I see that Iranian armed vessels roughly consist of four largish diesel-electric subs, 17 light (but apparently torpedo-capable) shallow-water subs, 4 frigates, 3 corvettes, and about 15 smallish fast missile boats. Air- or surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles apparently include some fairly modern and capable types, in addition to the aging Silkworms already mentioned. I’ve didn’t stumble across a discussion of Iranian minelaying capability, but I imagine some such ability exists. I’m guessing Iranian airborne assets are negligible even before determined US air strikes would begin.
If the above is correct, I’m not saying we wouldn’t get our hair mussed ;), but I don’t see any way Iran could shut down Persian Gulf shipping traffic effectively for more than 2-3 weeks at best, if the US (and probably NATO) choose to break the blockade, as they appear willing to do. The surface ships are fairly vulnerable; the subs maybe less so, but by the end of a few days Iran’s offensive abilities would likely be reduced to small-boat hit-and-runs, and sporadic potshots with missiles fired from land.
IIRC, during the ‘tanker war’ of the '80s, while a large number of commercial vessels were damaged and several hundred civilian crew killed, few if any of these vessels were actually sunk; modern cargo ships are just so damn big. Most of Iran’s anti-ship missiles appear to be effective on vessels of up to 4,000 tons or less, but with typical cargo ships running several times that size, one can make a big hole and set things on fire pretty bad, but the vessel will most likely remain afloat and repairable.
The US, as of this afternoon, has stated that an Iranian blockade “would not be tolerated” and I imagine that message is clear enough. This sounds like a non-starter for Iran, even if we assume that the most irrational elements of their leadership hold sway.
A U.S. Gov’t site with bathymetry of the Strait of Hormuz. If you scroll to the legend of the map, you get a color picture of the depth profile of the Strait, with a helpful blue line indicating "supertanker draft’. From that, I see that the Strait is quite wide, if the fear is of wrecked VLCCs blocking the passage, a la what the British did to try and safeguard the entrances to Scapa Flow. While the traffic lanes look quite narrow on the map, my guess is that they could be widened if need be, and are only that narrow in an attempt to come no closer to either Oman (the Quoin Islands) or Iran than necessary.
Mining the Straits could be done a variety of ways: small surface vessel/speed boats, aircraft, or SSKs. While doubtlessly there is a NATO SSN watching over the area 24/7 (U.S. or U.K.; who knows, maybe an Italian, Danish, or Norweigian SSK on a very long cruise?), SSKs are supposed to be very hard to track. Would not surprise me if there was some skullduggery done to make the specific Iranian models much easier to find.
As far as surface to surface missiles go, the primary warning is going to come from an AWACS that I’m sure is also stationed over the area 24/7. Probably more than one, too. The thing is, it’s pretty hard to kill a VLCC/ULCC with antiship missiles. The ships are just too big, whether laden or in ballast, and the warheads are usually way too small—the Silkworm’s 350-500 kg warhead aside. Not to say that it wouldn’t leave a hell of a mess though. It kills Iran’s chances of trying to deny that the missile was one of theirs, unlike if they instead tried to used mines to close the Straits. As Martin Hyde notes, it also would be one hell of a casus belli, at a time where the U.S., IMO, is probably looking for one anyway.
An interesting wrinkle is that Iran does have multiple ties to terrorist groups, and has for a long time. If the powers that be in Iran felt that they were threatened existentially, their most effective ways to wage war against the U.S. would probably be to use those resources against domestic U.S. targets and not try to fight the USN force on force. Again, IMO, the Iranian PTB would have to feel in a similar position to Saddam Hussein, April 2003, for that to be likely—because U.S. public opinion would demand Iranian regime change at a minimum were terrorist attacks to occur on U.S. soil—but it would be my major concern if I were giving advice to the U.S. As it is though, I think it’s just sabre-rattling.
Martin is making great points in the thread; just wanted to add a few things.
I guess I don’t grasp the concept of global oil markets very well…isn’t this the same argument people make against the US tapping into wildlife preserve areas for more drilling, in that the oil produced domestically wouldn’t lower our prices or dependence on foreign oil because it all goes into a global market pool? How is sanctioning Iran keeping that oil out of the pool if that is so?
Bear with me and my neophyte views. I am pretty well versed in things military but global market concepts escape me. I am trying to figure out an outcome for Iran by disrupting the Strait that is favorable to them (presumably in response to increased sanctions) and I am coming up empty.
Odds are that if some countries refused to buy Iranian oil others would, and maybe even at a discount price if Iran was having trouble selling it. That’s assuming Iran had a way to get the oil out.
Iran does have lots of ground routes to get its oil out, if its neighbors are cooperative. That would of course drastically slow the flow, it they were limited to convoys of tanker trucks rather tankers by sea.
I’ve been looking to see if Iran has any pipelines to get its out out and I haven’t found any, though there is at least one operating and another under construction for natural gas.
Forcing Iran to sell at a discount is the whole point of the Obama Administration’s current round of sanctions. It will essentially guarantee a decrease in revenues for the Iranian government. Especially since any refined petroleum products they buy will be coming back in with the global market price priced in. So they’ll be selling raw petrol at a discount and buying say, gasoline, at full market value.
Yes, why does Iran need so much oil refined abroad? Why can’t they build their own refineries? It’s not as challenging a technology as nuclear weapons.
No, he didn’t. The point wasn’t simply that Iran was attacking 3rd party tankers, it was that 1) Said actions are clear cut acts of war, which he was ignoring, and 2) that mines are indiscriminate weapons.
How you derived magic mines from anything I’ve written is beyond me. Anyway, the Iranians were attacked in the 1980s. Perhaps you didn’t read the link on Operation Praying Mantis. It wasn’t the only time there was shooting between the US and Iran either. You may remember we shot down an Iranian airliner by accident. The Vincennes was engaged with several Iranian small boats when it fired on the airliner.
They don’t remember it because it didn’t happen. The Iran-Iraq war wasn’t a proxy war. The USSR wasn’t backing either side in particular and the US wasn’t unwilling to engage in direct warfare with Iran because of the USSR. You’ll note again, the US did engage in direct warfare with Iran.
As to point 1: garbage. Iran attacking 3rd party tankers was an act of war against said nations. Attacking them had no justification under international law. The extent of US ‘support’ for Iraq was very small. The US had no desire to fight Iran through Iraq. Iraq started the war independently of anything related to the Cold War. Had the US desired to fight Iran through Iraq it would have actually supported Iraq in a meaningful way. Exactly how much military hardware did the US deliver to Iraq in the 1980s? How many tanks, AFVs, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, automatic rifles and rounds of small arms ammunition did the US give or sell to Iraq? Oh yeah, none.
Which is an unasked part of my question. It sounds to me much like the people of Alaska paying exorbitant prices for gasoline when so much oil comes from there…the fact that raw crude is extracted from there doesn’t equal low gas prices due to a lack of refinery infrastructure…well, almost anywhere really. The US is even really susceptible in that regard, dependent upon hurricanes and such in the Gulf Of Mexico.
Its ironic how a nation like Iran can have so much oil, yet have trouble exporting such a valuable commodity, then threaten not only their primary mean of exporting said black goop, but have no way as a result of their actions to supply their country with the refined product they (like every other developed nation) so desperately need as a result of their stupid sabre rattling.
It would be funny if they were the only country affected.
I never said they weren’t clear cut acts of war. But not all acts of war are equivalent in nature. Acts of war range from the bombing of Pearl Harbor to British merchant captain Robert Jenkins having his ear severed by the Spanish when they boarded his vessel (thus starting the “War of Jenkins’ Ear.”)
When Commodore Perry forced open Japan to American trading vessels that was also an open act of war.
No one ever said Iran wasn’t engaging in acts of war against various other countries in the 1980s. The Soviet Union and the United States engaged in various acts of war against each other throughout the Cold War, the U.S. blockade of Cuba was unambiguously an act of hostility and warfare. A more outright act would have happened if the Soviet ships had not stopped (because Kennedy gave them the order to open fire if they didn’t.)
But obviously casus belli can exist without a war starting, and likewise wars can start without casus belli as well.
My point was that closing the Straits of Hormuz would be an act of war that would result in actual warfare being waged. This is why I pointed out something from one of your own cites, namely that Iran never closed the Straits of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. I never denied they ever dropped a mine anywhere in the Persian Gulf, but I do deny that they attempted to close the straits to all naval traffic via the use of mines. (Even your own cites contradict this.) There is a big difference between “dropping a few mines in the Persian Gulf” and “mining the Straits of Hormuz”, mining the Straits implies actually trying to close the straits to navigable sea traffic, something Iran has never done before.
Further, and to the point, estimates are that it would take about 300 mines to effectively close the Straits of Hormuz to shipping. Iran had over 2,000 mines during the Iran-Iraq War, and has 5,000 mines now. If Iran then or now wanted to actually try to close the Straits, nothing is stopping them from making that attempt. But they never attempted to close the straits, even the minefield the USS Samuel Roberts sailed into was not put out there as an attempt to close the Straits of Hormuz but instead was deliberately aimed at the U.S. The Samuel Roberts had passed through that very area just days before, and there were no mines, so it has always been my understanding that the Iranians mined the area in expectation that the Samuel Roberts would pass over the area again (this is part of the reason the response happened as it did–if you remember the news about Operation Praying Mantis Reagan specifically spoke of consequences for attacking our ships, no one viewed it as an accident that one of our ships specifically hit the mine.)
Finally, while I can’t seem to find confirmation on line, my understanding is the USS Samuel Roberts hit an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf proper, after having left Kuwait, and was not actually in the Straits of Hormuz in any case.
I never said we’ve never attacked the Iranians, I said the Iranians didn’t close the Straits of Hormuz because they did not want war with the United States. If you note the response to the USS Samuel Roberts hitting an Iranian mine, it was a measured, limited response. If you actually remember what Reagan said on TV after the attack, he said “No, I do not think we’ll have a war with Iran, they couldn’t be that stupid.” If Iran wanted an outright war they could have brought it right then and there, since we had opened direct hostilities against them. But we made it clear we intended a limited response, and Iran did not do much of anything about it. It was very obvious both then and now that Iran did not/does not want open war with the United States.
If they actually closed the Straits of Hormuz by laying down mines, basically a few things could happen. If the U.S. observed them doing it, we would almost certainly attack their ships and stop them. Where it went from there would probably depend on the Iranians…if they persisted we’d probably expand the naval and air campaign to involve strikes against the Iranian navy and its facilities as well as the Iranian air force. Potentially the Iranian nuclear facilities scattered throughout Iran (the reason being we’d have probably the best justification we’ll ever have to hit them directly.)
If the Iranians successfully pull off their mining operation before we can respond, then I suspect the U.S. will start working to remove the mines, a task that will take some time and money. We may strike at Iranian bases we saw being launch points for the minelaying ships (or we might not.) At that point, if Iran let us clean up the Straits without interfering with our ships doing their job, and without trying to lay more mines, it’s possible we would only respond with economic sanctions (possibly attempting to get more countries on board–which they might indeed be willing to do in response to this.) But if Iran made it clear that the mining wasn’t just a temper tantrum, and they were going to essentially contest the matter and try to keep the Straits closed, then the scenarios I’ve mentioned above would play out (massive strikes against Iranian ships and naval bases, Iranian air fields/air force and etc.)
The USSR was significantly backing Iraq, and was Iraq’s primary supplier for virtually everything. However, Iraq also received billions in dual-use technology and economic aid from the United States. Additionally, it is widely acknowledged that the United States moved non-U.S. origin weaponry into Iraq for Iraq’s use against Iran.
It is very much the case that the Iran-Iraq War, for the United States, was a proxy war designed to contain Iranian expansionism. If you’ve read about the U.S. goals in regard to Iran, after the Iranian Revolution there was a misguided view that persisted for some time that eventually a more moderate power would take over Iran and we could resume good relations with that country. For that reason, we didn’t want to totally alienate Iran. However, we also feared Iranian expansionism, if you read anything that U.S. leaders wrote about the conflict, the genuine fear was that Iraq would lose more than anything else, and without all the support Iraq was given by various powers I suspect Iraq potentially would have lost the war with Iran.
Our involvement in support of Iraq was openly acknowledge and publicly discussed in Congress. It was public knowledge we were providing aid to Iraq to contain Iran, it was most definitely an example of a proxy war. Further, while not known at the time, it is now widely acknowledged we were moving weapons into Iraq, showing a clear level of support.
Finally, it is definitely in large part because of the Soviet Union that we did not actually go to war with Iran at any point from 1979-1988. There are conflicting stories to this day about why we didn’t try and help the Shah fight off the Iranian Revolution. Some say it was just general ineptitude and intelligence fail, others think that perhaps the Carter administration felt the revolution could not be stopped, and we needed to try and position ourselves to be on good terms with the new government. Either way, from that point onward there was a serious amount of policy duality in regards to Iran. We had continual problems with them, we were labeled the “Great Satan” by their Ayatollah, but we also were hoping we would be able to establish normal relations with Iran again. We were very afraid of Iran becoming a Soviet puppet. The Soviets had just rolled into Afghanistan and there were fears now that since Iran didn’t have U.S. support as it had before, they would start to look to the Soviets as a source of aid. The fear was if we actually entered a war against Iran we would end up pushing them completely into the arms of the Soviets.
It’s obviously complicated at that point because the Soviets were heavily supporting the Iraqis as well. (But the Soviets actually gave varying levels of support to both sides throughout the conflict.) When the conflict first started the Soviets were trying to essentially court both sides, with a slow tilt towards Iraq that intensified massively in 1987 when the Iranians captured the Faw Peninsula and there seemed to be serious risk of an Iraqi collapse. Even at the late stages of the war, when the Soviets were transferring upwards of $10bn of weaponry to Iran, the USSR was still trying to hold the door open to have a warming of relations with Iran. But Iran basically rejected any significant overtures from the Communist USSR.
I never claimed that Iraq started the war on U.S. orders. I’m saying that U.S. support of Iraq came about because of a U.S. desire to contain Iranian expansionism. By fighting through Iraq, the U.S. was engaged in a classic example of a proxy war.
Your belief that no military hardware was ever transferred to the Iraqis by the United States is simply flawed, it is widely acknowledged we transferred non-U.S. origin weaponry to Iraq covertly. Not to mention “dual-use” technology openly (meaning both military and civilian use, and in most cases its civilian use is irrelevant and all of the goods are used for military applications.)
I also never stated that Iranian attacks on neutral tankers wasn’t an act of war. Who said that? What would be the point in saying such a foolish thing? What I pointed out was, given the West’s support and the other Arab state’s support of Iraq in its war with Iran, it wasn’t really that shocking that Iran started to attack neutral vessels in the gulf. I’m not saying that made it “not an act of war” but I think the complexity of the situation is why the international response wasn’t to join together in a joint invasion of Iran.
When the Germans started preying on neutral shipping in both WWI and WWII that’s obviously an act of war, but it didn’t lead to immediate declarations of war. Partly because many countries recognize that Germany’s reasons for doing that were ones of self-interest, and there was of course the open fact that these neutral ships weren’t really that neutral. That isn’t saying anyone thought Germany was right, but the neutral powers at those points in time were largely neutral because they didn’t want open war with Germany, so Germany attacking their ships wasn’t immediately enough to bring them to open war.
In the Persian Gulf, the Arab states and the USSR and the US were supporting Iraq. The Arab states were giving massive financial aid to Iraq, and their “neutral” ships were enabling Iraq to continue making war by transporting Iraqi oil out of the gulf so that Iraq could continue generating funds. So while they were neutral in name, they openly supported Iraq. The only reason they weren’t at war with Iran is because they didn’t want to have to fight a war, and they preferred that if a war be fought, it be fought between the Iraqis and the Iranians. So the reason no one immediately declared war on Iran is because by and large all of the neutral parties that were more or less universally helping Iraq, did not want an open war with Iran in the first place. So Iran simply recognizing the truth of the situation (that the neutrals overwhelmingly supported Iraq), and taking action against their vessels, didn’t result in any immediate Declarations of War.
I think after the exchanges with the United States that resulted in open hostilities, if the Iranians had continued along that line a true war could have erupted. But if you note, after Operation Praying Mantis the Iranians mostly did not mess with the United States again during the war, because there was a genuine realization that if pushed far enough Iran might entice some of the neutral powers into deciding to join the war themselves. If the US was brought directly into the war it would have been very bad for the Iranians.
I just cannot envision the Iranian regime being this stupid, unless they too have fallen victim to the “paper tiger” meme of America. Our navy will fuck them up in a bad way if they go this route, and I’d like to believe that they know it. And unfortunately for them, Israel is also nearby and itching for any excuse to attack them pre-emptively. Oh, this will end well.
Why the confidence that all Iran has are silkworm missels?
Keep in mind I know nothing of weapons or silk.
Could they have developed their own improved versions? New technology that surpasses the silkworm? Would we have necessarily detected their tests? Could they have purchased more recent Russian, Chinese or North Korean explodythings?
I’m not trying to be argumentative, I’m asking about the state of knowledge and confidence that Iran has no tricks up its sleeve.
Oh, I’m also not suggesting that they have magic bullets, a working nuclear device or even improvements that could significantly change the in-thread speculation.
Oh, they have other stuff we know for sure. They have more advanced French missiles but they are still fairly old, and their supply of those as far as anyone knows is very small.
Military forces don’t exactly advertise all their shit, it’s absolutely correct Iran has more than we know about, and probably less of some things than we think they have.
I have made the focus on Silkworms for two reasons. Firstly, we know they bought them in large quantities, and moreso than other anti-ship missiles. Secondly, we know that after the Chinese stopped selling Silkworms to Iran, Iran developed the capacity to manufacture them on their own. It’s probably the case they have tried to make improvements on them as well. Since we know the Iranians can make home-brew Silkworm missiles then it’s most likely that will constitute the majority of their missile arsenal versus newer/more exotic weapons from more powerful countries. But certainly they’ve probably got a few more advanced weapons now than they did in 1989, but I’d be shocked if the majority of Iran’s arsenal of anti-ship missiles is anything other than original Chinese silkworms and/or Iranian manufactured silkworms of similar capability.
Not so sure about your first point. Minelaying isn’t really a complex activity nor does it require advanced military tech to perform - any two bit trawler could do it. So unless the US/UN is willing to blow every civilian ship flying Iranian colours out of the water (or really any civilian ship at all, since of course wetworks minelaying details would fly different flags) I doubt we could really prevent it from happening if Iran set its mind to.
I could see a coalition of Western powers commandeering the Strait entirely after the initial minelaying to clean it up and prevent it being mined again (not that it would really matter since civilian operations wouldn’t find the risk appealing anyway) but stopping Iran from mining it out of the blue ? Not really.
That being said I agree with the rest of what you say. It certainly would be an open declaration of war on the entire Western world, and they would get fucked up bad in very short order.
Still, talking about it make people talk about Iran and wonder if they’d be crazy enough to do it. Mission accomplished. Besides, at a guess I would say this theatre is not meant for American or European audiences, but for Iranian ones.
I have only a paper-thin knowledge of U.S. naval capabilites but I had the impression that our mine clearing assets were pretty good. While I know it wouldn’t get every mine I would assume it’s good enough to keep the straight open. I’d love to hear your thoughts Martin Hyde (and all just singling Marin because I’ve enjoyed much of what he’s written here).
This (PDF) that I read yesterday talks about the capabilities of Iran with regard to mining the Straits; the report is open ended on how effective Iran would be at an attempt to mine the Straits, but it certainly doesn’t seem to imply that it’s some sort of impossible feat for the NATO / USN forces in the area to stop it. Like you said, I imagine they’d have to know what was going on, and the report makes it clear that the first few hours are critical, if Iran can operate for a few hours unmolested they would have much of the job finished.
I’ve absolutely never been a sailor or involved in the Navy, but I have to imagine a body like the Persian Gulf, in this day and age, with modern satellite, radar, etc, is probably monitored extremely heavily. I’m not exactly sure how easy it would be to pull of a major minelaying operation. Iran doesn’t actually have that many boats, I think it’d be notable if a lot of boats, even civilian boats, started to engage in a lot of strange activity in the Straits.
One thing, too, is the Straits are like 20 miles wide, but the international shipping lanes are basically (going from memory) 2 miles wide inbound, 2 miles wide outbound, forming two “lanes.” In between the inbound/outbound lanes is a 2 mile wide “buffer” area. Outside of the international shipping lane is of course Oman/Iran waters. A true closing of the Straits would have to have ships operating in the buffer area and Oman and Iranian waters, because if you just mined the established shipping lanes most likely the international response would include things like running convoys through Oman’s territorial waters or Iran’s while the main lanes were cleared up. So to effectively close the Straits I’d think you’d see a lot of strange activity with ships in the buffer zone, and ships from Iran in Oman and Iranian waters doing things they normally wouldn’t do.
Again, having never been in the Navy I don’t know what sort of monitoring goes on 24/7 and how noticeable this would all be.
My understanding is certain types of mines are a bear to deal with even with modern mineclearing ships.
A traditional mine just floats in the water and explodes on contact, and is made of metal. These are banned by international treaty and were the original naval mines (they are banned because they will flow away with the currents and spread to areas well outside of the conflict area, causing lots of problems.) Iran probably wouldn’t use any like this simply because the currents would pull them all into the Persian Gulf proper and thus wouldn’t do a great job of closing the Straits.
After that you have mines that are kept in one place, either near the surface or below the surface. The ones near the surface are more detectable, the ones deeper below the surface are very detectable with modern equipment.
Then there are mines that actually are put directly on the seafloor. These are only effective in area with water shallow enough for their purpose. These mines detonate at the seafloor, and the explosion will be big enough to damage ships on the surface. From what I understand the Straits of Hormuz are right at the “limit” of depth where such a mine would be effective. That PDF I linked to in my previous post mentions that the Iranians would probably not use such mines because, while not impossible for them to work in the Straits, they wouldn’t be ideal. My understanding is these ones are a bit harder to detect/remove because they are on the sea floor itself.
There are also mines that sit on the sea floor and fire off a small torpedo when a ship passes overhead. My understanding is these are harder still to deal with since they are actually a semi-automated sort of defense system that will launch pretty aggressively at anything near by.
Finally, my understanding is the big concern isn’t so much any of the conventional mines mentioned above, for which there are processes to handle them. But rather there are some mines made out of non-metallic materials which are a lot more difficult to locate.
I don’t know much about modern mine removal technologies, I’d be surprised if the U.S. has no way at all to remove any of these mines, but depending on the mines used it could increase the time required to remove them and the potential for damage to U.S. ships/personnel while removing them.
They have built their own refineries. I’m not up on the current state of Iranian refining capacity but estimates earlier this year had them producing enough gasoline domestically to keep up with demand.
It’s not really the scientific challenges but the engineering challenges. It takes years to bring a modern refinery online and to full capacity. You can’t just toss a major refinery up in a year.
That’s true in the US, even without having to follow all the environmental and safety regulations (which account for a non-negligible amount of time). These aren’t going to be the inefficient refineries of the 40s, after all. Even in the US, we’ve drastically expanded capacity at existing refineries (often doubling or more the capacity for older refineries). Even these renovation projects take several years.
So a shortfall in refining capacity for a couple years isn’t really that surprising.