The question I have is whether losing some decisions has an effect on the others, even though they rest on different grounds and are not connected from a legal theory standpoint.
Meaning if you try 14 separate lawsuits on various grounds and lose the first 6 of them, does this track record bias future judicial rulings on the case, in that judges will just tend to see them as one big bunch of quixotic challenges? Or would judges consider each lawsuit on its merits?
Taking it just as a legal issue, it really depends on the rulings. A judge can rule against one lawsuit in a narrow manner that only effects that lawsuit. But on the other hand, a judge could use the dismissal of a single lawsuit as a reason to issue a broad decision that effects a large number of other lawsuits.
Consider one of the most famous court decisions: Dred Scott. Taney could have ruled against Scott on narrow jurisdictional grounds that would have essentially only applied to Scott’s case, which had unusual jurisdictional issues. But Taney chose instead to rule based on the broadest possible grounds with a decision that effected the legal rights of all black people as well as anyone living in a territory.
If you read the linked article, there are a number of challenges to the law, which are unrelated - on legal grounds - to each other, and also unrelated to the prior challenges to the law that have already been dealt with (including the USSC decision).
The central question in the prior challenge was that the government lacked constitutional authority to impose the employer mandate. Current challenges include the notion that since the penalty has been ruled a tax it had to have originated in the House and not the Senate, the issue of whether the law granted subisides for people enrolling through the Federal exchange, the question of whether the Obama administration overstepped its bounds in various executive revisions to the law, challenges on religious grounds, and more. None of these are technically related to each other.
My question is whether a judge, hearing yet another challenge on new grounds to a law that has been challenged on multiple grounds already, begins to look at this as just some kooky tactic and tends to dismiss the challenge in his or her mind on that basis alone even though the actual legal grounds might have been considered more strongly if they were being raised in isolation.
It’s really a psychological question, but there’s possibly some judicial history that would shed some light on it.
A judge is not supposed take the motivation for filing a lawsuit into consideration. So he cannot issue a ruling like “You’re a Republican and you’re just filing this lawsuit because it’s against a law that was enacted by Democrats.” So each case will be considered separately and unsuccessful lawsuits have no effect on future lawsuits based on that issue.
However, in my previous post, I was pointed out a way in which unsuccessful lawsuits could have an effect on future lawsuits based on a different issue.
Well in proper circumstances, res judicata may apply. Not the case here and in the cases cited in the OP from what. I can read, the constitutionality of the ACA is not being challenged. They are stating that the executive, when implementing the same, acted in excess of its powers, in other words went beyond the authority granted to them in the enabling legislation and or constitutional power.
I keyed in; Obamacare + Severability Clause; and retrieved this;
The question presented is whether the ACA must be invalidated in its entirety because it is non-severable from the minimum coverage provision that exceeds Congress’ limited and enumerated powers under the Constitution.
As a legal answer (barring certain estoppel issues), the answer is clearly that each claim gets considered on its own merits. The problem is going to come up, I would think, where all of the cases end up being heard by the same judges (either because you file them in the same district or, as is the case here, becuase they’re all ultimately presented to the same nine-judge panel). It’s exacerbated, of course, when the original ruling was contentious or viewed as overly political.
Other factor, I would think, would be the nature of the challenge. I don’t think the Court is going to be favorably disposed to the argument that “since you decided the penalty was tax, here’s an origination argument” but they might, more neutrally, look at a claim that says: “here’s this other thing over here that’s a problem.”
As a pratical matter, I would think that the strong sense (which I agree with) that Roberts engaged in a last-minute defection as a matter of political or “institutional history” (as opposed to legal) concern makes it highly unlike that the Court would turn around and strike down large portions of the act, especially on constitutional bases. The arguments nibbling around the edges (textual analysis of the subsidy provision or religious exemptions for certain employers, for example) will probably be considered on a no-less-fairminded-than-usual basis.
I’m not sure there’s a factual answer to the question, but that seems to me to be some of the key factors.
So the SUpreme Court said the penalty for not buying insurance was a tax. Can the trial judges below SCOTUS now use the decision and the additional fact that the tax was not deemed unconstitutional as part of this ruling to say the origin argument has no merit? “The SCOTUS said it was a tax and did not say it was unconstitutional, therefore it is a valid constitutional tax?”
Or was that simply an oversight of the one side in the suit not to bring up this issue, so tehrefore tehre is no precedent?
or is it all handwaving, sufficiently vague that the lower courts could rule either way and leave it to the SCOTUS to clarify?