I'm bowing out of all future "paranormal" threads.

The BBQ Pit
101

No, you can’t both agree and disagree. :smiley: I mean, you can, but it is unreasonable. It is like you are saying that you agree that arithmetic and geometry are two different things, but not different enough to matter. To put yourself in my position here, imagine that, as an economist, you are explaining to someone the differences between Austrian economics and Keynesian economics. You give them references to Hayek and Keynes, and they come back and say, “Yeah, but that’s just y’all’s opinions, and you’re just giving these things arbitrary names. I just don’t see any difference between a claim that macroeconomics is an exercise in futility and a claim that government ought to manage an economy. You’re all just making stuff up and have for hundreds of years.”

Not necessarily. They might exist on alien planets, but not here. Or they might exist in such a manner that some people can perceive them while some cannot. (Like 3D opticals in those pixelated images.) Implicit in the claim of actuality is possibility. It is necessary to prove the possible before the actual.

It is a claim contradicted by Immanuel Kant, and means that exitence of a thing is contingent on some property. Kant maintained that existence has no properties, and philosophers found his argument compelling until recently. Now, there is renewed controversy. It seems that existence can have the property of “bounds”. Here is an excellent introduction to the concept of existence:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/

Yes, but without any of the meanings we have attached, like “2” for example. Like I said, where will the grid be that localizes the two stones? There are two only because we have grouped the two together. The universe recognizes no such grouping of “2”.

Incidentally, the notion that there is a universe we are living in right now and a possible other one is a statement about modality. To address any claim about it, you need modal logic. And here is an introduction to that:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

102

Liberal, I’m really, honestly, trying really, really hard to understand you. I will think about this, and I will study your links, but in the meantime, be kind and answer one more question.

You say that if someone makes a metaphysical claim, one should not approach that claim empirically, but analytically. Give me a good example of a metaphysical claim, and explain to me what goes wrong if I approach it empirically instead of analytically.

103

I appreciate your willingness to dig deeper. A metaphysical claim is a claim about existence, the nature of existence (ontology), or some quality of existence.

Suppose, for example, someone says, “It is possible that it is raining outside.” You must pry a bit to discover whether the claim they are making is metaphysical or epistemic. If they mean, “It is possible that, for all I know, it is raining outside,” then they are making a claim, not about the existence of the rain itself, but about the extent of their knowlege. Knowledge -> epistemology. But if they mean, “It is possible, given the logic of the circumstances, for it to rain outside,” then they are making a claim, not about what they know, but about the nature of the circumstances in which rain can exist. Nature of existence -> metaphysics.

For the epistemic claim, you want to question them about what they know. For the metaphysical claim, you want to question them about what logic makes the rain possible.

If all you do is demand that they look out the window, then you affect nothing except what they know. If it is indeed raining, then it is indeed possible. If it is not raining, then it is not possible — because you know it isn’t. But if they were claiming a metaphysical possibility of rain, then what you want to hear is an argument explaining the conditions necessary for rain and establishing that those conditions exist. Empirical observation might lead you astray. If you look outside and see water splashing against the window, for all you know it could be someone on the roof with a water hose, or some other even more elaborate illusion.

That’s why you need logic to explain optical illusions, like one where two lines look parallel but aren’t. Your observation (empirical) tells you a lie, but you can use the rules of geometry (analytic) to prove that the two lines really are not parallel.

104

With you so far. So, would you say that “elephants exist” is a metaphysical claim (given that it deals with existence), or just that “elephants could exist” is a metaphysical claim?

105

They are both metaphysical claims. (They are also both modal, assuming that the first one means “elephants exist in actuality”.)

106

Clarification:

If the guy means “elephants could exist for all I know” when he says “elephants could exist”, then the claim is epistemic. Sometimes, you have to clear that up. But your context pretty well meant “elephants could exist given the right logical circumstance” since you were asking specifically about metaphysics.

107

So “elephants exist” is a metaphysical claim, but (I assume) “elephants have trunks” isn’t, it’s an empirical claim. Color me clueless, but I don’t get the difference. Both are statements about physical reality, both can be confirmed by observation (inasmuch as anything can)…

I’ve read most of the document on existence you linked to, but it hasn’t helped so far. Also, I’d appreciate clarification on this bit in that document:

I don’t get the difference here either. “Is” means the same thing in all these four cases.

108

“Elephants have trunks” can be a metaphysical claim if you mean that elephants exist as creatures with trunks; that is, “trunkness” is a feature of an elephant’s existence. That’s one of the things that always bothered philosophers about Kant’s argument, and why he himself wrote Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. There are things that exist without trunks; therefore, trunks might define the bounds of something’s existence. But that’s a digression. On the other hand, it could be an epistemic claim if you mean that you know elephants have trunks. Or it could be an empirical claim if you mean that you have observed elephants with trunks. It is a modal claim if you mean that elephants must have trunks; i.e., it is necessary that elephants have trunks.

That’s why I say that you must sometimes inquire as to what someone means. It isn’t being picky; it’s seeking clarification. You have to eliminate the ambiguities sometimes. Think, for example, how you often reduce an analytic statement to simpler terms to make it easier to solve. Or think how a scientist will often tweak his experiment to make sure that he is excluding external factors. In a similar way, you sometimes have to dig deeper to figure out what someone means so you can use the proper tools to respond.

Note that you cannot test “Elephants exist” by observation if it is a metaphysical claim, and that it is not necessarily a statement about physical reality. There are things that exist that are not physical. Language exists, for example. Just because you observe an elephant does not mean it exists, as any drunkard who has seen pink ones can tell you. Learn to differentiate “elephants exist” from “I can show you an elephant”.

If someone says, “Ghosts exist,” ask them: Do you mean that you can show me a ghost? Or do you mean that you have knowledge of ghosts existing? Or do you mean that given the right circumstances, the existence of ghosts is either possible or necessary? Or do you mean that ghosts cannot not exist? Or do you mean something else?

Regarding the four is’s, here is what the scholars at Stanford mean, and why they say that they are all so different that they have nothing whatever in common:

*** ‘Socrates is’, rendered in regimented language as ‘(∃x)(Socrates = x)’.**

This is an unequivocal metaphysical claim, akin to “I am”. It means that Socrates is real.

*** ‘Cicero is Tully’, rendered as ‘Cicero = Tully’.**

This is a copula. It is a claim of identity.

*** ‘Socrates is wise’, rendered as ‘Wise(Socrates)’.**

This is another copula, but a different kind. It is a claim about, not Socrates himself, but a particular attribute of Socrates. (This is the one that drove Kant up the wall.)

*** ‘Man is an animal’, rendered as ‘(x)(Man(x) → Animal(x))’.**

This is a relation of antecedant/consequent. It is a claim that a relation exists between man and animals that is conditional but not biconditional. In other words, man is an animal, but an animal is not necessarily a man.

109

I’m sorry, but this still seems like wordplay to me. I understand why “elephants can exist” or “elephants might exist” is a different statement from “elephants actually exist right here and now”, and you can prove the two former with logic and the latter needs empirical studies, but once you make the statement that elephants do in fact physically exist, the two former statements become meaningless, because if elephants exist, they must certainly be able to exist. If logic shows that elephants cannot exist, but elephants do in fact exist, then my money is on the logic being wrong.

Thanks for trying, but it still makes no sense to me.

Socrates is. Statement about something about Socrates.
Socrates is Tully. Statement about something about Socrates.
Socrates is wise. Statement about something about Socrates.
Man is an animal. Statement about something about man.

If one is “identity” and another is “attribute”, so what? It still just tells you something about Socrates. The thing it’s telling you varies, but that doesn’t mean the word “is” means something different.

110

I think maybe part of the reason some of it seems like wordplay to you is that you are rather careless with words. The two former statements do not become meaningless at all; rather, they obviously are intrinsic in the latter statement. Actuality is a modality just like possibility and necessity. Something can be both possible and actual, and in fact, if actual, it must be possible. This makes for what is called a symmetric accessibility relation. In the link I gave you to modal logic, look for the map of relations. Find the B Axiom: A -> <>A. It reads, “If A is actual, then it is necessary that A is possible.” It implies that wherever x has a relation with y, y has a relation with x.

That is not possible. The fact that you believe (erroneously) that logic can pull rabbits out of hats indicates an inadequate understanding of logic. You could not even conduct your scientific experiments without logic because you need logic to contextualize them. It requires logic even to show that science is a valid method of inquiry. And the fact that you are using logic — “if…then”, “can’t…because”, “it must be that…”, and so on — in your own arguments means that you depend upon it. Learning it might be worth your while.

The reason American Heritage gives eleven different definitions for “be” (the infinitive of “is”) is that there is more than one meaning for the word. Imagine someone coming into a conversation about math and saying that there is no difference between the three meanings of “-”: (1) as subtraction, (2) as negation, and (3) as additive inverse. Suppose the person said, “They’re all the same to me. They’re all just minuses.”

Saying that Socrates and Tully are the same person, and saying that Socrates has the quality of wisdom, are as different as saying that x is a subtrahend of y, and saying that x is a negative solution to the square root of y. I’m sorry you don’t get it, but if nothing else, the fact that great minds throughout the centuries (including the likes of Einstein) do get it ought to give you pause to consider that perhaps you ought to hang in there a bit longer rather than discarding it. Maybe you have a mental block. Maybe you’re trying too hard. Who knows? But I can guarantee you this: if you will stay with it until it makes sense to you, it will benefit you in whatever discipline you work. If you are an economist, for example, you will understand economics better.

111

In case you are a computer programmer (by vocation or hobby), I thought of another example that might help you. Consider the man who has learned only the BASIC language. He is surprised when he discovers that in other languages, “=” has two different meanings in a statement like “If x = 5 then z = 5”. How would you explain to him that in one instance, it is an assignment and in the other, it is a comparison? How would you convince him that, without a compiler that differentiates the two for him, it makes sense to express it as “If x==5 then z=5”?

112

No, I don’t believe that and I believe I do understand logic decently. I just don’t see what it’s good for in the kind of situations we’re dealing with here. If elephants exist, then they must be able to exist, right? If we’ve never seen an elephant, why is it interesting to even discuss whether they could exist? The same goes for ghosts. Isn’t it supremely uninteresting to try to work out if they could exist, when what’s interesting is whether they do exist?

My example with elephants was meant to illustrate that if elephants do exist and someone works out, using logic, that they cannot exist, then that person did something wrong and his logic is invalid.

I’m not much for authorities, but don’t you think I am hanging in there?

113

Well, for one thing, thinking about things that might be, sometimes just might give us ideas about other things to do. Good way to stretch the mind. Hey, someone had to be the first person to think, “I wonder how man could fly.”

114

And yet, you are using it all the same. :wink:

Yes. See my reference to the B Axiom above.

Well, that’s a subjective question. What interests one man might not interest another. Even scientists enjoy discussing such things as branes despite that none have been observed. In fact, I would say that open-mindedness and curiosity are essential human traits, and are beneficial to man’s scientific and technological progress. Quite many discoveries are serendipitous.

Different people are interested in different things. That’s why there are theorists and engineers. Part of what you’re learning here is the ability to discern whether a discussion interests you. If people are discussing, say, a unique accessibility relation with respect to ghosts, it is helpful to understand that their discussion entails the CD Axiom: <>A -> A; that is, if A is possible, then A is necessary, meaning that wherever x has a relation with y, x and y are identical. It would be a discussion that does not interest you, and it would be unseemly for you to descend into it to opine that the governing relation should be serial.

Well said.

Very much so. You seem sincere, and have earned my respect. I am willing to answer any question that you have and that I am capable of answering.

115

Yes, I know I am. You’re a killer at pointing out inexact use of language, aren’t you? It’s the same with the “interesting” bit. Of course it can be interesting (in an “I’m slightly drunk and sitting around at 2 am” sort of way) to discuss whether something could possibly exist, so that’s not what I meant. Sometimes being a nonnative English speaker makes life on this board really difficult.

I know you hate hypotheticals, but let’s do one anyway. A new member registers on the SDMB. Let’s call him Ghost Guy. His first post is in Great Debates and states quite simply “I believe that ghosts exist. Do you?”. What would you say is the proper response?

116

He has made a doxastic claim. Therefore, the question is not about ghosts at all, but about belief. I would respond simply, “No, I do not”. If I had an interest in pursuing the discussion, I might continue with, “Why do you believe in them?” That might lead him to make a statement of another kind, such as those we’ve discussed here.

117

By the way, what is your native language? Perhaps I could recommend a philosopher to you that you might enjoy who has written in your language.

118

Let’s say you do ask him why, and he makes one of the following responses:

  1. Ghosts exist. I know this because two hours after my father died, I saw him in my bedroom and we spoke briefly, saying goodbye. He then vanished.

This is an empirical claim, right?

  1. Ghosts must exist. It is inconceivable that a human mind would just disappear after death.

This is a metaphysical claim, right?

  1. Ghosts must exist. So many people have seen them. It’s unbelievable that they were all mistaken or hallucinating.

This is also a metaphysical claim, right?

119

Swedish.

Actually, I kind of doubt it.

120

Remember, Priceguy, in Lib’s world, things all depend upon what the meaning of “is” is. :wink: