We interrupt your regularly scheduled gun debate to bring you this:
At first blush, this seemed irredeemably stupid and unfair, especially given the facts of this particular case (the woman worked for the dentist for 10 years and only became “too hot to employ” when his wife found out about non-sexual text messages between them), but it doesn’t seem to contradict any established principle of law in a right-to-work state.
Thoughts?
Not seeing where this ties into “right to work”. If she wasn’t in a union, and didn’t have some other sort of employment contract, I don’t see why the employer can’t fire an employee at will. Not a nice thing to do, but the constitution doesn’t mandate niceness.
It’s not supposed to be a right-to-work thread. I’m just pointing out that if it wasn’t a right-to-work state, firing on the basis “irresistible attraction” would not be termination for cause, but it’s not, so it doesn’t have to be.
Allowing bosses to be as stupid and unfair as they please while ensuring employees can’t fight back is the whole point of “right-to-work”, so it seems perfectly consistent to me. He’s the lord, she’s the serf, so he can do as he likes and she just has to take it.
Maybe I just don’t understand “right to work”, but how would it be different if this were not a right to work state?
I don’t get this, surely the term “right to work” implies increased legal protection for employees, not the ability to sack them for no good reason?
And surely The Patriot Act simply encourages patriotism, right?
ETA: These are marketing terms, not scientific terms.
Thoughts:
Are they naming things with names that actually mean the opposite of what they do? Like the Ministry of Peace?
Two points: does “hotness” represent the kind of discrete and insular minority likely to be subjected to invidious discrimination such that we should alter the default rule of employment at will, which permits private employers to terminate the employment relationship for good cause or no (or bad or dumb) cause?
Second, is the question “This employee was terminated because he/she is too attractive” one that courts could meaningfully answer? Suppose a plaintiff argues, “I was fired because I’m so good-looking.” Defendant answers, “Cha! That fugly bitch/bastard? Not hardly!” What does the court do now? Rate plaintiff’s looks on a ten-point scale?
Sex discrimination is how this should be analyzed. If the defendant passes from discriminating against hot chicks to women generally, that should be unlawful. It is curious that the plaintiff didn’t take this tack, as it seems like there could be a better-established (factually and legally) sex discrimination claim.
I don’t know, but you can’t infer the details of a piece of legislation from its name. Is that really surprising?
I think you should be able to infer the main thrust of a piece of legislation from its name, e.g. the Local Government (Scotland) Act, does exactly what it says. An act that calls itself something like “right to work” that actually makes it easier to fire employees does exactly the opposite.
I think the OP may have confused *right to work *(union membership can’t be required as a condition of employment) with *at will employment *(an employee can be fired for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all). I live in an at will state, and yes, you can be fired for any reason except those specifically excluded (race, gender, etc.). There are only 7 U.S. states which are not at will, and since Iowa is not one of them, the decision seems correct, while not necessarily fair, to me.
Lauren-C - *right to work *means the right to work without being forced to join a union.
It’s nice that you think that, but it simply isn’t so.
“Right to work” laws don’t make it easier to fire someone, btw.
So it’s an attack on the unions then?
Yes.
In the same way that that the first amendment is an attack on religion, because it doesn’t allow the state to force you to worship in any one way. Right to work laws can have the net effect of reducing union membership, but I don’t see anything inaccurate about the name itself.
Just to reiterate, the case described in the OP has nothing to do with right to work. The fired employee was not a union member, and as far as I can tell, the office was not unionized.
We are trusting the phrasing “even if the employees have not engaged in flirtatious behavior or otherwise done anything wrong” from the AP.
Is it clear in the actual ruling? Or has anyone seen better evidence that’s the case?
The justices did address that - he wasn’t discriminating against a gender, just this one particular woman and their relationship.
I want to see a sexual harassment argument - but I can’t find one. If he would have sexually harassed her, but fired her so he wouldn’t, that would seem (to me) to be very measurable damage from sexual harassment. But the flirting seemed to be mutual.
This is a tangent, of course, but right to work is a misnomer in that, in non-right to work environments, you certainly can work. You just can’t get the benefits of union advocacy (higher wages and benefits) without paying the equivalent of union dues.
Right to work would better be called, “Right to Freeload Off Union Advocacy.”