The purpose of imposing a statute of limitations on prosecution is, as correctly noted above, to provide repose and to prevent an accused from being forced to answer stale charges so outdated they presumptively impede his ability to gather and present potentially exculpatory evidence.
When a prosecutor is permitted to indict a DNA profile, that goal is frustrated.
There can be no serious debate on that issue. When “John Q. Smith, of Villa Park, Illinois,” is indicted, he is on notice that he is accused. Indeed, an innocent man named has a great motive to step forward, if not in custody, and clear his name. The indictment NOTIFIES THE ACCUSED that he is charged with committing a crime.
When a DNA profile is indicted, no such notification occurs. The person - or persons - that match that DNA profile have no way of knowing they have been named.
Indicting DNA profiles eviscerates the legislative goals that led to the creation of limiting actions in the first place.
Now, the reason opinions are so mixed about this practice, notwithstanding the above, is that the assumption is that the accuracy of DNA profiling outweighs any potentially exculpatory evidence the accused might otherwise procure for his defense. In other words, we don’t mind this injustice, because we’re so sure we’ve got the right guy that it doesn’t matter when we try him - the evidence will convict him.
But that’s not true.
Without corroboration, DNA evidence merely proves that a particular person was in a particular place at some point before the sample was taken. The capacity of the accused to offer an innocent explanation for his presence his highly relevant, and highly evanescent. Even the smoking gun of DNA - semen collected as part of a rape kit - is not necessarily dispositive as to guilt. If the accused claims consent, the evidentiary value of the DNA is slight. But what would a tolling of fifteen or twenty years do to an accused’s ability to corroborate a legitimate consent defense with witnesses and other evidence?
The presence of a person’s fingerprint at a crime scene does not
compel the conclusion that the person in all reasonable likelihood
committed the crime. Still, courts have found that fingerprints alone are sufficient to establish probable cause and, in some cases, even proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a suspect’s guilt. Fingerprints are arguably a superior identification technique to DNA. Why have we never permitted fingerprint indictment?
Finally, there is the issue of speedy trial requirements to consider.
The general proposition is that the right to a speedy trial attaches at either the arrest or the filing of an indictment or information against the accused. The reason for this is that an arrest or indictment is a public act that subjects the accused to restrictions on his liberty and public shame and ridicule; it’s incumbent upon the government not to let that state of affairs languish.
Of course, as I said above, the DNA indictment does not suffer those ills. But if a DNA indictment does, in fact, describe a person, then it seems to me that technically, the speedy trial clock begins ticking.
In the Supreme Court case Doggett v. U.S., a man was indicted by a federal grand jury in 1980. Not knowing of his indictment, he moved from the US to Colombia. In 1981, he was arrested in Panama, but the US took no steps to extradite him, and he returned to Colombia. In 1982, he returned to the US, passed through immigration and customs with no problem, and lived a law-abiding life until 1988, when a routine credit check caused police to notice him and serve the arrest warrant.
In vacating Doggett’s conviction, the Supremes commented both on the fact that the government had taken no active steps to locate Doggett, and said:
Just my thoughts…
- Rick
