I think therefore i am.....

[begbert2]

Yes, I have on occasion admitted awareness of my errors. In this we differ.
Suppose that a thing called “I” does not exist. Please write a sentence expressing a proposition that specifically describes this truth Then write a sentence expressing a false proposition, that specifically describes the negation of this truth.

Suppose that a thing called “I” does exist. Please write a sentence expressing a proposition that specifically describes this truth Then write a sentence expressing a false proposition, that specifically describes the negation of this truth.

Does a statement’s meaningfulness depend upon its own truth value? You’re misrepresenting deflationary theory. The only truth-value gaps involve statements without truth value.

You specifically introduced an examination by case (more than once, even) and I specifically stated that my analysis addressed the case: where no existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction “I”.

Case lists need cover all cases and single cases may not be extracted and swung about as though they prove anything. If you’re dealing with a single case of an examination by case, then be aware you haven’t demonstrated anything.

It indicates that sentences that attempt to express propositions whose subject is non-existent do not, in fact, express any proposition at all and thus lack a truth value.
…
You see, the whole point is that sentences of a certain structure DO NOT EXPRESS PROPOSITIONS.

You do like to shout. Perhaps that is the only to get things to penetrate into brains in your universe. Also, your statement explicitly misrepresents your source. From the deflationary article you posted earlier (emphasis mine):

The same thing is true, according to some philosophers of language, about propositions which presuppose the existence of something which does not in fact exist

What part of PRE don’t you understand? It’s a separation of two things, one happening before the other. We’re only dealing with one thing: wether a speculated thing exists. Nothing precedes.

I ask again, explicitely and specifically: what subject is being modified by the meaningful sign “don’t exist”? Does that entity appear in the sentence?

Curious question. In the sentence “I don’t exist”, “I” is the subject, yet, it need not exist. Amazing, huh? Well, not if you’re using the definition of existence I’m using (and have stated numerous times). “Not exists” isn’t a property that implies existence.

[Liberal]

I took several moments, Libertarian. I’m willing to accept that the definition for the term “Argument from Authority” has been defined to mean what I would call “Argument from Unqualified authority”. It surprises me a bit, but okay. Is there a fallacy for “Accepting as true the words of a professional on a contested subject among such professionals, without further substantation”?

Argument from authority is not a fallacy of formal logic at all; it is a fallacy of informal logic. In formal logic, a fallacy is characterized by an invalid inference. But here, in this thread, no one has presented any sort of formal modal tableau or deduction chain from which an inference can be analyzed for validity. Rather, people here are arguing by rhetoric over whether Descartes’ argument is valid. Formalizing the argument would certainly clarify things, but that has not been done. Formally, the argument is either this:

(A) I -> T :: I

or this:

(B) I -> T :: I -> E

depending on whether you postulate existence as predicative.

The problem with (A) is blatantly obvious. Its axiomatic assertion is a petitio principii that is contingent on its own conclusion. The problem with (B) is more subtle, and implies, because of its monoconditional implication, that existence is predicated on thinking. Thus, the universe itself, being brainless, does not exist. Biconditionalizing the implications is problematic.

It is in fact impossible to prove your own existence either formally or informally without some form of circulus in demonstrando. The informal argument makes this clear: in order to do anything at all, including prove your own existence, you must first exist (since nonexistence things don’t do anything at all). Because your axiom — that you exist — is identical to your conclusion — that you exist — you have begged the question, and the argument is not valid.

Curiously, it is possible to prove the existence of something besides yourself. I can, for example, provide a valid formal argument that existence itself exists. And I can provide a valid formal argument that God (defined as Supreme Being) exists. But I cannot prove that I exist. The effort is futile.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Yes, I have on occasion admitted awareness of my errors. In this we differ.

As usual, your interpretation of the written record is suspect.

Suppose that a thing called “I” does not exist. Please write a sentence expressing a proposition that specifically describes this truth Then write a sentence expressing a false proposition, that specifically describes the negation of this truth.

[ul][li]No existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction “I”. [/li][li]An existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction “I”. [/ul][/li]Observant readers will perhaps feel a sense of recognition upon encountering those words. Each sentence above expresses a proposition whose subject is the class of existing things.

Suppose that a thing called “I” does exist. Please write a sentence expressing a proposition that specifically describes this truth Then write a sentence expressing a false proposition, that specifically describes the negation of this truth.

[ul][li]I exist.[/li][li]I do not exist.[/ul][/li]Each sentence above expresses a proposition about hte subject “I”.

Does a statement’s meaningfulness depend upon its own truth value?

No. Under a propositional theory of truth, though, a sentence that does not express a proposition has no truth value. “Does not express a proposition” can be taken as synonymous with “has no meaning” under some theories of meaning.

You’re misrepresenting deflationary theory. The only truth-value gaps involve statements without truth value.

Yes, and I have VER Y EXPLICITELY argued that your sentence, under the case where no existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction “I”, does not express a proposition. Ergo, it has no truth value.

Now, you obviously disagree with that conclusion, based upon your long and detailed familiarity with deflationary theories of truth, but by some perversity of character you can only frame that disagreemnt by pretending that I am misrepresenting the theory in question.

I am not. I have linked to a discussion the theory; I have tied my arguments specifically to elements presented in that discussion; and I have explained how those elements pertain to your analysis by case. Despite that, the only way you can manage to express disagreement is by pretending that I am misrepresenting the theoory.

How very Begbert2.

Case lists need cover all cases and single cases may not be extracted and swung about as though they prove anything. If you’re dealing with a single case of an examination by case, then be aware you haven’t demonstrated anything.

You presented the case list. I am challenging one aspect of that list. To pretend that a proof by exhaustion cannot be challenged by challenging an individual case betrays an understanding of logic that both inadequate and quite in character for you.

You are wrong. Again.

I am pointing it out. Again.

“X fails in this case” is a perfectly fine method to challenge the argument that “X holds in all cases”.

You do like to shout. Perhaps that is the only to get things to penetrate into brains in your universe.

Emphasis is sometimes necessary to help poor readers focus upon particularly relevant passages in a post. Thus far, of course, it has done little to ameliorate the failings of your education. Nevertheless, it does sometimes manage to get your attention so I continue to try.

What part of PRE don’t you understand? It’s a separation of two things, one happening before the other.

I understand all of it. You are the one who is having a failure of comprehension. You continue to think that the intended content of the propsition somehow impacts the requirements of the structure. This is not the case. You see: one thing has to happen before the other.

We’re only dealing with one thing: wether a speculated thing exists. Nothing precedes.

Thank you. I could hardly have asked for a better demonstration that you are failing to separate the two elements in question. I doubt it will help, but I will list them out for you.

Again.

In bold, just in case it helps your eyes focus.
[ol][li]First, a sentence must express a proposition.[/li][li]Then, the proposition can be evaluated for truth value.[/ol][/li]Your sentence fails in step (1). It attempts to frame a proposition whose subject is non-existing. Thus, the intended proposition PREsupposes the existence of a non-existent thing. This is a consequence of structure. It has nothing to do with the meaning of the proposition once we get to step (2), because we never get to step (2).

The sentence fails to express a proposition.

Curious question. In the sentence “I don’t exist”, “I” is the subject, yet, it need not exist.

Under the theory of truth that we have been discussing, it does.

If it does not, it cannot be used as the subject of a proposition.

Amazing, huh?

No. Just incorrect. I have long since lost any capacity for amazement at your incorrect assertions.

“Not exists” isn’t a property that implies existence.

Serving as the subject of a proposition is.

[ul][li]Propositions are non-linguistic entities.[/li]The subject of a proposition thus cannot be a “grammatical placeholder”.
“the subject of proposition” is a first-order predicate.
Thus, entities that serve as subjects of propositions must be able to validly accept a first-order predicate.
Under your definition of existence (as well as under the rules for truth-bearing entities in the theory we have been discussing) a thing that does not exist cannot legally accept the first-order predication “the subject of a proposition”.

[li]Sentences are linguistic entities.[/li]In language, one can use symbols without objective referents.
In English, one can use a non-existent thing as the subject of a syntactically correct sentence.
Such a sentence fails to express a proposition.[/ul]

[begbert2]

Okay, S.M., brace yourself. Apologies in advance for the incredible length, but you guys have been asking for it for a while.

So, IF I exist, the statements “I exist.” and “I do not exist.” have meaning, and IF I does not exist, then they don’t. This is a condition where a statements is not either true or false or meaningless, depending on the condition of reality, but “true or meaningless” and “false or meaningless” respectively. ANY statement of this style would be begging the question, including the meaningful ones (since it can be reasonably said that the speaker indented the sentences as meaningful, and therefore was assuming that “I” exists, even when they claim opposite. This is not acceptable.

You (S.M.) touched on the correct solution; the problem is not that the statements lack meaning, it is that they are being misinterpreted. I claim the blame for this; becuse the above is demonstrative that existence is a first order propert, a position that I’ve been asking we pretend to adopt for simplicity and consistency. Everbody from Descartes on at least occsionally speaks of existence as a property of the “existent” things; all such references are merely shorthand for comments on tehe contents of reality of a whole. Arguing about existence is considerably easier when everybody agrees to pretend that existence is a first order property, as we have been pretty much doing for a long while.

So, in short, I have caught you out in an error, S.M.: both sets of answers should have read like the verbose, more accurate versions. In the interests of someday perhaps being able to make less-than-monstrously verbose arguments, I will now propose an explicit redefinition of phrasings where ‘exists’ is apparently used as a predicate. I’ve pretty much been meaning these very meanings for some time (the whole time) and find them, while more cumbersome to argue with, as intuitive as any other approach. I ask that when I say “I exist” and the like in the future, it be interpreted as stated below.

S.M. may claim credit as inspiration/source for the english phrasing.

[ul][li]“Bs exist” (plural) as “At least one existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction B.” Ex.( B(x) )[/li]
[li]“B exists” (singular) as “One specific existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction B.” Ex.( B(x) && Ay.( B(y) -> (y=x) ) )[/li]
[li]“B(s) do(es) not exist” (either) as “No existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction B.” ~Ex.( B(x) )[/li]
and

[li]“ALL Bs think” (plural) as “Every existing thing that matches the criteria described by the abstraction B has the property of thinking.” Ax.( B(x) -> T(x) )[/li]
[li]“SOME Bs think” (plural) shall NOT be defined since it is particularly problematic, and not overly useful in this argument.[/li]
[li]“B thinks” (singular) as “One specific existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction B, AND that one specific existing thing that matches the criteria described by the abstraction B also has the property of thinking.” Ex.( B(x) && T(x) && Ay.( B(y) -> (y=x) ) )[/li]
[li]“B(s) do(es) not think” (either) as “No existing thing both matches the criteria described by the abstraction B AND has the property of thinking.” ~Ax.( (B(x) -> ~T(y)) && (T(x) -> ~B(y)) )[/ul][/li]
As can be seen by these definitions, I CONCEDE that you folks have finally (indirectly while barking up a different tree) demonstrated that, using existence as a forst-order predicate causes errors, we have no choice but to make existence requisite for the statement of other predicates. In other words: I accept that the axiomatic acceptance of the statement “I exist” begs the question, since it includes the axiomatic assumption of existence.

Now that that has been stated, when you all regain consciousness…
Time to reformulate the argument. (You didn’t really think I was done?) At this point, there’s nothing to do but get formal. Very formal.

Symbols:

P(x) = x is a perception. The perception is distinct from that which is perceived (which may or may not exist separately from the perception) and that which perceives/observes the perception.
P(x:y) = x is a perception that seems to its observer to have the content y (y given for information only)
O(x,y) = x observes/perceives y
I(x) = x is I. (Or one of them, if there can be more than one.) As will be made explicit in a premise, that which observes this argument.
IsP5(x) = x is premise P5.

Arg = THIS argument.
Premises

P0: Azc.( P(z:c) -> P(z) )
For the symbolic purists. Of course, it doesn’t work in the other direction.

P1: Az.( P(z) -> Ex.( O(x,z) ) )
That is, that all perceptions are observed (by existant things). This is from the understood meaning of the word “perception”, as being pretty much a nounified verb.

P2: Axyz.( ( O(x,z) && O(y,z) ) -> (x=y) )
That is, that each perception has one observer. Now, the same thing may be percieved my many different observers, but each observer has its own perception. This is from the understood meaning of the word “perception”, as being pretty much a nounified verb. I’m not going to use this yet, but will use it to counter any “something(s)” claims that roll around.

P3: Axz.( ( O(x,z) && P(z:Arg) ) -> I(x) )
P3b: Axz.( I(x) -> ( O(x,z) && P(z:Arg) ) )
That (and only that) which percieves this argument can be called (call itself) I. I can see it now: "But, that means that there are as many different “I"s as there are different perceptions of the argument!” Not necessarily: P3 says one observer per perception, not one perception per observer. But yes, in the absence of other informatin this premise allows that it is possible that there are many different things contemplating the argument (or rather, entertaining the perception that they are contemplating the argument), and that therefore qualify to be called “I”.

P4: Ez.( P(z:Arg) )
And so our story begins: with the perception that the argument is occuring.

P5: ~Ex.( IsP5(x) )
JUST KIDDING. After finishing editing I noticed I skipped the number 5. Give me a break, it’s late.
Inferences/Conclusions and maybe one more premise later.

I6: P(parg:Arg)
Instantiation of ‘parg’ for z in P4. Now we have a name for the z in P5.

I7: P(parg:Arg) -> P(parg)
Instantiation of ‘parg’ for z and ‘Arg’ for c in P0. For the purists.

I8: P(parg)
Modus ponens on I6 and I7. Now, for the purists, we have a parg that will fit in most of the other statements.

I9: P(parg) -> Ex.( O(x,parg) )
Instantiation of ‘parg’ for z in P1.

I10: Ex.( O(x,parg) )
Modus ponens on I8 and I9. Note that this says, literally, “There exists some thing x that observes/percieves parg”. This and/or I11 is the point as which we have concluded S.M.'s “something(s)” exist. Except, we’ve only proven a singular existing observer, of course. No (s). This will be discussed further later.

I11: O(begbert2,parg)
Instantiation of ‘begbert2’ for x in I10. We’ve now named the observer “begbert2” (fancy that).

I12: O(begbert2,parg) && P(parg:Arg)
Conjunction of I11 and I6.

I13: ( O(begbert2,parg) && P(parg:Arg) ) -> I(begbert2)
Instantiation of ‘obs’ for x and ‘parg’ for z in P3

I14: I(begbert2)
Modus ponens on I12 and I13. The instantiated object begbert2 (which then does exist) has the propert of being “I”. So, “I exist”.
With the current premises, it cannot be proven that I am the only I that exists. However, it is possible to prove that a given obserer can prove, to itself, that it is the only ‘I’ that exists. This is done by noting that, to a given observer, all perceptions that can be known to exist can be observed by the given observer. So, as far as I(begbert2) can tell, the following premise is true.

P15: Axz.( O(x,z) -> (x=begbert2) )

Do you guys mind if I skip some of the intermediate substeps? I can do them on request if you really want me to.

I16: Axz.( ~(x=begbert2) -> ~O(x,z) )
The contrapositive of P15

I17: Axz.( ~(x=begbert2) -> (~O(x,z) || ~P(z:Arg) )
An disjunction-creation substitued into I16

I18: Axz.( ~( O(x,z) && P(z:Arg) ) -> ~I(x) )
The contrapositive of P3b

I19: Axz.( ( ~O(x,z) || ~P(z:Arg) ) -> ~I(x) )
A demorganized ~( O(x,z) && P(z:Arg) substituted into of I18

I20: Axz.( ~(x=begbert2) → ~I(x) )
Transitivity of implication substitution across I17 and I19
…proving that if it ain’t begbert2, then it ain’t I; and given that by I14 we know that the thing known as begbert2 is I. So, when basing your argument only on perceptions of which one can be aware, exactly one single entity, I, can be proven to exist.

Heavens, that’s a lot of typing there. Have at.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

It’s late, and I have a busy weekend planned. I just thought I would get a couple of things out of the way quickly:
[ul][li]I know you like to think that you catch me in errors, but the sentences I gave you were correct. You yourself had stressed that the only mechanism for “lacking truth value” that you would accept under that theory of truth was “presupposition of a nonexisting thing”. Yes, “I exist” carries problematic implications of existence as a first-order redicate, but that wasn’t the treatemnt that you asked me for.[/li]
On meatier matters:
[li]P2 Is not obviously true. Some people believe in telepathy and/or empathy. Some people also think that direct recording/playback of perceptions may someday be possible. If some nihilistic gothabee decides to plug into a perceptive loop of my death rattle in 2060 does that make him me?[/li][li]P3 & P3b explicitely depend upon the content of a perception. Can we assume that you no longer want to argue that you don’t need one of those?[/li][li]P15 not only relies upon the contents of perception, the argument that you use to present it has equivocated the use of the symbol “I”. (When you say as far as I(begbert2) can tell, the following premise is true you clearly require more capacity of “I(begbert2)” than O(begbert2,parg)[/ul][/li]I’m not going to bother with the second part of your presentation until we clear up all of the issues leading to P15.

Kudos on finally seeing that there are problems with treating existence as a first-order predicate, even if you did feel the need to insert your little ego salvaging parenthetical.

[Liberal]

Oy. So much audiatur et altera pars, so little time. Let’s just start with I11.

Where is the premise that “begbert2” is an observer? What is missing is something to identify the symbol “begbert2” as the entity “begbert2”. You could just as well have substituted “Invisible Pink Unicorn”. Or “Jehovah”. Or even “x’’’”.

As I already proved, no matter how you approach this argument, you will be arguing in circles if you state all your premises. Your attempt is rather like attempts to circumvent quantum uncertainty by making indirect measurements.

The fact is that if you postulate yourself as an observer, then your entire argument — complete with its charming proprietary symbologies and terms — collapses into a restatement of Descartes’ original argument: I observe; therefore, I exist.

[Ramanujan]

begbert2, you still don’t understand why “i don’t exist” is meaningless. consequently, all your attempts to give it meaning have focused on unimportant aspects.

first of all, think of what we mean when we provide a subject in a sentence. we do not mean that that subject exists in any absolute sense. one might say “dirk gently is a detective” when discussing a certain piece of literature. that doesn’t mean that you can go to london and find a detective named dirk gently. nor anywhere else in the world. it does mean that there exists some entity we call “dirk gently” in the context about which we are speaking of him (the novel).

when we say “i am arguing.” we mean “there is something in this context (perhaps the universe) called ‘i’ that is arguing.”

so when one says “i don’t exist”, it generally semantically translates to “there is soemthing in this context called ‘i’ that does not exist in this context.”

so saying “unicorns are horses with one horn.” is not an example of a meaningless sentence when we realize there are no unicorns in the forests of earth. it is meaningful in the context discussed in the sentence, perhaps some story of fantasy.

to communicate what we mean by “i don’t exist”, it would be better to say something like “there is no thing one could reasonably call ‘i’ in the context being discussed,” and either give a definition of ‘i’ that is independent of the speaker of that sentence, or have the context being discussed one in which the sentence is not being spoken.

[Ramanujan]

begbert2, you still don’t understand why “i don’t exist” is meaningless. consequently, all your attempts to give it meaning have focused on unimportant aspects.

first of all, think of what we mean when we provide a subject in a sentence. we do not mean that that subject exists in any absolute sense. one might say “dirk gently is a detective” when discussing a certain piece of literature. that doesn’t mean that you can go to london and find a detective named dirk gently. nor anywhere else in the world. it does mean that there exists some entity we call “dirk gently” in the context about which we are speaking of him (the novel).

when we say “i am arguing.” we mean “there is something in this context (perhaps the universe) called ‘i’ that is arguing.”

so when one says “i don’t exist”, it generally semantically translates to “there is soemthing in this context called ‘i’ that does not exist in this context.”

so saying “unicorns are horses with one horn.” is not an example of a meaningless sentence when we realize there are no unicorns in the forests of earth. it is meaningful in the context discussed in the sentence, perhaps some story of fantasy.

to communicate what we mean by “i don’t exist”, it would be better to say something like “there is no thing one could reasonably call ‘i’ in the context being discussed,” and either give a definition of ‘i’ that is independent of the speaker of that sentence, or have the context being discussed one in which the sentence is not being spoken.

[Milum]

Words have no ultimate base meaning.
Words only have evolutionary function.

Geez…I thought everyone knew that.

[begbert2]

originally posted by Ramanujan
begbert2, you still don’t understand why “i don’t exist” is meaningless. consequently, all your attempts to give it meaning have focused on unimportant aspects.

A person having yet failed to understand something is definitive proof that all subjects yet under examination have been irrelevant? Really? When engaging in attempts to claim ignorance in someone, it is important not to say silly things. It undermines the effort.

If your position is that “the statement cannot have meaning because ‘the speaker of the sentence’, which is ‘I’, must exist for the sentence to be spoken”, then the word you are looking for is false. Because, as S.M. has so vehemently defended, if I does in fact exist, “I don’t exist” is in fact a meaningful statement. If you are deriving 'I’s existence from the existence of he statement, the the statement is indeed meaingful, though false.

I’m afraid I’ll have to contest the charge of misundertanding. And thanks for responding to the cue, S.M.

originally posted by Libertarian
Where is the premise that “begbert2” is an observer? What is missing is something to identify the symbol “begbert2” as the entity “begbert2”. You could just as well have substituted “Invisible Pink Unicorn”. Or “Jehovah”. Or even “x’’’”.

To your first question:

I11: O(begbert2,parg)
Instantiation of ‘begbert2’ for x in I10. We’ve now named the observer “begbert2” (fancy that).

It’s not a premise, but so what. And there is no mention anywhere in the argument of an “entity” that is otherwise named begbert2, until we name the instantiation of “I10: Ex.( O(x,parg) )” ‘begbert2’. Any other label would be fine (although ‘x’ would be an extremely tacky choice given its frequency of use as an uninstantiated variable). The ‘begbert2’ is merely a label; the thing that it points to (since it is instantiated) exists, and has been proven to have the property of being “I”. S.M. had much issues about just this sort of thing some time ago.

As I’ve said many times before, we can deduce nothing about the thing that exists except that it is ‘I’ (and, given the path of logic that we followed to find that out, we also know P11 to be true, indicating that it is an ‘observer’). It doesn’t matter what shorthand label I use to refer to the specific thing, be it “begbert2” or “libertarian” or “Freddy the third unicorn from the left”. That’s just a label, and has no implicit meaning.

If you don’t like the label ‘begbert2’, then merely generalize I14 to
“C14b: Ex.( I(x) )”. Referring to my list of unchallenged phrase redefinitions, that exactly translates to “At least one existing thing matches the criteria described by the abstraction I.”, which from there translates to “'I’s exist.” Any element in the non-empty set of things ‘I’ can be spoken of in the singular as existing, of course.

originally posted by Libertarian
As I already proved, no matter how you approach this argument, you will be arguing in circles if you state all your premises. Your attempt is rather like attempts to circumvent quantum uncertainty by making indirect measurements.

I didn’t see any proofs of your statements, merely some declarations.

And your charge of my leaving out premises is unfounded. My logical progressions are based in explicitly stated premises, as is in the case in all valid logic. Just because you’re personally certain that Ex.( I(x) ) must be present in any argument that concludes it, doesn’t mean that the lack thereof implies an unstated premise is being referenced (perhaps by a “By modus ponens on I13 and UnstatedPremise”).

Audiatur et altera pars is NOT a fallacy of formal logic. You wanted a clear formal argument, so I gave you one. The fact that it doesn’t support your declarations about informal arguments on the subject shouldn’t bother you.
And, from S.M., we have the expected attacks on the premises (he can’t resist a list):

P2 Is not obviously true. Some people believe in telepathy and/or empathy. Some people also think that direct recording/playback of perceptions may someday be possible. If some nihilistic gothabee decides to plug into a perceptive loop of my death rattle in 2060 does that make him me?

No, because he is not observing your perceptions. He is observing a perception, the content of which is the content of your original perception. As are the telepaths and empaths. Is a direct recording of something the something itself? Does superman live in my TV?

P3 & P3b explicitely depend upon the content of a perception. Can we assume that you no longer want to argue that you don’t need one of those?

P(x:y) = x is a perception that seems to its observer to have the content y (y given for information only)

Emphasis mine (of course). I don’t care what’s actually being percieved. As was stated, I’m talking about the apparent contents of the perception. That is, the data which comes across (or seems to come across) that perception, the objective truth of which is highly doubtable, yet which is still part of any perception.

And, we don’t have to assume anything; haven’t you done logic before? If you want to prove your usual out-of-date claim, all you have to do is demonstrate that “AxBc.( P(x:B©) -> B© )” follows from my premises. Go ahead. Take your time.

P15 not only relies upon the contents of perception, the argument that you use to present it has equivocated the use of the symbol “I”. (When you say as far as I(begbert2) can tell, the following premise is true you clearly require more capacity of “I(begbert2)” than O(begbert2,parg)

No it doesn’t and no it didn’t. And come on, anybody can look at P15 and notice that there is no reference whatsoever to the contents of a perception, or even the apparent seeming contents of a perception. Stop destroying your credibility.

And did you really think I was implying an ability to converse when I said “can tell”? For the lingustically challenged, replace “can tell” with “can observe”. I clearly require no more capability from things called “I” than the ability to observe. Which by P3b is explicitly availiable to all things I(x).

I’m not going to bother with the second part of your presentation until we clear up all of the issues leading to P15.

The smokescreen has been cleared; do you want me to formalize the second half of the argument now, or can I leave it as an excersize to the reader? As we’ve already discussed P15, the only possible problem left is invalidity.

[Nomadic_One]

Ultimately considering all the pages here i am sure that (I) exist…now if your all just a fragment of my imagination …well im not so sure…do you all exist or are you just my imagination… lol…i love these boards

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Regarding (P2)
No, because he is not observing your perceptions. He is observing a perception, the content of which is the content of your original perception.

[ul][li]P(x:y) = x is a perception that seems to its observer to have the content y (y given for information only)[/li]
[li]O(x,y) = x observes/perceives y[/li]
[li]P2: Axyz.( ( O(x,z) && O(y,z) ) -> (x=y) )[/ul][/li]Note that the constant term in (P2) is “z”. “z”, in (P2), is “y” in “O(x,y)” and “x” in “P(x:y)”[sup]1[/sup]. So, “x” is the perception, and the only way that a perception is specified in your proof is through the association with “y” and a modus ponens with (P0). But “y” in P(x:y) is the same as “z” in (P2), so the only way in the structure of your proof for the let side of (P2) to be evaluated is through the correspondence of z, and z is set by the apparent content of the perception “y”.

Now, it’s all well and good for you to declare that each perceptive event is an entity unto itself, and that the hypothetical deadhead in 2060 is not observing the same perception as “I” am . . . the quesiton is how can either “he” or “I” know in the moment of perception that “he” is not onserving what “I” observed. In particular, in your formal structure you are going to have to establish some means for the test on the left side of (P2) to be evaluated. (At least, you will have to do so if you ever want to actually use (P2). I don’t think that you do so in your presented argument.)

[sup]1[/sup] I wish you had been consistent in your use designators for free variables. It would make these relationships more clear.

Is a direct recording of something the something itself? Does superman live in my TV?

Careful. Philosophically, the question you are dancing close to is: are perceptions entities with identity independent of their content. This one gets tricky in a hurry. Most people, as we both have in this thread, will admit that a perception has an identity independent of the object of that perception. You and I might both look at a red ball, label that perception “seeing a red ball”, etc. But we acknowledge that the contents of the perception, the subjective experience that we label “seeing a red ball”, might be vastly different. It might also be identical; we just have no way to tell. So, it is easy to call those “different perceptions” based upon the expected/assumed/allowed for distinction in content.

But what happens when we assert that we are each experiencing the identical contents of a perception. How, in that case, can we call the perceptions different? What are our options:
[ul][li]Because the perceptive event(s) occur at different space/time coordinates.[/li][li]Because one is being observed by “you” and one os being observed by “me”.[/li][li]Because . . .[/ul][/li]The problem (in the context of our discussion) is that each of those distinctions relies upon the content of some other pecetion being accurate. (“You” are different from “I”, “here” is different from “there”, etc.)

So, if you want (P2) to be useful, you are going to have to address how one P(x:y) can be said to be “the same perception” as another P(x:y). And you are going to have to be careful how you do so, or else (P2) will degenerate very quickly into a tautology and thus be of no use at all in proving your result.

**Spiritus: **P3 & P3b explicitely depend upon the content of a perception. Can we assume that you no longer want to argue that you don’t need one of those?

**begbert2: **P(x:y) = x is a perception that seems to its observer to have the content y (y given for information only)

**begbert2: **I don’t care what’s actually being percieved. As was stated, I’m talking about the apparent contents of the perception. That is, the data which comes across (or seems to come across) that perception, the objective truth of which is highly doubtable, yet which is still part of any perception.

Actually, you are correct. You do depend upon a specific perceptive content, p(x:Arg), but you do not rely upon those contents to accurately reflect any objective referent.

My bad. I was misled by the apparent specificity of your instantiation. When I had a chance to look over your proof more closely, I realized that “Arg” really serves as nothing more than an instantiation of a free variable. Your conclusion is thus exactly what one would expect from the axiom “A perception exists.”

Thus, since the first section of your proof does not in any way reference (P2), I find myself in agreement. Accepting axiomatically that a perception exists allows us to conlude that somthing(s) exist. You choose to label that something(s) “I(begbert2)”, but that is misleading.

The entity in your conclusion has only one specified quality, tht it satisfy the implication I9: P(parg) -> Ex.( O(x,parg) ), where no significance is attached to the content of “parg”. Calling it “I(begbert2)” is a perfectly legal act of labeling, but it becomes equivocation as soon as you attempt to use any quality for “I(begbert2)” other than the one specified in (I9). Which brings us to . . .

**spiritus: **P15 not only relies upon the contents of perception, the argument that you use to present it has equivocated the use of the symbol “I”.

**begbert2: **No it doesn’t and no it didn’t. And come on, anybody can look at P15 and notice that there is no reference whatsoever to the contents of a perception, or even the apparent seeming contents of a perception. Stop destroying your credibility.

It hardly destroys my credibilit to state what is true. You introduce (P15) and defend it thusly:
[ul][li]This is done by noting that, to a given observer, all perceptions that can be known to exist can be observed by the given observer. So, as far as I(begbert2) can tell, the following premise is true.[/li]
P15: Axz.( O(x,z) -> (x=begbert2) )[/ul]
Note the section in blue. How does the “I(bebgert2)” know that all perceptions that can be known to exist imply the same “I(bebgert2)”? Rigorously, it can’t. “I(bebgert2)” is nothing more than a label applied to a single implication of an observer from a perception. To apply the same label meaningfully to a second (thir, fourth, . . .) instance of implication from perception requires some method of equating the two conclusions. You do this by declaration that the same “I(bebgert2)” is doing the observing. That declaration is done by “noting”, which is another way of saying “perceiving”. This is now new. You have habitually relied, at this point in your proofs, on the perception that a single unified awareness is on the end of multiple perceptions.

What you have not done is derive that result from your formal structure. For the “I(bebgert2)” of (I14), the only rigorous way to express something close to (P15) would be:
[ul][li]P15a: Exz.( O(x,z) -> (x=begbert2) )[/ul][/li]Which is valid but not very interesting. Nevertheless, the only thing perception that the “I(bebgert2)” has been matched with is the instantiated “Arg”.

And did you really think I was implying an ability to converse when I said “can tell”? For the lingustically challenged, replace “can tell” with “can observe”.

No. This would be simpler if you would stop imagining that people who disagree with you must necessarily be stupid.

I clearly require no more capability from things called “I” than the ability to observe. Which by P3b is explicitly availiable to all things I(x).

As I have touched on above, you clearly do require more of “I(bebgert2)” than you have demonstrated by (I14).
[ul][li]You require “I(bebgert2)” to observe more than a single perception.[/li][li]You require “I(bebgert2)” to know that it is observing more than a single perception.[/ul][/li]Neither of those qualities has been demonstrated for the “I(bebgert2)” that was concluded in (I14).

Alternatively, you could argue the degenerative case where “all” is read to be “the single”, in which case you get to (P15a)

The smokescreen has been cleared; do you want me to formalize the second half of the argument now, or can I leave it as an excersize to the reader?

If you can reformulate your argument to make use of (P15a), then please do so. If not, then you still have some smoke to clear.

[Liberal]

It’s not a premise, but so what.

So what?

If an assertion is not a premise, then it must follow either from a premise or from some other assertion that is itself derived from a premise. You have made your argument equivocal by substituting one free variable for another.

What you have done is the equivalent of solving 2X = 10 by saying that X = Y.

[thejunkie]

You always bring up the lighter side of life - haha