If you cannot be certain that your self-aware thoughts are meaningful, then you cannot be certain that something is aware. We can be certain that a something is reacting to the extent necessary for perception to occur. We do not, however, say that the flower is aware of the Sun or that the computer aware of the data.

If I were to rewrite it, I might say “I seem to think, therefore I am.” rather than the other way around.

I would write: I seem to think; therefore somthing is.

And as to wether “self” has been proven, by the observing/mistaking argument, “I” must necessarily be the thing that is (or thinks) it aware of the thoughts that appear to belong to itself

Necessarily? No.

Why would you think so?

And, S.M., the phrase was “non-observable properties”, and I never said I could prove that they eixst.

Yes, typo on my part. As I said before, the reason I ask is because I think that if you made the attempt to prove that nonobservable properties exist it would help you to understand how much of the perceptive process that you are taking for granted in the proofs that you have attempted.

[begbert2]

Hmm. Long, itemized response. Late hour. Hmm.

Firstly, using unclear/inconsistent notation is an excellent way do obscure meaning and overlook mistakes, if not to oughtight disguise a swapping out of meaning. Given our happy "debating: history, I don’t think that your current list, with inconsistent definitions, is a good place for either of us to be playing. If you like, feel free to try and restate it more clearly for the benefit of my easily confused mind.

Please feel free to explain to me what assumptions my delineations are making. Please allow for the fact that when I try to completely purge all language of the type “my” and “thoughts” from the argument, it becomes blatantly unreadable. It might help to note that for some time now, the “I” referred to in the argument has always had quotes about it when referred to. Without quotes, it’s just me.

You are standing on a sphere. Really.

You have yet to demonstrate this to me in a comprehensible way. Until demonstrated otherwise, I will assume you are wrong about my knowledge of the problem.

You argue that “I” must be aware of self/others because “I” is aware of self/others.

No, I argue that because “I” is aware of self/others, it is reasonable to entitle it “I”. “I” must be aware of self/others because we are. There is even always something for us to be aware of: that last doubt. The point isn’t that it exists, it’s that we know it.

There is no objective point of view.

Well, having doubted all other points of view, how can I speak of “not” my point of view then? Beware my words! They are in English!! (An ambiguous tongue and a flogging offense, yes I know.)

Why would you think so?

Why would I think that “I” must necessarily be the thing that is (or thinks) it aware of the thoughts that appear to belong to itself? Well, largely because it was just stated. This was about two paragraphs up from the passage you quoted:

Because I persist in being aware of these seemings, I know that there is something out there with the capability of being aware of other thoughts, or of mistakenly believeing that some internal error with this capability of awareness is in fact an awareness of something external. Because of necessity I am the only thing that I can know is aware of things, the label “I” is natural.

You can think of it repeating myself if you like. I considered it ‘Hilighting the existing fact to support the answer to the next question.’
Tell you what: you can, if you like, again attempt to demonstrate to me the apparently obvious fact that there are a pheloria of gradiations of possible accuracy in perception. The fact that I have considered anything that is misinforming at all to be potentially absolutely untrustable need not distract you. But, don’t be surprised if I fail to see how slicing out four different levels of thought detail will effect an argument that allows all thoughts to be absolutely meaningless. (I’m not arguing Stanford’s view at the moment, remember?)
And, as I intimated, in spite of the pheloria of examples that indicate that there are subjectively unobservable properties, it cannot be proved that there are in fact objectively or subjectively unobservable properties. (Everybody else could be lying.) I specifically corrected you when you indicated that I said I could make such a proof. (You are, of course, invited to provide your own proof of the existence of unobservable properties. Perhaps there is indeed something that I overlooked.)

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Firstly, using unclear/inconsistent notation is an excellent way do obscure meaning and overlook mistakes, if not to oughtight disguise a swapping out of meaning.

[ul][li]There is nothing inconsistent about the notation. [/li][li]I am not sure what you find unclear. Are you still unclear what Perception(“label”) designates? How many examples do you imagine that it will take before you can extrapolate a theme?[/li][li]Your final insinuation is insulting and, given that I introduced the notation with an acknowledgement of some vagueness, perfectly in character for you. I see that retractions and protestations aside you remain consistent in your devotion to honest debate.[/ul][/li]

Given our happy "debating: history, I don’t think that your current list, with inconsistent definitions, is a good place for either of us to be playing.

There is no inconsistency in my definitions. If you think that you see some, please be so kind as to call it out.

What I have acknowledged, and what you have apparently fixated upon without understanding, is a vagueness in the notation. Since you have objected, however speciously, I shall elaborate.

In the initial stages of examination, there is nothing vague in the notation that I offered. Initially, the only assumption that we make is that perceptions of variance indicate an actual variance. Thus, we cannot speak rigorously about distinctionc between one kind of perception and another. All we can know is that a perception appears to have a certain character. Any talk of “the object of perception” or “the category of perception” or “the properties of the object of perception” is unjustified, because those distinctions have yet to be demonstrated. Thus: Perception(“characteristic”) delineates the only thing that can be delineated: an apparent characteristic of the perception.

It is only later, when we have begun to add axioms that allow us to address additional distinctions as “real”, does the possibility of vagueness arise. Now, Perception(“characteristic”) might be delineating a characteristic of the perception, of the object of the perception, etc. Of course, until we make the assumption that our perceptions are unfailingly accurate (which I never do) these distinctions are transparent to our analysis. Without that assumption, we must always allow the possibility that Perception(“characteristic”) delineates only a characteristic of the perception, without external referent. Thus, I carry through the notational simplicity rather than extending each argument with additional subcases that do not affect the final outcome.

At no point, of course, is the notation inconsistent.

However, I have offered to rework the argument if the vagueness of the notation causes a problem. Thus, if Begbert2 (or anyoen else) can provide an analtsis of any of the four sections that demonstrates a different result using any of the readings of Perception(“characteristic”) that I have offered, then I will abandon the notation for one that eliminates the generality of characteristic.

Yes, Begbert2, you may have to actually understand what the argument says in order to provide such a demonstration. I would be happy to answer any specific questions you might have.

Please feel free to explain to me what assumptions my delineations are making.

I have already done so. Allow me to repeat with bolding so that you may recognize it more easily: [your delineations] proceed from an assumption that we already know enough about what is perceived to assign categories like “internal” and “external” and “thought” as if they represent real distinctions.

Please allow for the fact that when I try to completely purge all language of the type “my” and “thoughts” from the argument, it becomes blatantly unreadable.

I allow no such thing, for you use it as a crutch to insert unjustufued assumptions into your arguments. This would not be such a grevious error if you were able to recognize such insertions when they were pointed out to you. Unfortunately, we must deal with the situation as it occurs.

It might help to note that for some time now, the “I” referred to in the argument has always had quotes about it when referred to. Without quotes, it’s just me.

Why do you persist in imagining that people are confusing the “I” in the argument with the individual typing posts on the SDMB. It isn’t happening. You can stop addressing the point.

You have yet to demonstrate this to me in a comprehensible way. Until demonstrated otherwise, I will assume you are wrong about my knowledge of the problem.

Thus does ignorance armor itself against education. What you find comprehensible is beond my control.

No, I argue that because “I” is aware of self/others, it is reasonable to entitle it “I”. “I” must be aware of self/others because we are. There is even always something for us to be aware of: that last doubt. The point isn’t that it exists, it’s that we know it.

Please consider how all of the bolded elements can be used as support for the attribution of the label “I”.

What you are considering is a circle.

Well, having doubted all other points of view, how can I speak of “not” my point of view then?

You cannot. More importantly, though, having pretended to doubt all you should not speak of “my” point of view.

Beware my words! They are in English!! (An ambiguous tongue and a flogging offense, yes I know.)

Yes, I am familiar with the tongue. The problem is not in your tools.

Why would I think that “I” must necessarily be the thing that is (or thinks) it aware of the thoughts that appear to belong to itself? Well, largely because it was just stated.

Appearance, the mother of necessity?

By the way, explaining “why” you think something by pointing out that you said it earlier is a bit strange, don’t you think? Since you draw attention to your earlier passage, though, let’s take a lok at it.

Because I persist in being aware of these seemings, I know that there is something out there with the capability of being aware of other thoughts, or of mistakenly believeing that some internal error with this capability of awareness is in fact an awareness of something external. Because of necessity I am the only thing that I can know is aware of things, the label “I” is natural.

That’s one Hell of a lot of subject you use to argue that the label implying a subject is natural. Mind if I ask how you go about proving things like “of necessity I am the only thing that I can know is aware of things” before you have demonstrated that “I” exists?

Tell you what: you can, if you like, again attempt to demonstrate to me the apparently obvious fact that there are a pheloria of gradiations of possible accuracy in perception.

Apparently obvious fact.

I just thought that bore repeating.

The fact that I have considered anything that is misinforming at all to be potentially absolutely untrustable need not distract you.

There is a disjunction between the axiom that you claim to accept: (existant) idea(s) without meaningful content, and the argument that you make, which is strangely crowded with presumptions and conlusions drawn from the content of ideas (setting aside, for the moment, the problems involved in the attribution of ideas to an “internal” world while arguing that internal and external are meaningless concepts.)

Apparently obvious fact.

I just thought that bore repeating.

don’t be surprised if I fail to see how slicing out four different levels of thought detail will effect an argument that allows all thoughts to be absolutely meaningless.

If you had ever actually made an argument that rigorously applied that stricture, I would not need to point out the apparently obvious facts to you.

And, as I intimated, in spite of the pheloria of examples that indicate that there are subjectively unobservable properties, it cannot be proved that there are in fact objectively or subjectively unobservable properties.

Ah, so you accept the absolute necessity of observation in the demonstration of existence. Good.

I specifically corrected you when you indicated that I said I could make such a proof.

I do not believe I have ever said any such thing. Can you provide a cite?

You are, of course, invited to provide your own proof of the existence of unobservable properties.

What an interesting rhetorical trick. Do you think it was effective?

[begbert2]

Starting from the bottom:

What an interesting rhetorical trick. Do you think it was effective?

What trick? I had said such a proof was impossible, but I could be wrong about that, and you were invited to prove me wrong if you believed otherwise. Since that particular ‘rhetorical trick’ is the basis of rational scientific examination, I don’t mind using it, although I find myself wondering what you think I was trying to effect with it.

Part of the problem is that you seem to get so excited about disproving my points, you don’t bother to say what your stance is, merely merrily charging on ahead with what’s supposedly wrong with what I’m saying. Let’s look at an example with this whole unobservable properties thing.

I believe I first mentioned it here:

A, me
Though existence is a slippery concept, I choose to define it (<-definition warning) such that in the absence of existence, an object could have no observable attributes. (Or unobservable ones, but that is mostly irrelevant.)

When I said “mostly” irrelevant, it was because it wasn’t so totally irrelavent that I would be able to get away without covering the case in my proof. Saying they were irrelevant would be incorrect, because I need to be aware of everything at least far enough to say it doesn’t matter to my proof. (Also, perhaps we differ on the definition of “unobservable”. To me, the mass of an electron is unobservable, yet we should take it into account as far as is necessary.)

I said a long bit that ended with about observable properties that ended with the short paragraph

B, me
Don’t get hung up on the "observable"ness of the properties. Unobservable properties would work just as well, but they’re a bit harder to know about.

bolding new. This statement was intended to point out that, whe referring to observations, the alternate case of unobservablility would not be a disproof of my proof, even though I never addressed it specifically since it cannot be demonstrated to apply. When talking about something in general, you’re supposed to at least briefly mention all the cases of it.

Then I quoted A again, because TVAA called for my definition of existence.

Then, in response to B, S.M. replies:

C, S.M.
“A bit harder to know about?”

Indeed, and the crux of this proof is “what we can know”. Would anyone else like to se Begbert2 attempt to insert unopbservable properties into his proof?

after which I posted

D, me
See the above post for textbook example of misinterptreting a passage of my argument. The passage quoted is intended to point out that, even if we are unable to observe a property, that does not prove that the property does not exist, while simultaneously giving a slightly humorous note to the fact that unobservable properties are not directly useful in proving anything.

An example of an “unobservable” property: Infrared radiation. Also electron weight. (I s’pose you could just pile them on the scale…)

It’s a good thing to be aware of unobservable properties, because they can be distorted via altered perception into observable properties. (Ever seen night-vision goggles?) Since distortion of perception is certainly allowed by my proof, it should be noted that distortions do not create or erase properties, though they might cause them to be imperceptible (or bring otherwise imperceptible ones to light).

I’m actually not sure what S.M. is trying to say. He sure seems to be enjoying himself though.

And I wasn’t sure. However, I had obliged him in giving some examples of subjectively unobservable properties, and stating how, because such properties can be distorted in and out of observation, they were relevant to my proof (to counter claims that apparent distortion had to come from nowhere, or some such thing).

*E, S.M.*Here is what I said:

• the crux of this proof is “what we can know”.
• It would be interesting to see you attempt to insert unopbservable properties into his proof?
  In all else, you are replying to your imagination.

For the curious, I thought that the attempt to fit unobservable properties into your proof might help you understand the crucial position of the observer in the epistemological structure. It is a point you seem determined to resist, for a reason that I cannot fathom. If the observer is truly unimportant, though, you should be able to easily adapt your proof to demonstrate the existence of unobservable properties.

Can you?

Well, no, I can’t, duh. The proof was meant to prove the existence of "I’, not random other words within the proof, including “proof”. But at that point I had got fed up to here with S.M.'s namecalling, and so openly lied about mathematics, and retracted everything above that line of the post, rendering the entire previous discussion about my use of the word “unobservable” moot.

F, S.M.
Still waiting for that demonstration of existence for non-observable properties.

Except to S.M…

G, S.M.
ps
Still waiting for that proof of existence for nonobservational properties.

Who just won’t let up. Now, why would he be repeating this absurd claim? His phrasing is making it look like I had offered such a proof, which I certainly had not; S.M. had claimed erroneously (in E) that “you should be able to easily adapt your proof to demonstrate the existence of unobservable properties,” but I certainly hadn’t given any support to that absurd idea. So, in the hopes of killing (again) that retracted issue:

H, me And, S.M., the phrase was “non-observable properties”, and I never said I could prove that they eixst. (And it’s all retracted now anyway.) Non-observable properties do seem to be around in abundance. They fall into roughly two categories: properties that we can observe, but others claim they cannot, and properties that we cannot observe, but that others insist are there.

Examples of the first:
Light which the blind claim not to be able to observe
Colors which dogs reportedly cannot observe
Quiet sounds which the deaf cannot observe
That annoying shriek that occasionally I notice my monitor making that doesn’t seem to bother anybody else

Examples of the second:
The time when my monitor is fading to black between refreshes
The color of the back of my head
The empty space between atoms in solid objects
microwave radiation

So, I have reason to believe that there very likely are properties of things that I cannot observe. I have no reason to believe that all properties of everything are observable by anything; so I have no reason to assume that properties are objectively observable. I am certainly unable to disprove unobservable properties of an existing thing, because by the nature of being unobservable, I cannot be effected by them enough to know one way or the other.

Satisfied, S.M.?

Of course not. Remarking on the fact that I had noted his typo:

I, S.M.
Yes, typo on my part. As I said before, the reason I ask is because I think that if you made the attempt to prove that nonobservable properties exist it would help you to understand how much of the perceptive process that you are taking for granted in the proofs that you have attempted.

Actaully, it would make me look silly; and in spite of your implications by phrasing in F and G, after you inaccurately claimed in E that “If the observer is truly unimportant, though, you should be able to easily adapt your proof to demonstrate the existence of unobservable properties.” Which is totally irrelevant now because it is responding to a different, retracted proof. My current argument hinges on observation. I, of course, am giving S.M. the benefit of the doubt and assuming that he has some reason for continually bringing up this train of thought, and reply accordingly in an attempt to draw out from him what on earth he’s trying to say; what position does he hold?

J, me
And, as I intimated, in spite of the pheloria of examples that indicate that there are subjectively unobservable properties, it cannot be proved that there are in fact objectively or subjectively unobservable properties. (Everybody else could be lying.) I specifically corrected you when you indicated that I said I could make such a proof. (You are, of course, invited to provide your own proof of the existence of unobservable properties. Perhaps there is indeed something that I overlooked.)

And so I execute my “rhetorical trick.” Uh-huh. As usual, S.M. leaps to the defensive the minute I imply (or can be imagined to imply) that he said something he didn’t. In your posts E, F, and G you firmly imply that I am somehow obligated to prove this unprovable notion, a claim which would only be true if I had made such a claim. There’s your cite. Realize that refuting it would underline your statements as attempts to decieve the viewing audience (if any). Something which I would not accuse you of. I think you actually believed that I had made such a claim, and were therefore mistaken, not lying.

Oh, and

Ah, so you accept the absolute necessity of observation in the demonstration of existence. Good.

That’s not what I said. the only time the word “existence” comes up is in the phrase “existence of unobservable properties”, which ain’t the same thing as “existence of ‘I’.” But that’s irrelevant, because my (current, unretracted) argument does indeed make use of observation.
And what’s wrong with your definitions? Why, hey don’t distinguish between wether “Perception(“I”)” means “the perception of “I”” or “The perception of the label “I”.” As You have tried to accuse me of trying to prove the mere existence of labels before, there’s no way I’m going to start down a proof or list or whatever which cannot distinguish a perception of a thing and a perception of its label; that defeinition is begging for you to switch them on me. Yeah, I know, you’re a sinless godly individual who would never do such a thing, but I’m not going there.

And what’s wrong with my list? It’s a set of speculations about what might actually be the case. A list of things that can be axiomatically believed, at the high level, where all the words are still legal. It is not meaningless to discuss the case, or to take axiomatically the case, that your thoughts are true and your perceptions are false. It may not be right, but it ain’t meaningless. My list differs from your list in that it appears to relate directly to the problem at hand, without resorting to obtuse phrasing that offers massive opportunity to alter meaning and obscure. And, my first step in my list IS the first step in your list (assuming you aren’t already distorting the meanings), and my arguement chooses to take no further assumptions that that, the rest of your list gives the appearance of being obfuscation.

In short, your list appears to be pure meaningless crap, having no relevance whatsoever on what I’m saying but many opportunities to distort what I say about it. The fact that I don’t give it the credence that you feel it deserves doesn’t really impugn upon my intelligence, but you can believe what you want.

And if you want to try to restate it with clear definitions, fine, but keep in mind that I don’t take any of those convoluted axioms as true but the first, non-convoluted one. You’re almost certainly putting up strawmen, wether you know it or not.

(To your credit, the Stanford approach is open to critiscism on how much you can infer from the perception of thoughts. Perhaps you just didn’t notice when I explicitly broke from their approach.)

[erislover]

How unsurprising.

[begbert2]

How unverbose.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Here are the things that I said:
[ol]
[li]Ah, so you accept the absolute necessity of observation in the demonstration of existence. Good.[/li]Answer: Actually, you still don’t, though you maintain that you cannot prove existence using unobservable properties.
[li]I do not believe I have ever said [that Begbert2 said he could make such a proof. [/li]]. Can you provide a cite?
Answer: no.
[/ol]
As I said before, and you quoted in your response, the reason for my asking was the hope that the attempt would help you to see the crucial nature of the observed in any proof of existence. It would be a good point for you to understand.

I, of course, am giving S.M. the benefit of the doubt and assuming that he has some reason for continually bringing up this train of thought, and reply accordingly in an attempt to draw out from him what on earth he’s trying to say; what position does he hold?

For reason: see point (1) above.
For my stance, see previous paragraph, or see the sections that you apparently quoted without comprehension in your last post.

And so I execute my “rhetorical trick.” Uh-huh.

Yep. Do you think it worked?

And what’s wrong with your definitions? Why, hey don’t distinguish between wether “Perception(“I”)” means “the perception of “I”” or “The perception of the label “I”.”

Perception(“I”). Perception("label “I”).

It’s not really so hard. Of course, at axiom (I) the syntactic distinction is irrelevant, since there is no possible manner in which to differentiate the percption associated with each characteristic.

A more precise concern would have been that Perception(“label I”) is a subset of Perception(“I”), so care must be taken to not confuse the usage. To that, I would agree.

As You have tried to accuse me of trying to prove the mere existence of labels before, there’s no way I’m going to start down a proof or list or whatever which cannot distinguish a perception of a thing and a perception of its label; that defeinition is begging for you to switch them on me. Yeah, I know, you’re a sinless godly individual who would never do such a thing, but I’m not going there.

As you wish. Ignorance is not a door which can be forced from the outside.

The perceptive among the audience might note that I explicitely demarked the discussion of labels in my study of cases, thus taking steps to avoid confusion in minds other than Begbert2’s.

And what’s wrong with my list?

[ol][li]It is based upon presumptions about the state of reality that are already quite strong. Hiding such assumptions is the keystone of a circular argument.[/li][li]You do not apply it rigorously in your “proof”.[/ol][/li]
But that has been said before, more than once. Do you think the answers are going to change if you repeat the question enough times?

It’s a set of speculations about what might actually be the case.

As is mine.
As is any set of speculations about existence prior to a demonstration of the nature of existence.

This sentence betrays your inability to approach this investigation free from preconception.

A list of things that can be axiomatically believed, at the high level, where all the words are still legal. It is not meaningless to discuss the case, or to take axiomatically the case, that your thoughts are true and your perceptions are false.

Of course not. I never said that it was meaningless. It is also not meaningless to take axiomatically the case that you exist.

Neither of those cases, though, represent a truly skeptical approach to the question of existence.

My list differs from your list in that it appears to relate directly to the problem at hand, without resorting to obtuse phrasing that offers massive opportunity to alter meaning and obscure.

Actually, it is my list that relates directly to the matter of perceptions. Yours makes assumptions about reality and then hides them behind the definitions and categories.

Do you have any specific quibbles with my axioms (besides the fact that they are not the same as yours), or are you just put off by the number of words?

And, my first step in my list IS the first step in your list (assuming you aren’t already distorting the meanings)

No, it is not. Is it really necessary for me to point out to you that my initial axiom does not allow for the use of categories like internal and external because it does not assume that a subject exists?

Apparently so.

and my arguement chooses to take no further assumptions that that

Is it really necesary to point out to you, again, that you move beyond your first axiom every time you make arguments (such as the assignment of the label “I”) that draw support from the meaningfulness of the content of your perceptions/ideas.

Apparently so.

the rest of your list gives the appearance of being obfuscation.

:wally

Setting aside for the moment the fact that you do not understand the distinction between my first axiom and your own, I posted my list first. It’s a bit stupid to pretend that I was attempting to confuse the issue with regard to your proof when you had not even posted your list of axioms yet!!

Then, of course, there’s the little matter of this thread not being entirely about you. There were these fellows named Descartes and Russell whose ideas have been mentioned.

It’s bad enough when Bozo stops being funny. When he begins to think he’s the only act in the circus it’s time to send in the clown car.

In short, your list appears to be pure meaningless crap, having no relevance whatsoever on what I’m saying but many opportunities to distort what I say about it.

The ignorant fear what they do not understand.

And if you want to try to restate it with clear definitions, fine, but keep in mind that I don’t take any of those convoluted axioms as true but the first, non-convoluted one. You’re almost certainly putting up strawmen, wether you know it or not.

Are you truly stupid enough to imagine that I was presenting the axioms of your argument?

Amazing!

The fact that I don’t give it the credence that you feel it deserves doesn’t really impugn upon my intelligence, but you can believe what you want.

See above.

To your credit, the Stanford approach is open to critiscism on how much you can infer from the perception of thoughts. Perhaps you just didn’t notice when I explicitly broke from their approach.

To your discredit, you follow the accusation that I am presenting strawmen with the acknowledgment that the argument was pertinent to teh Stanford link, which you had chosen to reintroduce to this thread.

Perhas you didn’t notice that everything in this thread is not about you. (I know, I covered this before. One time never seems to be enough with Begbert2).

To your further discredit (if such a thing is possible) you remain oblivious to the reliance of your own argument upon what can be inferred from the perception of thought. Here’s a hint, it’s pretty much everything that you use to bind something(s) that exists with the meaningful label "I"

erl
I don’t know. I have to say that Iwas surprised by some of the above silliness. Truly, man’s capactiy for self-delusion is a formidable thing.

[begbert2]

There’s nothing wrong with referring to collectives with single words. Such as, say, “collective”.

You make a lot of noise, S.M., but I’m waiting for contribution. Other than trying to discredit me. You know, this thread isn’t entirely about me.
Short proof.

Axiom 1: observation(“my doubt”) exists.*
Axiom 2: observation(s) -> observer
Conclusion: observer exists.

*note that the content of the observation is entirely untrustable. “my doubt” is merely a label, referring to a real observed thing with unreliable content or properties other than its existence/variance.

Was that too fast for you? Here: I’ll make it longer:

Axiom 3: If there is an observer of “my doubt”, that observer shall be called ‘I’.**
Conclusion 2: I exist.**

** The label “I” refers to the previously-proven observer. As the label conforms to the common understanding of “I”, the axiom is not only reasonable, but the quotes can be dropped too.

Interesting to note that whatever it is composed of, at the level of observation, only one observer need exist. So, a singular label is fine, so long as one is aware that that one may actually be a conglomerate acting to observe as one.

S.M., I don’t care one whit how many ways you can slice perception. It has no relevence to what I’m talking about. But, go ahead and shovel whatever you want into your posts. I don’t care.

What I’m curious about is, did Descartes give much in the way of indication of how he personally got from “I think” to “I am”? The phrasing in the Stanford article made it sound like their explanation was their own, or popular philosophy’s, invention. Did Descartes give it grounds for support? erislover? (If you have time.)

[Spiritus_Mundi]

You make a lot of noise, S.M., but I’m waiting for contribution. Other than trying to discredit me.

It requires no effort to discredit you. I merely call attention to your own words.

As to my contributions, they are what they are.

You know, this thread isn’t entirely about me.

Interesting rhetorical trick. Do you think it might be time to learn a new one?

**The label “I” refers to the previously-proven observer. As the label conforms to the common understanding of “I”, the axiom is not only reasonable, but the quotes can be dropped too.

I think you will have a difficult time suporting that statement, using only the axiom that perceptions exist and imply a perceiver.

S.M., I don’t care one whit how many ways you can slice perception. It has no relevence to what I’m talking about.

It does as soon as you start trying to do things like assert that the unbounded “thing that exists” conforms to the common understanding of “I”.

Not that I expect you to perceive that, of course.

But, go ahead and shovel whatever you want into your posts. I don’t care.

It’s called truth. How little you care for it is obvious.

Since you have yet again (pardon my shock) failed to present any substantive response to any of the points in my last post, I shall conclude that you are both unable to do so and aware that you are unable to do so.

This thread is just chock full of obvious conclusions.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

“Collective” is a collective noun.
“I” is a singular pronoun.

Are you now arguing that the common understanding of the first-person singular pronoun in English is that it designates a collective?

(I know, there I go again, applying grammar to statements in English.)

[begbert2]

S.M. has put forth two points worth examining. One of them was so worthwhile, that it inspired a clarification of my argument.

The other was

originally posted by Spiritus Mundi
“Collective” is a collective noun.
“I” is a singular pronoun.

Are you now arguing that the common understanding of the first-person singular pronoun in English is that it designates a collective?

No, you misread the proof. There was a line in it stating: observation(s) -> observer. That’s a single observer, which gets called “I”. The realization that a single observer may be composed of may components does not unmake the fact that it is a single observer.

This was already pointed out in

originally posted by begbert2
Interesting to note that whatever it is composed of, at the level of observation, only one observer need exist. So, a singular label is fine, so long as one is aware that that one may actually be a conglomerate acting to observe as one.

The worthwhile point comment was:

*originally posted by Spiritus Mundi in reference to
"*The label “I” refers to the previously-proven observer. As the label conforms to the common understanding of “I”, the axiom is not only reasonable, but the quotes can be dropped too."

I think you will have a difficult time suporting that statement, using only the axiom that perceptions exist and imply a perceiver.

S.M. is right to a point; it’s hard to support the obvious. Since, within the perspective of the proof, no words are usable, it is obvious that the term “I” is being applied at the level of the text of the proof, not that of the amorphous objects being contemplated. Of course within the word of the proof, using only the axiom that perceptions exist and imply a perceiver, no words can be applied. Fortunately, when rephrasing the conclusion of the proof to better state the meaning thereof, we have access to all of the english language and the defeinitions thereof.

Now, I had originally stated that “If there is an observer of “my doubt”, that observer shall be called ‘I’.” However, as I reflected about it, I realised that that didn’t sound quite right. I must thank S.M. for giving me occasion to review my argument so that I could find the flaws in it myself. Of course it always might have had flaws; it was my own idea. A person would have to be wildly overconfident beyond all resaon and/or a diety to claim that their every posted word was inherently “truth”.

The flaw is, as any theist would point out, that God is observing their thoughts too, as is Satan, and any number of things in the metaphysical studio audience. The skeptical mind also cannot dismiss the claims of psychics; there’s no proof in their favor yet, but maybe they are reading my mind, which is to say observing my thoughts. So, my application of the definition of “I” is too general to be safely applied. If it were lying to have been wrong, I would retract the statement, but as it is not, I will merely correct it:

The argument, in its effort to pare out unused concepts, needs to be restored somewhat to apply my shiny new definition of “I”:

Axiom 1: A point of view, which can be reasonably called “my” point of view based on pre-doubt labeling, is currently observing that (“my doubt”) exists.
Axiom 2: observation -> observer
Conclusion 1: An observer, which has “my” point of view, exists.
Axiom 3: That which has my POV is me.
Conclusion 2: I exist.

This application of I’s meaning is more specific and more true to the definition. It also makes use of the fact that I am aware only of my own awareness, and thus neither God nor any other additional observer of my thoughts can usurp the title “I”.

[erislover]

What I’m curious about is, did Descartes give much in the way of indication of how he personally got from “I think” to “I am”? The phrasing in the Stanford article made it sound like their explanation was their own, or popular philosophy’s, invention. Did Descartes give it grounds for support? erislover? (If you have time.)

His development wasn’t really much more rigorous than:

“Hmm, everything could be an illusion. But who would it be fooling?” Hence the self must exist. The answer “no one, obviously” never seemed to cross his mind. Which is not to assert there is no self, only to note that a skeptical approach to ontology should rule this out and it doesn’t. Why didn’t it? Well, here’s where we get into assumptions necessary to assert etc.

Axiom 1: A point of view, which can be reasonably called “my” point of view based on pre-doubt labeling, is currently observing that (“my doubt”) exists.

That’s some axiom you have there.

I do not see why the concept of possession is justified there. I do not see why you would choose to make an observation into an axiom unless we have really pushed you to the border between realizing you are walking a circle and pure madness.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

No, you misread the proof. There was a line in it stating: observation(s) -> observer. That’s a single observer, which gets called “I”. The realization that a single observer may be composed of may components does not unmake the fact that it is a single observer.

I did not.

You are now conflating the conclusion of your implication, which is that at least one observer is impied by one observation, and the perception that many separate perceptions can all be labelled as belonging to/originating from “I”.

A rigorous approach we be to recognize that:
[ul][li]Each separate observation that exists implies at least one observer.[/li][li]If we demonstrate/assume that more than one perception exists, we have no way to bound whether those observations imply one observer or several.[/li][li]If those several observations imply several observers, we have no way to assert what qualities those observers may or may not share.[/ul][/li]If it is your contention that the above list of qualities delineates the “common understanding” of “I”, well, I am forced to conclude that your understanding is somewhat less than common.

But I think we knew that already.

A point of view, which can be reasonably called “my” point of view based on pre-doubt labeling, is currently observing that (“my doubt”) exists.

A bit unwieldy. Why not just phrase it: I exist.

(Unless, of course, you wish to revise your definition of “nothing” to allow i to exhibit the property “is currently observing”.)

[begbert2]

erislover
For observations to enter into an argument, (at least, the type where the term “axiom” is used) they have to be axioms. Recall that the conclusions of previous arguments can be taken axiomatically in other arguments.

The axiom is big because simplifying it is a process of discarding detail. Simply saying “There is an observation” disregards the fact that these observations are all of the set “my perceptions”, which pending proof of existence is merely a label to remind us not to include extra stuff. I have to put it verbosely because if I had just said:

A1) My perceptions exist
A2) If my perceptions exist, then I exist
C1) ergo, I exist

then all I would get is this the thing quoted back at me with the "My"s and "I"s bolded. Which is not the point; the fact is that I have a point of view, at the least capable of sensing these doubtable perceptions, and by the fact that I cannot entirely doubt away my perceptions I can know that I have a functioning POV. Dunno what’s causing it, but whatever it is, I’ll hang the title “I” in it 'cause it’s the thing that has my POV.

Dunno why you keep talking about circles, since there still aren’t any. In short, it’s Perceptions -> POV -> I. The perceptions’ existence is undoubtable, and the rest follow like dominoes. Pretty darn straight.
S.M.

A bit unwieldy. Why not just phrase it: I exist.

(Unless, of course, you wish to revise your definition of “nothing” to allow i to exhibit the property “is currently observing”.)

Good heavens, are you delusional? Of course I’m not going to say that nothing can observe things; besides being silly, it is exactly the opposite of the heart of my proof!

And why don’t I rephrase “E=MC[sup]2[/sup]” as E = 2. It would be so much easier to understand. :rolleyes:

And, I already corrected for multiple perceivers; try to keep up.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Good heavens, are you delusional? Of course I’m not going to say that nothing can observe things; besides being silly, it is exactly the opposite of the heart of my proof!

Indeed, so your axioim reduces immediately to: A point of view, which can be reasonably called “my” point of view based on pre-doubt labeling, exists.**

Since you never use anything to bind “I” other than the perception that it owns/originates “my point of view”, this reduces to: I exist

And why don’t I rephrase “E=MC[sup]2[/sup]” as E = 2. It would be so much easier to understand.

I don’t know. Doing so could hardly make you appear more foolish than what you actually do post.

And, I already corrected for multiple perceivers; try to keep up.

No, you did not. Try to read carefully.

[begbert2]

Indeed, so your axioim reduces immediately to: A point of view, which can be reasonably called “my” point of view based on pre-doubt labeling, exists.

Yes, that’s the application of Axiom 2 to get to Conclusion 1.

Since you never use anything to bind “I” other than the perception that it owns/originates “my point of view”, this reduces to: I exist

Actually I used Axiom 3, which seems to resonate nicely with most people’s definiton of I. And yes, if you apply Axiom 3, you get Conclusion 2.

So nice to see you can follow my argument. If you feel inclined to actually dispute something, you might try claiming that some of the axioms, as presented, are unsubstantiable. Or you can instead go on piling it on about how my posts are silly and yours are pinnacles of godlike brilliance. As always, your call.

[erislover]

*Originally posted by begbert2 *
The axiom is big because simplifying it is a process of discarding detail.

Then, as a matter of standard approach, your axiom is too big. It says too much. Perhaps if you took an approach similar to Spiritus’s above you might start to see the sort of assumptions you are making. Descartes took a sort of rhetorical approach, just a guy thinkin’ about stuff. But he wanted the strength of the anylitic conclusion. I apoligize for not having read over his responses to critics yet, rest assured I will.

Simply saying “There is an observation” disregards the fact that these observations are all of the set “my perceptions”

And what makes that a fact?