Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program

[FinnAgain]

The IAEA will be releasing a report soon that, according to insiders: [

will offer details of Iranian research in neutron physics and experiments using “uranium deuteride,” some nuclear experts say – two activities that are precursors to bomb development and that have no application for civilian power or medical use.

](Will next report on Iran nuclear program 'prove' quest for nuclear weapon? - CSMonitor.com)
The IAEA itself has maintained, for years now, that Iran has willfully and deliberately blocked a full accounting of its nuclear activities with activities ranging from simply refusing to implement the Additional Protocols which would verify non-diversion of nuclear materials to actually bulldozing a facility that the IAEA had requested access to. The IAEA has used the phrase “a pattern of concealment” to describe Iran’s nuclear program. This upcoming report will, however (if advance claims are accurate), indicate a substantial change in the IAEA’s assessments, from the fact that Iran’s nuclear program is of indeterminate status to the conclusion that it was and/or is a program with a military component.
Nor is this in contradiction to foreign intelligence agencies’ findings. The milestone NIE conducted by the US concluded that:
[

We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.

We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.)

We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.

](http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/12/03/iran.nie.pdf)
For comprehension’s sake, the different confidence levels were based on different degrees of evidence:

What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language

We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate—and probabilistic terms such as probably and likely—to convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have “proof” that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.

In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often conveys 1) our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence we ascribe to the judgment.

Estimates of Likelihood. Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language to reflect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events. Terms such as probably, likely, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even chance. The terms unlikely and remote indicate a less then even chance that an event will occur; they do not imply that an event will not occur. Terms such as might or may reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as we cannot dismiss, we cannot rule out, or we cannot discount reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning. The chart provides a rough idea of the relationship of some of these terms to each other.
[…]
Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of confidence to our assessments, as follows:

High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.

Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

Low confidence generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.

All of this taken together means that we can say that Iran has most likely had a nuclear weapons program in the near past, and that they may still be working on one. Assuming that leaked reports of the IAEA’s findings are accurate (and that’s a pretty safe assumption), what if anything will this mean for our current stance on the national and international levels?

Instability in the Middle East caused by Iran’s nuclear program has already been leading towards a true arms race, which in and of itself could have truly disastrous repercussions, even in the wake of the Arab Spring.

As for consequences, fears of Iran directly utilizing atomic weapons are unlikely but not impossible to play out. Fears of Iran giving nuclear materials to its proxy forces are also somewhat unlikely since the traditional non-response to Iranian attacks on foreign nations like the marine barracks bombing or the Khobar Towers bombing would almost definitely not be the pattern we’d see in the event of radiological or full out atomic incidents. What it does suggest, however, is that Iran will be more willing and likely to use its proxy forces in order to achieve regional and international goals, and the rest of the world will have few if any military responses open aside from missiles strikes.

What then, if anything, should the rest of the world be doing?

The precedents set by Israel’s attack on the Iraq reactor and Syria’s (alleged) nuclear program suggest that the rest of the world might tisk a bit, but nothing much would be done if Israel was to launch a preemptive strike. It’s unlikely that western powers would launch an attack themselves, but it’s not inconceivable that the US might greenlight Israel. Especially with most of the other states in the ME bearing Iran no small bit of antipathy. However, it’s doubtful if any weapons short of tactical nukes could truly take out Iran’s nuclear program, and their use might very well prompt Egypt’s new government to declare war against Israel.

Perhaps the best course of action, from here on out, are diplomatic actions, support for reform within Iran (possibly including covert action and support), containment, further Stuxnet type cyberwarfare and tactical assassinations of Iran’s nuclear scientists. What say y’all?

[marshmallow]

@FinnAgain

Perhaps the best course of action, from here on out, are diplomatic actions, support for reform within Iran (possibly including covert action and support), containment, further Stuxnet type cyberwarfare and tactical assassinations of Iran’s nuclear scientists. What say y’all?

I think if someone suggested the same be done to the U.S. you’d flip your lid.

[FinnAgain]

I will have to reevaluate my traditional assumption that Iran and the United States are fungible.
Good call.

[Ravenman]

Do you seriously think that someone can stop Iran’s nuclear program? Like, in its tracks, not just delay them a little while longer? Or is your goal to draw out the process somewhat, to perhaps delay the inevitable?

[XT]

I think it could be delayed, and that delaying it would have at least the possibility of halting it. I guess it comes down to whether you think that the current Iranian government/system is sustainable in the long term. Personally, I think change is in the air, and that eventually, one way or the other, the current Iranian system will go the way of Kaddaffi and his merry men (probably a hell of a lot bloodier, sadly).

-XT

[FinnAgain]

Depends on the semantics of the equation. Totally stopping Iran’s nuclear program would probably require, at the very least, removing its government permanantly if not rubbling the nation itself, and rinsing/repeating as required. Tactical nuclear weapons could set them back to zero, but even then they’d just build twice as deep and reinforce the sites twice as much. No, a total halt to Iran’s nuclear program is most likely impossible barring violence that approaches Total War.

The ideal outcome from here on out, I’d opine, would be based on maximum delay without tactical military action. Especially since, given enough time, a lot of things can happen… who knows, maybe the people of Iran will get their wish and they’ll manage to establish a democracy in the next few decades and a desire for nuclear weaponry will be remembered as being part of the Bad Old Days.

[JoelUpchurch]

@Ravenman

Do you seriously think that someone can stop Iran’s nuclear program? Like, in its tracks, not just delay them a little while longer? Or is your goal to draw out the process somewhat, to perhaps delay the inevitable?

You don’t need to stop the Iranian nuclear program forever. You just need to delay until the Islamic fundamentalist government falls. If someone could destroy the rest of the centrifuges used to create highly enriched uranium, then that could be long enough.

[John_Mace]

@FinnAgain

The ideal outcome from here on out, I’d opine, would be based on maximum delay without tactical military action. Especially since, given enough time, a lot of things can happen… who knows, maybe the people of Iran will get their wish and they’ll manage to establish a democracy in the next few decades and a desire for nuclear weaponry will be remembered as being part of the Bad Old Days.

Most of the nuclear powers are democracies. Why would democracy eradicate the desire for nuclear weapons in Iran?

[Erdosain]

@John_Mace

Most of the nuclear powers are democracies. Why would democracy eradicate the desire for nuclear weapons in Iran?

A democratic Iran would presumably decide that the ability to menace the entire Middle East is not worth being a pariah nation.

[John_Mace]

@Erdosain

A democratic Iran would presumably decide that the ability to menace the entire Middle East is not worth being a pariah nation.

You mean like India?

[Der_Trihs]

@FinnAgain

I will have to reevaluate my traditional assumption that Iran and the United States are fungible.

No; America is demonstrably much more dangerous and aggressive. Iran doesn’t go around invading people on a regular basis.

@JoelUpchurch

You don’t need to stop the Iranian nuclear program forever. You just need to delay until the Islamic fundamentalist government falls. If someone could destroy the rest of the centrifuges used to create highly enriched uranium, then that could be long enough.

Nonsense. They were threatened by the West since before the present government; remember the Shah. There’s no reason for a successor government to stop trying for nukes, because there’s no reason to think we we’ll stop being their enemies.

@Erdosain

A democratic Iran would presumably decide that the ability to menace the entire Middle East is not worth being a pariah nation.

A pariah nation safe from invasion is better off than a non-pariah nation conquered and devastated by the US or a US puppet.

[FinnAgain]

P.S. I’m sure that everybody reading along is familiar with more… comic book style glosses of the situation. If we could avoid engaging them, that’d be awesome.

@John_Mace

Most of the nuclear powers are democracies. Why would democracy eradicate the desire for nuclear weapons in Iran?

You’ve misunderstood me. Democracy, in a vacuum, does not lead to any specific decision on nuclear weapons. However, Iran, reintegrated into the international community and filled with a populace who want nuclear energy but not nuclear weapons would be far less likely to develop them. And it might implement the Additional Protocols, to boot.

[Der_Trihs]

@FinnAgain

P.S. I’m sure that everybody reading along is familiar with more… comic book style glosses of the situation.

You mean like the one where Iran is supposedly uniquely suicidally evil, and will willingly go to its own annihilation?

Apparently not.

[Erdosain]

@John_Mace

You mean like India?

That was different. They got in on a 2-for-1 deal with Pakistan.

But seriously, no one (in the West) was scared of India so there was little appetite to make an example out of them. Especially when Pakistan got their own, so everyone had an ally who was implicated. All the nukes in this case were pointed at each other, so the rest of the world gave them a pass eventually. Which will probably come back to haunt us, big time.

[John_Mace]

@Erdosain

That was different. They got in on a 2-for-1 deal with Pakistan.

No, they didn’t. India had nuclear weapons more than 20 years before Pakistan did.

But seriously, no one (in the West) was scared of India so there was little appetite to make an example out of them. Especially when Pakistan got their own, so everyone had an ally who was implicated. All the nukes in this case were pointed at each other, so the rest of the world gave them a pass eventually. Which will probably come back to haunt us, big time.

The West wouldn’t necessarily be afraid of a democratic Iran, either.

[FinnAgain]

A democratic Iran not only wouldn’t necessarily want nukes (there’s little evidence that its people do), we might also not have any reason to want to prohibit it from having 'em.

[Erdosain]

@John_Mace

No, they didn’t. India had nuclear weapons more than 20 years before Pakistan did.
The West wouldn’t necessarily be afraid of a democratic Iran, either.

Oops, my bad on the India timing.

But given Iran’s recent history of funding terrorism and history of revolutions, I think there’s quite a bit to fear from a (temporarily) democratic and nuclear Iran.

[Ibn_Warraq]

@FinnAgain

A democratic Iran not only wouldn’t necessarily want nukes (there’s little evidence that its people do), we might also not have any reason to want to prohibit it from having 'em.

I’d respectfully disagree. I’m pretty sure a Mousavi-led Democratic Iran would still want nukes to protect themselves from the people they see(with good reason) as bullies threatening them.

[Simplicio]

@FinnAgain

A democratic Iran not only wouldn’t necessarily want nukes (there’s little evidence that its people do), we might also not have any reason to want to prohibit it from having 'em.

I don’t think that’s true. According to the IAEA report, most of the serious military work in Iran seems to have taken place under the more pro-democratic, pro-Western gov’t of Khatami and then slowed under the conservative, anti-democratic, really really not pro-Western Ahmadinejad gov’t.

I’m kinda repeating myself from the other current Iran thread, but I think people in the US overestimate how much the Iranian desire for a nuclear deterant stems from Islamic fanaticism and underestimate how much of it comes from a fear of being targets of their Sunni neighbors and Western powers. The latter fear is going to remain regardless of how much or little democracy exists in the country, and is shared by Mullahs and reformists alike.

[FinnAgain]

@Ibn_Warraq

I’d respectfully disagree. I’m pretty sure a Mousavi-led Democratic Iran would still want nukes to protect themselves from the people they see(with good reason) as bullies threatening them.

While this study may have been an outlier, it supports some patterns I’ve seen in various polls:

[

Developing nuclear weapons was seen as a very important priority for the Iranian government by only 29% of Iranians. By contrast, 88% of Iranians considered improving the Iranian economy as a very important priority for their government. Rather, 80% of Iranians favor Iran providing full inspections and a guarantee not to develop or possess nuclear weapons in return for outside aid. A majority of Iranians (52%) also favor the development of nuclear weapons and believe that the people of Iran would live in a safer world if Iran possessed nuclear weapons.

However, support for nuclear weapons drops to below 17% if Iran were to receive outside assistance in return for full inspections and a guarantee not to have nuclear weapons.

68% of Iranians also favor normal relations and trade with the United States. In return for normal relations, a majority of Iranians favor recognizing Israel and Palestine as independent states, ending Iranian support for any armed groups inside Iraq, and full transparency by Iran to the United States to ensure there are no Iranian endeavors to develop nuclear weapons.

](http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT%20Iran%20Survey%20Report.pdf)

Other polls have found, generally, similar results. Of course there are outliers (and it’s hard to figure what is and isn’t an outlier, due to the problems inherent in polling in Iran), but I remain optimistic that warm relations and renewed trade would obviate much of the drive towards nuclear weapons, and much of the risk of a nuclear Iran in any case.

@Simplicio

I don’t think that’s true. According to the IAEA report, most of the serious military work in Iran seems to have taken place under the more pro-democratic, pro-Western gov’t of Khatami and then slowed under the conservative, anti-democratic, really really not pro-Western Ahmadinejad gov’t.

You’re referring to the new report that’s not out yet? Do you have a cite?
Even if true, Khatami’s government may have been comparatively moderate, but we should keep in mind that true political power and military C&C doesn’t flow from that office in Iran.

@Simplicio

I’m kinda repeating myself from the other current Iran thread, but I think people in the US overestimate how much the Iranian desire for a nuclear deterant stems from Islamic fanaticism and underestimate how much of it comes from a fear of being targets of their Sunni neighbors and Western powers.

Could be… but with Iraq mostly neutered, other nations actually invading Iraq seems somewhat unlikely. I’d also point out that if the NIE is correct, the response to (or at least a proximal event to) Bush’s Axis o’ Evil speech was that Iran’s nuke program went dormant, not into high gear.