Was the Fall of France in 1940 inevitable?

[syncrolecyne]

I am neither a Francophile or a Francophobe. Over the years, when I have heard the issue of France in World War II come up - usually in the context of how they basically rolled over or behaved disgracefully in the face of the German attack, I feel the need to defend France, just to be a contrarian. I use this as evidence.

I think many people look at a map and see that France is larger than modern Germany in terms of area. So they think it should have been an even match. But the German Reich in 1940 had about 80 million people, with Austria and the Sudetenland. France had about 40 million. Plus, the Germans had a larger army and a much larger industrial capacity. The British In the end it took nearly four years for the combined armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth allies and colonies to break the Germans. The Soviet Union itself nearly collapsed in a few weeks. The Americans inital efforts in North Africa were often uneffective too. The French didn’t have an English Channel, an Atlantic Ocean, or vast expanses of often frozen territory to buffer their borders against the Germans. Aside from the Alps and Pyrenees, most of Northern, Central and Eastern France seems to be open territory that isn’t all that defendable…

Now what have I said that is inaccurate? Or just weak? I don’t want to be using false arguments.

I am not excusing the policies of the Vichy regime or saying that the French couldn’t have done more. I know their commanders did make terrible mistakes as well. But wasn’t Germany undefeatable, on the ground, in 1940? What do the French really have to be ashamed of? Could their army have held together enogh to provide a viable pocket of resistance.

And what role did the British play? i know they had to pull out from Dunkirk after being nearly cut off by a German advances. How did they fare in combat with the Germans at this stage?

[Marley23]

Plus, the Germans had a larger army and a much larger industrial capacity.

France also lost 1,500,000 soldiers in WWI, so they were in a weakened state when Nazi Germany invaded.

[Ephemera]

In addition to the ***massive ** * loss of life in World War I, they erroneously believed they were safe behind the Maginot Line and were taken by complete surprise at Germany’s invasion through the forests of Belgium, which they thought were impenetrable to modern war machines.

[Marley23]

The SD column about the Maginot Line, by John Corrado.

[Paul_in_Qatar]

Was defeat inevitable? Yes and no.

The French General Staff was completely prepared for the last war. Backward-looking, tribal and arrogant they failed to prepare for the German attack. In fact the best explanation is the the Generals wanted to loose to impose a right-wing government on France.

(This is not true at all, but it does fit the available facts.)

The French, given a true Joint Staff could have fought better. Maybe even well enough to hold off defeat. Certainly they could have withdrawn to the Empire (Community, whatever) to continue the fight at sea. Colonial formations plus the Fleet could have changed a lot in 40-42.

In addition, the French people had no will to defend themselves. The First World War had shattered their morale. The idea that the masses of the French people fought against the German occupation is a pure myth. Most people just tried to get along and use the occupation to settle political scores.

The French did cave in. had they fought well they would have at least been defeated honorably and perhaps even won.

[clairobscur]

@Paul in Saudi

Certainly they could have withdrawn to the Empire (Community, whatever) to continue the fight at sea. Colonial formations plus the Fleet could have changed a lot in 40-42.
.

This would have been a big bet on the will of the UK not to agree on peace terms with Germany (and there wasn’t any reason to assume they wouldn’t at these times) and to be able to conquer back France. Remember that the UK was alone against Germany, at this point. Nor the Soviet Union nor the USA had entered the picture.
As for the OP question, that is : “assuming that the french generals had not made enormous mistakes, could the allies have stopped to german offensive or not?” I really have no opinion.

[clairobscur]

@syncrolecyne

Could their army have held together enogh to provide a viable pocket of resistance.

Concerning this particular question, this has been actually envisionned. Said pocket would have been Britanny, in order to keep a foothold on the continent. but the new french commander in chief (called back from retirment) Weygand stated it was militarily unfeasable and untenable, and tried instead to organize a defense line along the Loire river, 100 kms south of Paris (but the germans had already crossed the Loire before it could be organized, at which point Weygand told the government to ask for an armistice).
So, apparently the options were :

-Managing to stop the german advance and to defend a significantly large part of the territory (your hypothetical)

-Organizing a government in exile and keeping the french colonies, possibly some of what was left of the airforce, and more importantly the navy, as mentionned by ** Paul in Saudi **. It would also have been very helpful for the north-africa campaign, too (assuming there would actually have been a german attempt to attack in north africa in such a situation.

-Surrendering
Keeping a pocket somewhere in mainland France didn’t seem to have been a realistic option. And though I know esssentially nothing about military issues, I just can’t imagine this pocket actually resisting until 1943.

[Alan_Owes_Bess]

By Marley23

France also lost 1,500,000 soldiers in WWI, so they were in a weakened state when Nazi Germany invaded.

Most of them would have been too old to be front line troopers anyway.

Reasons that involve who suffered the most in WWI are so irrelevant. All European countries directly involved in the conflict suffered greatly and this has only a limited amount of relevance on the performance of countries in WWII.

The French military system itself was deficient in flexibility and ability to respond to changing situations. So were the military organisations of most countries, although the German army had a small advantage there.

Communications between General Gamelin of France and General Gort, Commander of 9 British divisions (British Expeditionary Force – BEF) were also haphazard. Althogh the British Government had agreed to place General Gort under the command of the French C in C, Gen Gort had a fall back position that if he felt that an order from the French C in C would endanger the BEF he could appeal to his own government. Absence of orders from the French High command was interpreted by him to mean that he could do what he thought best.

In any event, after the French reverses following the German attack on 10 May 1940 and the replacement of Gamelin with General Weygand by the French Government on 19 May he spent two days taking a tour of a crumbling front before giving any useful orders, so Gort had a free hand there, as did the attacking force.

I have not even touched upon the folding up of Belgium. It is impossible to summarise the whole situation in a brief post. If you are interested there is ample material on the web covering all of these issues.

It is, IMHO, too glib and petty to attibute the failure of the French military in WWII to something loosely called the French “character”. However, to answer the OP and taking all of the deficiencies of the allies – organisationaland and logistical – it was probably inevitable.

Posted by Paul in Saudi

In addition, the French people had no will to defend themselves.

This “people’s will” business does not, nor has it ever had, any basis in reality. Nor IMHO has it had much direct bearing on political or military developments at any stage of human history in any context whatsoever IMHO (which is where an OP like this usually starts, ends up, or should end up - IMHO)

[Neurotik]

@Paul in Saudi

Was defeat inevitable? Yes and no.

Wrong.

The French General Staff was completely prepared for the last war. Backward-looking, tribal and arrogant they failed to prepare for the German attack. In fact the best explanation is the the Generals wanted to loose to impose a right-wing government on France.

(This is not true at all, but it does fit the available facts.)

WTF does this mean? It’s not true, but it does fit the available facts? It’s not true and it doesn’t fit the available facts. The French were done in by crappy bureaucracy and poor intelligence. If the war had been fought in the fall of 1939 as Hitler initially wanted (and was talked out of by his generals), France would have kicked the crap out of the Germans. It wouldn’t have even been close. That’s because the plan at that time was a modified Schliefen Plan. However, during the winter, the Germans continuously played war games trying to figure out the best way to take France. They constantly changed plans until deciding on the final one towards the beginning of spring.

During the winter, the Germans figured out that the French would be expecting another Schliefen plan. So they changed that route of attack into a feign and made the big push through the Ardennes. And it was a huge a gamble that paid off only because of some fortuitous luck dropping on the Germans. The reason the French didn’t expect the Ardennes push is because it’s extremely difficult to get motorized armor through there. And the roads are so narrow that if you could knock out the lead divisions, everything would be halted and it would be a gigantic turkey shoot leading to annihilation of the German forces.

The French, on the other hand, didn’t do that. They were certain they were correct, and it was only confirmed when they recovered German plans in January that basically said the Germans would be pulling another WWI plan of attack. So they massed their forces there.

Basically, the Germans had better intelligence on what the French were going to do than the French had on what the Germans were going to do.

In addition, the French people had no will to defend themselves. The First World War had shattered their morale.

This is just ignorant. The French were spoiling for a fight right before the invasion. There were huge public demonstrations by the French public calling for the French government to lead them into battle. Morale was ridiculously high.

Quite frankly, the only people who believed the Germans had a chance were Hitler and a few of his closest associates. To a man, the German military command believed that they were leading Germany into destruction and this desperation made them willing to gamble on risky plans since a conservative plan would get destroyed they had nothing to lose by gambling. Which is what they did.

The French government, the British government, and the military commands of both also believed that Germany had no chance.

Basically, it was desperation and luck that led to German victory and overconfidence that led to French defeat. Read Strange Victory by Ernest May.

In short, it wasn’t inevitable that France would be defeated. In fact, had the invasion been staged a several months earlier, a German defeat would have been inevitable in that initial invasion. Even when the invasion had begun, the odds were still against Germany. It wasn’t until they managed to push through the Ardennes and into French soil that it was inevitable France would fall.

[David_Simmons]

I don’t think this question is settled or ever will be settled. I’m quite sure that it came as a surprise to most military experts that the battle in France ended so quickly. I don’t think the loss British forces were all that significant a factor since their army was small as they hadn’t had time to mobilize a big one.

The French seemed baffled by the German use of armor, the mobility of their army which allowed rapid exploitation of tank breakthroughs and by the use of close air support in the form of dive bombers. By today’s standards German mobility wasn’t much but in 1940 is was significantly superior to that of either the British or French.

[Duke]

@Alan Owes Bess

By Marley23

France also lost 1,500,000 soldiers in WWI, so they were in a weakened state when Nazi Germany invaded.

Most of them would have been too old to be front line troopers anyway.

That’s not the whole issue, though. As Niall Ferguson mentioned some time back, the men France lost in WWI weren’t around to raise the WWII generation. True, Germany lost a lot of men, too, but their population was bigger, so they were able to take the losses better.

Now, nobody would pin the fall of France on affected demographics, but it was a factor. I think Neurotik’s got it right for the most part–overconfidence on the part of the French generals, specifically regarding the Maginot Line, and trying to fight WWII on WWI’s battle plans.

[Neurotik]

@David Simmons

The French seemed baffled by the German use of armor, the mobility of their army which allowed rapid exploitation of tank breakthroughs and by the use of close air support in the form of dive bombers. By today’s standards German mobility wasn’t much but in 1940 is was significantly superior to that of either the British or French.

Nonsense. The French knew exactly what the German tactics would be. They weren’t stupid, they paid attention to what went on in Poland. They just thought the point of breakthrough would be somewhere else so they massed their defenses there.

The French certainly were inferior in terms of mobility and communications, but even if they had been on the German level I doubt they could have done much since they didn’t realize that the main thrust was through the Ardennes until it had already broken through.

[Neurotik]

@Duke

Now, nobody would pin the fall of France on affected demographics, but it was a factor. I think Neurotik’s got it right for the most part–overconfidence on the part of the French generals, specifically regarding the Maginot Line, and trying to fight WWII on WWI’s battle plans.

Sort of, but not really. The French generals didn’t overestimate the effect of the Maginot Line. The Maginot Line worked perfectly and pretty much exactly as it was designed to. It was the Ardennes that the generals had overconfidence in.

The Line wasn’t supposed to be like the Great Wall of China. It was supposed to clog up the most easily invadeable portion of France and force a German invasion to be funneled up north through the Low Countries. Well, the Line almost did exactly that. It funneled the invasion north - but through the Ardennes which the French though impassable for motorized armor. So you had the bulk of the French forces sitting on the Belgian border fending off the German feign, while the main thrust went through the Ardennes - which was a huge gamble for the Germans.

In short, the French generals overestimated the defensive value of the Ardennes, not the Maginot Line.

[David_Simmons]

@Neurotik

They weren’t stupid, they paid attention to what went on in Poland. They just thought the point of breakthrough would be somewhere else so they massed their defenses there.

OK, where was this other place they massed their defenses? Most of the arguments I hear seem to be that the French relied on the Maginot Line, so they certainly shouldn’t have massed the greater part of their reserve and mobile forces there. So where were those forces if not up north where the Maginot Line was not?

Maybe your statement gives a clue. You say that “They just thought the point of breakthrough would be somewhere else.” This implies that you think the French expected a breakthough and were only prepared to defend against it. How come they weren’t working on a breakthrough of their own if their mobility and communications equalled those of their enemy?

[Duke]

@Neurotik

Sort of, but not really. The French generals didn’t overestimate the effect of the Maginot Line. The Maginot Line worked perfectly and pretty much exactly as it was designed to. It was the Ardennes that the generals had overconfidence in.

Oh, precisely–I should have been more clear on that. The generals’ confidence in the Maginot Line left them open for the attack through the Ardennes. As you say, they never really expected the Germans to go through there.

[Captain_Amazing]

@David Simmons

How come they weren’t working on a breakthrough of their own if their mobility and communications equalled those of their enemy?

The French plan was to funnel the Germans into a really narrow line, let them break through, fight them to a standstill, then, after the Germans were exhausted from attacking and most of their army was in the pocket, close the pocket, and capture or kill the German army.

The French had learned from WWI that it was impossible for an army to maintain an offensive.

[Neurotik]

@David Simmons

OK, where was this other place they massed their defenses? Most of the arguments I hear seem to be that the French relied on the Maginot Line, so they certainly shouldn’t have massed the greater part of their reserve and mobile forces there. So where were those forces if not up north where the Maginot Line was not?

Um, the French didn’t mass their forces on the Maginot Line. The Maginot Line was designed to maximize the effects of fewer troops and free up most of the military to defend against an invasion through the Low Countries. Which is where the bulk of the French forces were - north of the Ardennes on the Belgian border where they assumed the main German point of attack would be.

But that was only a German feign. The main point of attack was through the Ardennes, which the French left relatively lightly guarded because they thought it would be impassable for mechanized units. Basically, the Germans pushed through the chink in the French armor - between the Maginot Line and the main French force further north.

Maybe your statement gives a clue. You say that “They just thought the point of breakthrough would be somewhere else.” This implies that you think the French expected a breakthough and were only prepared to defend against it. How come they weren’t working on a breakthrough of their own if their mobility and communications equalled those of their enemy?

Maybe you should actually, y’know, read what people write.

Where did I say that the French mobility and communications equalled the Germans? In fact, I specifically said that the French were inferior in that regard, but I don’t think it would have made much of a difference since by the time the French realized what was going on they had been outflanked.

The French did not expect a breakthrough. That was what they were trying to avoid. They played a conservative defensive game that was supposed to halt the German advance before it was able to make it onto French soil.

And it would have worked if not for their overestimation of the Ardennes’ defensive value.

[Captain_Amazing]

@David Simmons

OK, where was this other place they massed their defenses?

They massed their army in Belgium. That’s where they figured the main German thrust was. Here’s a BBC interactive map of the campaign.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/launch_ani_fall_france_campaign.shtml

[David_Simmons]

@Captain Amazing

The French plan was to funnel the Germans into a really narrow line, let them break through, fight them to a standstill, then, after the Germans were exhausted from attacking and most of their army was in the pocket, close the pocket, and capture or kill the German army.

Such a scheme requires a defense in considerable depth and so in the area where the French expected the attack, north of southern Belgium, that should have been the case. The Germans came through the Ardennes, which it is true was unexpected, however they then turned north from Sedan to try to split the Fench and British armies apart and that should have taken them right into the main part of a French defense.

The French had learned from WWI that it was impossible for an army to maintain an offensive.

It seems to me that what you claim the French learned in WWI was wrong. Somehow the Germans managed to maintain their offensive for quite some time.

It is true that you cannot indefinitely maintain an offensvie. Sooner or later you have to stop and resupply, equip and get replacement troops. However, also by that time the enemy rear area has been so badly disrupted that his logistical problems are worse than yours. And his combat troops morale is shaken, at least, by your sucess. Or at least that’s the expectation.

[MMI]

Neurotik: IIRC one of the criticisms of the French deployment in 1939-40 was that the French deployed there armies as though the Maginot line weren’t there, or at least with far less concentration in the north as they should have in order to fight the battle on the Belgian plain.

Other problems faced by France:

The Netherlands and France’s strategic reserve: prior to May 1940 the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent) avoided making any joint plans with the Allies so as to avoid antagonizing Germany. They sat out WWI and they would sit out WWII if at all possible. Turns out Germany didn’t particularly care about neutrals and so invaded and pretty much overran the Netherlands. The allies , in order to shore up/relieve the Dutch sent a large chunk of front line forces in an offensive northward to help. This stretched the Allied lines and consumed the French reserves. When breakthroughs happened nothing could be done to plug the holes immediately or counterattack so lines just tended to collapse.

Poor deployment: The French understood correctly that a properly equipped if modest force could hold the Ardennes. However, when orders were sent to deploy various units the units sent to the Ardennes included cavalry units and fortress divisions (intended to man the Maginot and as a result having very few heavy weapons), neither of which were equipped to deal with an armored attack.

Tactical and doctrinal failures: The allies had more tanks and more heavily armed and armored tanks then the Germans did. The German tanks had radios (rather then the semafore flags used by the esposed commander of a French tank) and were used in larger numbers, trained in combined arms tactics, with armor, infantry and artillery all used in conjunction. The French tended to have poor cooperation between different arms and units.

Passivity: If France and England invade Germany while German forces are still in Poland it’s game over for Germany. They simply don’t have the forces on the west wall to stop the allies. All of their major assets are in the east. The French and English keep hoping that somehow a way can be found out that doesn’t involve a real war. As a result the Germans are able to overrun Norway and Denmark and refit and expand their military between the end of the attack on Poland and the beginning of the attack in the west.