After years of bashing the French for sport, I figure it’s time to settle down and look at the facts regarding their surrender.
Big of me, I know. What are the facts regarding the size/strength of the forces that were being deployed to defend France vs. the German forces? Did France make an necessary, if unpleasant, decision? Why, when so many other countries were overrun within days, did France get such a bad rap?
Until the real experts get here this is my take on it.
The french got a bad rap because, well, they deserved it. They fell victim to the same plan the germans had used in WW1 (not exactly the same but similar), a right hook trhough belgium. It very nearly worked in WW1, the french and british just managing to stop them in time. Allied to the greater mobility available to the Germans in WW2 I could never understand how the french ignored the possibility that the Germans might try it again.
The french also had more, and better tanks than the Germans had, they just failed to utilise them properly. They deployed their tanks in 1’s and 2’s letting the germans obtain local superiority.
Last, but by no means least, they gave up. Fighting to the last man just wasnt their style. The Old Guard must have been rolling in their graves.
Someone can correct me if I am wrong, but I don’t think that is quite true. In WWI, the German’s did what you say, a swinging advance through the low countries. In WWII, I believe they feinted that way, but sent their main force further south, through the Argonne Forest, which France thought could not be gotten through by a large army with tanks and support vehicles. The French (and British) had sent much of their armies north to stop the supposed invasion through Belgium. When the German’s main force got through, they had split the armies from the rest of the country, and had a pretty clear road to Paris.
It can certainly be debated that the spirit of defeatism at the time caused the French to be unprepared and surrender way too early, and other such arguments, but I think it is unfair to say they were fooled by the same trick as in WWI.
Brad
Gotta love the Onions’ take on it:
Here’s my admittedly non-expert take on this. Beware that a little knowledge is sometimes worse than none at all.
The French didn’t extend the Maginot Line along the frontier with Belgium for several reasons. First, politically it was difficult to be in a position where they essentially would be telling the world that they expected the Germans to overwhelm Belgium and that they, the French, were not going to do squat to help them. Second, the military strategists of the day simply didn’t expect that the Germans could overwhelm Belgium and flank the French line so quickly that the French troops couldn’t adjust. This is the common military problem of fighting the LAST war. Extending the Maginot Line that far would have been expensive, and considering the political and military situation it just didn’t seem worth it. In retrospect this was wrong, but it’s easy to say that now.
None of this has anything to do with the valor or lack thereof of the common French soldier. Basically the French were out-generaled, with the French (and, it must be said, everybody else) simply failing to understand Blitzkrieg until it was too late. Whether the French would have accomplished anything by “fighting to the last man,” I don’t know, but keep in mind that when the fortunes of war eventually turned, the Germans and Japanese didn’t either, even though they did put up considerably more resistance.
YOu could be right Brad. I always they that feinted to the center and outflanked them on the right through Belgium.
The History Channel “Modern Marvels” segment on Panzers from sometime within the last week said that even though the French had more and better tanks than the Germans at the start of the war, they were scattered all throughout the country. The Germans, on the other hand, gathered a huge amount of armor into a very tightly concentrated area, a new tactic at that time, and by virtue of this focus swept away all opposition.
It should also be mentioned that the French went into WWII with a spirit of defeatism…the French Communist Party worked feverishly to destroy French morale. In fact, they (the Communists) were actively telling the soldiers NOT TO FIGHT!
Second, the French military leadership was superannuated-the C-in-C (General Gamelin) was 75 years old! I cannot believe that the French couldnot have had a younger general-Gamelin might have been OK in 1918, but in 1940 he was outclassed.
Finally, the point about French armor is correct-the French tanks were actually technically better than the German, but they were not employed properly.
It all added up to a massive French defeat.
See if your library has the 196X BBC series The World at War. I found it to be pretty darn enlightening.
What has been told about tanks is accurate. More generally, the french commanders expected a position war, not a ovement war. It’s obvious in the case of tanks, which were scaterred and considered as infantery support weapons. There was extremely few (perhaps only a couple) armored regiments. And even them were more of an experiment and weren’t really prepared to operate in large armored units.
Another less well known example of France not being prepared to fight a movement war is that the french army didn’t use radios for communications (because these communications could have been intercepted) but instead relied on phone lines, which were considered safer. The result, of course, being that as soon as the germans had bypassed the french lines (and cut the phone lines), or even as soon as a french unit had moved, there weren’t any communication with the headquarters, and the officers in command had no clue about what was actually happening on the front line, and were unable to issue orders.
When France surrendered, most of the country was already occupied, and the panzers regiments were running unopposed towards what was still under french control. It was a matter of days before the whole country would be under german control, except for a couple pockets (Britanny and north-eastern france).
So the choice wasn’t about going on fighting in France, but between :
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Asking for an armistice or peace conditions
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Not doing so and forming a government in exile in the french colonies or in the UK (Churchill even proposed a common franco-british government). In the latter case, the french colonies and more importantly the french fleet (and whatever was left of the french airforce) could have been useful to fight the war against Germany.
I would note that making this latter choice (which was supported by De Gaulle, but apparently also by the french prime minister, but he resigned on the same day) was a bet on the UK not asking for/ not accepting peace terms following the collapse of France (which wasn’t obvious) and being able to eventually win the war against Germany essentially single-handely (which was even more doubtful).
There was some definite incompetence on the part of the French in 1940. For example, the French air force was woefully ill-equipped for contemporary combat, lacking a decent communications system and efficient delivery of spare parts.
However, the French didn’t give up easily, even though they collapsed quickly. I read somewhere that the Wehrmacht suffered more casualties after the fall of Dunkirk–about the halfway point of the campaign–than it did up to that point. The Luftwaffe took losses more serious than that of the RAF, which helped them to survive the Battle of Britain. And, if one can find a touch of humor in the tragedy that was the expansion of fascism, the French utterly humiliated the Italians before finally conceding defeat.
One way to look at it is to compare France to any other force which faced the Germans in 1939-41. Geographically speaking, France held out about as long or longer than the similarly-sized Poland or Yugoslavia/Greece, and the Soviet Union conceded an enormous chunk of its European territory and troops by the seven-week mark of Operation Barbarossa (but they, unlike France, had lots of both to spare). Nobody got close to defeating the Germans, although the Soviets did eventually manage to stop them.
The German armed forces of that period simply had better communications, better tactics, more experience, and possibly better leadership than any force which had to oppose them on the ground. And just as had happened in the Great War, the Germans largely maintained that edge until they were logistically overwhelmed.
Oh, and one last note: the original German plan for France and the Low Countries was a modification of the Schleiffen Plan of WWI. However, those plans were lost behind enemy lines (intentionally or, as Guderian maintained, otherwise) and the only other detailed plan the Germans had was that conceived by General Manstein. It looks similar to the Schleiffen Plan on paper but which in fact placed the main line of attack (the schwerpunkt) through the Ardennes forest, rather than Belgium.
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Ok, this is more to the point I think. Regardless of how poorly they managed/prepared for the war it was the choice for option 1 over 2 that gave them the coward rap, correct? What would have been the downside to option 2, the destruction of Paris?
Nope. At this point, Paris was already occupied and intact (It had been declared an “open city”) and the germans were way south of it. The french government had fled to the south-western port of Bordeaux which was some days away from the german advance (after a failed last attempt to organize a defensive line along the Loire river).
The downsides would have been :
1)France would have been a fully occupied country rather than retaining some sovereignty as long as the war lasted
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The peace conditions could have been harsher for France once the UK would have made peace with Germany (and France left alone with nothing else beside its african colonies).
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Less important at first glance but significant for some decision-makers (in particular the new commander-in-chief Weygand), the french prisonners would have been held in captivity, along with the soldiers belonging to armies which were surrounded and doomed (in north-eastern France in particular). Weygand was opposed to a military capitulation, mainly for this reason (even more prisonners) and wanted the politics to ask for an armistice.
More generally, France would have had essentially no say in the outcome, and had to rely on the UK being willing (or not) to pursue the war and Germany being willing (or not) to grant bearable peace terms.
By the way, some politicians, in particular the minister Mandel (to whom Churchil had proposed to be the head of a french government in exile. It’s quite well-known he wasn’t exactly happy with De Gaulle, who anyway was a very minor figure), refused, out of principle, to leave France while it was occupied, considering it was a shameful and coward action (he would be executed latter in the war by the Vichy para-military militia). For similar reasons, a delegation of members of the parliament convinced the french president Lebrun (who anyway had zero actual power and was only a symbolical figure) not to leave France to North-Africa as he intended to do.
Finally, though this is essentially a technical point, France and the UK had signed a treaty earlier in the war by which they agreed not to unilaterally ask for peace. Hence, france asking for surender terms was in direct breach of this treaty.
I watched a special on the History Channel about the France’s surrender, and it pretty much focused on the Marginot line. The original part of the line was built during economic prosperity, and enough funds could be put towards building a strongly reinforced wall. The problem was, the economy took a downturn and money to build extensions of the line became slim. Unemployment became a large problem, and citizens were sent to the southern extension of the wall, which was being built. These southerly sections only covered the likely entry points that invading Germans might take, but were not as well reinforced as the northerly part of the line. France also counted on Belguim to not allow German troops through their land, but when they decided upon neutrality and allowed German troops to mobilize inside their border, the French were left with a wholly unprotected border. The Germans easily circumvented the wall and attacked it from the rear–where it was very weakly reinforced. The French, facing immense casualties and likely defeat surrendered to the invading German forces. This is all off the top of my head, so anyone more knowledgeable can feel free to correct any errors in my statement.
Some of the WWII French-bashing has nothing to do with their surrender, but actions of some French people thereafter, who welcomed the Germans with open arms and handed over their Jews.
I must add that yes, there was the French Resistance as well, of course. But the Vichy government and many, many collaborators gave the French a bad name for awhile.
Beside the cost, the extension of the line along the Belgian border was a diplomatic no-no, as already mentionned in this thread, since it would have meant that the french could have chosen to stay behind the fortified line rather than actually fight in Belgium if this country was invaded by Germany.
More likely, you’re refering to the western extension, rather than southern. Indeed, defensive strongpoints had been build beside the Maginot line, but they weren’t at all in the same league. mostly plain bunkers built, as you stated in likely entry points.
Belgium was already a neutral country before the war, AFAIK. Anyway, the Maginot line goal was essentially reached, even without extending it along the Belgian border, since it made necessary for the German to attack through Belgium, hence allowing France and the UK to mass their troops there rather than spreading there along the boundary from Switzerland to the Channel
Not really. The germans turned westward and encircled the french army and the BEF which had rushed into Belgium and displayed a total unability to retreat from there in time. There has been very few attacks against the Maginot line, be it from the front or from the rear, and not very successful anyway. The maginot line was essentially untouched when france surrendered. Roughly, the Germans just ignored it.
By the way, the Maginot line wasn’t a wall, but an extensive network of very modern (for this time) and large strongpoints. Think bunkers connected by galleries, equipped with the best artillery available, with deeply buried reserves, ammunitions stockpiles, etc… intended to be able to sustain massive attacks for a long time.
You can see many pictures and some explanations in english about one of this strongpoint in this page. Installations in the inside in particular I find pretty impressive and modern-looking for this time and era.
It seems I can’t post a direct link to the exact page I was refering to on this site. You must click on “- The fortress Schoenenbourg” part. Though the rest is probably interesting too.
Because I have an unreasoning prejudice against getting historical analysis from web sites and television programs (in the same way I don’t like to get my daily news from USA Today) let me refer you to an honest to goodness book. Try Alistair Horne’s To Lose a Battle, Penguin Paperback, and John Keegan’s History of the Second World War. Both should be readily available at any good library or any chain bookstore ,*e.g.*Barnes and Noble or Borderers. Both are very readable although Keegan’s love affair with the subordinate clause means that you occasionally have to diagram a sentence to make sense of it.
A crude summary is that France had any number of problems including a lack of political unity, a misplaced reliance on fortresses and strong points, a complete failure to understand the potential of armored vehicles, and a reliance on a continuous front. In other words, France had not recovered from the first war and was prepared to fight the first war all over again. The political disorder had a lot to do with the conservative ascendency during and after WWI and a political system rigged to keep it that way. The general feeling that it is a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight was very strong in France, not without reason.