Reading between the lines apparently there were some text messages involved which would certainly suggest that it wasn’t so much her looks as her behavior that caused him to fire her after she’d worked for him for ten years.
Here is theJudgement in question. They do consider Federal Law and conclude it does not apply. They also cite several US Court of Appeals cases which state that personal jealously which leads to dismissal does not constitute discrimination.
From the article in the Times, she particularly did not claim sexual harassment because she did not at any time did not feel uncomfortable due to his actions.
I can see a rape trial or seven in these idiots’ future.
What do we expect? We let the bosses gut unions, we elect Republicans and conservatives to office, they appoint conservative judges, who treat workers like dirt in their decisions, which is to say, they approve letting bosses treat workers like dirt. Gotta fight back if you want justice, you won’t get it by asking pretty please. Nowadays, not even by asking Democrats, our government is THAT much a bought entity.
After reading the decision, I stand down from my implied accusation that the assistant was complicit in inappropriate behavior. I also think that under the circumstances, a one month severance was woefully inadequate. This was obviously a one sided problem with the dentist being the responsible party.
I still agree with the decision of the court, in that it is not legally advisable to mandate continued employment under these circumstances. I think the same protection should be afforded to an employer not directly involved in the disruptive relationship in their workplace.
If two employees have a relationship that is causing one or both of them and/or other employees to suffer in the workplace, I think the employer has the right to remove one of those employees from the environment. In the absence of a legal violation by either party, I think the employer has the right to choose which employee is more valuable to the company and dismiss the other. They should also have the right to dismiss both.
I made some incorrect conclusions based on speculation and I retract my statement that the suit was frivolous, but I still think the court made the right decision here.
Weren’t at least 4 of these judges the same people who upheld gay marriage in Iowa? Are the judges appointed or are they elected since some of them lost retention elections after their vote in 2009?
I really do not think a political bias is present here; it’s just application of the law.
I might relocate there. The story’s the exact opposite of what I often see: older, experienced workers getting laid off and replaced by young hotties. Granted, a younger, less experienced pair of hands can do the same job for less pay (with good looks seen as a plus,) there’s a reason why companies keep their experienced and reliable employees.
That’s absurd.
In any case, what you are missing, is that unions have already impacted non-union wages in the company before they became right to work.
If a state becomes right to work, at Acme Widget Company the union wages are X and the non union wages are also X. Your idea that they will just bargain for union workers only, makes no sense (aside from the fact that the can’t legally do it and stay certified), because as the state becomes right to work, both the wages are the same. So the downward spiral is immediate, and any disparity between union and non-union wages can’t exist yet.
Right to work is utterly misnamed.
The law is what we make it, and until the middle class start voting in leaders who have their interests at heart, the law is gonna stick it to workers every time.
Not harassment, sex discrimination. There is a difference. If I as a gay man refuse to hire women because I believe they are prone to gossiping and hysterics, I have committed sex discrimination even without engaging in sexual harassment. Similarly, if I have hiring policies that are unrelated to the applicant’s ability to perform the job and which disadvantage women applicants, then I have committed sex discrimination (but not harassment) by disparate impact.
I’m really confused about the right to work stuff coming up in this thread. Can someone error check my understanding here:
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Right to work legislation. The default under the Taft-Hartley act is traditional “closed shops” are illegal. However, “union shops” are legal. A union shop is one in which anyone may be hired without joining the union, but the union can require that you become a member of the union after a certain period of time or that you are required to pay union dues after a certain period of time (regardless of membership.) Taft-Hartley however provides for State-level abolition of even the “union shop”, in which case unions can still operate in those States but they cannot compel workers to either join or pay dues. “Right to work” legislation refers to the State level legislation that, under the Federal Taft-Hartley act, allows abolishment of the “union shop.” That’s the only intrinsic difference from “right to work” versus “not right to work”, in a “right to work” State the union shop allowed for under Taft-Hartley has been prohibited under State law.
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Any other issue relating to workers rights may vary from State to State, but isn’t intrinsically linked to “right to work” which just refers to whether or not a union can have a “union shop” in that State.
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“Employment at will” is a totally different issue from “right to work.” You can theoretically be a State that doesn’t have “employment at will” but is also right to work. Employment at will is simply a legal doctrine under which, without a specific employment contract or collective bargaining agreement, an employer or an employee have an “at will” relationship meaning either side may discharge the relationship at any time without incurring liability (exceptions for discharges due to membership in protected classes etc.) My understanding is, while a number of States have modifications to this simple “at will” doctrine, the only truly not at-will State is Montana, which specifies in law the specific types of discharges that are allowable. Montana Department of Labor even says:
Otherwise, while some States may commonly be reckoned as “not at will” because of additional protections, every State operates “at will.” At will and “right to work” are not synonymous. Your State can be at will without having right to work legislation passed or vice versa.
- Even in a non right to work State, not all employers are unionized. In fact it would be atypical for a small dental practice to be unionized. So, even in an non right to work State it is highly unlikely this dental hygienist would have been protected by any collective bargaining agreement. Thus right to work vs non right to work is most likely irrelevant to this woman’s situation.
I haven’t had a chance to read the Iowa ruling, but it seems like to me the dentist was texting the woman and also made inappropriate (to me) comments to her. However, she didn’t assert harassment, so it seems likely they had a very casual relationship where traditional norms in employee/employer weren’t common (I’ve seen this before.) As an employer I try to be semi-aware of sexual harassment law and my understanding is a cornerstone of said law is that it is “unwanted.” Since the woman isn’t asserting that, sexual harassment isn’t on the table regardless of him being inappropriate or not.
Gender discrimination I think could be possible, but it seems like in this case the dentist could make an argument that two employees have an intractable personal difference. In this case the dentist’s wife and the dental hygienist cannot work together. I think to some degree a court would be unlikely to want to meddle with an employer’s ability to resolve situations where two employees have intractable differences.
Now, my brief stint in State government during discrimination training we heard a story about a former Vietnam veteran who worked out of the same State police station as a Vietnamese American trooper. The veteran made the claim to his superiors that, because of his experiences in the Vietnam war he was unwilling to work at the same location as a Vietnamese person. The case made its way through the administrative hearing system where it was decided that the State could not or would not alter personnel assignments on the basis of an individual’s race, which they would be doing if they moved the Vietnamese trooper or the veteran trooper. The trooper was basically told to continue working as normal or face disciplinary action.
So I could see a discrimination argument if the dentist basically couldn’t have a woman hygienist because of his wife’s gender discrimination. But in this case I think you could argue the dentist wasn’t terminating the hygienist because of his wife’s gender discrimination but because of his wife’s specific personal animosity towards this specific hygienist based on her personal behavior.
FWIW I do suspect a wife would be at least as upset if they perceived their husband to be giving undue attention to a male hygienist.
Martin beat me to it. This is an “at-will” issue and has nothing to do with “right to work”. You can let someone go for any reason except being a member of a protected class.
Several people mention sex discrimination. To what extent is that illegal? It’s not protected in the constitution. There’s the rather vague “equal protection” clause that’s often used in similar cases. But in this case it’s not for being female, it’s for being attractive. Hot women are not a protected class. But of course there may be federal and state statutes.
Yes they do, albeit indirectly.
Right to work disempowers unions; unions can no longer negotiate employment protection rules; employees are thus easier to fire.
Thus, while to say “Right to work” implies “Right to fire” may be oversimplified and exaggerated, it is still effectively valid.
Is that actually true? My understanding is “right to work” legislation just refers to the stipulation in Taft-Hartley that a State can prohibit the “union shop.” It doesn’t ban all collective bargaining or disallow unions to negotiate certain things. Additional legislation could, I suppose, but I don’t think that is an intrinsic part of “right to work” laws.
From Wiki (I’m loathe to quote but as a general purveyor of information I think it’s okay here):
Now maybe some state laws prohibit, in addition to the union shop, unions negotiating hiring/firing practices, but I don’t believe that is an intrinsic part of what people call right to work legislation.
Why would employees unionize a one- or two-employee shop. What would be the advantage to collective bargaining over individual bargaining in such an instance? Would it be worth paying union dues for?
It’s pleasing to see such support for trade unionism, but it would be nice to evidence of some thought behind it, rather than irrelevant, reflexive declarations that a union would worthwhile here.
Unions aren’t magical (which, by the way, is why it’s not unfair to employers to have them around — they’re just a bargaining agent). You’re not going to a full blown grievance process here. I doubt any union would be interested in representing such a small office anyhow.
Not really. A better descriptor would be “right to hire”, since it allows employers more flexibility in whom they can hire, and it has the advantage of not being an exaggeration.
“At will employment” could accurately be called “right to fire”. Which is what is going on this particular case.
Is Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., in the Ninth still good law?
Right to work doesn’t prohibit union activity, but such activity is still inhibited – with no incentive for employees to pay union dues, the union is likely to wither.
To answer another objection, my comment was unrelated to OP’s incident but was in answer to the tangential (hijacking) question: Does “Right to Work” lead indirectly to “Right to Fire”?