Iraq, federalism, and "consociational democracy"

[BrainGlutton]

One of the so-called “sticking points” holding up adoption of a new constitution for Iraq (http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/08/22/iraq.main/) is that there is no clear consensus on the very form and structure of the state. Everybody wants some kind of “federalism,” but agreement ends there. The Iraqi Kurds, and some Shi’ites (http://www.tvnz.co.nz/view/page/425822/603750), apparently want a the new Iraq to be a federation of three autonomous regions – Kurdish-majority, Shi’ite-majority, and Sunni-majority. That would leave the Sunnis as the only group without substantial oil assets in their region. It would also be a big change. From the creation of Iraq after WWI to the present, Iraq has been divided into 18 governorates or provinces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq#Governorates), of roughly equal population, their boundaries bearing no intentional relationship to the predominant local religious or ethnic group. While I haven’t heard any statements to this effect by Sunni leaders, they presumably would want that system preserved, but with democratic governments established for each province.

In his 1957 book The Breakdown of Nations (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1870098986/qid=1125290372/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/103-7313433-7643062?v=glance&s=books&n=507846), political scientist Leopold Kohr argued that that kind of arrangement is usually a better model for a successful federation than one where the constituent states are of very unequal size or strength. Bismarck’s German Empire, in which Prussia was far and away the largest and most powerful state, was effectively a Prussian empire over the rest of Germany. Switzerland, OTOH, a highly successful (at least, durable) multinational state (64% German-speaking, 19% French-speaking, 8% Italian-speaking (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Switzerland#Demographics), is a federation of 26 cantons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Switzerland#Cantons_.28states.29). The German cantons outnumber the non-German but do not dominate them; every canton has the same status, the same powers and functions, and the same degree of autonomy WRT to the national government. If Switzerland were instead a federation of a German state, a French state and an Italian state, the non-Germans would be systematically overshadowed and perpetually discontented. Wouldn’t something like the established Swiss model be better for Iraq?

On the other hand, suppose a three-part federation is what the majority of the Iraqi people (at least, a majority of those who vote or are active in politics and not supporters of the insurgency) want? Doesn’t respect for the principles of “democracy,” for which (among other things) this war purportedly was fought, demand that they get it, even if that leaves the Sunni minority shit out of luck? There will be a dissident minority on practically any issue “resolved” through the democratic process. Democracy means the minority has to accept losing and go along with the majority will.

Or does it? Is that the only meaning of “democracy”?

Political commentator Michael Lind wrote the following in 1999 – before the Iraq War, before 9/11 – but I think it has obvious relevance to the Iraqis’ current challenge. From “Why There Will Be No Revolution in the U.S.,” New Left Review, 2/1/99, http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=1013 (written in response to an earlier article, in the same periodical, by leftist writer Daniel Lazare, on the U.S. Constitution as being an outdated impediment to true democracy):

Lazare never makes explicit his own conception of the ideal constitution. From his writings, it appears that his conception of the good constitution rests on two premises. The first is that a “demos” is a more or less coherent community. The second assumption is that relatively simple majoritarian institutions are the most adequate vehicles for the expression of the sovereign will of the demos. Lazare’s ideal constitution, it would seem, would establish a unicameral legislature in a unitary state, with a majority of the legislators free to abrogate the constitution and promulgate a new one whenever they chose to do so. This conception explains Lazare’s insistence that federal systems and complex constitutions are either deluded responses to groundless fears of majority tyranny or sinister contraptions devised by machiavellian elites to neutralize democracy. “Can a people divided and conquer itself?” Lazare write (p. 27). “Is stable self-government really to be achieved through self-fragmentation?” (p.27).

If this is a fair statement of Lazare’s views, as I believe it is, then Lazare belongs in the older and more influential of the two traditions of thinking about democracy. The oldest and most prevalent conception of democracy identifies it with the will, or in another version the interests, of a numerical majority. Most centrist liberal and progressive proposals for constitutional reform, along with those of the radical left, have been based on this assumption. 7 There is, however, a minority tradition in political thought, which questions the identification of democracy with majority rule. The nineteenth-century American theorist and South Carolina Senator John Calhoun, with his idea of “the concurrent majority,” is one of the key figures in this minority tradition. 8 So are twentieth century theorist of “consociational democracy,” like Arend Lijphart and Lani Guinier, most of whom are found on the center-left and share nothing in common with Calhoun except for a concern with the plight of numerical minorities.9

The consociational theory of democracy differs from the majoritarian theory in two key respects. First, unlike majoritarians, consociationalists take seriously the possibility that a given political community may be made up of two or more enduring, distinct communities defined by extra-political characteristics, such as regional, racial, or religious identities. The second difference follows from the first. Consociationalist theory rejects the assumption that simple majoritarian constitutional structures are necessarily the best. In countries with a complicated regional or ethnic make-up, complicated democratic instititutions may be necessary.

Concessions and Consensus

From the consociationalist perspective, a given constitution may be less important as a set of rules for the self-government of a majority than as what the philosopher John Gray calls a modus vivendi, a treaty among various groups, which may have a long history prior to that of the national or multinational polity in which they find themselves as a result of coercion or choice. In particular countries, particular compromises embedded in the constitution as a concession to this or that sub-national group will cause the constitution to deviate to a greater or lesser degree from the Platonic ideal of a democratic constitution. In some cases the deviations may be unjustifiable (like the concessions made to slave-owners or less populous states in the U.S. constitution). In other cases, though, the concession may be reasonable and legitimate—particularly if the alternative to an idiosyncratic constitution is not a simpler, more majoritarian constitution, but secession or other kinds of civil strife.

For many (though by no means all) majoritarian theorists, the purpose of democracy is to “express” the “will” of the more or less unitary “people”—a Rousseauian General Will that somehow (perhaps by mental telepathy) has formed apart from, and prior to, elections and debates among elected officials. For adherents of consociationalism, the purpose of democracy is not the expression of a pre-existing national will, but the formation of a consensus among sub-national groups—substantial minorities, as well as majorities. Elections, negotiations among parties within the legislature, negotiations among houses of a government with separation of powers, even negotiations between levels of government—all of these may be legitimate stages in the cobbling together of a political consensus. To oversimplify matters, it might be said that majoritarians see legislation as the product of a political consensus, whereas consociationalists see a political consensus as the product of the legislative process.

The emphasis that consociational democracy puts on consensus suggests that as a rule supermajorities should be preferred to simple majorities. A program enacted by a bare majority, against the bitter opposition of a near-majority, is likely to be lacking in legitimacy, in practice if not in theory. Nor is it that much more legitimate in theory, if one rejects the majoritarian fiction that fifty-one percent of a population speaks for the whole. Every numerical minority in a society cannot be placated. But no effect should be spared to coopt substantial minorities, if social peace hangs upon the result.

Consociational democrats are much more likely than majoritarians to view the constitutional polity as something fragile and in danger of “Balkanization” into lesser communities along subnational lines. The fact, noted above, that party systems in democracies tend to perpetuate and reinforce regional and ethnic and religious divisions within nations only strengthens the fear of consociated theorist that ill-designed democratic arrangements will exacerbate rather than avert civil strife.

How can we apply this thinking to the situation in Iraq?

[Measure_for_Measure]

You may be missing the point.

It is reasonable to read the current draft as an attempt by the Shias and Kurds to stick it to the Sunnis.

I see little in democratic theory that would justify oil-rich regions from essentially seceding from the whole, leaving resource-poor regions to fend for themselves.

Admittedly, the draft of the Iraqi constitution doesn’t go that far. Existing oil wells are supposed to be distributed according to population, adjusting for past inequities (i.e. leaning away the oil-poor, formerly favored Sunni middle). Nothing is said about future wells.

There is an obvious way forward. Keep federalism, but say that the oil underneath the ground accrues to all Iraqis, and that present and future revenues be divvied up by population. Period. http://slate.msn.com/id/2125097/?nav=tap3

Whether the Sunnis would go for this is admittedly unclear at present. Some of them are losers who just want to stay on top. This is understandable, but it is also probably a pipe dream.

[Measure_for_Measure]

---- Doesn’t respect for the principles of “democracy,” for which (among other things) this war purportedly was fought, demand that they get it, even if that leaves the Sunni minority shit out of luck? …Democracy means the minority has to accept losing and go along with the majority will.

Or does it? Is that the only meaning of “democracy”?

Er, no.

Speaking loosely, “Democracy” does not refer simply to majority rule. It includes a package of institutions: among them are a free press, elections, rule of law and protections of the rights of minorities.

Furthermore, a variety of voting and constitional systems are considered to be “Democratic”.

Lots of things are inconsistent with Majority Rule: the American Bill of Rights, for example, is full of them.

[BrainGlutton]

Here’s an incisive recent discussion, by an Arab (judging by his name) writer, on “consociational patriotism” as applied to Iraq: http://www.swans.com/library/art11/jelloun2.html

And here’s a Wikipedia article on consociationalism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consociationalism

[BrainGlutton]

@Measure for Measure

Speaking loosely, “Democracy” does not refer simply to majority rule. It includes a package of institutions: among them are a free press, elections, rule of law and protections of the rights of minorities.

I beg your pardon. Except for elections, those things are not definitionally inherent in “democracy,” not even “speaking loosely.” (They are, however, necessary to what political scientist Robert Dahl (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_A._Dahl) denominated “polyarchy” – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyarchy – which, when you look at it closely, and in Dahl’s original usage, appears to be pretty much the same thing as “consociational democracy,” distinguished only by differences in emphasis.)
“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want and deserve to get it good and hard.”

– H.L. Mencken

[Measure_for_Measure]

@BrainGlutton

I beg your pardon. Except for elections, those things are not definitionally inherent in “democracy,” not even “speaking loosely.”

I respectfully disagree, but note that we are discussing definintions here, and not underlying concepts. (Ergo, no biggie).

I’m lucky. Wikipedia’s section on democracy backs me up:

From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy

Democracy is a form of government in which policy is decided by the preference of the majority in a decision-making process, usually elections or referendums, open to all or most citizens. It is now commonly used as a synonym for liberal-democratic systems in nation-states. The meaning of the qualifier ‘liberal’ in this context is not agreed, see below and the main article Liberal democracy. Definitions of democracy have in any case broadened to include aspects of society and political culture in democratic societies, which are not specifically a ‘form of government’.

Emphasis added. Again, you were using “Democracy” in the narrow technical sense, I was describing “liberal-democratic systems in nation-states.”

On Consociation

Arabs sometimes shake their head at the hubris of Americans who seem to believe that American civil society can be constructed over night. I daresay that asking the Iraqis to adopt Dutch political culture is expecting even more. [1]

Unfair. What about the 1943 Lebanon example? From BrainGlutton’s link: “Lebanon’s 1943 National Pact was worked out by Christian and Muslim members of a “Resistance Government” in the Mountain. It was a direct consequence of the arrest by the French (November 10, 1943) of the Maronite President Bishara al-Khuri, the Sunni Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh, and many ministers. By 1946 the last French troops had to leave the country.”

There’s the rub. There’s a great deal of distrust between the 3 Iraqi ethnic groups, and an absence of a common struggle to unite them.

[1] But what do I know? I just learned the term “consociation” 20 minutes ago. Last evening I thought that BG could really use a spellchecker. :smack:

[John_Mace]

@BrainGlutton

From the creation of Iraq after WWI to the present, Iraq has been divided into 18 governorates or provinces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq#Governorates), of roughly equal population, their boundaries bearing no intentional relationship to the predominant local religious or ethnic group. While I haven’t heard any statements to this effect by Sunni leaders, they presumably would want that system preserved, but with democratic governments established for each province.

That seems like one huge presumption. What makes you think it’s true?

Federalism is the only way democracy has even half a chance of working in Iraq. Anything less would lead to out and out civil war as the various ethnic groups chafe under what would be Shiite rule.

And although I said “half a chance” that’s undoubtably overly optimistic. History has shown us that holding together rival factions like we have in Iraq is best done by a strongman. Sometimes you’re lucky and you get a relatively benign strongman and sometimes you’re not so lucky. I fully expect that such a strongman will emerge sometime in the next 10 years if Iraq is to stay one country.

[BrainGlutton]

@John Mace

That seems like one huge presumption. What makes you think it’s true?

Good point. The alternative would be an old-French-style unitary state, with the governor or prefect of each province appointed by the national government. I’ve no reason to suppose the Sunnis want that either. All that’s clear is that they don’t want the three-state form of “federalism” proposed by the Kurds and Shi’ites.

[BrainGlutton]

@Measure for Measure

There’s the rub. There’s a great deal of distrust between the 3 Iraqi ethnic groups, and an absence of a common struggle to unite them.

Better point. The only unifying “common struggle” in Iraq right now is that of the insurgency, in which several parties and factions (religious-radical Shi’ites, socialist-secularist Ba’athists, radical-Islamist volunteers from other countries, and plain old get-the-furriners-out nationalists) with very different agendas are united against the common enemy – the foreign occupiers and the government they are trying to establish. If we pulled out and that government fell – well, I suppose the insurgents would immediately split up and start fighting each other.

[John_Mace]

@BrainGlutton

All that’s clear is that they don’t want the three-state form of “federalism” proposed by the Kurds and Shi’ites.

At some point one has to say “tough shit”. The Sunnis appear to want the status quo ante, which was them lording over the country. They’re being given roughly equal status (by % of population) and they’re bitter. The oil wells are largely outside of their territory, and they’ve been given roughly equal access to the profits. Somehow this isn’t enough. It’s hard to feel sympathetic.

[BrainGlutton]

@John Mace

At some point one has to say “tough shit”. The Sunnis appear to want the status quo ante, which was them lording over the country. They’re being given roughly equal status (by % of population) and they’re bitter. The oil wells are largely outside of their territory, and they’ve been given roughly equal access to the profits. Somehow this isn’t enough. It’s hard to feel sympathetic.

Perhaps it is, but we can’t ignore their POV either. That’s the whole point I’m trying to make in the OP: “Majoritarian” democracy in this particular instance mandates that the majority – Shi’ites and Kurds" – get their way (a three-state federation), and fuck the minority (Sunnis). “Consociational” democracy suggests that sometimes you have to make large concessions to substantial minorities to build a viable state – which is more important than following the “will of the people” defined as an overall numerical majority. If a minority as large as the Sunnis is deeply discontented with the constitutional settlement, there’s going to be trouble, sooner or later, and probably sooner.

[John_Mace]

What specific concessions should the rest of the country make to the Sunni? Fact is, a centralized state would be LESS pallatable to them. They boycotted the elections and now complain that they’re not getting what they want. Problem is, what they want, NO ONE ELSE IN THE COUNTRY wants. They need to learn to bargain instead of taking themslves out of the political process. I haven’t seen any legitimate demand of theirs that ought to be met, in light of what the other groups’ needs are.

[BrainGlutton]

@John Mace

What specific concessions should the rest of the country make to the Sunni? Fact is, a centralized state would be LESS pallatable to them.

Well, what (other than a return to the Sunni-dominated status quo ante bellum, which it should be obvious even to them is completely out of the question) do you think might be palatable to them?

[John_Mace]

@BrainGlutton

Well, what (other than a return to the Sunni-dominated status quo ante bellum, which it should be obvious even to them is completely out of the question) do you think might be palatable to them?

I dunno. I was responding to your point:

“Consociational” democracy suggests that sometimes you have to make large concessions to substantial minorities to build a viable state

I can’t think of any **specific **concessions that are reasonable to make under the circumstances, but I’m open to suggestions. Can you?

[Measure_for_Measure]

@BrainGlutton

Well, what (other than a return to the Sunni-dominated status quo ante bellum, which it should be obvious even to them is completely out of the question) do you think might be palatable to them?

See my link to Fred Kaplin’s analysis at Slate.

---- “Majoritarian” democracy in this particular instance mandates that the majority – Shi’ites and Kurds" – get their way (a three-state federation), and fuck the minority (Sunnis). “Consociational” democracy suggests…

I would maintain that Majoritarianism is a strictly theoretical construct, and that all democratic governments in practice have definite institutions to curb the possibility of mob rule and the like. Nit picking aside though, I agree that a viable solution in Iraq must either be authoritarian or combine Democracy with the consent of all three ethnic groupings.

[BrainGlutton]

@Measure for Measure

See my link to Fred Kaplin’s analysis at Slate.

Interesting . . .

One section of the constitution addresses the resulting inequities by declaring that revenue from oil and gas extraction will be fairly distributed throughout the country, according to need. However, this section—Article 110—refers only to revenue from “current” oil and gas fields, not from the vast untapped wells. Article 110 also notes that, for some period of time, an extra percentage of the money—conforming to a “quota” set by law—should go to “regions that were deprived in an unfair way by the former regime.” Those regions, of course, were the ones with Shiite and Kurdish majorities, which Saddam Hussein treated terribly. In short, the Sunnis see the constitution as a gang-up.

If the Sunnis can be bought off, one way might be to revise Section 110 in a way that ensures equitable distribution of all oil and gas revenue—from current and future fields—and to drop the bonus quota for the Shiite and Kurdish regions.

It may be that the Sunnis can’t be bought off. Many of them reportedly believe that Sunnis make up the majority of Iraq’s population. (Though no official census has been taken for a quarter-century, the common estimate is that Sunnis account for about 20 percent, the same as the Kurds, while Shiites comprise about 60 percent.) Sunnis have been accustomed to running Iraq for so long—they’ve been accustomed, for that matter, to running nearly all the Arab countries—that they cannot conceive of living under the rule of Shiites, whom they have always held in contempt. In other words, many Sunnis may be insisting on a strictly central Iraqi government not just to keep Shiites and Kurds from controlling the country’s resources, but also to ensure what they see as the resumption of “majority” Sunni rule.

!!!

So now we have to placate a group of people whose operating assumptions are completely at odds with reality . . .

Maybe the U.S. should be pushing for a centralized system. The Sunnis would support that – but after the first elections under the new constitution, the Sunnis would run up against the hard fact that they’re not the majority and the Shi’ites are; in fact, the Shi’ites could dominate a national parliament even without support from the Kurds.

But we can’t do that, because the Kurds want a federal system and we can’t piss them off too much. They were on our side during the invasion, and their region of Iraq is the only one not in active rebellion.

sigh

Anybody got any ideas?

[Sam_Stone]

I think you’re making a fundamental mistake by treating the Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites as homogenous voting blocs. They aren’t. If you look at opinion polls in each region, you find a pretty large split in opinion on many issues. A pretty large percentage of Shia, for example, do not support a theocratic state.

I think the closest to a unanimous opinion within a group that you’ll find is that 91% of Kurds support federalism. That suggests to me that Iraq is going to have to be a federal republic of some kind, although the broad outlines of what that has to look like are still not clear.

I’m also not sure why a federal Republic is seen as a bad thing. As long as minority rights are ensured, oil wealth is equitably distributed, and the defense forces are drawn from all regions rather than having militias in each region, I think a federal Iraq could work fine. It works for many other democracies, and in fact it may be what holds many of them together.

[BrainGlutton]

@Sam Stone

As long as minority rights are ensured, oil wealth is equitably distributed, and the defense forces are drawn from all regions rather than having militias in each region, I think a federal Iraq could work fine. It works for many other democracies, and in fact it may be what holds many of them together.

Well, its not a simple choice between a federal system and a unitary system. See the OP (better yet, read Kohr’s book). How a federation is set up, in particular the number, size and relative power of the federation’s subnational units, can affect its political decisionmaking dynamics – and its viability. Look at Czechoslovakia. A federation of only two states drawn along the lines of two cultures with fairly well-defined national identities, it was always a breakup waiting to happen. No matter how loose and accommodating the national government was, and no matter how trivial the differences between Czech and Slovak might appear to the outside observer, it was a foregone conclusion that, as soon as Soviet control was removed, and there was no longer a need for the two republics to join forces against German or Austrian aggression, the Slovaks would want to go their own way. Fortunately, there was no real bad blood between the two and the breakup was peaceful.

Now consider the future of a federal Iraq composed of three highly unequal states divided along ethnoreligious lines (as opposed to a federation of 18 more or less equal provinces). How long would it last? Before long, a substantial minority, maybe even a majority, in the central Sunni state would be clamoring to secede – figuring that, with the rest of the country no longer under their control, what’s in it for them to remain in Iraq? Even the prospect of sharing in the oil revenue might not be enough to deter them. The Shi’ites (Shi’ite state or Shi’ite controlled national government, makes little practical difference) would use military force to keep them in the federation . . . the Iranians would lend the Shi’ite state support (maybe even military support, if the Coalition forces are gone by then) . . . the Kurds would decide that, having their own perfectly nice little state, they need have no dog in this fight and they might as well do what they’ve been hankering to do all along and declare their own independence . . . the Turkish government would feel obliged to put a stop to that, to keep their own Kurdish region from getting similar ideas . . . and after that . . . well, after that, it’s almost impossible to speculate with any clarity. Way too many x-factors at play. But it’s hard to imagine any peaceful resolution. It’s even hard to imagine any violent resolution that doesn’t spill over across Iraq’s borders.

[Measure_for_Measure]

@BrainGlutton

Look at Czechoslovakia. A federation of only two states drawn along the lines of two cultures with fairly well-defined national identities, it was always a breakup waiting to happen. No matter how loose and accommodating the national government was, and no matter how trivial the differences between Czech and Slovak might appear to the outside observer, it was a foregone conclusion that, as soon as Soviet control was removed, and there was no longer a need for the two republics to join forces against German or Austrian aggression, the Slovaks would want to go their own way. Fortunately, there was no real bad blood between the two and the breakup was peaceful.

I disagree with the bolded part. Before the breakup, there was a great deal of support for increased “respect” from the Czechlands, but I don’t think a breakup was inevitable.

My take is that Czech broke away because they didn’t want the distraction of Slovak separatism while they attempted to restructure the economy. Recall that Slovakia had proportionately greater Soviet-style industry, which would have to be shut down.

[Measure_for_Measure]

Sam’s point is a good one. For example, all ethnic groups in the oil-poor middle have an interest in doling out petro-dollars on the basis of population.