Not prepared for a disaster like 9-11 or Katrina? You’re irresponsible and incompetant.
Trying hard to prepare for mutating avian flu or credible terrorist threat on NY? Well, if neither of those happen you’re hysterical and fear-mongering.
Maybe it’s because I’m so half-assed in my own personal life (see my post in the dictator thread) I’m just impressed that anybody attempts to prepare for anything at all.
It’s so easy to have the answers to yesterday’s crises. But I don’t think anyone is truly prepared for tomorrow’s. Sadly, the political posturing and finger-pointing does nothing to aid preparation, but that seems to be most of what we get.
Wish I had the answers…
What I was struck by in the wake of Katrina was how predictable the destruction of New Orleans was. It really was an inevitability, and nobody should have been surprised by it. So that sort of thing is worth preparing for. Anything you know is coming is worth preparing for.
The current avian flu strain is not an inevitable pandemic scourge. It might be, but there’s a degree of uncertainty. Fixating on one strain is a mistake. Accurately estimating the likelihood such a pandemic will break out eventually is a much better approach to public health, and governments should plan accordingly, if such information can be had.
9/11? If some basic airline security had been followed, it never would have happened. Good baggage searches and some skymarshalls are adequate for such threats. People who think skyscrapers should be built to withstand jumbo-jet impacts are going over the top methinks. That’s an “ounce-of-prevention” type of problem.
Preparations are always necessary. That doesn’t mean every alleged preparation is appropriate. If you’re thinking of this week’s subway threat, the DHS specifically said it was not credible…
Things are always clearer in hindsight, of course, and it’s much easier to criticize post hoc than to foresee all potential hazards. The attacks on September 11[sup]th[/sup] are a prime example of this; although we certainly had well-founded speculation of conspiracy and even some hard evidence of preparation for an attack, the various agencies responsible for intelligence and counterterrorist efforts were not well-coordinated, and attempts by individuals to highlight specific threats ran into an entrenched bureaucracy that was more interested in CYA and not overextending itself than in pursuing potential leads. Although there were certain individuals in authority who could have and probably should have done more to clear the lines of communication, it isn’t the case that anyone was directly culpable, but rather represents an institutional model that goes back to the post-Church Committee hearings and the continued favoring of signals and photographic data over the neglected human intelligence (HUMINT) programs all throughout the last two Presidential administrations.
In the case of Katrina, however, it seems pretty clear that not only was the chief executive placed in the position as a political sop, but that he did very little–even for someone with such a dearth of experience–to maintain readiness to respond to a disaster, and that furthermore, frequent and persistant attempts to notify the agency of the potential for destruction of the incoming storm did not result in any significant degree of mobilization. The fact that days after the event FEMA was not cognizant of the degree of damage, was not prepared to distributed needed foodstuffs and provide shelter, and worst of all, not only failed to coordinate volunteer efforts but actively hampered third-party efforts indicates that the agency that was once so authoritative and comprehensive that it was entasked to respond to nationwide emergencies had been lobotomized. Criticism was well due.
Regarding the recent plans to respond to Avarian Flu outbreak with martial law: it is certainly the job of the Chief Executive and his advisors to consider all circumstances, even to an extreme. Although the notion of regional or national martial law is abhorant, bringing to mind images of Kent State writ large, it is the responsibility of those who have the authority to issue such orders to consider the necessitating circumstances and reprocussions. It may be that this was just one obscure bullet point in a list of all possible responses. Be that as it may, it would be absurd to violate the letter and spirit of the Posse Comitatus Act to deploy troops in response to an epidemic that isn’t person-to-person contageous and that, at worst, might kill a few thousand people. Nor is it clear how deploying Army and National Guard troops would help. It is, in fact, a very knee-jerk and short-sighted action with long-ranging consequences, both politically and socially, and nothing about the statement that contained this information implies that those impacts have been considered. Indeed, when such discussions are undertakened (generally in response to an objective and limited think-tank study) the results are kept “on the QT” to avoid the appearence of impropriety or public disquiet.
As for New York: the reason for concern, particularly in light of the recent bombings in London the alert is understandable. It’s questionable whether the security measures will have a significant deterrant effect, and unlikely that they’ll screen out dedicated attacks in the hit-or-miss fashion that they work. I suppose they provide the illusion of security, but the result is that people learn to live in a siege mentality, making it easier to justify ratcheting up another attack on civil liberties next time an attack slips through.
It is a truism that, as obvious as problems and foresight may be to individuals, for entrenched bureaucracies any amount of change or action is difficult and lumbering at best. When it is directed by executive decision makers who are obtuse, self-absorbed, or just plain incompetent, you end up with an agency which is not only unable to prepare for future problems but is an impediment to others trying to respond or prepare. Michael Brown, et al deserve most of the criticism leveled at them, but the real problem is that their replacements are probably not going to be held any more accountable, thanks to institutional inertia.
Remind me to tell you about the fellow polishing his cannon someday.
Stranger