As to the OP: here is a link to one of the threads in which this most recent tape was discussed, and the thread includes a link to a full translation of the tape itself; as an Arabic-speaking analyst, I can say that I feel the translation is an accurate reflection of the original speech, as broadcast on al-Jazeera TV (I have also previously posted links to the original broadcast in Arabic, if anyone feels so inclined to listen).
In this tape, as in all others purportedly issued by ObL or al-Qaieda, there are no mentioned “links” or support of Saddam Hussein; you can read the transcript for yourself, and determine that there is nothing directly connecting ObL to Iraq, period. The most that anyone can deduce from this particular piece of “evidence” is the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” argument, and even that doesn’t really work if you take the whole speech in context: the excerpts you yourself have provided show that ObL doesn’t really consider Saddam a legitimate Muslim leader. An important point to make here, regarding semantics: the word “ignorant” in Arabic, when used by Islamists (especially of the fundamentalist bent), usually connotates either “non-Muslim” or “poor example of a Muslim.” This is also seen in its common usage to refer to Pre-Islamic history, which is often called the “time of ignorance.” So I think ObL (who is capable of pretty eloquent and educated Arabic) is making a point, to other Arabs, of supporting the Iraqi people, without directly supporting Saddam. To English speakers, the distinction would be pretty well lost in translation; I don’t think any Arab speaker would feel that the current broadcast (or any other ObL has purportedly made) in any way supports Saddam or his regime.
The Zarqawi evidence is also quite thin, and not really much to hang any charge of cooperation on: even the administration hasn’t really belabored the point, besides the already present comments. The fact is al-Qaieda cells are active in many places: there are evidence of cells in several European countries, Africa, and obviously even in the US before 9/11 (and there is little reason to suspect that all are gone from US territory even now). How much easier would it be for mostly Arabic-speaking Muslims to form cells in Arabic-speaking countries? If indeed there is corroborated evidence placing someone like Zarqawi in Baghdad, it is not surprising: he may have gone for medical treatment, and even recuperated there. If so, he would have been closely watched by the SSO, assuming they knew he was there (a pretty safe assumption, BTW). However, even if the US passed news of his whereabouts to the Iraqi government, it would have been difficult for the Iraqis to take direct action: this incident occurred in May 2002, at which point there was scrutiny of Iraq by the US, but no strong decisions had yet been made; the Iraqis have strongly supported the Palestinians, who have in turn given at least partial support for the Iraqis and Saddam; Zarqawi is Palestinian (often called Jordanian, but in fact a Palestinian from one of the Jordanian camps), and direct action against him by Saddam would have been counter-productive regarding both the Palestinians and al-Qaieda. And it is even possible that, by the time the Iraqis saw that Zarqawi was doing more than mending (by allegedly being in contact with Kurd-based al-Qaieda members) or by the time the US had provided specific information on his whereabouts, he was off to Syria or Lebanon, purportedly planning the assassination of Foley in Jordan.
Some suspect that he later returned to the Ansar al-Islam camps in the Kurd-held areas of Northern Iraq; however, this would not be a particularly safe place for him, as most persons involved there know (or at least highly suspect) that the CIA has ties and informants in that area, as does Saddam. Most likely, he has led people to believe that he is in that area, to spread confusion and to get us focused in that direction.
As for direct cooperation between the two entities: highly improbable, though not completely impossible in some limited way. The two have neither love nor trust for each other; indeed, it would be more likely for ObL to foster some kind of thought that the two are in cohoots, in order to bolster the likelihood of our attacking Iraq. A war against Iraq plays into the hands of ObL and al-Qaieda: it foments mistrust of the US, causes discord among the alliances (NATO and the UN), focuses our attention away from possible terrorist activities, and removes a source of annoyance to al-Qaieda that has existed for years (Saddam and his regime). ObL is a religious zealot, who is most likely convinced that he is on a holy path; as such, the destruction of Saddam’s regime, to him, provides an opportunity for the development of a possible religious regime in that area, sooner rather than later. He sees that whatever we may do in an attempt to reconstruct the region will be purely artificial and sure to collapse or disappear once we leave, as we eventually must; just like in Afghanistan, where the Soviets finally withdrew in exasperation. We are foreign to the area, and have little understanding of the region, its cultures, its traditions, its people, or its religion; in ObL’s view, we are like the Crusaders, and he is a spiritual Salah ad-Din (Saladin). His followers’ patience will eventually triumph over all of the evil: Saddam, the Saudi and Kuwaiti royal families, and us.
I think it can be safely stated that there is little other evidence to point to a connection between the two entities, either covert or open-source; if so, the US would be providing as much as possible to the members of the UNSC. There is one journalist that has attempted to make a connection (Safire), though his most recent article (in January of this year) was mostly a re-hash of a weakly supported article he wrote last year; this was discussed in a previous thread on the SDMB/GD a couple of weeks ago.
Hope this is close to what you were asking for in the OP