No Ramanujan, I genuinely believe that the seeming perception of perhaps imaginary (insert as many qualifiers as it takes) is significant and can be used as evidence in favor of my existence in the same manner that skeletons can be used as evidence of the proof of the onetime existence of dinosaurs.
Since, the way I figure it, the much-qualifed perceptions could not be percieved, at all, period, if I didn’t exist, those perceptions are proof in favor of my existence.
so then you think “i perceive my perceptions” has meaning when “i” and “my” don’t. simple enough transformation.
what does it mean in the absence of “i”?
(as a side note, dinosaurs can’t use the existence of their bones to demonstrate they once existed, since they would have to exist in order to prove it)
Curious, I was just reading this, where I took the author to mean exactly the same – that these words repeated enough lose their (imagined?) meaning.
Incorrect transformation. Consider the assertion: “I percieve my perceptions” cannot be true in the case that “I exist” is false (all other combinations are possible). This can be written in a truth table:
P E
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
This is the standard truth table for implication. So, we see that the previous trusim can be described accurately by the statement " ‘I percieve my perceptions’ implies ‘I exist’."
As the terminology indicates, the condition of existence being necessary for perception is what allows us to use perception to prove existence. If independent evidence of perception is found, then existence is proven. If independent evidence of existence were found, this implication would tell us nothing about perception. That’s the way the implication works.
In the absence if I, there would be no impression of perception. None. Period. Because, as you note, “I exist” is required for “I think” (or “I percieve”, or “I pretty-much-anything”). It is because of this fact that I can use perception in an implication to say something about existence.
Dinosaurs, were they in a position to view their bones during their lives, could indeed use their bones to prove their own existence. “They would have to exist in order to prove it” is equivalent in meaning to “If they can prove it, then they have to exist.”
The problem you see is actually the solution. The limitation on the existence of perceptions from non-existent things is the method we use to demonstrate the existence of ourselves.
Oh, and The Great Unwashed, that is a poorly structured argument. A -> B does not transform into C(A) -> C(B) by any valid logical rule. (And no, the additional “I thinks” are not the same as the first “I think”; the extras are modifiers while the first stands alone.)
A better thing to note would be that “I think I think” implies that “I think” is true (ie, C(A) -> A), and then one can take any such premise (“I think I think I think I think I think I think I think”) and repeatedly apply the C(A) -> A rule to strip off the extra qualifiers. When that is done, one can fire the cleaned-up A through the A -> B implication to prove B.
In other words,
A = I think
B = I am
C(x) = I think (that it is the case that) x
A -> B
C(A)
:. C(B)
is NOT a valid proof. It just reads well to the layman. 
In retrospect, my counterargument would NOT read well to a layman. Let me try this again.
If you’re willing to say, “if I think, then I am”, then that’s one thing, but “if I think I think, then I think I am” is entirely another. If “I think I think” means, “I think”, then you could have just said “I think”, and then gone on to say, “I am”.
If “I think” means, “I don’t know one way or the other wether I think”, then you’re suppost to just stop there. If you don’t believe “I think”, then you don’t have to believe “I am”. At least until the next proof comes along…
So, “I think I think” either means, “I think”, or it doesn’t. But trying to shove the extra “I think” to the “I am” side is just bad. It makes for a cute read, but it’s just not how things are done.
No, I noted that your dinosaur analogy was stupid and that you cling to it with characteristic gusto.
I never called you stupid, though I certainly allowed for the inference to be made. That is nothing that you do not do with your own posts, of course.
The bolded section is the content of a perception.
I have thought about it. Perhaps you should, too.
[ul]li My perceptions seem to exist.[/li][li]The content of perceptions is taken to be meaningless.[/ul][/li]See the problem yet? Probably not.
If you wish to be rigorous, then you should rephrase © to state clearly that you accept axiomaticallt that that particular content of a perception is reliable and meaningful.
I. of course, made no such statement in my example because it is not a minimalist approach to the question of personal existence.
Are you truly blind to this irony?
[ul][li]My questions on number cannot be answered because they do not supply information about the subject of the perception.[/li][li]In your argument, the questions are answered.[/li][li]But you pretend that you don’t supply information about hte subject.[/ul][/li]:rolleyes:
You noticed that, did you? And did you notice this:
That was back in the minimalist approach that you asked for but have failed to address in a meaningful manner. You see, I make it quite plain that I am accepting axiomatically that perceptions vary and that this variance implies existence.
The contrast with your own case is rather striking.
Once again, your absurdly careless reading and/or reasoning leads you to make silly claims. How shocking.
I understand quite well what you are saying.
And yet, you say that the content of all perceptions can be taken to be meaningless. So, this axiom does not get you to, “my perceptions exist”. It gets you to, “the perception that ‘my perceptions exist’ exists.” “My perceptions exist”, of course, remains axiomatically meaningless. At least, it does in a rigorous trewatment. Shall we see how you treat it?
Please note the imposition of subject. How many sentences has it been since you claimed: **And I pointed out explicitly that no assumption on the subject is made in my actual proof as is presented. **
As I said earlier, what I present for inference is no more than is apparent in your own posts.
False statement? Please supply a counter-example.
And how, from within the structure of the proof, do “I” know that “I have made a choice”?
Not true. We know that the set of things is empty. We know, by definition, that some POV can be said to be aware of at least one element of this non-empty set. But the question I asked was "“how, exactly (yes, I mean that), do we know that this POV exists?” And “this POV” is what you have characterized as “the single observer” that “has my POV”. The “my”, of course, is what you later equivocate into a statement of personal existence.
I will keep asking it until you actually answer it: how, exactly (yes, I mean that), do we know that this POV exists?
Even? No.
I am able to understand that by asserting as fact that I seem to be perceiving reality I am asserting that I exist. What you are able to guess is a statement that must stand on its own.
Neither bigfoot nor dinosaurs must exist for me to see a bone or a footprint. Thus, I can use the bone or the footprint as evidence from which to conclude that either bigfoot or dinosaurs exist. Bigfoot, however, has no such luxury in proving his existence to himself.
Much the same as last time, since you seem incapable of formulating a cogent reply.
It doesn’t matter how many qualifiers you place in front of it, if you insist on holding that the perceived “I” is significant and can be used to ground a proof of existence. By accepting the significance of the “I”, you demonstrate that you are not doubting personal existence at all.
on preview
Not true. In the absence of “I”, it would simply not be “I” doing the perceiving or being perceived.
Indeed. But you cannot say anything about the existence of “I” unless you first inject meaning for “I”. In your particular case, you do this by relying upon the contents of perceptions that suport the existence of “I”, and you defend this by arguing that if “I” did not exist then “I” would not be perceiving things.
That, of course, is begging the quesiton.
That’s one way to describe arguing in a circle.
The problem is not how you get from “I perceive” (or “I have bones” or “I have footprints”) to “I exist”. The problem is how you demonstrate that “I perceive”.
Your preferred answer seems to be, “because I perceive it to be so”.
No, I noted that your dinosaur analogy was stupid and that you cling to it with characteristic gusto.
I never called you stupid, though I certainly allowed for the inference to be made. That is nothing that you do not do with your own posts, of course.
The bolded section is the content of a perception.
I have thought about it. Perhaps you should, too.
[ul]li My perceptions seem to exist.[/li][li]The content of perceptions is taken to be meaningless.[/ul][/li]See the problem yet? Probably not.
If you wish to be rigorous, then you should rephrase © to state clearly that you accept axiomaticallt that that particular content of a perception is reliable and meaningful.
I. of course, made no such statement in my example because it is not a minimalist approach to the question of personal existence.
Are you truly blind to this irony?
[ul][li]My questions on number cannot be answered because they do not supply information about the subject of the perception.[/li][li]In your argument, the questions are answered.[/li][li]But you pretend that you don’t supply information about hte subject.[/ul][/li]:rolleyes:
You noticed that, did you? And did you notice this:
That was back in the minimalist approach that you asked for but have failed to address in a meaningful manner. You see, I make it quite plain that I am accepting axiomatically that perceptions vary and that this variance implies existence.
The contrast with your own case is rather striking.
Once again, your absurdly careless reading and/or reasoning leads you to make silly claims. How shocking.
I understand quite well what you are saying.
And yet, you say that the content of all perceptions can be taken to be meaningless. So, this axiom does not get you to, “my perceptions exist”. It gets you to, “the perception that ‘my perceptions exist’ exists.” “My perceptions exist”, of course, remains axiomatically meaningless. At least, it does in a rigorous trewatment. Shall we see how you treat it?
Please note the imposition of subject. How many sentences has it been since you claimed: **And I pointed out explicitly that no assumption on the subject is made in my actual proof as is presented. **
As I said earlier, what I present for inference is no more than is apparent in your own posts.
False statement? Please supply a counter-example.
And how, from within the structure of the proof, do “I” know that “I have made a choice”?
Not true. We know that the set of things is empty. We know, by definition, that some POV can be said to be aware of at least one element of this non-empty set. But the question I asked was "“how, exactly (yes, I mean that), do we know that this POV exists?” And “this POV” is what you have characterized as “the single observer” that “has my POV”. The “my”, of course, is what you later equivocate into a statement of personal existence.
I will keep asking it until you actually answer it: how, exactly (yes, I mean that), do we know that this POV exists?
Even? No.
I am able to understand that by asserting as fact that I seem to be perceiving reality I am asserting that I exist. What you are able to guess is a statement that must stand on its own.
Neither bigfoot nor dinosaurs must exist for me to see a bone or a footprint. Thus, I can use the bone or the footprint as evidence from which to conclude that either bigfoot or dinosaurs exist. Bigfoot, however, has no such luxury in proving his existence to himself.
Much the same as last time, since you seem incapable of formulating a cogent reply.
It doesn’t matter how many qualifiers you place in front of it, if you insist on holding that the perceived “I” is significant and can be used to ground a proof of existence. By accepting the significance of the “I”, you demonstrate that you are not doubting personal existence at all.
on preview
Not true. In the absence of “I”, it would simply not be “I” doing the perceiving or being perceived.
Indeed. But you cannot say anything about the existence of “I” unless you first inject meaning for “I”. In your particular case, you do this by relying upon the contents of perceptions that suport the existence of “I”, and you defend this by arguing that if “I” did not exist then “I” would not be perceiving things.
That, of course, is begging the quesiton.
That’s one way to describe arguing in a circle.
The problem is not how you get from “I perceive” (or “I have bones” or “I have footprints”) to “I exist”. The problem is how you demonstrate that “I perceive”.
Your preferred answer seems to be, “because I perceive it to be so”.
Strange: I only perceived myself hitting “Submit Reply” once.
the problem is, explicitly noting that “i” must exist in order for “i think” (or whichever “i” statement you want to throw around now) to have meaning, does not mean that “i think” has meaning by itself.
“i think” is not false if “i” is nonexistant. it is meaningless, nonsensical. there is a difference.
Yeah S.M., well, we all know how untrustworthy those pesky perceptions are.
Suppose you have a box. (It has “perception” written across the side.) Soppose you open the box and in it there is a piece of paper with “You have a box” written on it. Does doubting content of the box mean that you have to disbelieve in the existence of the box? Or can you be sensible and say, “Yeah, usually the stuff I find written in the boxes are worthless, but this one can be verified by that I had to have the box to get to the statement.”?
Personally, I don’t give a tinker’s damn wether or not a perception supports my position. I haven’t made relied upon the content of an non-independently-verifiable perception since I stepped back from Stanford’s support of Descartes (which I abandonded just because it relies on perceptions’ contents in this way). The perception that there are perceptions is self-proving. It cannot be reasonably doubted, once it has been concieved. And I rely upon the proof of that perception to support my argument, rather than the content of it.
Simply said, your repeated statements that I am referring to the content of perceptions to support my argument is in error. The defense has been presented just previously. Arguments of yours that rely upon my having referred to the contents of perceptions are not addressing my argument as it currently stands. There is hardly a better refutation that I can make to them than that.
AHA. This may be were we differ. So, is it your position that , “There must be something aware of these perceptions, but it needn’t be ‘I’”?
That would perhaps explain it.
I find that position to be indefensible, because not only is something aware of those perceptions, but I’m aware of them. If I weren’t, then I wouldn’t be aware enough of them to bring them into the proof (as assumption C).
I define “I” as “that which is aware of my perceptions”.
That’s it. That’s all “I” means.
“I” can actually be a committee of left-handed bassoon players, for all I know or care. It just (demonstrably) functions as though it has a single POV, the one that I call “my” own because I can’t think of another lingusitic construction that conveys the same notion. I am aware of the perceptions. That’s all it takes.
And it’s also a way of describing when somebody takes the basis for the definition of implication and tries to use it as a refutaion of the usefulness of evidence. Do you realise that if that’s circular, then all arguments that use implication are circular?
And, on preview:
Nope. It’s a syntactically clear statement with definite meaning. The only way it would be meaningless is if you insist that subject-verb pairs are meainingless (I hope not), that “Think” is meaningless, or that “I” is meaningless. Not that I is non-existent, but that the word flat-out has no meaning. I’m noy buying any of it.
The statement would have to be false if I didn’t exist, just the same way that “That’s a bigfoot footprint” must be false if bigfoot doesn’t exist. That wouldn’t eradicate the footprint though; it would just tell you that you have incorrectly defined the maker thereof.
And my definition of “I” by definiton describes the thing that is aware of everything that, well, I am aware of. That the language doesn’t permit a non-synonymous description of the ownershop of those awarenesses should tell you something.
syntactically clear, sure, but semantically meaningless. when you use the word “i” with no referent (“i” does not exist), then “i” is meaningless. the sentence is meaningless, because there is no subject, even though there appears to be.
i would argue (and i’m sure many others would) that the concept of “bigfoot’s footprint” is also meaningless in the context in which bigfoot does not exist.
it tells me that you can’t prove the existence of “i” without referring to an existent “i”. what does it tell you?
It tells me my definition of “I” is right.
And the notion that phrases lose meaning if they cannot be true is a hijacking of the meaning of “meaningless.”
“7ofuyigusdv;a” is meaningless (to me, anyway). “Bigfoot’s footprint” conveys the meaning of a depression in some substance that would presumably occur if bigfoot did exist and put his weight via foot on some compressable surface. That’s a pretty definite meaning as far as I can tell.
The word that describes what phrases lose if they cannot be true is “truth”.
And when I use “I”, it has a referent. That which is aware of the perceptions I seem to be aware if. (If you were in a position to see, I’d point and say, those perceptions, but sorry, I can only describe them in the way language allows me.)
Make that “And when I use “I”, it has a referent. the referent is that which is aware of the perceptions which I seem to be aware of.” It was pretty unclear even before the if/of switch.
so you admit, then, that you assume “that which is aware of the perceptions ‘i’ seem to be aware of” exists?
good.
now, tell me to what “i” refers in that, and tell me why it’s different from the previous “i”.
not if they also cannot be false, as in this case.
One proper form of the argument would be:
There seems to be perceptions (thoughts, etc)
“Seems to be” implies the existence of an observer.
That would be me.
So I am.
“I think therefore I am” would be an catchphrase abbreviation of the proof, which is rather obviously glossing over why we believe “I think”. Why are you debating the semantics of an abbreviation? In the abbreviation, the “I” is the same “I” in both “I think” and “I am”. So what?
And, on preview:
Oh, come on. You’re going to tell me that if “I exist” is false, that “I think” isn’t false? Not the way I define “false”, pal. I can easily concieve of a world where I neither think nor exist. A statement than cannot hold truth value would have that property regardless of the scenario you put it in. So no, “I think” is indeed a fact, holding one or the other of the boolean truth values in our current universe.
rather than “that would be me”, and “so i am”, i would say “there is an observer”. if “i am the observer” is an axiom, that also has no meaning in the absence of your existence.
one cannot say “i think” is false if they don’t know to what “i” refers.
in your theoretical universe, you are applying the meaning of “i think” from this universe, where it does have meaning. it does not have meaning in that new universe if that universe is independent of this one, unless you exist there.
and, on
how is this possibly true? “there is a fareaeddelei on my lawn” might have meaning in a universe where “fareaeddelei” means something, but in this one, it can be said to be neither true nor false.
Suppose, instead, that I ponder the question of my own exisence without suposing that I exist.
You have. You simply refuse to acknowledge that fact.
A more accurate way to describe it is: axiomatic.
More precisely, it cannot be reasonably doubted once any perception (including a conception) is granted as existant.
No, you rely upon the content. You just lack either the awareness or the honesty to acknowledge that fact.
Simply said, you are wrong.
For instance, you justify your argument with phrases like: Whether or not I seem to have any. That of course, is a perception. I pointed that out above. You have characteristically ignored that point in your response.
You also, I feel inspired to note, ignore in your response the refutation of your jibe that I ignore **“Seems like a perception” ** being the content of a perception. I just thought that I would note that as yet another example of your dedication to rigor and integrity in debate.
Simply said, you are wrong again. The fact that you pretend not to rely upon the contents of perceptions is irrelevant, since you supply little else when defending your argument (again and again and again) through reference to the content of your perceptions.
This is probably true. You have no good refutation.
No. My position is that a minimalist approach can conclude: something(s) exists. Further axioms can be used to reach a more restrictive conclusion.
"I’m aware of them", of course, is one of those contents of a perception that you pretend not to rely upon.
I shall now ask again the question that you seem incapable of answering with rigor: how, exactly (yes, I mean that), do we know that this POV exists?
[ul][li]And how do you define “my”?[/li][li]And how do you determine that a single observer is experiencing all perceptions that seem to be?[/ul][/li]And who want to bet me that the root of both answers is a content of a perception?
You have failed to make any such demonstration, though, except through appeal to the content of perceptions.
You are relying upon the existence of “I” in order to demonstrate the existence of “I”. Yes, that is all it takes. Trivial things rarely take very much.
It does not require denying the utility of implication to note that it is a bad thing to use evidence that can only be relied upon if a conclusion is true in order to demonstrate the truth of the conclusion. The reliability of “my” perceptions is entirely dependent upon the conclusion that “I” exist. Thus, relying upon the content of those perceptions, including the content that they are “mine”, in order to prove that “I” exist is not the tactic of a wise man.
Yes, under the model of existence that you yourself have proposed. “Does not think” is a characteristic, and you have asserted as axiom that things which do not exist cannot have characteristics.
There are other possible ways to model existence, of course, but this is the one that you have argued for in establishing your proof.
(1) Check.
(2) “At least one” observer is justified. “Exactly one” is not, given the structure you claim to be following.
(3) Check (though misleading) as an arbitrary act of labeling. Not justified if “my” carries specific meaning, given the structure you claim to be following.
(4) Check (though misleading) as an arbitrary act of labeling, given the structure you claim to be following.
Ramanujan
“That which is observing from my perspective” is a perfectly reasonable definition for “I”. And the only reason you know that there is an observer is because you are observing the fact that your own awareness is observing. In order to divorce yourself from this observer, you have to assert one of the following statements:
How would you know? Since distinguishing the observer from yourself in this manner would require you to be aware of things that you are not aware of, you cannot reasonably make this distinction. And even if that was the case that my awareness was merely a subset of a larger awareness, “I” would simply point to the subset of “The observer”'s awareness which is aware of the things of which I am aware. And that there must be some reason why my awareness is so limited, and that this reason defines me uniquely.
That’s nice for the “observer”, however it fails to explain how you are aware of everything you are aware of. And once you realize that it will take a separate “I” to explain the available awareness, then you will realize that you can no longer justify the separate “observer” anymore, since all known awareness has been accounted for.
The clincher here is the word “separate”. If the observers are truly separate, then there is not one thing that has the awareness that you can verify. In the posited scenario, nothing could explain the total known awareness. If the things are sharing awarenesses, of course, then they are all part of what makes up “I”. Or part of each of them is.
We cannot know what “I” is. But we can know it exists.
I know what “I” refers to: “That which is observing from my perspective”. Scenarios requring me to lack a definition for “I” do not apply to me. Or, I hope, you. Even if you cannot accept my defintion of “I” as applying to yourself (don’t ask me why) surely you can see that if my definition was used, the statements and argument would not automatically lack meaning?