I know I said I would refrain from comment until Begbert2 committed himself to a single unambiguous usage of the symbol “I”. But I’m weak. This one was too good to pass up.
"A bit harder to know about?"
Indeed, and the crux of this proof is “what we can know”. Would anyone else like to se Begbert2 attempt to insert unopbservable properties into his proof?
See the above post for textbook example of misinterptreting a passage of my argument. The passage quoted is intended to point out that, even if we are unable to observe a property, that does not prove that the property does not exist, while simultaneously giving a slightly humorous note to the fact that unobservable properties are not directly useful in proving anything.
An example of an “unobservable” property: Infrared radiation. Also electron weight. (I s’pose you could just pile them on the scale…)
It’s a good thing to be aware of unobservable properties, because they can be distorted via altered perception into observable properties. (Ever seen night-vision goggles?) Since distortion of perception is certainly allowed by my proof, it should be noted that distortions do not create or erase properties, though they might cause them to be imperceptible (or bring otherwise imperceptible ones to light).
I’m actually not sure what S.M. is trying to say. He sure seems to be enjoying himself though.
And has it never occured to him that my opinions of his liarness might fluctuate with time? No, I shouldn’t go there. No change in a person’s stance or opinions is permitted. Any claim of such is a lie. A horrible, damnable lie. Gotta remember that.
I’ve already talked about I. Bring your own definition: it’s a buffet.
Oh, this one is good. Simply beautiful.
Yes, that was easy to type just now, wasn’t it?
Hey, this is almost addictively amusing. I can see why S.M. does it.
He returned to reality in and after the third meditation when the perfect god was proven to exist. Thus, he said, there could be no malicious deceiver. A bit stronger than your standard ontological argument, maybe, but I would imagine it is where Descartes is battled the most.
There is no need to slander such a great thinker. But he made, IMO, a mistake. Even us normal folk do that from time to time.
Very well. I will drop any and all posts previous to this and understand that any notion I had to the contrary was the result of difficult and/or sloppy phrasing and/or reading. In this case, we shall stick with that which is defined by “I” as per MW, which is the self, which is of course (not surprising from MW) the standard definition, in which case its emphasis hardly seems necessary.
Please explain it’s use in the observation: “I think” without appealing to the conclusion of this argument: cogito ergo sum.
Absolutely so.
Then I am glad we are in agreement here.
For higher-order concepts and abstract philosophical terms I usually agree, but citing a fairly standard dictionary term seems insulting or obvious (I’m not sure which). We can all go to Merriam-Webster for such definitions, I am not sure they really solidify anything. Which is to say: I never had the suspicion that we were using different definitions of “I”, except for the “label” fiasco which I feel is best dropped (from my point of view; of course, if you would like me to take a stand on whether I really misread you or whether you really said that I am willing to do so at your request).
When we are discussing something like “a universal” which has (at least) three accepted philosophical meanings with various interpretations I would agree. However, since the thrust of Ramanujan’s, Spiritus Mundi’s, and my arguments has been based only on the epistemological circle, the various ontological members of the proof may remain undefined so long as their use is consistent. This is why I don’t see what good defining the word “exists” will do when it is not in dispute in the first place, and does not affect the eventual conclusion that “‘I think therefore I am’ is a circular argument and thus, while not false, is trivial.” It is not trivial because of its subject matter, but because of its construction.
The circularity and intended effect both of “cogito ergo sum” require the M-W (or a vastly similar) definition. If you wish to change the definition of “I” again, please say so. I see no reason to conclude that you are consistently using the definition you offerred us if ‘I’ now encompasses every seeming.
It implied exactly as much as Descartes liked. If you would like us to abandon Descartes’s argument and consider yours as it stands, please say so and then restate it for us.
This is why Descartes’s proof takes place in hyperbolic doubt and only proves the existence of the thinker that is doubting in the first place. Of course, that a thinker is doubting in the first place is the assumption carried over from the first meditation into the second so it is quite circular to then claim that “the thinker exists” has been demonstrated. Of course the truth of “the thinker exists” is indisputable—it was assumed, it formed the very backdrop/framework of the discussion.
I do not see what that would accomplish.
And then he cited your own posts for this. If you wish to take the moral high ground and feel you are correct but are unwilling to respond in kind, as a fellow poster I would urge you to simply find his questions that refer to the discussion at hand and respond to them, and them alone, clearly outlining whether
Of course, I only say this to finally appease your insistence on “discussing interesting things about the argument”, not because I necessarily feel this will enable you in a more objective sense to take a moral high ground. And I say this because you seem to have no inclination to admit any fault whatsoever, so if you want to discuss things, my advice is: discuss them. You will find Spiritus to be just as challenging of a person if you can work around raising his temper. Perhaps after a much more calm discussion you will realize why he said the things he has. Perhaps it will only start again. Anyway, my advice is what it is.
That, however, is not the game that is being played. MHO.
And yet you have no trouble casting what you do not understand as a misinterpretation. Your concern for accuracy is touching.
Here is what I said:
[ul][li]the crux of this proof is “what we can know”. [/li][li]It would be interesting to see you attempt to insert unopbservable properties into his proof?[/ul][/li]In all else, you are replying to your imagination.
For the curious, I thought that the attempt to fit unobservable properties into your proof might help you understand the crucial position of the observer in the epistemological structure. It is a point you seem determined to resist, for a reason that I cannot fathom. If the observer is truly unimportant, though, you should be able to easily adapt your proof to demonstrate the existence of unobservable properties.
Can you?
It has, thus I offer you chances to retract your falsehoods. Such an offer would be absurd if I felt your attitudes were static.
That you remain obstinate in leaving the charge to fester, even after you have apparently changed your mind, speaks volumes about your character. It is, unfortunately, a repetitious volume.
All I have asked is that you use the symbol consistenty in your proof. Why you find that request so difficult to fulfill is the one thing in you posts that truly surprises me.
Pay attention, I am going to use those pesky tools of grammar and semantics again:
[ol][li]claimed every word of the refutation was a lie[/li][li]rebuted every argument you have made[/ol][/li]These two phrases do not mean the same thing.
For instance, I might rebut your arguments by showing that you were:
[ul][li]Misinterpreting English sentences.[/li][li]Arguing deception of form when the form is standard for this medium.[/li][li]Supplying details irrelevant to the issue at hand[/li][li]Offering inapropriate and poorly sampled numerical analyses[/li][li]Claiming a meaning for your words that is not consistent with standard rules of English[/li][li]Lying.[/ul][/li]Please note that only the last of these is consistent with the charge made in (1) above, but all are consistent with (2).
Yes, it’s even better if you actually understand the meanings of those words to which you choose to bring our attention.
[sub]p.s.[/sub]
erl the peacemaker? What will Eris think?
Eris, of course, works in mysterious ways. (Mysterious-er than most 
)
I don’t feel like denying S.M.'s charges of lying anymore. He just calls those charges further lies (or sometimes “wholly without merit” that “An honest man would now retract”). Note that his “refutation” to the charge of deceptively selective quoting was that he, not I, knew what I meant by my statements, and that only the bits that he can put together funny have meaning anyway. If that’s a refutation, then he can refute anything I say, no problem; why should I give credence to the idea that such “refutations” are worthy of interest by offering him more chances to “refute” things?
I’m getting tired of this, particularly of S.M.'s noise. How about this: 4+5 = 2. There. Now I am a liar, inarguably; it’s proven, I need not try and refute it; I have no defense. Enough about it. And now, to kill this unending contention, I retract ALL my previous statements. Poof. No more quarrel. Forgive and forget.
On-topic, I found an interesting (and rather long and intricate) site: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/ I haven’t fully grokked it, but I thought I’d throw it out here and you could read it or ignore it as you wish.
My recent argument was a distinct argument asserting necessary existence, which, though heavily based on Descartes, was not what he said. It was, however, demonstrably non-circular; I have hoped to be able to demonstrate that Descartes’s argument is similarly non-circular. For that proof, the identity of the provee is irrerelevant, and the “existence” that is proven is very very very basic. But, since I have retracted it, that’s all irrelevant anyway.
Now. From the top.
From the nifty essay linked above, where it is responding to several “philosophic and interpretive mistakes”:
I have already violently demonstrated that I couldn’t have put it better. Now, as you have likely already heard these positions, what do you think of them?
Also, Descartes’s argument was about removing all that was doubtable, and then rebuilding that which could be certain. We would not expect him to be able to discover, from an extremely limited subset of pre-doubt knowledge, anything that is contrary to the pre-doubt knowledge. So, why should the fact that his conclusions (or one of them) seem naturally obvious negate the meaningfullness of those conclusions? Perhaps to the average man it seems like a waste of time, but philosophically speaking, wether or not a previously assumed fact is actually knowable is a significant detail.
Did you find it by reading my posts?
…Didi I find what? (You’re a sweet guy, erislover, but your penchant for pitching one-line posts out of left field is a bit irritating.)
Well, I certainly do so when they consist of further lies, statements wholly without merit, or charges that an honest man would retract.
That’s one way of summarizing our exchange. Here’s another:
:wally
No reason at all. I suggest that you simply stop posting lies and false charges. It will be a kinness to all involved.
Ironically, there is no intent to deceive in this statement, so it is not a lie. However your conclusion is certainly correct.
Noted.
At least this time you managed to put your insults in entirely different paragraphs from your retraction.
No and not yet.
[ul]
[li]Forgiveness requires an expression of contrition.[/li]
[li]Forgetting will happen eventually if you adopt an honest posting style, but the lessons of experience are not banished with a word.[/li][/ul]
ON TOPIC
those who read carefully will recall that erl has already noted the difficulty with relying upon a subjective character of experience in order to demonstrate the existence of “I”. The next two sentences in the Stanford summary provides a noce coda:
So, in order to create a “special” character for the experience of pain beyond “there is pain” we turn to the subject of the pain. And then we use this “special character” to argue for the existence of that subject.
That, friends and begberts, is a circular argument.
Still waiting for that demonstration of existence for non-observable properties.
Speaking of, “out of left field”, the quote was from “Small Gods” by Terry Pratchett.
I see Spiritus was kind enough to both restate the position and link to the post.
I have never intended to decieve. I have occasionally responded to misunderstood statements, generating replies which were based on false assumptions about he arguments being posed, but there was never an express intent to decieve. What would be the point? I’m not being paid per the head of ‘believers’.
And “forgive and forget” was a comment on what I’m going to do, regarding you (S.M.). You can do what you like.
Whatever.
And I actually Googled the link; it had slipped my mind that you’d (erislover) posted it when I decided to go hunting for other takes on the subject. Think of it as proof of my poor memory for detail. And no, I don’t read this entire thread each day to refresh my memory; shame upon me for such neglect.
The position you take to demonstrate circularity, then, is as follows… (Refute as desired; I’m trying to clearly state your opinion. So if I get it wrong, correct it.)
There are thoughts/perceptions, which are poorly described by objective statements like “There is pain.”
These thoughts seem to point to the existence of POV.
Nominating the POV “I” is declaring it to exist.
Using the existence of “I” to then prove “I” is begging the question.
From Stanford:
…meaning, that the I is a placeholder to note the missing subject that the thoughts by their nature seem to be referring to. As the article says, if this position is taken, then the step that looks like an implication “…therefore I am.” is not begging the question based on a previously realized existant I, but rather the realization that the subjective character of thoughts does, in fact, imply the existence of an existent subject.
In effect, what if Descartes meant the cogito not to be step 4, but rather step 3? As the lynchpin of his argument, (the realization that his thoughts have an objective character,) it seemed to deserve a catchy phrase.
If that was the case, then there is not curcularity, more of an underlining of the point.
Is there a reason why this perspective cannot be taken?
…Shoulda said “seems to deserve a catchy phrase.” Lest I get accused of deceptively claiming to have known what Descartes was thinking…
If ‘I’ is at one point a placeholder and at another a self (whether or not substantial i.e. - correlated with a physical body) the charge is equivocation. If the reason we don’t understand the proof is because we fail to recognize the subjective character of the cogitatio the charge is circularity. If we account for both circularity and equivocation, we end up with various possible statements given other assumptions, two of which have been mentioned in this thread. One is Russell’s “there are thoughts” and another is “There seems to be a self; or, I seem to exist”.
Response to Russell: “On behalf of Descartes, it seems that such objections fail to consider fully the subjective character of experience. There surely is something more to the experience of pain than what ‘there is pain’ conveys.” [original emphasis] It goes on in the same rebuttal: “Of course, for all Descartes’ meditator Knows (at this early stage of the inquiry), the ‘I’ might well turn out to be indicative of nothing more than a Humean bundle, or perhaps even a committee of substantial selves. But whatever the eventual outcome, vis-à-vis the ontological status of the self, the ‘I’ can be read as a placeholder for what is a primary datum of experience.” [Note the mention of Hume, how “surprising”] Which returns me to objections made about 5 pages ago, actually:
What distinguishes “there are thoughts” from “there is a placeholder ‘I’”? Russell’s comment:" ‘thought exist’ is a justifiable statement." But we don’t want to say that, we want to say that ‘I’ is a placeholder for something more than just thoughts. Why do we want to say this? Well, because of the subjective character of the cogitatio!
Which brings us back to this objection: if we are doubting our seemings, why not “I think therefore I seem to be”? And around and around the circle we go.
‘I’ is not a placeholder for thoughts, ‘I’ is a placeholder for the subject of the thoughts, which is implied by the fact that the thoughts seem to be of a subjective nature. The formal installation of the subject occurs when we note “I think” (as in, the thoughts seem to require a thinker), “therefore, I am” (as in, the thinker required by the thoughts exists).
On another subject:
What’s a ‘seeming’? A thought? It sounds like what you get after you doubt something else, like “I seem to have a body,” or “I seem to exist.” On doubting ‘seemings’: What are you doubting about the seeming? It’s clear that we cannot doubt that it exists, the way we can our body or memories. “There seems to be a body,” is an expression of doubt about the body, and “There seems to be memories,” is an expression of doubt about memories, but “There seems to be a seeming,” merely replaces “a potential misperception” with another “a potential misperception” of exactly equal value. By noting the potential inaccuracy of our pereceptions, we can make scramble the seeming and doubt that it shows us anything, but we cannot doubt that the seeming itself exists/is occuring.
The best you can do is collect things together and reduce the nuber of seemings you have. I seem to have a large number of senses, but I can call that one seeming. If you want to cut to the chase, you can say “there seems to be a myself existing and having all the symptoms thereof”, and end up with exactly one seeming that encapsuates all of the doubts, but that final seeming cannot be successfully doubted.
I’ll stop here and get your take on this. A question to start from: Do you see why and/or accept that the existence of “seemings” are undoubtable?
I never disagreed.
As in equivocation. Inconsistent use of ‘I’.
I wouldn’t know. Who brought it up?
“(as in, the thoughts seem to require a thinker)”, wherin ‘I’ is defined as the thinker that would seem to be required by the thoughts.
“(as in, the thinker required by the thoughts exists)”, wherin ‘I’ is defined as the thinker that would seem to be required by the thoughts.
Please explain the inconsistency/equivocation; I’m not seeing it.
Granted that later in the proof, Descartes tries to use the rather less substantiable argument described in the Stanford article as the Cartesian Circle to prove God and the objective truth of subjective reality, but I don’t agree with him that far. At this point in his meditations, we know nothing further about the I than that which was stated, consistently, above.
Your seemings, not mine.
I apologize, then, for sloppy phrasing. More clearly: "If we are doubting that anything supports our seemings (not that the seemings qua seemings are in doubt), why not ‘I think therefore I seem to be’? "
My fault.
In the matter of equivocation I must fault myself again. Hasty response. So, then, in this case, ‘I’ is not ‘self’?
I’m afraid I need a bit more clarification. Are you asking:
or
Depends; what do you mean by “self”? The answer is most likely no; ‘self’ sounds like it carries baggage that is not implied by the fact that many thoughts appear to have a subjective nature to them. As has been stated, (yet again, from Stanford):
At this point, we know nothing further about the subject of the thoughts than that there is a subject of the thoughts, labeled “I”.
By the time we get this far, we have noted the uncertainty in our own perceptions, and, presumably, memories and thoughts themselves. I don’t know about you, but my self-conception is dependent on those things, and so long as they are uncertain, I cannot be certain of my self as I imagine to know it.