I think therefore i am.....

[Spiritus_Mundi]

You never ever learn. It is the controlling metaphor for this thread.

This was the part when S.M. was saying that he was going to consider things I was calling “Inferences” as axioms regardless of how I put them.

(earlier) I think I’ll make the inference back into an axiom; I have been considering it for a while anyway.I only wrote it as an infrence in the hopes of pointing out the obvious to you people.

And, of course, (P11) was never phrased as an inference. Still, why should honesty get in the way of a good begbert2 post, eh?

Liar.

Not because the inference was highly informal and not valid in formalized logic, but because “a posture of extreme skepticism” required it.

Yes, you roll your eyes and pretend to “infer” the behavior of “I” from a context in which “I” is doubted. In a posture of extreme skepticism, “I accept premise (P11)” cannot be inferred from the contents of my perception that “I” am making an argument.

Not that begbert2 will ever understand this. Your ignorance is a closed system.

Coming soon: my conclusion must be taken as an axiom or extreme scepticism will be violated. :rolleyes:

Well, since the structure of your argument begs the question this statement is actually correct. As usual, when you actually say something true you roll your eyes like a clown and demonstrate that it was an accident. Comprehension continues to elude you.

This was in reference to the use of a consistent definition of “I”. Which is not a violation of formal logic.

Learn to read. It had nothing to do with the definition of “I”. It had everything to do with the insertion of meaning into a “proof” in a manner that is not supported by formal structures.

Self-referentiality is also not a violation of formal logic, it is entirely unmentioned in formal logic.

This is really complicated. Try to follow along:
[ul][li]Formal logics are well-defined rules for symbol interpretation and manipulation.[/li][li]In a formal logic, only those well-defined rules may be validly applied to the manipulation of or interpretation of symbols.[/li][li]Things “entirely unmentioned” in a formal logic are not a part of those well-defined rules.[/ul][/li]There. Maybe even begbert2 can understand that. (Probably not, but miracles do happen.)

Of course, that was in reference to self-referential inference, which begbert2 dropped from the formal logic in favor of an asserted axiom, though now he likes to pretend otherwise. If begbert2 were able to read, he would have sen that my objection to this axiom was not based upon the self-reference vilating the standards of formal logic (in fact, I explicitely denied this charge when he made it.) My objection was phrased thusly:
[ul][li]I am disavowing the use of self-reference in a context in which I am supposed to be doubting my self. It is the intellectually honest thing to do.[/ul][/li]

The equals sign was equating “begs the question” with “unsound”. I guess that S.M. is denying similarity between “unsound” and “criticizes the soundness”.

No, I am making the factual observation that the relationship between the two is not “=”.

Begbert2, of course, is demonstrating the quality of his thought and integrity by trying to sneak in a substitution of “similarity” for “equality”. Why he continues to make such pathetically inept attempts at dishonest representation is a question that only begbert2 (or perhaps a qualified therapist) can answer. But it does provide a nice example of the leitmotif for our conversation.
:wally

Berhaps he’s criticizing my phrasing?

Learn to read.

My statement was not ambiguous. I said: **The relationship between the two is not “=”.
**

The bit of his text that S.M. quietly ommitted from his quote, which directly preceded his claim as to my knowledge, was “This, too, is part of that “whole logic thing”.” Which is of course completely bogus; the term “begging the question” has nothing to do with formal symbolic logic.

And, yet again, begbert2 tries to make the substitution of “formal symbolic logic” for “logic”. Not only is this a rather pathetic repetition of the tactic he just used above, it also ignores (as is begbert2’s habit) the preceding context of our debate. “The whole logic thing” was a phrase initially coined by begbert2 himself in an attempt to demean my understanding, and it was absolutely not presented in a context of formal symbolic logic.

How begbert. :rolleyes:

Spiritus Mundi
It has the same problems. [As your earlier ofered proofs]

Trying to get me to admit that your little deluded “begbert2 has always been wrong” worldview is true?

No. Simply a statement of fact.

From your perspective, in which you are a special little boy who sees something to which all others in this thread are blind: your latest proof would have the same problems as you have admitted in your earlier proofs. None.

To those of us that do not suffer from begbertomania: your latest proof would have the same problems as you have admitted in your earlier proofs. It begs the question and arrives at what would be a trivial conclusion if the premises are accepted.

Really, how hard is that to understand? Well, too hard for begbert2, obvioulsy. But I can lower the bar only so far.

Go flush yourself, you twit.

Please don’t violate the rules of this forum.

The main problem that all my argument have shared is inexpert support

Hardly, but now you are saying that you do see a flaw that all your arguments have shared. I shall have to modify “None” above to “Inexpert support”.

I think I shall also note that you have just explicitely accepted the truth of my statement. How tragicomically perfect.

The definition is not meaningless. It is referring to a specific thing that is inferrable from the consideration of the argument.

And the consideration is (say it with me now) the content of a perception

As has been said many many many many times before, it is not difficult to prove that “I” exist if “I” begin by trusting the contents of “my” perceptions. THAT ARGUMENT IS TRIVIAL.

Anybody want to wager whether begbert2 will understand that this time?

[Ramanujan]

*Originally posted by begbert2 *
The thing is, the starting condition is the perception of reality. It takes some pretty aware thinking to deny the senses. So, you have a choice: sensing, or doubting.

that is only the case when you start with everything (including existence) and try to whittle it down. it’s very easy to arrive at a contradiction when you start with a premise and presume the opposite. if you do not start with an existent entity, there is no reason to talk of it having senses or doubting.

The definition is not meaningless.

it is not meaningless. but when it doesn’t refer to anything, its use is meaningless.

The fact that it, while being consided, speaks of the thinker in teh first person instead of the third is necessary to discuss the point

it’s funny that you think it is meaningful for nonexistent entities to refer to themselves.

The real answer, linguistically, is that “I do not exist” is in fact meaningful.

yet you can’t give a meaningful answer to the question “what does it mean?”.

I did not exist 1000 years ago, and I can understand what it would mean if I weren’t here now.

the past is totally irrelevant. “i did not exist” is NOT the same as “i do not exist.” and if you weren’t here now, would you be able to understand what it would be like?

In my computer game I was playing a few hours ago I came across a body and a message including something like this: “If you are reading this, then I am now dead.” I didn’t have a lick of trouble understanding it.

alive and dead are properties of existent entities. one can lie when saying “i am dead”; it is not the same.

I have no need to look it up. I already understand the sentence; I don’t need to read some treatiese telling me I don’t. That position is obviously false. No matter what authority you argue from.

so then you are the world’s foremost expert on linguistic evaluation of semantic content? or do you just prefer to be ignorant?

[Ramanujan]

*Originally posted by begbert2 *
“P21c) I (that which is making/considering the argument) am making/considering this argument” is the premise you’re probably speaking of. “Considering the argument” is meant to encapsulate that whole awareness/perception thing from earlier, which even S.M. granted proved the existence of “something(s)”, without assuming predicable entities.

so wait…

you say “[something] [is] making/considering this argument”.

isn’t that the assumption you just told me you weren’t making?

[erislover]

$10 against.

[begbert2]

Okay, first I’ll deal with Ramanujan. One thing at a time; easy one first.

Originally posted by Ramanujan
so then you are the world’s foremost expert on linguistic evaluation of semantic content? or do you just prefer to be ignorant?

No, I prefer not to give credence to fallacious argument, which is just what an appeal to authority is.

I have assumed to this point that everything that your authorities say, you have related. If it’s wrong when you say it, having it said by a guy with a doctorate isn’t going to make it any less wrong.

Avoiding fallacies from authority:
[ul][li]If you know something you haven’t said which supports your position, say it.[/li][li]If somebody else has said it better and it’s on the web, link it.[/li][li]If it’s off the web, quote and cite it.[/li][li]If it’s too long to quote, paraphrase and cite it.[/li][li]If it merely says the same thing you’ve been saying all the time, don’t bother with it.[/ul][/li]
Anyway, on to why your postion is wrong.

I assume your position is still something like, " ‘I do not exist’ is a meaningless statement", supported by something like "Statements with nonexistent subjects are meaningless.

Demonstration of the absurdity of this reasoning: if non-existence of the subject made a sentence meaningless, then all of the following sentences have no meaning:

A unicorn looks like a horse with a horn.
Pink elephants ate my homework.
An honest crook is hard to find.
A nonexistent thing could not be responsible have no properties.

Funny, I understood them. On to why the position is internally inconsistent:

By your reasoning, “I don’t exist” is meaningless because statements whith nonexistent subjects are all meaningless, supposedly. But wait! That means that if I do exist, then this statement is not meaningless; merely false. So, then, by your reasoning, if the statement is true, it is meaningless, and if it is false, then it is meaningful. But wait! Suppose we don’t have sufficient evidence to know wether the statement is true or false. In that case, then we can’t know wether the statement is meaningful or not!

Of course this is ridiculous. And, therefore, so is your position. Nonexistent things can meaningfully be the subject of statements.

[Liberal]

No, I prefer not to give credence to fallacious argument, which is just what an appeal to authority is.

Not necessarily. An appeal to authority is fallacious only when the authority is illegitimate. You might have confused formal logic with informal logic. It is the latter that is being employed in this thread. See Stanford University’s excellent introduction to informal logic. Stanford is a legitimate authority on the topic of logic.

[begbert2]

Not necessarily, Libertarian. An appeal to authority is also fallacious when the legitimate authority is not itself backing up its statements in a reasonable manner.

The Pope is an authority on religion. So, is it fallacious to cite the Pope’s official position in an argument on wether God exists as fact? “The Pope says that God exists, so it must be true.”

Descartes claimed to have successfully demonstrated “cogito ergo sum”. Most people would agree that the Descartes was a legitimate authority on existential philosophy; so, would I be engaging in good, nonfallacious argument were I to make the following argument?: “Descartes says “cogito ergo sum” is right, so it must be right.”
I tried to make it clear that if the authority adds nothing to the reasoning of the argument as presented, then its mere authoritiness is not reason to accept an argument. A citation of personal experience would be something. And heck, I wasn’t even pointed at an authority. I was just told to go “look it up”. Does “any old book that agrees with Ramanujan” count as a legitimate authority?
I’ll deal with S.M.'s claims when I have the free time to sort through the crap. A teaser though: P11c spent its childhood as the premise P11b (and “P11” has always been a premise; type more carefully, S.M.)…

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Read more carefully, begbert2.

[begbert2]

Then what the heck do you think you’re talking about? I thought you were claiming (again) that P11c had originated initially as an inference, which is at least supportable; claims that P11 has been claimed as an inference within an argument would seem totally unsupported. Express yourself more carefully, S.M…

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Learn to read.

Your charge was: **S.M. was saying that he was going to consider things I was calling “Inferences” as axioms regardless of how I put them. **

You have two premises in your current argument that I have said should be considered axioms in a context of hyperbolic doubt.
[ul]li: Was never called an inference by you. Thus it cannot be used to suport your charge.[/li]*: You initially called an “inference” but you yourself noted that you were making it “back into an axiom”. Thus, it does not support your claim that I am treating it as an axiom in complete disregard for how you “put them”.[/ul]

[Spiritus_Mundi]

I thought you were claiming (again) that P11c had originated initially as an inference

Why in the world would you imagine that I would care about such a claim?

[Spiritus_Mundi]

BTW, in regards to your ongoing dispute with ramanujan (you remember, the one based around a semantic dispute that you accused me of making up out of whole cloth) I posted links some time ago to discussions of various theories of truth that contain pertinent information.

Some of those theories of truth might actually support your position, as you would know if you had bothered to follow the links and read (with understanding) the material.

[begbert2]

Your charge was: S.M. was saying that he was going to consider things I was calling “Inferences” as axioms regardless of how I put them.

Yes, and this was based on (bolding mine):

originally posted by S.M.
Of course, even without such an admission I would only be able to evaluate the premises (P11) and (P11c) as axioms, since I am supposed to be considering this proof from a posture of extreme skepticism.

The admission I made to which that comment was responding was

orignally posted by begbert2
I think I’ll make the inference back into an axiom; I have been considering it for a while anyway.I only wrote it as an infrence in the hopes of pointing out the obvious to you people.

Meaning, yeah, P11c-as-inference was not supported by any formal rules of inference, and evolving my argument in that direction was probably a bad idea, particularly given the formal-logic meaning that the word “inference” has.

So, I admitted that P11c should be made into an axiom rather than an inference, and you responded that you don’t need the argument reformulated to consider it as one. That is, that you don’t care how I write the argument, you’re going to read it however you want to. And then you cite extreme skepticism as your reason for this, without hinting how extreme skepticism supports anything about how arguments should be read.

Apparently, you meant something less peculiar than this position with your statement. Problem is, your words were, at the least, ambiguous.
And as for ‘some time ago’ previous posts, my memory is poor. And as for “theories of truth”, I’m starting with only the position that Ramanujan seems to be using:
[ul][li]Nonexistent things cannot be the subject of statements,[/li][li]…but existent things can.[/ul][/li]…and from those, pointing out the absurdities that follow inherently from that position. My rebuttal should work in any ‘theory of truth’ that his (apparent) position is operable in.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

You have a point, but you neglect to mention the post to which that statement responded.

Evidence. While it’s true that all premises are “taken axiomatically” from the perspective of a proof, it’s obvious that P11c is not meant to be an axiom in the sense that axioms are accepted without reason. (Nor is P11.) Surely you know this.

Setting aside the quibble that axioms are accepted without proof not without reason, this statement was offered in response to my question: what other reason could ever be given for rejecting an axiom. The implication appeared (and still appears, to me) to be that your premises should be accepted or rejected based upon “evidence”. “Evidence”, of course, would be the content of a perception.

I referenced your post to the effect that you were treating (P11c) as an axiom, at least in attempting a more formal presentation. I further stated that in a context of hyperbolic doubt such a treatment was correct with or without that admission on your part.

you responded that you don’t need the argument reformulated to consider it as one. That is, that you don’t care how I write the argument, you’re going to read it however you want to.

No, though this seems to be the part where you think I have been ambiguous. I have throughout this thread maintained that relying upon the contents of perceptions to ground the premises of a logical proof of self can result only in a trivial argument. This does not directly address “how I read the argument”. It addresses “how a premise can be founded if I am doubting all the contents of my perceptions”.

In other words:
[ol][li]Doubt the content of all perceptions.[/li][li]consider a premise.[/li][li]Find support/contradiction for this premise in the content of a perception.[/li][li]Oops, toss out step (3) due to step (1)[/ol][/li]This leaves only three good ways to establish a premise:
[ul][li]Demonstrate it as a structural necessity of logic.[/li][li]Derive it in a previous argument.[/li][li]Accept it axiomatically.[/ul][/li]

And then you cite extreme skepticism as your reason for this, without hinting how extreme skepticism supports anything about how arguments should be read.

See above. Alternatively, see quotes in previous posts such as: [ul][li]I am disavowing the use of self-reference in a context in which I am supposed to be doubting my self. [/li]
[li]In a posture of extreme skepticism, “I accept premise (P11)” cannot be inferred from the contents of my perception that “I” am making an argument.[/li][/ul]

Apparently, you meant something less peculiar than this position with your statement. Problem is, your words were, at the least, ambiguous.

I trust they are clear now.

And as for ‘some time ago’ previous posts, my memory is poor. And as for “theories of truth”, I’m starting with only the position that Ramanujan seems to be using:
[ul][li]Nonexistent things cannot be the subject of statements,[/li][li]…but existent things can.[/ul][/li]…and from those, pointing out the absurdities that follow inherently from that position. My rebuttal should work in any ‘theory of truth’ that his (apparent) position is operable in.

You don’t think that a theory of truth and falsehood might have some bearing on the conflicting claims that “I do not exist” is either false or semantically empty?

shrug

If one cared to delve into philosophies of truth, then one might see that, say, A propositional deflationary theory of truth could answer your cases with:
[ul][li]A unicorn looks like a horse with a horn. If this sentence expresses a proposition about the abstraction “unicorn” then it is true. If it is a sentence about an instantiation of a non-existent creature then the sentence fails to express a proposition, so the sentence has no truth value.[/li]
[li]Pink elephants ate my homework. This sentence expresses a proposition about an action. That proposition is true iff pink elephants ate your homework.[/li]
[li]An honest crook is hard to find. This sentence expresses a proposition about finding an honest crook. That proposition is true iff it is hard to find an honest crook.[/li]
[li]A nonexistent thing could not be responsible have no properties. This sentence does not parse.[/li]
[li]I do not exist This sentence does not express a proposition. Thus, it has no truth value.[/ul][/li]
Alternatively, you might want to research theories of meaning first, but eventually you will get back to truth theory so long as you want to assert that “I do not exist” can be unambiguously false (or true).

[Liberal]

Not necessarily, Libertarian. An appeal to authority is also fallacious when the legitimate authority is not itself backing up its statements in a reasonable manner.

Upon what authority do you say that?

[begbert2]

Upon my own authority. (If the proof by counterexample didn’t sell you.) Now, upon whose authority can one determine that any specific authority be detemined an authority? Never mind, this is a side issue.
S.M. (and Ramanujan too,)
On the subject of my list 'o sentences, you were aware that pink elephants and honest crooks were assumed nonexistent for the duration of the excersise, right? (And, obviously, I need to pay more attention while I’m editing.) Dunno if that effects your answers.

Meaning is referenced in that article of yours a few times; once to say that deflationist theory couldn’t explain it, and then to say that meaning was to be used as a safety valve for the truth system: statement not having a truth value being declared meaningless (to protect the definition from having to explain such statements).

So, to consider “I do not exist.” You (S.M.) stated “This sentence does not express a proposition”. But why doesn’t it? You didn’t give a lick of support for this notion.

You may be confusing this statement with ones like “The present king of France is bald.” or “The unicorn in my closet is three years old.” and “The earth is in orbit around the sun.” You know, “proposition[s] which presuppose[s] the existence of something which does not in fact exist”. For example, the nonexistent earth is neither in orbit, nor not in orbit. It merely isn’t.

This statement is not a “proposition[s] which presuppose[s] the existence of something which does not in fact exist” it is a proposition about the existence of a thing. (Thanks for the article; in reading it I realized this distinction.) Lets look at the possibilities for the truth/meaningfulness of “I do not exist”:

[ul][li]I actually do exist. Well, in this case the statement is meaningful and false.[/li][li]I actually don’t exist. Well, in this case the statement is meaningful and true.[/li][/ul]
Unambiguous. There is no condition where this statement lacks a truth value, and certainly none where it lacks meaning.

“This sentence does not express a proposition.” is a claim entirely without support. I’ve supported the opposite view; truth values can meaningfully be assigned to proposition in all cases of reality; regardless of wether “I” exist or not, even (especially?) under the deflationist theory of truth. This has been supported by demonstration above.

So S.M.: support your claim.

I’m now waiting to hear about how “I” is a pronoun without a referent. (Then I’d be able to claim ‘begging the question’.) But I’ll let people make their own arguments.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

On the subject of my list 'o sentences, you were aware that pink elephants and honest crooks were assumed nonexistent for the duration of the excersise, right?

No. A convicted criminal might become honest. An elephant might be painted link. If the sentences were explicitely meant to presuppose the existence of a non-existent thing, then the sentences do not express propositions. (Using a propositionalist deflationary theory of truth that accounts for truth gaps in such a manner, of course.)

However, in one of these examples expresses a proposition that does not rely upon the existence of a non-existing thing. “It is hard to find a thing that does not exist” expresses a proposition about finding things. In such a case, “honest crook” would be an existing abstraction with no expression in reality. Thus, the sentence forms a proposition. The distinction here is that while the sentecnce can be formed to make “honest crook” appear to be the subject “honest crook” is not the subject of the proposition. I’ll give another example to illustrate.

The sentence: “Many people have searched for a method geometricaly of squaring the circle.” expresses a proposition about people that includes an object that does not exist. But the proposition does not presuppose the existence of the object. The sentence: “A method for geometrically squaring the circle has been searched for by many people” expresses the same proposition. Shifting the sentence into the passive voice disguises the subject in English grammar, but it does not alter the subject of the proposition.

The “pink elephant” sentence is different, in that the non-existent object is the subject of both the sentence and the proposition. The senence, under a straightforward reading, does not express a proposition. However, one might argue (as it appears that you do) that a meaning can be attached to that sentence as a consequence of other propositins that are unambiguously true or false. For instance:
[ul][li]“My homework has not been eaten; therefore all sentences of the form ‘X ate my notebook are false.’” [/ul]or[ul]“My dog and only my dog ate my homework, therefore all sentences of the form ‘X ate my notebook are false.’” [/ul][/li]The important thing to realize here is that you have now left the propositionalist deflationary theory of truth, for the truth-bearer that you rely upon is not a proposition whose subject is a non-existent thing.

Of course, an adherent of a propositional deflationary theory of truth would probably wonder why you have gone about analyzing such a sentence under the case where “pink elephants” are asserted to not exist in the first place.

So, to consider “I do not exist.” You (S.M.) stated “This sentence does not express a proposition”. But why doesn’t it? You didn’t give a lick of support for this notion.

Because it presupposes the existence of a non-existing thing. I thjought that was obvious.

You may be confusing this statement with ones like “The present king of France is bald.” or “The unicorn in my closet is three years old.” and “The earth is in orbit around the sun.” You know, “proposition[s] which presuppose[s] the existence of something which does not in fact exist”.

No confusion. It is indeed such a sentence. Using “I” as the subject of a sentence that attempts to make an assertion that specificaly references the properties of “I” presupposes that “I” exists.

This statement is not a “proposition[s] which presuppose[s] the existence of something which does not in fact exist” it is a proposition about the existence of a thing.

Well, the sentence is not a proposition at all. Sentences express (or not) propositions. If you read the page carefully you will see that there is a related but disctinct deflationary theory of truth that considers sentences rather than propositions to be the truth-bearers.

That quibble aside, though, “I do not exist” matches both of your conditions..
[ul][li]It is a sentence that presupposes the existence of something that does not (in this considered case) exist in an attempt to express a proposition.[/li][li]That proposition would be (if expressed) a proposition about the existence of a thing.[/ul][/li]

There is no condition where this statement lacks a truth value, and certainly none where it lacks meaning.

This is incorrect.

In the case where no existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction “I” there is no existing referent for the assertion “do not exist”. The sentence does not express a proposition. Now if you want to use a theory of meaning to argue that the sentence in question means some other proposition, one in which the subject is not “I”, then you will certainly be able to find some support for your position.

BUT you will need to be very careful not to equivocate the meanings that you place upon the symbol “I” in your proof if you turn to such a theory of meaning.

“This sentence does not express a proposition.” is a claim entirely without support.

This statement is simply untrue.

I’ve supported the opposite view; truth values can meaningfully be assigned to proposition in all cases of reality; regardless of wether “I” exist or not, even (especially?) under the deflationist theory of truth.

Well, you have made assertions to that effect. Those assertions do not accurately reflect an analysis under a propositional deflationary theory of truth.

Perhaps another way to look at it will help: under your analysis of the case where “I do not exist” is true, what subject is being modified by the meaning? What entity is having its potentialities restricted? Once you have answered that, ask yourself: does that entity appear in the sentence?

[Liberal]

Upon my own authority. (If the proof by counterexample didn’t sell you.) Now, upon whose authority can one determine that any specific authority be detemined an authority? Never mind, this is a side issue.

It might be a side issue, but it is one that you raised. You categorically — and therefore incorrectly — dismissed appeal to authority as “fallacious argument”. As to your question, it is answered in the link I gave you previously to Stanford University’s excellent essay on informal logic. It would behoove you to take a moment to read it.

[begbert2]

I took several moments, Libertarian. I’m willing to accept that the definition for the term “Argument from Authority” has been defined to mean what I would call “Argument from Unqualified authority”. It surprises me a bit, but okay. Is there a fallacy for “Accepting as true the words of a professional on a contested subject among such professionals, without further substantation”?
S.M.:

Because it presupposes the existence of a non-existing thing. I thjought that was obvious.

It presupposes nothing. The statement is a sentence that expresses a proposition about the existence of a thing. (And we have not determined yet that “I” is non-existent. It might be non-existent; not yet determined. Quit begging the question.)

If I don’t exist, then the sentence expressing the proposition about this fact is “I don’t exist.” Another meaningful proposition would be ‘I do exist’, but that proposition would be false.

S.M., be careful. Your recent statements would indicate that you believe that meaningful propositions about existence/non-existence cannot be created. Are you sure you want to support this position? I would point out that your source gives no support for this idea, referring to propositions with non-existent subjects only when such sentences don’t hold truth value.

Correct me where I’m wrong… Because you couldn’t possibly be wrong…

[Spiritus_Mundi]

It presupposes nothing. The statement is a sentence that expresses a proposition about the existence of a thing.

No. If it expresses a proposition about a thing then it has presupposed existence. Since in this case you have stipulated non-existence, the sentence does not, in fact, express any proposition at all.

Understand, you have alternatives in theories of truth that allow for non-obtaining things to exist. But you might not like some of the consequences of such an aproach for your overall argument (or perhaps you will–it’s difficult to predict.) But in the propositional deflationary theory that I have been offering as one example of how these things can be considered, your sentence does not expres a proposition. It tries to, but it fails.

And we have not determined yet that “I” is non-existent. It might be non-existent; not yet determined. Quit begging the question.

Quit being a begbert2.

You specifically introduced an examination by case (more than once, even) and I specifically stated that my analysis addressed the case: where no existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction “I”. Haven’t you learned yet that the words you write remain visible?

Haven’t you learned yet that misrepresenting the context of our exchanges in an attempt to score a cheap rhetorical point rarely works to your favor?

If I don’t exist, then the sentence expressing the proposition about this fact is “I don’t exist.”

Not under the theory of truth we have been discussing (or several others, but let’s stick with just one at a time.)

I ask again, explicitely and specifically: what subject is being modified by the meaningful sign “don’t exist”? Does that entity appear in the sentence?

Another meaningful proposition would be ‘I do exist’, but that proposition would be false.

Perhaps, but the sentence “I do exist” also fails to express a proposition, in the case where no existing object matches the criteria of the abstraction “I”.

S.M., be careful. Your recent statements would indicate that you believe that meaningful propositions about existence/non-existence cannot be created.

Not to people that can read with comprehension. People that read well might notice that I have written sentences that express propositions about existence/non-existence more than once during this little digression.

Are you sure you want to support this position?

I am sure both that I do not.

I am also sure that I have not implied that I believe any such nonsense.

I would point out that your source gives no support for this idea, referring to propositions with non-existent subjects only when such sentences don’t hold truth value.

My source supports my argument very well. It indicates that sentences that attempt to express propositions whose subject is non-existent do not, in fact, express any proposition at all and thus lack a truth value. Your particular sentences do not escape this consequence simply because the proposition that they attempt to make is existential in nature. You see, the whole point is that sentences of a certain structure DO NOT EXPRESS PROPOSITIONS. The particualrs of the proposition that does not get expressed are entirely irrelevant to that judgment.

“I do not exist” attempts to express a proposition about a non-existent subject. Thus, the sentence does not, in fact, express a proposition. And thus no truth value can be associated with the sentence.

Correct me where I’m wrong.

Again?

Okay.

Because you couldn’t possibly be wrong

I have no problem owning up to my errors when I am made aware of them. This is yet another area in which you and I differ significantly.