LOL
We always no just what to say to convince ourselves, don’t we.
About all I remember of that thread is having the argument and then having to defend myself against someone else upset about a “homeschooling is selfish” OP to which I had dared to apply letter grades. I seem to recall it was a good PITting, though. One of the only ones I’ve had.
If by “good” you mean “I made the person who sidetrack-pitted-me-after-the-original-pit-thread-was-over-with cry” then it was friggin’ awesome. Ha! Yep, that was the thread. contented sigh
Good times. Yes, the letter grades, I’ll never forget that (as you can see). 
Well, actually I meant the original PIT, as in "I got pitted by someone who actually had an issue to fight about, and we both fought hard and clean (i.e. were responsive to the actual bone beind contended.)
Yeah, I remember making her cry, too. I’m kind of conflicted about that, though she certainly brought it upon herself. It’s not nice to make people cry. Oh well, I wasn’t exactly in the running for the next “SMB congeniality” award anyway.
This thread seems to be about done now, since Begbert2 has determined that we’re all a bunch of stoopid-heads who cannot see the obvious truth of his lies and correctness of his fallacies. I suppose I could delve into **TVAA’s[/] “Really?”, but I think the details are all here if he chooses to wade through the sewage.
TVAA
I’m not trying to cut off debate. If you want to explore why I say Descartes’ mistake was elsewhere, say the word and I shall respond. Otherwise, unless Bebert2 wants to come spew some more misguided venom I say we let this meditation sink slowly into the SDMB unconciousness.
Yes, that’s a rare pit thread, and I enjoyed it, too. I also seem to remember that when someone came in and bitched about it we presented a unified front against them. It was a fun thread.
RE: the crying. Yes, I would imagine you were conflicted. I still think you were right not to buckle, the attack on you was really out of the blue. Almost shamefully so. Still, I think it worked out for the best in the end.
OK, I am not done with this thread as I promised begbert2 I would bring up any relevant portions of Descartes’s responses to his critics. Unless that is a no go…?
I had forgotten about that. I would be interested in seeing Descartes’ responses, too.
So, I guess we can’t drop this thing to the bottom just yet.
And of course we provided a united front. It was our fight, dammit. We get to set the rules for our own duel. It’s in the Napoleonic Code or something.
…I’m back.
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Does that mean that the thread is gone?
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[hijack]S.M. seems to feel EXACTLY the way about me that I feel about him… Astonishing… Nearly imcomprehensible…[/hijack]
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If I may make a suggestion…
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…Oh, hang it all. There’s probably already enough invective in this post already.
As there has been some time passing since the last post, I thought I would just toss something out here. (In no way do I want to distract erislover from the search for Descartes’ own responses. Those I too would be interested in hearing.)
I have not yet been convinced that necessary existence cannot be proven. I believe that I can in fact construct an argument that demonstrates it beyond doubt. If this argument is wrong, reasonable counters to it should be producible. I wish to offer you all the chance to enlighten me as to the flaws that may or may not be in my argument.
The goal will be simplicity and clarity. When the responses (if any) come back, I will respond to the parts that appear to be relevant to the argument, and quietly take any personal attacks as proof that the writer thereof is a worthless sack of shit. If multiple errors are percieved in the argument, or if one error seems to have effects at multiple points in the proof, then it might be more useful (for the purposes of clarity) to respond to just one error at a time, and if there are further potential problems, note that they exist and defer them until the current point has been resolved. It only takes one unresolved point to unmake an argument, after all.
Assumptions made:
A) That it cannot be the case that a non-existent thing can be aware of anything. I derive this from the idea of what existence is.
B) Considering things X, Y, and Z: if thing X is aware of thing Z, that does not imply that thing Y is aware of thing Z. So, if X is aware of N number of things, that does not imply that there are N different Y’s roaming around. Just the X.
C) My perceptions seem to exist.
Argument:
*Anything can call itself “I”. Particularly things that are mistakenly of the belief that they are aware of MY perceptions! 
Anything can be proven given the appropriate axioms.
Necessary existence can be proven given a very skeptical set of axioms.
Necessary existence of a subject cannot be.
Your rephrased argument makes not even a pretext of avoiding teh subject in its premises. The “I” in (3) has no more meaning than the “I” in (2). In other words, you have concluded the existence of something(s). Alternatively, you can use equivocation to pretend that the “I” in (3) is actually bounded in some meaningful manner.
Of course, thee’s also the issue that in (2) you simply declare that “I’m still aware of them”. This opens up another potential for equivocation if you use it to argue that the “I” (whatever it may be) that is aware of the perceptions is in some manner related to the “I” (whatever it may be) that is the object of some perceptions (as in, those labeled “My perceptions” in (1)).
Once again, you are wrong.
long time no see.
please note that this is an assumption. you have not yet concluded that you exist. whose perceptions, then, are those that seem to exist?
from the beginning, i’ve said my problem with “i think” as the opening assumption for this argument is that it assumes “i exist”. i’ll try to illustrate that again.
suppose we try to claim i (do something) before we claim “i exist”. if we are not assuming the existence of the subject “i”, who then is doing the (something)?
there is another approach that avoids this problem. it says “there are thoughts” (or perceptions), and “that there are thoughts means that there is a thinker”, and we can conlude “there is a thinker”. this is a much easier pill to swallow. the problem then lies in trying to equate the thinker in the conclusion with “i”. to say that “i observe those thoughts” falls into the same trap as the “i” in the previous attempt to prove. all we have then, is a generic thinker.
do you think “i think” has meaning before we’ve given meaning to “i”? do you think “it seems to me” has meaning before we have given meaning to “me”?
Now, having responses, I will attempt to clarify. Thank you all for only addressing a single issue in your post as requested.
I figured I would get some takes on this. The thing is, I do seem to have perceptions. It was typed as it was because that is the way I see it. Fortunately, the “My” in the axiom is not used to determine the existence of the single observer. It merely states the way things appear to be. On to the protests:
I don’t presume to guess. The argument (perhaps unlike Descartes’s) does not presume that perceptions require an originator or an “owner”. Or that thoughts imply a thinker. The important detail about the perceptions (as is clear by their use in 2) is that I am aware of them.
S.M., that’s a singular observer. The argument behind this notion is laid out in assumption B. I will revisit it if desired. The essential point is, that one single observer is implied by the awareness of the perception(s), regardless of the number of things which the observer is aware of.
As was in *, given a determinably single observer that is distinguishable in that it has the POV which I commonly consider my own, it seems reasonable at that point to call it “I”. As you might have noted, the * was on the 2, not the 3; by 2, we have established an observer with the qualities I recognise of “i”. You are correct in noting that no additional meaning has been granted to the “I” between 2 and 3.
Given this, what problems remain with my little argument?
B does not allow you to declare a single observer. That would require taking as axiom that if N things are perceived they are all perceived by X. While it is true that multiple perceptions need not imply multiple perceivers (your axiom B) that does not imply that there is a single perceiver for all perceptions that appear to be associated with a single perceiver.
This essential point is wrong. Or, at least, it is not a minimalistic approach to the issue of perception implying existence.
[list][li]You have not determined a single observer. If you wish to assert it as axiom then you should do so clearly.[/li][li]You have not presented any necessary connection between the observer(s) and what is perceived as “your POV”[/li][li]Thus, you have bound no meaning to the label “I”.[/li]
This is simply sloppy. Statement 2 establishes only that something which you are labeling “I” is aware of the perceptions you have earlier labeled “My”. You have an asterisk noting that “anyhing can call itself ‘I’”. How do you propose that such a note **establishes an observer with the qualities I recognize of ‘I’"?
Actually, as long as I am here I think I will additionally note that statement 2 is also invalidated by your failure to actually establish that a single perceiver is aware of all of the perceptions labeled “My”.
Then the “I” you conclude bears no resemblance to the “I” of general understanding.
The same ones I noted originally, plus the additional issue of (B) not establishing what you say it establishes.
S.M.
I have had a difficult time with the “my perceptions” assumption. I had thought that that statement would encapsulate that all of these perceptions are within my perspective. Which is to say, if my POV didn’t include them, I wouldn’t know about them, and they therefore wouldn’t be included in the set described as “my” perceptions.
Consider the case were you, and I, are aware of different things. It is true that there are perceptions that I am not aware of, then, however, I am not aware of them. The perceptions of B and C and the rest of the alphabet are not avaliable for examination by A, and so do not enter into the problem as it is stated.
Then explain the minimalist approach to me. However, if it willfully ignores the fact that the set of perceptions described as “my” is distinguished by sharing a single POV (ie if the proof concludes that we have no way of knowing if anything is both aware of the view from my left eye and the view from my right eye) then I will have to conclude that it is an invalid approach, since I have a counterexample handy.
Which understanding is that? That bears no resemblance to “that which has my POV”?
I await your riposte.
This already assumes that “I exist”, unless you care to argue that non-existent things have perspectives. Thus, you should not use it as a basis upon which to hang a proof of personal existence.
As above, but now with an explicitly epistemological element. What “I” know is an unreliably defined set before “I” know that “I exist”. In Russells terms, the supposed members of that set are grammatically convenient but they do not descibe data.
Wring case. It is a misguided example, until you and I can be said to exist.
Consider this one, instead. (Are you a basebal fan?)
Perception: Crack of bat, ball splashing into McCovey cove.
Perception: A different crack of bat, a different ball splashing into McCovey cove.
Perception: A different crack of bat, a different ball splashing into McCovey cove.
Perception: A different crack of bat, a different ball splashing into McCovey cove.
Question: how many home run hitters are there?
Question: how many perceivers are there?
Question: how do we now how many balls have been perceived?
I have done so already.
Fact? Yes, it denies that this is a fact. You should be denying it, to, since you claim that you proceed from the position that the content of perceptions can be taken as meaningless. I have little hope that you will understand it this time, but I shall repeat it nontheless: The unity of your POV is itself the content of a perception.
Post your counterexample. I shall make the bold prediction that it depends for confirmation upon the existence of a consistent “I”. (And quite likely some “eyes” as well.)
You are in error. It does not follow from your stated axioms.
And how, exactly (yes, I mean that), do we know that this POV exists?
Actually, that issue was settled long ago. The only question is whether you will be able to recognize your errors.
Wrong question, for you have not demonstrated the existenc of “that which has your POV”.
How am I not supposed to interpret this as you deciding in advance that you’re right? Open your mind and listen for a moment.
This statement is either false or without meaning. The fact that I have perceptions is obvious. The label of “my POV” distingishes the perceptions that I am aware of from those I am not (if any such exist). The unity of my POV is obvious; if I am aware of it, it is in my POV. If I am not aware of it, then it is not in my POV. There are only two ways to be: in it, or not. That’s the unity I’m talking about.
If I perceive this fact, then sure, I have a perception of the unity of my POV, but as the fact is independently knowable, you can doubt the content of that perception as much as you like; it keeps coming back for more.
And that is exactly how I know that this POV exists.
You are in error. It follows from assumption C, with B for garnish.
So, we have:
Which I then follow up with (based on assumption A):
Yeah, the word “I” turns up in the example. This is because the language wisely does not account for referring to awareness in any concrete manner without attaching a reference to an observer.
Answer: No way to tell, unless you have unaccountable trust in your perceptions.
Answer: No way to tell, unless you are of the opinion that a perception cannot be shared amongst multiple observers. If you have this assumption, then I have a question: do I seem to be having these perceptions? Cause if I do, then there’s just me having them. If not, then there are clearly multiple observers.
Answer: Again, you’re talking about a rather high level of trust in the perceptions. And even if they are trustable, who says there can’t be multiple different perceptions of the same hit?
And so, we cannot trust the existence of dinosaur bones until after we have determined the existence of dinosaurs. Nope. As was stated, the set is defined meaningfully, and directly implies the existence of an observer.
You can say I’m wrong until your font turns blue. But your arguments so far fail to support those claims.
Have you any further arguments to present?
I lost count of how many times you used the specific details of what “I” experience to account for your attribution of “my POV”. This is not just a convenient grammatical marker; you explicitely rely upon the qualities of the self in order to suport your argument. If you cannot find a way to support your argument without relying upon the existence of your self, then you do not have a good argument for the existence of your self. I cannot put it more simply than that. Perhaps the professor who thinks you are so bright can explain it to you.
I also note, strangely, that in the home run ball example you state that there is no way of knowing how many discrete perceptions and perceivers and objects are involved, yet in your axiom (B) you think that you have validly determined exactly one observer for your POV. Surely you understand that if you are not extracting meaning from the content of your perceptions, then you can conclude exactly the same thing from ANY arbitrary set of perceptions.
Ooops. I take that back. Surely you do not understand. Nevertheless, it is true.
I am right, but that was not decided in advance. It was determined through several iterations of you posting variations upon the same flawed arguments. Open your mind to the idea that you are not smarter and more rigorous than Descartes. You have not closed the loopholes in his proof. And you have not succeeded in proving beyond doubt that “I exist”.
It is not just the word “I” which appears, it is the asserted unified POV, the self that is (supposedly) being doubted.
I shall now take a moment to be amazed that my prediction was so amazingly acurate.
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Okay, all done. I guess it wasn’t so amazing after all.
This is a stupid analogy. The existence of dinosaurs is not required for me to be aware of the bones. Thus, we can use the bones to argue for the existence of dinosaurs.
Surely you do not understand. Nevertheless, it is false. When speaking of ANY arbitrary set of perceptions, I can only conclude “No way to tell”, unless some other things are known,
You listed a bunch of perceptions, but you left some rather important things vague, things which are not extracted from the content of the perceptions.
Wether I was supposed to have seemed to have noticed these things the way I seem to notice what I call “reality”, or wether they were merely thoretical constructs in your argument that could possibly not have all be available for me to be aware of. (This needs to be ascertained before I can prove my own existence based on the hypothetical perceptions. This is known in the case of the actual argument.)
You still haven’t said wether those were “personal”, unsharable perceptions, or wether they could be observed by the masses. Usually, thousands of people see each such home run; but you wouldn’t necessarily say that thousands of people are sharing the same perception. (This needs to be ascertained before I can limit the count of observers that can be observing the hypothetical perceptions. This is not known in the case of the actual argument.)
I tried to point out the vaguess of your hypothetical case in my second answer, and from there to cover all of the cases. If these questions are not answered, then as I said, “No way to tell, unless…”, which would be the answer to “ANY” arbitrary set of hypotheticals.
This is an excellent analogy. My assertion that I must exist is not required for me to be aware of reality. Thus, we can use the awareness of reality to argue for the existence of my necessary existence.
If we consider the case if I didn’t exist, and therefore had no unified POV, then I definitely would not even seem to be perceiving reality. The fact that this is not the case can definitely be taken into account.
And as to wether I’m smarter and more rigorous than Descartes: doubtful. Of course, not knowing how he reacted to his detractors, it’s a little hard to compare, neh? Most likely he just said, “this is obvious”, and his detractors approached him from valid points of attack. For example, since Descartes seemed in his meditation to be arguing for "I"ness based on the subjective flavor of his perceptions, it was a perfectly valid retort to point out that that approach requires a certain amount of trust in the subjective flavor of the perceptions, the non-assumption of which would lead to a perspective like Russel’s. My approach, being awarenss-based and not subject-based, does not have this vulnerability. Wether Descartes’s approach has this vulnerability cannot be dettermined until we hear him defend his position, and therefore don’t have to guess as to what he really was thinking.
My argument is vary similar to Descartes’s, being based upon it. You might say that I am “piggybacking” his smart and rigorous approach.
I await your Russellian-caliber response.
Known?
And how, pray tell, do you presume to know things about perception other than by the content of your perceptions?
Wrong. Unless you assert these “important things” axiomatically, there is no place else for them to come from.
"The same way . . ." That is a content of a perception. One perception “seems” to be like another perception because “I” perceive a similarity in the two events. That is no less a content of a perception than any other quality of the event.
[ul][li]“Seems like a memory” is a content of a perception.[/li][li]“Seems like a real event” is a content of a perception.[/li][li]“Seems like I’ve said all this before” is the content of a perception.[/ul][/li]
Yes, because that question is absolutely irrelevant to the issue of whether a self exists. And, for completeness:
[ul][li]“Seems like a personal/unshareaable/public perception” is the content of a perception.[/ul][/li]
Correct. And thus to any arbitrary set of perceptions whose content is taken to be meaningless.
You are unable to make your case without pretending to know some very important and very specific things about your perceptions. But all that is known of perceptions is based upon what is perceived (is it “mine”, is it “public”, is it “real” or an “imagination”, etc.), and you have asserted that the content of perceptions can be taken to be meaningless.
You ignored this question before, but I will repeat it now as a specific case illustrating the general truth: "how, exactly (yes, I mean that), do we know that this POV exists?
No it is a stupid analogy. Why you cling to it so tightly is merely suggestive.
Really? So you are now saying that things which do not exist can be aware? That directly contradicts your earlier statements.
Why am I not surprised. The contortions you attempt to avoid acknowledging even the most trivial error would be astounding, except that you have demonstrated it so many times that it has lost its power to startle.
Your analogy remains stupid. You remain Begbert2.
Circle bolded for those not too stupid to perceive it.
Silly man. The awareness upon which you base your approach is subjective. You have not escaped Descartes flaw. You roll around in the mud of subjectivity and then claim to be cleanly aware of your self.
You need a bath.
Only if I were delusional. Well, maybe if I were drunk enough or suffered a severe stroke.
No Russell in this caliber. More of a Winchester repeater.
No sense in pulling out anything new, since you simply dodge around the same mistakes once more.
In easily half of your previous post, your only argument was “You are stupid” with nothing but your dubious say-so backing you up. I have reacted as previously specified.
Wether or not I seem to have any. Think about it.
Well, in my argument, it was called assumption C. In your tangential little question list, it wasn’t stated at all.
This is obviously not true, as there a known fact about perceptions that can be derived from assumption C (“My perceptions seem to exist.”) and that is “My perceptions seem to exist.”
For those who persist in not getting it, this means that the set of things of which I am aware is non-empty. This means I have a POV. Mindless repetition of the false statement that “But all that is known of perceptions is based upon what is perceived” does not change the fact that before the content is evaluated, the ability to choose wether or not to doubt the content is certain proof that something is aware of the damned things.
I keep answering this and you keep asking it: We know that the POV exists because the set of things under the examination of the POV is non-empty. Now that it has been explained, again, consider yourself free to ask the same old question, again.
I understand why you bolded the “I”: you didn’t have a clue what I was saying. What you thought you were showing by bolding “The fact” is beyond my ability to guess, though, so I guess we’re even.
The statement “If bigfoot doesn’t exist, then that isn’t a bigfoot footprint” is a reasonable statement, no? And if only bigfoot were capable of making footprints, then “If bigfoot doesn’t exist, then there isn’t a footprint there” is also reasonable, until you look down and notice the contradiction with available evidence. I’d say more to make it clearer, but I can’t see any obvious way to do so.
Hey, whatever it takes to get you back to thinking normally. I would be lying in a big way if I claimed that the “cogito ergo sum” argument and our previous discussions about it were not the inspiration behind my current argument. My proof structure very closely mimics Descartes’s. Of course I’m drawing upon the positive aspects of his argument. When and if you regain control of yourself, you’ll realize that deriding obviously true (and, to your position, harmlessly true) statements is about as helpful to you as setting fire to your own feet.
No Russell indeed. And I haven’t dodged yet, mostly because you’re trying to load a winchester with wet feces. It’s fascinating to watch, but it’s irritating when you look through the spatter on your safety glasses and think I’m covered. You might consider emulating Russell. Count the times he called his opponent “stupid”. Surely since it’s such an effective argument tactic, he must have used it regularly.
I can’t hardly wait to see what you’re going to say this time… :rolleyes:
so, begbert2, you genuinely believe “i think” has meaning, even when “i” isn’t considered to exist?
what exactly is that meaning then? how is that meaning derrived? is it the same as what “i think” means when “i” is considered to exist?