"Impassible" terrain and military history

Factual Questions
21

While it was eventually overcome by massed brute force, the Germans’ Winter Line in Italy stopped the Allied advance into Europe cold for around half a year, from the end of 1943 until May of 1944. IIRC, the Germans were able to use a relatively small number of troops with the terrain of central Italy to completley nullify the type of mobility that the smaller US military prefered to employ in combat.

I still can’t figure out who looked at Italy and thought “Yep, that looks like a soft underbelly to me. Bears no resemblance to a boot at all.”

22

Winston Churchill. The same guy that thought Norway, Turkey, and the Balkans were “soft”. Good Prime Minister, but he never quite grasped the concept of a mountain.

23

[QUOTE=Little Nemo]
Winston Churchill. The same guy that thought Norway, Turkey, and the Balkans were “soft”. Good Prime Minister, but he never quite grasped the concept of a mountain.
[/QUOTE]

Yeah, as a Texan who happens to be a military history nut, that campaign is a sore spot for me. The 36th Infantry “Texas Division”, made up almost entirely of Texas National Guardsmen, was pretty much chewed to pieces during an attempt to cross the Rapido River to break through the Gustav line.

In addition to the Germans being dug in on the other side, the Texans had trouble with cooperation between the riflemen and the engineers, they had all sorts of logistical problems (many of the boats needed for the operation either were diverted for the landings at Anzio and Normandy, or else just piled up in the rear, akin to the British neglecting to bring ladders at the Battle of New Orleans). Just to make things worse, the British, who were supposed to sieze the nearby high ground so the Germans couldn’t drop artillery wherever they pleased, were behind schedule, and the smudge pots intended to conceal the Texans’ movements from the enemy mostly served just to cause confusion amongst the troops while under fire.

Would the English Channel count as an insurpassable obstacle? If I recall, the last guys to successfully invade England were the Normans WAAY back in the day, though the Germans possibly could have won the Battle of Britain with paratroopers had they not given up the initiative to play politician all of a sudden.

24

Hmmm. breaks out pot-stirring stick

Terrain was a definite factor here, but how much did the diversion of supplies, equipment, and personnel to the upcoming Operation Overlord contribute to this “stalemate”?

25

[QUOTE=mlees]
Terrain was a definite factor here, but how much did the diversion of supplies, equipment, and personnel to the upcoming Operation Overlord contribute to this “stalemate”?
[/QUOTE]
But the material could be diverted to a higher-priority operation, because the invasion of Italy had already achieved most of its’ objectives:

  • it kept German troops in Italy, keeping them away from both the Eastern Front and the Channel defenses. And had already pretty much removed Italy from the mix.
  • it took most of the easter Mediterranean Sea out of German control.
  • it threatened the Romanian oilfields, the major supply line for German fuel.

So it made definite sense for the military planners to de-emphasize the Italian campaign at this time, in favor of allocating more to the opening up of a third front against the Germans.

26

[QUOTE=t-bonham@scc.net]
The tendency of military high commands (from any country) to refuse to change their preconceived plans to take into account new technology is legendary. Part of the reasoning behind the comment that ‘generals are ready to fight the last war over again, but do it right this time’.
[/QUOTE]

But the thing is, the French were oh-so-nearly right. The original version of Case Yellow was basically a tired old retread of the Schlieffen Plan, and the allied defensive strategy would have ground that to pieces in the Low Countries. It was only due to some relatively last-minute (and uncharacteristically radical) changes by the Germans that the Ardennes route was taken. That, together with the much reduced need for artillery preparation caused by developments in armour and air power, screwed the allies.

[QUOTE= ralph124c]
I’ve always been puzzled by this, because it is not such difficult terrain.
[/QUOTE]
The Ardennes wasn’t regarded as being ‘impassable’ - just as being impossible to move a really large force through quickly, and that was primarily because it was terrain that needed roads to move things, and there weren’t many. Let’s face it - which sane commander would base their entire strategy on moving almost thirty divisions with all their equipment through a wooded, broken area with only a very few narrow roads, and then forcing a river crossing at the end? The infantry divisions the French placed to counter advances through the Ardennes would probably have been adequate against anything but the huge gamble the germans took. If there had been only a few more vehicle breakdowns and traffic jams on the narrow roads, or a little bit of bad weather, or if the allies had managed to maintain a stronger air presence and detect what was happening by reconnaisance while the Germans were preparing, the history books might have written off the Ardennes assault in 1940 as one of history’s great blunders.

27

[QUOTE=Raguleader]
Would the English Channel count as an insurpassable obstacle? If I recall, the last guys to successfully invade England were the Normans WAAY back in the day, though the Germans possibly could have won the Battle of Britain with paratroopers had they not given up the initiative to play politician all of a sudden.
[/QUOTE]

Both Henry IV (Bolingbroke John of Gaunt’s son) and Henry VII invaded from France - Henry IV is a bit odd as he deposed Richard II who had a very young wife who was daughter of the King of France .. also a defense deal.

I suspect a degree of revisionism in UK (or maybe English) history which runs along the lines of Norman invasion Ok - anything after was just guys lurking abroad and welcomed with open arms.

Currently I’m countering insomnia by comparing Simon Schama’s version against This Sceptred Isle - there is definitely a mismatch.

Like, I suspect, many UK denisons, my knowledge of UK history gets a bit murky from Edward I to Henry VII - but my suspicion is that France was busily shipping over expatriate forces on the very sound principle that it kept us from making their lives a misery.

28

[QUOTE=FRDE]
Both Henry IV (Bolingbroke John of Gaunt’s son) and Henry VII invaded from France.
[/QUOTE]
Just to clarify this statement, Henry Bolingbroke landed at Ravenspur in Yorkshire thus avoiding the English Channel.

Henry, Earl of Richmond (later Henry VII) failed to invade via the English Channel. From Wikipedia:

Then, on 1 August 1485, he succeeded with a landing in West Wales:

29

Rommel was forced to attack a narrow Allied position by the badlands south of, if I recall correctly, El Alamein. This denied him his normal tactical advantage of excellent mobility, and resulted in his being stopped before he reached Cairo and Alexandria. In this case, the defenders were right about the terrain being impassable.

30

[QUOTE=t-bonham@scc.net]
But the material could be diverted to a higher-priority operation, because the invasion of Italy had already achieved most of its’ objectives:

  • it kept German troops in Italy, keeping them away from both the Eastern Front and the Channel defenses. And had already pretty much removed Italy from the mix.
  • it took most of the easter Mediterranean Sea out of German control.
  • it threatened the Romanian oilfields, the major supply line for German fuel.

So it made definite sense for the military planners to de-emphasize the Italian campaign at this time, in favor of allocating more to the opening up of a third front against the Germans.
[/QUOTE]

Well, the argument about keeping the Germans in Italy is debatable, because they had a lot more than we did, and had a lot fewer troops tied down there.

Keeping the Germans distracted by an attacking force to the south is probably valid what with the bigger attacking force getting ready to hit them from the West.

The two points I can heartily agree on are the ones involving naval and aerial supremacy. Strategic bombing, even if it’s actual concrete gains in terms of destruction of factories and such is debatable, tied down an impressive number of German forces for air defense and damage control. Even a shot down fighter pilot, or for that matter, a shot down waist gunner froma bomber, would tie up a disproportionately large number of German forces as they tried to hunt him down and capture him. Keeping the Germans out of the eastern Med made it difficult for them to get at a lot of the British territory over there, including a fair number of oil fields, IIRC.

That said, was it the oil fields of Romania that finally turned out to be the lynchpin in Germany’s industry? I know it was oil production in general, but I can’t remember how central to that Romania’s fields were.

[QUOTE=Speaker for the Dead]
Rommel was forced to attack a narrow Allied position by the badlands south of, if I recall correctly, El Alamein. This denied him his normal tactical advantage of excellent mobility, and resulted in his being stopped before he reached Cairo and Alexandria. In this case, the defenders were right about the terrain being impassable.
[/QUOTE]

Heh, El Alamein is an interesting battle. From what I’ve gathered from various sources, the consensus is that we got totally tarred there in a tactical sense, but won in a strategic sense because Rommel didn’t get to where he wanted to go.

31

[QUOTE=Little Nemo]
Winston Churchill. The same guy that thought Norway, Turkey, and the Balkans were “soft”. Good Prime Minister, but he never quite grasped the concept of a mountain.
[/QUOTE]

Yeah, Winnie must have forgotten the disaster of Gallipoli, in WWI. A good idea gone bad-sma e deal. Taking on a superior force which held the high ground-not smart.
Also, forgetting that it gets cold in Turkey, in the winter! :o

32

[QUOTE=Raguleader]

Heh, El Alamein is an interesting battle. From what I’ve gathered from various sources, the consensus is that we got totally tarred there in a tactical sense, but won in a strategic sense because Rommel didn’t get to where he wanted to go.
[/QUOTE]

There are of course two stages in the conflict at El Alamein the early stages (during the summer of 1942) was defensive, which (as with most defensive battles) was won by the allied defenders by virtue of not losing. What is commonly called the “Battle of El Alamein” was the allied offensive later in the year which was an unambiguous (though hard fought) Allied victory.

In fact it could have been a complete, conclusive, defeat for Rommel if the Montgomery they had pushed harder and not allowed him to retreat intact. Whether that was a bad thing for the allies in the long run is debatable IMO as Hitler continued to pour troops into North Africa long after defeat became inevitable (and this was at a time when the Eastern Front in Russia was very much in the balance).

33

[QUOTE=Speaker for the Dead]
Rommel was forced to attack a narrow Allied position by the badlands south of, if I recall correctly, El Alamein. This denied him his normal tactical advantage of excellent mobility, and resulted in his being stopped before he reached Cairo and Alexandria. In this case, the defenders were right about the terrain being impassable.
[/QUOTE]

You’re thinking of the badlands known as the Quattara depression located about thirty miles south of Alamein and the second battle of Alamein, more commonly known as the battle of Alam Halfa (and to the German troops as the “6 day race”- named after an annual bicylce race held around Berlin).

America’s favourite German general attacked with his Afrika Korps on 30 August 1942, well to the north of the genuinely impassable Quattara depression, just south of the Ruweisat Ridge about 15 miles south of Alamein, and his force had to contend with standard desert conditions where they were defeated and forced to retreat, after 6 days, by the Eighth army, led by America’s most hated British general.

I think Alam Halfa was the first defeat of German army forces in WWII.

34

[QUOTE=griffin1977]
In fact it could have been a complete, conclusive, defeat for Rommel if the Montgomery they had pushed harder and not allowed him to retreat intact. Whether that was a bad thing for the allies in the long run is debatable IMO as Hitler continued to pour troops into North Africa long after defeat became inevitable (and this was at a time when the Eastern Front in Russia was very much in the balance).
[/QUOTE]

This ridiculous fable that Rommel retreated with his forces “intact” has been peddled assiduously and relentlessly by American writers of history tales for nearly 70 years. The fable has no connection to reality.

Another writer of history tales, Robin Neillands, has the allies taking 30,000 prisoners, 10,000 of them German. The Axis lost 320 tanks, 84 aircraft and 1000 artillery pieces. The remnant of the Axis force amounted to divisions reduced to less than brigade strength and only a few dozen tanks.

So much for the “allowed him to retreat intact” nonsense.

Oh, one more thing. It was a “complete, conclusive defeat” for America’s favourite German general

35

[QUOTE=slaphead]
But the thing is, the French were oh-so-nearly right. The original version of Case Yellow was basically a tired old retread of the Schlieffen Plan, and the allied defensive strategy would have ground that to pieces in the Low Countries. It was only due to some relatively last-minute (and uncharacteristically radical) changes by the Germans that the Ardennes route was taken. That, together with the much reduced need for artillery preparation caused by developments in armour and air power, screwed the allies.

The Ardennes wasn’t regarded as being ‘impassable’ - just as being impossible to move a really large force through quickly, and that was primarily because it was terrain that needed roads to move things, and there weren’t many. Let’s face it - which sane commander would base their entire strategy on moving almost thirty divisions with all their equipment through a wooded, broken area with only a very few narrow roads, and then forcing a river crossing at the end? The infantry divisions the French placed to counter advances through the Ardennes would probably have been adequate against anything but the huge gamble the germans took. If there had been only a few more vehicle breakdowns and traffic jams on the narrow roads, or a little bit of bad weather, or if the allies had managed to maintain a stronger air presence and detect what was happening by reconnaisance while the Germans were preparing, the history books might have written off the Ardennes assault in 1940 as one of history’s great blunders.
[/QUOTE]

Thanks for the info, but why didn’t the frech Airforce attack the german advance? ZOAN (Zone Air Operations du Nord) had planty of obsolete morane-Saulnier fighters, which would have made admirable ground attach aircraft. Sooting up the german advance would have bought the frech a lot of time.

36

[QUOTE=ralph124c]
Thanks for the info, but why didn’t the frech Airforce attack the german advance? ZOAN (Zone Air Operations du Nord) had planty of obsolete morane-Saulnier fighters, which would have made admirable ground attach aircraft. Sooting up the german advance would have bought the frech a lot of time.
[/QUOTE]

This isn’t an area of history that I have studied much, but from what I understand, teh French Air Force did an admirable job fighting off the German advance, (I heard somewhere, making vague hand wavy gesture that they shot down several hundred German planes), but they lacked the needed ground support to hold their airfields, and air interdiction and air support weren’t the finely-tuned machines of massive destruction back that they are now.

37

[QUOTE=Lumpy]
I keep hearing this same story over and over in my readings of military history. Someone confidently proclaims a certain piece of terrain impassible, and that therefore they have no need to guard against the enemy army coming from that direction. Enemy army does so anyway. So why do commanders keep making this mistake throughout history?
[/QUOTE]

A general has finite resources. If they decide to guard against something that seems very unlikely, then they have less to guard against things that seems very likely. Every general must decide how to allocate their forces so as to be best prepared to meet any attack. It would be a foolish general who had all his men guarding forbidding mountain passes, possible underground tunnels, teleportation attacks, etc. and didn’t leave anything to defend against the obvious way in.

Just stands to reason. You play the odds as best you can. Sometimes you lose. As others have pointed out, most of the time you win.

38

[QUOTE=Raguleader]

Would the English Channel count as an insurpassable obstacle?

[/QUOTE]

Not for the Allies.

[QUOTE=Raguleader]

…though the Germans possibly could have won the Battle of Britain with paratroopers had they not given up the initiative to play politician all of a sudden.
[/QUOTE]

How would paratrooper have won the Battle of Britain? Ze Germans would need to first maintain air superiority over the Channel other wise the RAF would cut down any airborne or water borne assault. Any paratroopers that did get through, while a nuisance, would be cut off without resupply and eventually captured or destroyed.

39

[QUOTE=Aquila Be]

Another writer of history tales, Robin Neillands, has the allies taking 30,000 prisoners, 10,000 of them German. The Axis lost 320 tanks, 84 aircraft and 1000 artillery pieces. The remnant of the Axis force amounted to divisions reduced to less than brigade strength and only a few dozen tanks.

[/QUOTE]

That being exactly the point.. The Axis force the were so weakened that it would have been possible to finish the campaign then and there. They were allowed to retreat and hence the campaign continued (and El Alamein was NOT conclusive in that it was not the conclusion of the campaign, it was just a big victory for the allies).

Of course we can only say this with hindsight, my personal opinion has always been that you cannot fault Montgomery for not pushing harder. Especially as the history of the North African campaign was made up of one side pushing too hard, over extending themselves and getting beaten back.

The point I was making that those extra months (between El Alamein and the Rommel’s final defeat in Tunisia) were NOT a bad thing for the allies. Whatever extra losses we may have incurred we could handle, the losses the Axis forces incurred may have been critical given the finely balanced state of the war in the East at the time.

40

[QUOTE=muttrox]
A general has finite resources. If they decide to guard against something that seems very unlikely, then they have less to guard against things that seems very likely. Every general must decide how to allocate their forces so as to be best prepared to meet any attack. It would be a foolish general who had all his men guarding forbidding mountain passes, possible underground tunnels, teleportation attacks, etc. and didn’t leave anything to defend against the obvious way in.

Just stands to reason. You play the odds as best you can. Sometimes you lose. As others have pointed out, most of the time you win.
[/QUOTE]
Well obviously. The point of my OP was that either the defending general was overly confident/ hidebound, or else the attacking general was a logistics genius who rewrote the book. For an example of the latter, the Union army managed to march from Savannah to Charleston through some of the swampiest terrain any army has ever passed through. They did it army-ant style, by literally building their own roads and bridges as they went.