Although I work in the oilfield service sector, I’m not an expert on the strategic end of things, so y’all are welcome to take my comments with a grain of salt if you wish.
The most magnanimous thing to do would have been for the US to help the Iraqis restart the Iraqi national oil company, guarantee them some low-interest loans for ten or 15 years, throw in some technical help pro bono and let them buy in the technology and equipment they need to increase production on their own, selling their produced oil at fair market rates, at which it will likely be sold no matter who is charge of production. Obviously, though, the temptation to make things a supposed "win-win’ for big business was too much.
Given the proposed setup, my first impression is that Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) are not the the best way to maximise oil revenue for the Iraqis in the long term, but that they would at least be relatively effective at ramping up production (and revenues) fairly quickly, which I think is a desirable thing for the Iraqis. It seems pretty clear that Iraq itself has neither the cash nor the technical expertise to bring production rapidly to the levels suggested in at least one of the linked articles. 1.5 to 8 million barrels per day in a few years? Highly unlikely, IMO, even with a flood of western technology and and a calm countryside in which to work.
Which brings up this point: any serious increase in Iraqi oil production assumes that the state of near-civil war that currently exists relaxes somewhat. If not, I find it difficult to believe that any company that closes a deal with the Iraqi government could meet any kind of realistic targets to increase production significantly.
Although western oil companies managed to carry on fairly effective oilfield development programs in Angola in the midst of a civil war, that situation was somewhat different: the fighting was in the interior between raltively poorly-armed combatants, while the majority of the exploration activity was offshore.
Turning to the issue of which companies are likely to get contracts, I note that most of the cited articles take it as a given that US-owned companies will get the lion’s share of the business, presumably either because of their relatively deep pockets or because of US government pressure on the Iraqi government. I have to say that I don’t really see any concrete reason, other than a totally corrupted bidding process, that would make that so. Absent some specific case of corruption, one presumes the Iraqi government will negotiate production deals that are as advantageous as possible. If TOTAL, or CNOOC, or ENI, or ONGC (to name a few large, non-US-based companies), propose deals that are more advantageous, why, other than pure corruption, would the Iraqis not take them?
I suggest interested persons check out the headlines on a site like Rigzone periodically to get a feel for whether American companies are really a lock to get most of the Iraqi contracts. I haven’t checked on this specific issue recently myself, so I have no idea what the general industry feeling is on this.
How well any of this works out, for the bidders or for the Iraqis, will IMO depend much more on whether the country can regain some semblance of stability than the specific details of the production contracts. At this time, at least.