Into the Valley of Death rode the six hundred...

“Half a league, half a league
Half a league onwards,
All in the Valley of Death
Rode the 600.
“Forward the Light Brigade”
“Charge for the guns!” he said
Into the Valley of Death
Rode the 600.”

     *The charge of the Light Brigade, by Alfred Lord Tennyson*

My question : Did the English C.O. at the battle of Balaclava really say “Charge for the guns!”? If he did - what was the matter with him? I can’t believe that any normal CO would believe that 630-odd cavaliers with swords would stand any kind of chance against 3 batteries of cannon. I am aware that contrary to popular opinion,the three batteries were not able to fire simultaneously upon “the 600”, but even so…WTF ?

IIRC 234 of the 630-odd died or were injured - IANA strategist, but I’m fairly sure that 1-in-3 is not the kind of ratio you want to see on the casualty list.

Can someone please explain why it all went so horribly wrong.

I think you really need to read about the Crimean War, to get a full understanding. I doubt very much whether it was Lord Cardigan or Lord Nolan who made the command- they would not have got that close to the front line.

There is a book which deals with this scenario quite succinctly- it’s called The Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman Dixon.

Grab a copy if you can.

:rolleyes:

Thanks for the reply (not sure why you rolled your eyes though). Since I’m in work and can’t grab a copy just now, do you know if it was a misinterpreted command or a genuine mis-reading of the situation?

Thanks

It’s been a few years since I have read it, but I don’t think it is either. (from memory).

The reason I was rolling eyes was not at your post, but at the mentality of the commanders of the English Army which was laying siege. The commanders were remote to the troops who lay dying due to extremely poor conditions and the absolute incompetence of the commanders to provide them with such basics as firewood and decent food. The English had sufficient ships to provide these but by sheer incompetence did not.

Anyway, to get back to your question, I recall that there was friction in the command chain in the English Army. The persons who were closest to the action stated that a charge of the Light Brigade was suicide (there was a heavy brigade as well): the order was reinforced by some nobleman wth limited experience in military tactics.

After that it became a matter of pride- sort of like stiff upper lip. There can be no doubting the courage of the men. Hey doesn’t this all sound reminiscent of The Great War- it was only 60 years later, and with far greater slaughter.

Sorry this is so long winded. And it was a few years ago that I read this so my memory could be playing tricks, but I think it is fairly accurate.

Yeah. The whole “do and die” thing sounds pretty shit. There is no denying the blind courage and nobility of the poor suckers in “the brigade” - riding to what (I assume) they knew was a bastard of a battle, with horrendous odds.

However, as an Irishman, I have always had a rather dim view of the English Army and the supercilious attitude of the commanders therein - witness the way the Irish were treated in 1916 and Gandhi and his followers in India, as well as many other occasions where the English came accross as more than a little ego-centric and nationalist. That notwithstanding, I always assumed that since at this time the English Army was still one of the great armies of the world, that the chain of command would have been a bit better regulated. I cannot fathom the reasoning behind sending (what seems like) a decorative brigade of lightly armed cavalry into battle against heavy artillary.

Even with the moustache from his Stiff Upper Lip blocking his view, surely the C.O. or whoever was there at the time would have valued his mens lives more highly than this ?

What I am trying to ask is: Did they actually consider entire situation, and then conclude that “the Charge” would manage to defeat the cannon batteries, or was it just stubborn refusal to look facts in the face ?

The Charge of The Light Brigade

Thanks for the link - it looks a bit big, so I’ll have to read it when I go home.

Thanks again.

Strangely the most notable conflict was between Lords Lucan and Cardigan who were brothers in law. Lucan ordered the charge and Cardigan led it but it was all based on a misunderstanding. The British had conducted two successful sorties against the Russians that day including the Charge of the Heavy Brigade and the famous “Thin Red Line” where troops resisted a Russian charge although unable to form their usual 3 deep formation.

Some useful sites explaining the nature of the misuderstanding are: Wikipedia, the Public Records Office and the XIIIth Hussars site.

There has been a recent TV documentary that I saw in the last few months that covered it very thoroughly.

Thanks for the further links. As for the documentary - I too saw one on BBC about 2 months ago, but it was a Friday evening and I was drunk. As a result I do not remember too much of what they were saying…

Thanks though

The 1 in 3 casualties suffered during the charge at Balaclava pale into insignificance when one looks at the casualties of Britain, France and Germany during WW1.

As a percentage of their entire populations they suffered 8%, 11% and 9% respectively!

cite

I am being lazy with the cites but the circumstances are pretty well understood now:

The C-in-C was on much higher ground with a panoramic view of the whole battlefield. Some British guns had been captured in some redoubts on one of the hills. The order was intended to get the Light Brigade to stop the Russian removing the guns as they were shaping up to do.

The written order however was a mess only referring to “the guns” and also being vague about other aspects of the geography of the battlefield. Basically no thought was given to the fact that those receiving the order would not be able to see what the C-in-C could see and so could easily misinterpret the order.

The Brigade Commander was confused, “Which guns?”, and sought clarification from the dispatch rider. But instead of clarification all he got was the reaction of an outflung arm in the general direction of the enemy and something along the lines of the phrase “There, sire, are your enemy. There are your guns!”

Unfortunately the direction of the outflung arm, whilst towards the hills on which the Russians were preparing to remove the captured guns could also be interpreted as being down the valley lined with Russian guns and with guns and cavalry at the far end.

The order required immediate execution and the Brigade Commander, having sought and failed to get clarification, obeyed. I cannot see what else he could have done in the circumstances - for all he knew some awful situation may require what seemed to him to involve the sacrifice of his Brigade.

As a postscript, the dispatch rider Nolan, who was part of the Brigade and stayed for the charge rode, early on charged ahead of the Commander leading out the charge, which was still at a trot, shouting and waving his arms but was immediately killed by a Russian cannonball or possibly shell. He was dismissed as a hothead. Some now think he had finally realised that the Brigadier has misunderstood him, and his orders, and was leading the Brigade not to prevent the removal of the British guns but into the “Valley of Death”. The rest as they say is history.

Actually 1/3 losses were pretty light for what they actually achieved. They did reach the Russian guns at the head of the valley and killed the gunners thus disabling them, but then were cut to pieces by Russian counter-charging cavalry. Their “light” losses were partly due to the Heavy Brigade taking action to cover their retreat but also as the Russian flanking guns did not engage them on the return trip. Whether that was due to pity or another military cock-up is open to debate.

What the British (and many other) armies lacked at that time was not so much good generals but proper military staff to organise things (medical, shelter, rations etc) properly, including the transmittal of orders. Historically that had happened under good commanders (e.g. Wellington) who took pains with everything but not under most others. A proper Staff would of course that the element of chance away to some degree.

Ah, now found the text of the written order;

“Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front and to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Horse Artillery may accompany. French
cavalry is on your left. Immediate.”

Pretty ambiguious in the circumstances I would say.

I was mistaken, it was the French cavalry that protected the retreat not the Heavy Brigade.

In case anyone is interested, the BBC has a wonderful audio recording made by Thomas Edison of Lord Tennyson reading his poem, “The Charge of the Light Brigade.”

It can be found here. It is a real joy!

notquitekarpov - Thanks for both your posts ! They answer my questions perfectly.

What a horrible mistake.

Calvin to Hobbes: “Live and don’t learn - that’s us.”

I know this is getting off topic, but it can be misleading to compare statistics of casualties amongst the population. For instance, how could anyone possibly know how many Russinas were casulaties?

Also, the casulaties of the ‘British Empire’ are normally recorded. However, if you delve deeper, you will find the casualty rates of the former empires were often higher- and here I talk specifically of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and RSA. Athought the English were pretty good at slaughtering thier own soldiers (63,000 casualties on the first day of the Somme) they weren’t above throwing the colonial soldiers into front on charges in the closing stages of the war rather than lose more English troops.

I despise Haig and his ilk.

I don’t know if that’s true. It might be true as a % of total population, but it doesn’t seem to have been true as a % of total mobilised forces.

Australia 64%
Canada 39%
Great Britain 44%
New Zealand 66%
South Africa 13%

French Empire 75%
Germany 54%
Russia 55%
USA 8%

Cite

Of course, different places give different figures. Still that seems to be the right sort of percentage casualties. The Aus & NZ ones are so high, I would guess, not because we spent them more freely but because they were involved at Gallipoli. I doubt anyone thought that that would be an easy duty, but I don’t think that they thought it would be any worse than the Western Front.

One thing that came out of this that I’d not seen before. Certain people tend to go on about the cowardly French. It might be fair to say that they were poorly led, but a 75% casulaty rate does not imply that they were hiding in the rear. I’ll have to remember that factoid :slight_smile: .

In actual fact the Charge of Light Brigade was seen as somewhat of a success.

At the time of the Crimean War cavalry was the unstoppable force of warefare while cannon was the immovable object. For cavalry to charge at guns was often theorised but never put into practice. It was kinda like the scenario of Soviet bombers against American carriers during the cold war, often studied but no-one dared do it.

However the actual commanders of the Light Brigade itself wanted to test the theory out themselves. Whether the order to charge was confused or not the officers of the light brigade took the opurtunity to try and show the superiority of British cavalry. Hence the charge.

It was a high risk tactic and pitted the most lethal attacking force on the battlefield against the most lethal defensive force. So the view was immediatley after the battle that 1 in 3 losses was actually fairly acceptable.

In fact if the heavy brigade had been sent to reinforce the postions taking by the light brigade then losses would have been lower and the whole attack would have seemed pretty successful.

Hope that helps sorry about the spelling. Comes from being an engineer!

I generally hate people that cry “cite!” but from where exactly do you get this theory? It goes against so much of what I know about the Crimean War, and against about 19th century grand tactics generally, that I am pretty suprised by your post and would be interested in any supportive evidence.

The theory and practise of cavalry tactics, at least up until the end of the period of smooth bore smallarms and muzzle-loading artillery, were pretty pretty well done and dusted as far as I am aware. Whilst certainly the Light Brigade were keen as mustard, as frustrated at their non-usage versus the scouting and exploiting roles they were intended for, I have read nothing to suggest they were keen to test out charging supported guns!! In fact exactly the opposite. Also I understood that Cardigan queried the orders on the day of the charge, as they appeared as suicidal to him as they proved to be. Yes, there was contributory factors like the bad feeling between him and his brother and stiff necked refusal to look beyond the mantra that “orders are orders” but no big issues of dispute over battlefield tactics. Cardigans behavoir afterwards, whilst callous, was more about following orders and nothing to do with covering up a failed theory of the possibilities of light cavalry versus artillery.

IIRC the main dispute on the battlefield up to then was the refusal of the C-in-C of the Cavalry Division to allow the Light Brigage to exploit the earlier success of the Heavies, and pursue the broken Russian cavalry. That would have been exactly the role light cavalry was intended for, and at the opposite end of the spectrum to wishing to charge an unbroken and supported gun line.

OK my knowledge is largely based on an old book “The Reason Why” http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0140012788/104-3452682-2532737?v=glance but unless you can support your theories I remain highly, highly sceptical.

I have no problem with the analysis above but perhaps more of an observation…

One should not conclude from the above that say 66% of New Zealanders involved were casualties - there is going to be a lot of soldiers who appear more than once in the wounded column having returned to service after each wound. Then if they are killed after that the same man will appear again. I couldn’t google up any stats to establish the percentage of mobilised individual soldiers who sufferred one or more wounds and/or death. I am assuming too that the killed in action stats are that and not killed from all causes (which would include battlefield accidents which were usually a significant percentage in most mechanised/industrialised wars).

But perhaps everybody here already appreciated the above - I only thought about it as the numbers seemed excessive to me.

For a real nightmare low survival rate look to the German submarine service in WW2 - some 75% of those served were KIA. But can I even find a reliable cite for that number? CIF… :rolleyes:

A couple of minor points:

there’s no such thing as the English Army, then or now; the British Army fought in the Crimea.

And interestingly enough, about a quarter of that army was Irish, according to many sources:

(from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/lj/warslj/soldier_02.shtml)

The following page has a quoted table which tracks the percent over time:

http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/harlandj/ireland/ireland_fa02/29outline11_1.html

(note the even higher percentages for the Indian Army).