[QUOTE=gonzomax]
The surge,adding 20 ,000 troops, is not a complex idea requiring large amounts of analysis. We have had more troops before. It is simply an attempt to buy more time. If Petraeus said it was a mistake he would be gone. If he came out in Sept and said it was showing no progress ,he would be gone.
If you add the so called Iraqi trained troops 100,000 plus. Add in the mercenaries 100,000 plus with our 140,000 troops ,the surge is minuscule. It is just trying to buy time.
[/QUOTE]
The surge is not about more troops. The surge is about a change in strategy, which happens to require more troops. A very significant change in strategy. One that should have happened years ago, but Rumsfeld and Petraeus didn’t agree with each other, and Rumsfeld won. It was the removal of Rumsfeld that opened the door to a new strategy that has already had significant success - not just now, but back when Petraeus was implementing it in his areas of Iraq a few years ago.
Let me explain the difference:
The strategy under Rumsfeld was a search-and-destroy operation plan, in which soldiers would enter an area known to be full of insurgents, attack them, clear them out, and then leave. This was part of Rumsfeld’s ‘faster, agile’ strategy, but it was wholly inappropriate to fighting an insurgency. Here’s what would happen: The U.S. would come in with limited local knowledge, and often get ‘played’ by various factions who would accuse each other of being insurgents. People would be killed, and there would be significant collateral damage. Then the U.S. soldiers would pack up and leave, and the terrorists would come back, and exact vengeance on anyone who helped the coalition. Once the population learned that the U.S. presence would be temporary, they stopped cooperating. Any temporary gains in security would be lost as soon as the Americans withdrew.
This strategy had one advantage - it was easier on the military. You needed fewer soldiers, and they came into areas in force and well protected. It had numerous disadvantages - it made enemies, for one thing. The collateral damage would be left behind without compensation - something that Iraqi culture despises. It did nothing about the underlying causes of the insurgency, and it made the population cynical.
Petraeus’ strategy is completely different. Now, the U.S. moves into an area, and sets up a permanent presence. The soldiers get out of the APCs and live among the population. They attend town meetings. They work with the locals. They eat with their families. Once the terrorists are cleared out, they’re kept out. Once the population realizes that the protection is permanent, they start cooperating. And areas stay peaceful and secure longer, which allows infrastructure projects to be driven to completion and the local economy to come back.
Also, with the soldiers living right in with the local population, they get a much better idea of the security scene. Collateral damage goes down. There was recently a major operation in Diyala involving extensive fighting, and only 11 civilians were killed (a tragic number, but a far cry from the hundreds that might have been killed by Rumsfeld’s tactics). In addition, under Petraeus the Americans are developing a reputation for fairness - whenever there is collateral damage, Petraeus or his commanders call in the local tribal leaders, go over the damage, and arrange compensation on the spot.
The old strategy alienated the population, and made the insurgency worse. The new strategy is all about winning hearts and minds. So far, it is showing reasonable success. The downside is that it requires more soldiers (soldiers have to stay in one area and can’t be reused to fight battles elsewhere). Hence, the surge requirement. It also has the disadvantage of putting the soldiers more at risk - they work within the population, far more exposed. It’s more dangerous to do foot patrols than to blast through an area in a Stryker and head back to base. So casualties are higher. But it’s also the only way there’s even a chance to win.
The surge as a military strategy is paying dividends. Tips from the population are up dramatically. Areas cleared of terrorists are staying cleared. After years of stagnation and reversals, there’s once again progress on the ground.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that it will be all for naught if the political process doesn’t come through with some serious accomodations between factions, and the Iraqi politicians are dragging their feet. The hope is that if the population can be better protected and the economy starts to move forward, there will be more political pressure on the various factions to make a deal and cement the gains. At a time when there were constant retributional attacks between factions, accomodation was impossible.
It’s a long, hard road. It could all fail. In fact, the odds today have to favor a failure. But then, the same could be said for the allies in WWII in 1940. Long odds do not equal failure. The war is not lost. Yet.
Given the extreme consequences of failure (anything up to and including genocide and an entire middle east in flames with millions of casualties), it is pusillanimous to advocate giving up and conceding victory when there is any chance of turning it around.