I can make a start on one of these while we wait for him to come back to the thread.
A ‘fractional orbit’ here refers to the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System that was tested by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. Banned by various treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons in space and by SALT II.
Basically, instead of the highly elliptical partial orbits typical for ICBMs (Minuteman III’s apogee is somewhere around 750 miles high), you actually put the warhead into an orbit. Once there, it orbits for as long as you practically want. When you want to bomb something, do a deorbit burn somewhere early warning satellites aren’t looking, and voila, instant re-entry over the target.
Warning time is a lot less than with the traditional ICBM profile, because until it deorbits, it looks like just another LEO satellite payload. Plus, the orbit can be in a non-typical direction; for example, you can launch the missile initially to the south, send the payload over the South Pole, and thereby have the warhead come from an unexpected direction. The initial link I have up claims that accuracy was much poorer than with a traditional ICBM launch. This is probably true with the warheads of the period. OTOH, design one that can use GPS, or take its own star sightings, then have some form of terminal guidance, and I see that problem going away. Still banned by lots of treaties though, which should be easy to enforce, as the weapons’ natural radioactivity (especially if Tritium is used) is going to give them away to a radiation sensing satellite set up to look for such cheating.
Longer, more detailed explanation of the Soviet FOBS system here.
EDIT: Or, I could have just waited a touch longer. LOL.
FWIW, I don’t think the DEW line, or its North Warning System replacement, had the capability to detect or track ICBMs. Hell on Bears and Backfires though. The long range radar at the NWS, the AN/FPS-117, lists its max detection height and range as 30.5 km high and 470 km away from the radar. BMEWS and especially Pave Paws though, definitely detect whatever’s floating around way up there.
Sea-Based X-Band Radar was supposed to be even better, but my understanding is that it rarely leaves the pier in Hawaii. The Ground Based Radar for the Ground Based Midcourse Defense program was also supposed to carry a lot of the finer tracking and targeting jobs for the U.S.'s missile defense system, but AFAIK, only one prototype was built and it’s still sitting at Kwajalein Atoll.
I still wonder, in the cases of North Korea and Iran, whether a large component of any proposed missile defense system will be utilizing either the AEGIS/SM-3 IIB combo or an F-22 or other launching platform utilizing either AMRAAM or whatever interceptor is going to be built for NCADE: the Air Launched Hit to Kill concept for boost-phase defense? See, e.g., the article The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense in Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 2010. Boost phase interception has a lot to recommend it: the ICBM is moving at its slowest; it’s at its easiest to detect, with a gigantic rocket motor plume spewing out behind it; all of the radioactive debris falls on the bad guys, and not your own country.
Well, yes, a nuclear weapon is like that Daffy Duck magic trick where he swallows the dynamite, gasoline, and a lit match… “it’s a great trick, but I can only do it once”.
Any actual use of a nuclear weapon by anyone other than a superpower would unleash such a shitstorm that it would only happen if the small country thought it would was on the irrevocable track to regime change (marines were half-way to the capital already). A giant F-you as they go down.
The only danger is if the regime used this when threatened by a different or internal problem - “If I’m going down in a coup, I’m taking you guys with me. The USA will kill us all.” We can’t rely on them being so inaccurate they take out Barstow instead of Los Angeles.
While I can understand the value of a space-based command-and-control system, why launch it up-and-down right at the time of attack? Why not just put it on a satellite and leave it up full time-- Nobody objects to a satellite. Is the assumption that by the time it’s needed, the enemy has already EMPed or Kesseled all of the satellites?
We’ve always used a lot of redundant forms of communication for nuclear command and control. Different airborne platforms, various sorts of ground radio. So the rocket radio was intended to be an alternate/emergency/backup among several other methods. There’s always been concern that over-reliance on satellites is dangerous, as weaponized satellites could be lurking about, or perhaps some sort of novel jamming technique developed.
I’m having a hard time finding what preceeded the MILSTAR satellites, though, which currently fulfill that role. Surely we had some satellites up since the 60s designed for command and control, right?
It could be used as either a preemptive counterforce weapon to reduce or eliminate strategic response, or as a delayed attack which could be launched into a ready orbit and then deployed upon command. Note that this capability was developed before the DSP launch warning satellites and over the horizon (OTH) radar was deployed, which largely negates the utility of FOBS weapons.
Boost phase interception is desirable from a surety standpoint; if you can knock out the booster during ascent phase well away from the target zone there is no question as to whether the interceptor actually would have prevented the threat from functioning by simply preventing it from getting to the ballistic trajectory. However, boost phase interception is logistically challenging; the interceptor has to be downrange and relatively near the threat launch position; the system has to be able to discriminate the threat in seconds; and the interceptor needs to be able to catch up to and hit a target laterally instead of in the forward path, which requires higher precision. The now cancelled Kinetic Energy Interceptor was intended to be a ship-based boost phase interceptor until studies determined that in order to be reliable in intercepting missiles from North Korea it would have to be parked in the western part of the Sea of Japan; essentially hugged up to the Korean Peninsula. (That this was about the least of the problem with that system understates the complexity of ballistic missile defense and the problems plaguing systems under development and ostensibly ‘operational’.)
Well, for one there is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which all of the nuclear-capable nations with the exception of the Peoples Republic of China have ratified. We’ve collectively agreed not to militarize orbital space (with a few marginal exceptions such as anti-satellite weapons and certain aspects of the Soviet Almaz program) because of the potential downsides for everyone.
Emplacing nuclear weapons in space has other substantial logistical, control, and technical challenges. Nuclear weapons–and especially weapons using tritium-boosted fission–require periodic maintenance. This is obviously challenging, especially if you want to locate such weapons out of the range of anti-satellite systems. Such weapons, if discovered (or even suspected) would be vulnerable to counterforce attack simply by creating an intercepting debris field. The weapons, being essentially autonomous, could be deployed by anyone who gained authority over the launch control system; there would be no human element to intervene on the launch execution side. And weapons above LEO are potentially only able to be launched a few hours after command, which is contrary to deterrence doctrine that weapons should be capable of being deployed on warning. Numerous studies were performed on basing US weapons in space (and even on the Moon) with the uniform conclusion that the costs and vulnerability were not worth any possible advantage this might provide.
The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) preceded Milstar in the early 'Eighties and operated co-jointly with it through the 'Nineties and early 21st century. Both are being replaced by the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite system. The NAVSAT system was used for navigation since the mid-'Sixties (originally intended to provide navigation fixes for Polaris ballistic missile submarines) but DSCS was the first military satellite communications system in general use.
Right, but I wasn’t asking about a weapon in space, just a communications platform (something that would fulfill the same role as ECRS). I’m almost certain that those aren’t covered by treaty, or if they are, everyone ignores it.
I had wondered what the Soviet Union thought of the Saturn V rocket…if instead of a capsule containing 3 astronauts, the Apollo command and service modules were simply realistic facades jam-packed with MIRVs
A space-based command, control, and integration system is valuable for global operations (hence the current emphasis in a secure system with this capability) but for a strategic system operating within the continental United States (CONUS) it would be susceptible to interference or sabotage compared to a hardline communications system. The ERCS system was considered to just be a backup in case of sabotage or damage to critical communication systems, but was never the primary system for strategic communications.
Going back to the original question, I’d suspect that any rocket with the thrust to put a satellite or manned capsule in Earth orbit has enough thrust to put a nuclear warhead in a ballistic or FOB trajectory. Guidance and readiness is another issue.
There is little in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which prevents militarization of space. Earth orbital space is full of military recon satellites right now.
I would not describe ASAT or ABM weapons as a “marginal exception”. These are clearly major military systems specifically designed for use in space. E.g, Navy Aegis SM-3 weapon system shooting down a satellite (240 of the the SM-3 interceptors have been delivered and are fully operational). US Navy SM 3 Missile Intercept a damaged spy satellite USA - YouTube
There is nothing in the 1967 treaty which prohibits widespread use non-nuclear orbiting space weapons, including orbiting kinetic energy bombardment weapons: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinetic_bombardment
There is also nothing which prohibits detonating nuclear weapons in space. The 1967 treaty only prohibits “stationing” nuclear weapons in space. It does not prohibit nuclear weapons transiting through space, as evidenced by nuclear-tipped ICBMs.
In fact a key element of the initial Strategic Defense Initiative was massive use of nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers, “popped up” into suborbital space to avoid violating the 1967 treaty: Project Excalibur - Wikipedia
Likewise the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would seem to prohibit detonation of nuclear weapons in space. However a closer reading includes the clause “at any place under its jurisdiction or control”: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty - Wikipedia
The Outer Space Treaty states space is like international waters of the open oceans on Earth – not under the jurisdiction or control of any nation. Therefore there’s a good argument that space is not under the jurisdiction or control of any nation, so the 1996 treaty might not apply in that case.